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ABSTRACT 
 
The failure of the trade negotiations at Seattle, and the collapse of the negotiations at Doha 
have bought increased attention to the issue of development, aid, and the implementation of 
special and differential rights in favour of developing countries. This thesis looks to examine 
one aspect of the many issues facing developed and developing countries in the negotiations 
that lie ahead, specifically how international economic law can be used in the application of 
technological processes to help address the Digital Divide.  
 
At present, there is an emphasis on development and the needs of developing countries, and 
that such development needs to be sustainable. Research reviewed in Chapter 2 indicates that 
growing information technology levels leads to growth of GDP. Importantly the use of ICT‘s 
will foster growth in the trade of electronic goods and services (electronic intangibles). By 
making positive attempts to reduce the Digital Divide, DCs and LDCs will be in a better 
position to access the necessary ICTs required to help grow GDP and facilitate sustainable 
development. The thesis sets out various measures to help reduce the digital divide and 
founded in international economic law. Central to the thesis is a new Layering Theory that the 
Author argues will assist operators (both incumbents and Independent Service Providers) in 
the developing world to gain access to international backbone Internet networks at cost price, 
one of the main impediments to reducing the international digital divide. The Layering 
Theory sets out a procedure for accurately identifying the relevant market for providers of 
Next Generation Networks (NGNs) and services so that those operators who abuse their 
dominance by refusing to supply an interconnection service or access to a digital network can 
be compelled to interconnect their networks to those smaller domestic or third country 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) operators who require access. By gaining 
access/interconnection in this way, operators in DCs and LDCs will be in a much better 
position to take advantage of cheaper production costs to export electronic intangibles 
overseas. Also, the thesis sets out recommendations for reform of international 
telecommunications, new provisions on technology transfer to help DCs and LDCs access the 
ICTs needed to address the Digital Divide, including provisions on technology transfer found 
in the increasing take-up of bilateral and regional trade agreements—and if there is to be free 
trade in e-commerce—recommendations for reform of current WTO rules on the 
classification of electronic goods and services.  
 
However, the thesis also argues that the digital divide cannot be addressed without 
strengthening the human capital base in developing and least developed countries, and that 
this cannot happen without such states also giving greater effect to the enforcement of civil 
and political, and economic, social and cultural rights ―at home‖. The thesis asks whether it is 
possible to define a relationship in IEL between civil and political, and economic social and 
cultural rights as a collective for example in the form of the much debated and somewhat 
controversial Right to Development (the ―RTD‖ as defined in this thesis) on the one hand, 
with economic indicators, such Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on the other? And if so, how the RTD can be operationalised.  
 
I declare that this thesis is my own work: 
 
Signed:               Dated: 1
st
 July 2012 
Rohan Kariyawasam
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In ancient history, the Silk Road between the East and the West provided an 
opportunity for the movement of labour and goods, such as silks, spices, ceramics, 
textiles and gems across national borders, particularly between China and Central 
Asia. Today, goods and services can now travel across the same types of territorial 
boundary, but in virtual space over the internet. As the Silk Road provided nations 
who could trade with increased wealth so long as they had access to the roads, the 
infrastructure, and the goods, so today access to the physical infrastructure of modern 
digital networks and the goods that flow over them is just as significant. The internet 
promises to be a new ‗Silk Road‘ as the title to this thesis suggests, but that access to 
the internet is not equal for everyone creating a sense of a ‗Digital Divide‘. This thesis 
is about how International Economic Law can be used to help address the Digital 
Divide between developed and developing countries. We will look more precisely at 
what is meant by the terms ‗Digital Divide‘ and ‗Developing Countries‘ in just a 
moment. But first, we will begin by unpacking the term ‗International Economic 
Law‘. The noted international trade lawyer and legal jurist John H. Jackson once 
defined international economic law as embracing ―trade, investment, services when 
they are involved in transactions that cross national borders, and those subjects that 
involve the establishment on national territory of economic activity of persons or 
firms originating from outside that territory.‖1 He left out competition, although it can 
be argued that competition by its nature would be encompassed indirectly by 
reference to ―economic activity‖. The failure of the trade negotiations at Seattle, and 
the collapse of the negotiations at Doha has bought increased attention to the issue of 
international economic law and development, specifically, the implementation of 
special and differential rights in favour of developing countries. This thesis examines 
one aspect of the many issues facing developed and developing countries in the 
negotiations that lie ahead: how International Economic Law (IEL) can be used as an 
                                                 
1
 Jackson J. The World Trading System MIT Press, 1989, p.21-22, 
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instrument in the application of technological processes to help address the Digital 
Divide. 
 
In Jackson‘s terms, IEL would include a combination of Public International Law as 
well as including all branches of law concerned with international economic issues. 
Subedi has defined IEL as including ―a vast array of topics ranging from public 
international law of trade to private international law of trade to certain aspects of 
international commercial law and the law of finance and investment.‖2 Atik similarly 
speaks of IEL as including monetary law, competition, intellectual property, and 
development law
3
. The American Society of International Law defines IEL as 
encompassing international trade law, international economic integration law, private 
international law, international business regulation (including competition law), 
international financial law (including FDI), law in development, international tax law, 
and international intellectual property law
4
. In his thought provoking book 
Perspectives in International Economic Law, Qureshi poses three questions as critical 
to the understanding of IEL
5
: (i) what interests does IEL serve? (ii) what interests 
drive it?; and (iii) what interests exist in international economic relations? He argues 
―that the questions most focussed upon and often evocative are the ones which centre 
on the interests that drive IEL, and the interests it serves.‖6 This would include the 
decision-making practices of international economic organisations and the influence 
of the role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and developed economy States in 
shaping international economic relations. According to Qureshi, an under explored 
area of IEL would be the international economic interests that exist in international 
economic relations. Exploring this area would be the most ―critical to the complete 
and wholesome development of the international economic order‖.7 This thesis does 
not attempt to do that, the scope of such an undertaking would be well beyond its 
boundaries, but it does seek to address in part the questions that Qureshi poses by 
                                                 
2
 Subedi S.P., Sustainable Development in Perspectives in International Economic Law (ed Asif 
Qureshi), Kluwer Law International, London 2002, p. 262. 
3
 Atik J., ―Introductory Essay: Uncorking International Trade, Filling the Cup of International 
Economic Law‖, 2000 15(6) American University International Law Review 1231-47 at 1232.  
4
 See website of the International Economic Law group at 
http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/inter_econ_law/ielgm.html, date accessed February 2011. 
5
 Qureshi A.,  ―Perspectives in International Economic Law-An Eclectic approach to International 
Economic Engagement‖ in Perspectives in International Economic Law (ed Asif Qureshi), Kluwer 
Law International, London 2002, p. 11 
6
 Ibid, p. 19. 
7
 Ibid. 
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looking specifically at how International Economic Law can help address the Digital 
Divide. What is meant by the term Digital Divide? 
 
Research reviewed in Chapter 2 reveals that there are several definitions given for this 
term. First, a divide can exist between people intra state (the so-called ‗domestic‘ 
divide as between rich and poor, young and old, able and less able) as well as inter 
states (the ‗international‘ divide). The subject matter of this thesis is concerned with 
the international digital divide as exists between developed and developing nations. 
The available research shows that the international digital divide is linked to several 
factors including access to communications infrastructure and Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) equipment, policies on innovation, competition, 
and the transfer of technology, access to education and improved literacy (human 
capital base), and the trade in electronic intangibles. Chapter 2 reviews the available 
research linking these specific sectors with the Digital Divide, and further reviews 
several definitions of the Digital Divide by scholars available in the public domain. In 
the concluding part to Chapter 2, the author draws these references together to suggest 
a new definition for the international digital divide which will be used throughout this 
thesis:  
 
A failure—between those users in countries who have access to 
communications infrastructure, services and tools to aid literacy and 
information literacy, and those who do not—to access the minimum available 
capacity of communication technologies and information within a structural 
context of successive innovation, competition and trade.
8
 
 
This definition is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. From the discussion of the 
definition there, four sectors emerge that are instrumental in shaping the Digital 
Divide: 
 
1. Competitive access and interconnection to communications and information 
technology networks (converging now to become Next Generation Networks- 
NGNs). NGNs can be defined as broadband networks that are layered in their 
structure and provide access to a range of converged services whether voice, 
                                                 
8
 The term ‗Users‘ can in turn be defined widely as end-users, consumers, SMEs, bodies with legal 
personality etc. 
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data, or video using one single transmission standard known as the Internet 
Protocol (IP). At present, current legacy networks use a variety of protocols 
for transmission of voice and data. NGNs are further discussed in Chapter 2; 
2. The transfer of technology;  
3. The trade in electronic intangibles; and 
4. The human capital base.  
 
Given these sectors, the basis of the arguments that will underlie this thesis include: 
 
a. That non-discriminatory, transparent and cost-oriented access and 
interconnection to the NGNs of International Backbone Operator Networks 
(IBPs) by DCs/LDC Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is impeded because of 
the lack of an effective international regulatory framework for interconnection 
and access to internet networks. Current WTO rules on interconnection do not 
adequately cover internet (NGN) networks;  
b. That current rules under the WTO‘s TRIPS agreement on technology transfer 
(specifically Article 66.2 TRIPS) have failed to deliver on promises of 
technology transfer by developed to developing nations;  
c. The current WTO rules on classification of electronic intangibles are confused 
and do not benefit DCs/LDCs; and  
d. That DCs/LDCs need to strengthen their human capital base. To do so will 
require enforcing civil and political rights and social, cultural and economic 
rights, and all rights collectively under a ‗Right To Development‘, and that 
this RTD needs to be operationalized.   
 
What is meant by the term ‘Developing Country’? The WTO covered agreements do 
not include a specific definition of a Developing Country (although a ―small nation‖ 
is defined), but many of the agreements, particularly the GATS, GATT, and TRIPS 
do make specific reference to the term in relation to Special and Differential rights 
(rights that apply specifically to benefit Developing Countries). Chapter 2 shows that 
the World Bank by contrast classifies DCs into four basic groups based on their level 
of per capita income: Low Income Economies; Lower Middle Income Economies; 
Middle Income Economies; and High Income Economies. The World Bank also refers 
to the Upper Middle Income Economies as ―newly industrialized‖ economies. This 
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will be discussed further below. There is no international consensus for the term 
―Developing Country‖ and the United States and European Communities have 
differing definitions referred to in various statutes and often tied to General System of 
Preferences (GSP) regimes that certain developed countries apply. Rather, countries 
use the term ―developing country‖ on the basis of self-selection.9 Basheer and Primii 
for example argue of self-selection: 
 
The self-selection of countries may not represent their true status, as such 
selection could be a politically strategic choice. The WTO grants transitional 
windows to developing countries that wish to take more time to comply with 
WTO obligations. To date, all WTO member states with the exception of the 
United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand have at 
one time or another classified themselves as developing countries for the 
purposes of the WTO.
10
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the World Bank considers countries with low or middle-income 
levels as ―developing‖.  In a recent classification, economies are grouped by using the 
2009 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita figures. Economies are divided 
according to 2009 GNI per capita as: low income, $995 or less; lower middle income, 
$996 - $3,945; upper middle income, $3,946 - $12,195; and high income, $12,196 or 
more.
11
 The World Bank states that: ―Low-income and middle-income economies are 
sometimes referred to as developing economies. The use of the term is convenient; it 
is not intended to imply that all economies in the group are experiencing similar 
development or that other economies have reached a preferred or final stage of 
development.‖ By using these measurements, countries with GNI per capita below 
US$12, 195 are classified as ‗developing‘.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Keck, Alexander and Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the 
WTO: why, when and how? WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-03, Geneva: 
WTO, May 2004. 
10
 Basheer S. and Primi A., The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring in the ―Technologically 
Proficient.‖ Developing Countries, in Jeremy De Beer, Implementing the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s Development Agenda (Wifrid Laurier Press, 2009), p.4. 
11
 See World Bank classification at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, accessed 
February 2011.  
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Basheer and Primii argue that developing countries should be distinguished between 
those that are ‗technologically proficient‘ and those that are not. They measure 
technological proficiency according to an index comparing (1) the share of medium- 
or high-technology products in total manufacturing value added, following the 
UNIDO classification, and (2) R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP along 
horizontal and vertical axis. According to Basheer and Primii‘s ‗technological 
proficiency‘ indices, the following countries can be classed as ‗technologically 
proficient‘ developing countries: Russia, Taiwan, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Ukraine, Malaysia, Belarus, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Chile, and Indonesia.
12
 The 
greater majority of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would fall outside of this 
classification.  
 
The UN Conference on Trade and Development has created a specific list for LDCs.
13
 
At the time of the 2003 review of the list, the following three criteria were used by the 
UN to classify a country as an LDC: low income, in the light of a three-year average 
estimate of the gross national income per capita (under $750 for cases of addition to 
the list, above $900 for cases of graduation); weak human assets (measured through a 
composite Human Assets Index); and economic vulnerability (measured through a 
composite Economic Vulnerability Index).
14
 By contrast, Horn and Mavroidis have 
created a list of developing countries selecting those countries as developing, which 
are both not members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and not in the group of LDCs (UN classification).
15
  
 
The distinction between DCs and LDCs is important as the WTO has within its 
covered agreements established separate Special & Differential (S&D) rights for both 
DCs and LDCs, where LDCs are able to take advantage of a broader selection of 
S&Ds than are otherwise available to DCs as a whole.  A S&D can provide a country 
with a range of benefits including lower export duties, a greater range of access to 
preferential tariffs, exceptions to imposition of TRIPS obligations etc. The full list of 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, p.5. 
13
 UN Conference on Trade and Development. 2002. UN recognition of the Least Developed Countries. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3618&lang=1, accessed February 2011.  
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Horn, H., and Mavroidis P.C, Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing 
Country Interests. Stockholm University, 1999. 
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S&Ds open to LDCs is set out in Annex III to the UN‘s Handbook on the Least 
Developed Country Category.
16
 The discussion of S&Ds is further covered in 
Chapters 7 (developing countries) and 8 (technology transfer).   
 
The Committee for Development Policy (CDP and part of the UN‘s Development 
Policy and Analysis Division, the main research development division of the UN 
Secretariat
17
), has made clear recently the criteria to be used for classifying a country 
as a LDC. In the CDP‘s update of September 201118, the CDP builds on the initial UN 
criteria established in 1971 as requiring a low capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
and structural impediments to growth for inclusion as a LDC. At its plenary session in 
2011, however, the CDP now defines LDCs as ‗low-income countries suffering from 
the most severe structural impediments to sustainable development.‘19 The emphasis 
on ‗sustainable development‘ is to encompass broader concerns of economic, social, 
and environmental development rather than a focus simply on the ability to 
manufacture or not (as indicated by the earlier criteria emphasising GDP for 
example). With the more recent emphasis on sustainable development, the criteria for 
definition now include Gross National Income (GNI). The CDP uses three specific 
criteria that need to be satisfied: (a) Gross National Income per capita; (b) Human 
Assets Index (HAI), and (c) Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI).  For the GNI 
criterion, the threshold for inclusion is based on a three-year average of the level of 
GNI per capita, which the World Bank defines for indentifying low-income countries 
(discussed above). The HAI criterion is an indicator for the level of development of 
human capital within the relevant country. The HAI consists of a simple average of 
four sub-indicators (two for health and nutrition and two for education).  According to 
the CDP, the HAI threshold for inclusion is ‗determined by the index number 
corresponding to the third quartile in the distribution of HAI results for the reference 
group of all least developed and other developing countries under review‘.20 The EVI 
criterion by contrast incorporates eight indicators, which are grouped into two broad 
                                                 
16
 Available at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_ldcs_handbook.shtml, 
accessed April 2011.  
17
 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/index.shtml, accessed April 2012.  
18
 LDC Information: The criteria for identifying Least Developed Countries at: 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_criteria.shtml, accessed April 2012.  
19
 Supra 16, p.1 
20
 Supra 16, p.1. Therefore if the reference group consists of 60 countries, there will be 45 countries 
whose HAI score are below the threshold and meet the HAI inclusion criterion.  
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categories (an exposure index and a shock index). Both these categories provide an 
indication of the risk of exposure of the country to external shocks that impact on a 
country‘s development. The EVI categories are not meant to indicate vulnerabilities 
that result from economic decisions made by the country in the past. Furthermore, the 
recently amended EVI (2011) now incorporates further criteria meant to reflect 
populations living in elevated coastal zones and victims of natural disasters due to 
climate change. According to the CDP, the EVI threshold for inclusion is the ‗value of 
the index at the first quartile of the values of the reference group‘.21 Furthermore, the 
CDP has introduced a new criterion in addition to GNI, HAI and EVI, such that a 
country cannot be classed as a LDC if it has a population in excess of 75 million.
22
  
 
The economist Hans Gosling has also produced fascinating graphics that seek to 
illustrate both the diversity of DCs and LDCs within Africa, for example that Cape 
Verde as an African country has a life expectancy at least 22 times greater than 
Swaziland, and that the income per person in South Africa (USD$9, 284) is almost 25 
times greater than that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (USD$374)
23. Gosling‘s 
argument in general is that the distinction between developed and developing 
countries are itself fast blurring, and that the continent of Africa contains within it a 
diverse range of countries. Gosling‘s statistics point however to the fact that many of 
the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa show the lowest indices for life expectancy and 
income per person.  
 
This thesis therefore will use the World Bank’s definition of a developing country as a 
country with a GNI per capita as below US$12, 195. Recent available statistics on 
GNI from Nationmaster (2011) reveals that both China at circa US$865 and India at 
                                                 
21
 Therefore if the reference group consists of 60 countries, there will be 45 countries whose EVI score 
are above the threshold and meet the EVI inclusion criterion.  
22
 The country can continue to enjoy LDC status (and not ‗graduate‘ from outside the LDC category) if 
at the time of evaluation, the population is at 75 million, but grows in excess of this figure over time. 
The CDP have established a set of graduation rules or thresholds where for example the country in 
concern ceases to meet two of the criteria listed above (with the exception of where GNI per capita is at 
least twice the graduation threshold levels). Graduation refers to the process of the country under 
review moving out of the LDC country as its economic and sustainable development criteria improve 
with time. The UN (CDP) have established specific rules for graduation which have been refined over 
time, but the latest set of rules are set out in the UN‘s Handbook on the Least Developed Country 
Category at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_ldcs_handbook.shtml, accessed 
April 2012.   
23
 http://www.gapminder.org/, accessed May 2012. 
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US$441 will qualify as ‗DCs‘ under this definition. 24 Singapore by contrast would 
not fall within this definition. In addition, the thesis will use the definition of LDCs as 
given by the UN‘s CDP described above. In this respect, many of the sub-Saharan 
countries of Africa would be included in the UN‘s definition of LDCs.25  
 
Does a Digital Divide exist? As mentioned above, Chapter 2 reviews research to show 
that it does, but that the divide is closing. A lack of modern telecommunications and 
internet infrastructure is one reason for its existence, particularly in Africa. For 
example, UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2008 reports that, ―..in Africa, total 
TNC investment commitments in infrastructure during the decade spanning 1996–
2006 were $45 billion – an amount (even if fully realized) that is barely equivalent to 
the region‘s current annual infrastructure investment needs of $40 billion‖26. 
Infrastructure in this context includes water and sewerage, electricity, transport, 
seaports as well as telecommunications. But the problem is not just a lack of 
infrastructure. Also, the existence of the digital divide concerns a lack of effective 
competition in the access to communications networks and services for end-users 
even with the infrastructure in place. Chapter 3 (international telecommunications) 
demonstrates that this problem with interconnection/access arises due to the inequality 
in bargaining positions between developed country operators (whether 
telecommunication or backbone internet operators--IBPs) and DC/LDC Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) operators, but that also within developing countries, the 
problem of a domestic divide exists because of an inequality between large incumbent 
monopoly operators who dominate data and voice infrastructures and smaller 
independent ISPs (Chapter 4). The divide is exacerbated because of the high costs for 
end-users in DCs/LDCs in gaining access to domestic and international networks and 
the lack of a an international regulatory regime covering access and interconnection 
for internet (NGN) networks. Further, Chapter 2 shows that a digital divide exists 
because of the lack of opportunity and training of a DC/LDC‘s human capital base, 
and that to enhance the human capital base, states need to invest and enforce both 
economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights.  
                                                 
24
 See GNI figures by countries at: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gro_nat_inc_percap-gross-
national-income-per-capita, accessed February 2011.   
25
 A full list of LDCs can be seen at: 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf, accessed April 2012. 
26
 World Investment Report 2008, UNCTAD, p.17. 
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This thesis attempts to address the following questions: 
 
(i) Can IEL be used to help address the Digital Divide between developed 
and developing nation states? 
(ii) Can IEL be used to accelerate the process of development in 
developing and least developed countries through technological 
processes (viz., telecommunications and technology transfer)? and; 
(iii) Is it possible to define a relationship in IEL between civil and political, 
and economic social and cultural rights as a collective for example in 
the form of the much debated and somewhat controversial Right to 
Development (the ―RTD‖ as defined in this thesis) on the one hand, 
with economic indicators, such Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the other? If so, how can the RTD 
be ‘operationalised’? 
 
1.2  Methodology and Overview Structure  
 
The methodology is based on desk research drawing mainly from WTO treaty law 
and jurisprudence. The methodology starts with a review based on doctrinal analysis 
of available scholarship on the digital divide (Chapter 2), which further to the 
definition of the digital divide set out in section 1.1 above highlights the following 
sectors as relevant: 
 
 Competitive access and interconnection to communications and information 
technology networks (NGNs); 
 The transfer of technology;  
 The trade in electronic intangibles; and 
 The human capital base.  
 
The methodology then seeks to review the current regulation of these sectors (see 
below) identifying weaknesses and proposing potential solutions to address 
weaknesses. A comparative review of the EC‘s New Regulatory Framework for 
electronic networks and services with the WTO‘s regulatory Reference Paper is 
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completed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 11, the thesis includes a case study approach of 
amendments to the UK‘s Financial Services Act 2002 to introduce a tax credit to 
incentivise multinationals to transfer technology to producers in DCs and LDCs as a 
means of operationalising the RTD. The UK is chosen for review given the advanced 
status of its tax regime and established history of providing development aid to DCs 
and LDCS through an existing institutional framework represented by the Department 
for International Development (DFID). The Author argues in Chapter 11 that with 
such a tax credit mechanism established, the mechanism could be enforced as part of 
the UK‘s reporting obligations under the UN‘s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and 
could provide the basis for other developed countries, particularly the Quad countries 
of the United States, the European Communities, Japan and Canada to follow suit.  
 
1.2.1 How are the sectors currently regulated?  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the rise of international backbone digital networks and the move 
to NGNs. The chapter illustrates how NGNs are layered in their physical structure and 
the corresponding problems for regulators in regulating such networks. Following a 
period of pubic consultation on concerns with access to NGNs, the European 
Commission issued a new Recommendation on Regulated Access to Next Generation 
Access Networks in 2010,
27
 which sets out requirements for increased transparency 
and access obligations to SMP operators of NGN networks, and requirements to share 
collocation and duct capacity for fibre optic networks. The recommendation is 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses how international telecommunications is currently regulated, 
particularly under rules of the WTO, specifically the regulatory Reference Paper to 
the Fourth Protocol, but that NGNs as internet networks currently fall outside this 
regulatory structure leaving a regulatory vacuum for rules on internet interconnection 
and access to NGNs.  
 
Chapter 4 goes deeper, looking specifically at internet interconnection, the nature of 
peering and transit agreements and how larger backbone providers (IBPs) can abuse 
                                                 
27
 Commission recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 
2010/572/EU, 20
th
 September 2010. 
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their positions of dominance. Chapter 4 is significant in that it attempts to illustrate 
the difficulties associated with internet interconnection, a matter of private contract 
often governed by non-disclosure agreements, and outside the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the WTO. Although Chapter 4 makes some reference to an older 2001 DFID 
report, drawing on a review of IBP contracts based on the author‘s own experience in 
private practice negotiating such agreements on behalf of IBPs with ISPs and vice-
versa, much of Chapter 4 contains new material. The problems on interconnection and 
access identified in Chapter 4 (and highlighted below) remains prevalent as evidenced 
by several sources cited by the author covering reviews of the sector over the 
intervening years from the DFID report. This includes research by Marcus and 
Elixmann (2008)
28
, Lie (2007)
29
, the Internet Governance Forum (2007)
30
, and 
Roseman (2003)
31
. Also, market power concerns with IBPs have been investigated in 
competition investigations, such as MCI/WorldCom/Sprint
32
, Bell Atlantic/GTE
33
, and 
AT&T/TCI
34
, and more recently in wholesale and retail internet services in allegations 
of margin squeezing in Wanadoo Espana v. Telefonica
 35
, and Deutsche Telekom v. 
European Commission36 where in October 2010 the European Court of Justice upheld 
a finding against Deutsche Telekom for margin squeezing.
37
  
 
Chapter 4 makes clear that IBPs do not necessarily prevent access and 
interconnection. In fact, IBPs will want to interconnect with other large ISPs in order 
to expand their network coverage. IBPs interconnect by means of peering and transit 
agreements. Peering and transit are terms that are more fully defined in Chapter 4: 
                                                 
28
 Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, Economic and Public Policy 
Aspects, a study for the European Commission, January 2008 
29
 Lie E., International Internet Interconnection, Next Generation Networks and Development, Global 
Symposium for Regulators, Dubai, 2007, discussion paper available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR07/discussion_papers/Eric_lie_international_interconnection.pdf, 
accessed February 2011. 
30
 Internet Governance Forum 2007: Best Practice Session Report, IXP Exchanges at: 
http://www.isoc.org/educpillar/resources/docs/igf-ixp-report-2007.pdf, accessed February 2011. 
31
 Roseman D., The Digital Divide and the competitive behaviour of internet backbone providers-a way 
forward, 2003. 
32
 Case No COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom / Sprint, June 2000. 
33
 Case No. 1:99CV01119, US Department of Justice, May 1999. 
34
 Case No. 1: 98CV03170, Columbia District Court, 1998. See also EC Case No IV/M.1252-
AT&T/TCI, December 1998.  
35
 COMP/38.784, July 2007. A summary of the Commission Decision was published in OJC 83/6 of 
2.04.2008. 
36
 Case 271/03. OJC 128 of 24.05.2008.  
37
 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, Case C-280/08 P, EU Press Release 104/10 at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-10/cp100104en.pdf, accessed February 
2011. 
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‗peering‘ refers to the exchange of internet traffic on a settlement free basis between 
operators, whilst ‗transit‘ refers to the payment by one operator to another for its 
traffic to be transported across the payee‘s network. Chapter 4 makes clear that IBPs 
can degrade the quality of interconnection and also refuse to peer on a settlement free 
basis with smaller ISPs so as to migrate smaller ISPs to transit contracts where ISPs 
will need to pay tariffs that are not transparent or cost-oriented for transit services. 
This raises the costs to end-users and exacerbates the digital divide.  
 
Also, Chapter 4 stresses that another impediment to developing country ISPs is 
gaining access to the incumbent telecommunication operator‘s network in their own 
country. State incumbents with internet subsidiaries have incentives to raise the price 
of interconnection to other ISPs. Again, this raises the prices for end-users. Also 
Chapter 4 discusses various forms of anticompetitive practice that can arise where an 
IBP can leverage its dominance from primary to secondary downstream markets and 
can margin squeeze. Bundling is also discussed, although the chapter notes that pro 
competitive and aggressive bundling can also be of benefit to consumers. For 
example, when competition takes the form of bundle v. bundle, bundling will only be 
abusive if the price of the entire bundle is predatory.
38
 This together with the pro 
competitive aspects of price discrimination are discussed further in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.4.1 (Settlements)). 
 
Chapter 5 reviews the framework for European Community rules on electronic 
networks and services (‗new regulatory framework‘). Chapter 6 suggests how the 
current EC‘s new regulatory framework for defining a relevant product market in 
internet markets is flawed (Chapter 6.3.3). For example, the judgment of the CFI in 
Microsoft
39
 has been much criticized by various scholars on focusing too much on the 
structural issues of competition as opposed to whether actual harm had been caused to 
consumers
40
. And in a different case involving Sun Microsystems and Microsoft, 
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 Papandropolous P., Tying and Bundling, Competition Law Insight, June 2006, p.4 
39
 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (CFI). 
40
 See for example: A. Witt, 'The Commission's guidance paper on abusive exclusionary conduct - 
more radical than it appears?' E.L. Rev. 2010, 35(2), 214-235; B. Vesterdorf, 'Article 82 EC: Where do 
we stand after the Microsoft judgement?' Global Antitrust Review (2008); H. Schmidt, 'Article 82: is 
technological integration checkmated?' J.B.L. 2009, 4; J. Robinson, 'The Microsoft Browser case: why 
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'The Microsoft decision: a setback to IP rights in Europe?' J.I.P.L.P. 2010, 5(4), 245-259; A. Toth, 
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where Sun sued Microsoft in an attempt to prevent the capturing of the open standard 
of Java, and turning it into a closed standard, Sun failed to establish any antitrust 
claim because the Court of Appeals in applying standard competition analysis found 
that there could be no market distortion in the absence of a strict market definition, as 
a prerequisite to identifying any market distortion is a clear definition of the relevant 
market.
 41
  Also Section 6.3.3 identifies specific issues of temporal distortions, 
Schumpeterian competition (rise and fall of dominance in rapidly innovating 
markets), and high levels of product differentiation, which makes the EC‘s current test 
of market definition in NGN markets particularly problematic. 
 
Chapter 6 suggests how current rules on electronic networks and services can be used 
to develop the basis for a new Layering Theory to deal with market definition for 
internet (NGN) cases and the potential for abuse of dominant positions by IBPs on 
both domestic EU and international backbone networks. Chapter 6 then goes on to 
describe how the Layering Theory can be incorporated into the WTO‘s regulatory 
Reference Paper (RP), amending the RP with the inclusion of extra clauses and the 
four layers as set out in Figure 1 (Chapter 6) so that it becomes relevant to the 
interconnection and access of internet (packet-switched) (NGN) networks. As 
mentioned above, the RP only applies currently to voice (circuit-switched) networks. 
A reworked version of the full RP incorporating the Layering Theory and Figure 1 
layers is set out in Annex 1 to the thesis.  
 
Chapter 7 then applies this Layering Theory to DC and LDCs both in addressing 
access and interconnection to the IBP international backbone networks, and also 
within domestic DC/LDC environments in gaining access to the digital networks of 
DC/LDC national incumbent telecommunication operators. The relevance of the 
Layering Theory is in restricting the abuse of dominance by DC/LDC state 
incumbents. Although the Layering Theory can grant more transparent and non-
discriminatory access by DC/LDC operators to developed country NGN networks 
(thus allowing for cheaper distribution and export of electronic intangible products 
                                                                                                                                            
'Protection of investments in European abuse of dominance cases' E.C.L.R. 2008, 29(12), 710-716; A. 
Andreangeli, 'Interoperability as an "essential facility" in the Microsoft case - encouraging competition 
or stifling innovation?' E.L. Rev. 2009, 34(4), 584-611. 
41
 Elkin-Koren N., and Salzberger M. E., Law, Economics and Cyberspace: The effects of Cyberspace 
on the Economic Analysis of Law, Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 44 (citing the case of Sun Microsystems Inc, 
333 F. 3d 517, p.532.) 
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sourced and exported from DC/LDC markets where they are cheaper to 
manufacture—and subject to adequate technology transfer provisions, discussed 
below), the real power of the Layering Theory is in guaranteeing access by smaller 
ISPs to the state incumbent‘s NGN network in DC/LDCs. This is not just an issue of 
domestic law, but also of international economic law. 
 
The reason for this is that access by DC/LDC ISPs to IBPs requires both domestic 
interconnection (regulated by domestic law) with the incumbent network and cross 
border interconnection (regulated by IEL) with the IBP‘s network by way of the 
domestic incumbent international gateway network. DC/LDC ISPs need non-
discriminatory access on cost-oriented rates to such networks. A failure to 
interconnect in this way will lead to higher prices being passed down to consumers, 
thus exacerbating the digital divide. For circuit-switched (voice) networks, this 
problem of cost-orientation was very well demonstrated in the WTO‘s Mexico-Telmex 
case discussed in Chapter 3. This thesis argues that the problem is even more acute 
with internet networks as there is no regulatory framework within the WTO to 
regulate interconnection on internet networks.  Chapter 7 also makes the distinction 
between greater access to international backbone networks controlled by companies 
based in developed country markets, but also better access by smaller ISPs to the 
domestic incumbent networks of DCs/LDCS. As the discussion earlier in this 
introduction noted, there is a further distinction to be made between the competitive 
environments in DCs to that of LDCs.  As chapter 7 makes clear, telecommunication 
markets in LDCs tend to be controlled by the dominant incumbent operator with a 
majority shareholding of the incumbent itself being held by the LDC‘s respective 
government. LDC markets therefore need a higher level of ex-ante or sector specific 
regulation as opposed to ex-post or market competition regulation. For example, 
telecommunication markets in India, a pro competitive DC are quite different to the 
markets of a number of sub-Saharan African LDCs, such as Sudan, Ethiopia or Mali. 
And within the grouping of Sub-Saharan African countries there are also great 
differences in terms of telecommunications development with South Africa, Ghana 
and Nigeria demonstrating with greater telephone line density rates than Republic of 
Congo, Malawi, and Angola for example. As mentioned, Chapter 2 looks at digital 
divide issues in general. 
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Chapter 7 makes reference to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). 
The WSIS was a two-phase United Nations (UN) summit to create a multi-
stakeholder platform at national, regional and international levels. The first phase took 
place in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003 and the second phase took place in 
Tunis, from 16 to 18 November 2005. The main aim of the first phase was to develop 
a clear statement of political will for a global Information Society. This led to the 
agreement of the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Geneva Plan of Action that 
were adopted on 12th December 2003.
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The aim of the second phase was to implement the Geneva Plan of Action and find 
solutions and reach agreements in the fields of Internet governance, financing 
mechanisms, and follow-up and implementation of the Geneva and Tunis documents. 
This led to the Tunis Commitment and Tunis Agenda for the Information Society both 
of which were adopted on 18 November 2005.
43
 
 
In the build up to the November 2005 WSIS (2
nd
 Tunis meeting), there was heated 
discussion on how the governance of the Internet should be managed. The main issue 
for many DCs/LDCs (particularly China and India, and countries within the G90, but 
also some developed countries) was the continuing dominance of the US in the global 
management of the Internet. To address these issues, four models for future 
governance were proposed by the WSIS Working Group on Internet Governance to 
stakeholders in July 2005. The WSIS, however, was not able to achieve consensus on 
future internet governance other than the creation of the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF), which is mainly a discussion stakeholder forum of governments, civil society, 
business and academic community without technical decision making capability.  In 
December 2010, the life of the IGF by resolution of the UN General Assembly was 
extended for a further period of five years (2011-2015).  
 
Since WSIS 2005, a cluster of WSIS-related events has been held on an annual basis. 
In 2009, the cluster of WSIS-related events was rebranded as the WSIS Forum with 
the latest 2012 Forum to be hosed by the ITU in Geneva, where issues of internet 
                                                 
42
 http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161%7C1160, accessed April 2012.  
43
 http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266%7C2267, accessed April 2012. 
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governance and security will be discussed. Further details of the WSIS are discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 8 looks at the regulation of technology transfer under the TRIPS Agreement, 
specifically Article 7, 8, 31, and 66.2 TRIPS. The chapter looks at the special and 
differential rights (rights that favour developing countries) under TRIPS and the 
current failings of the system to guarantee and enforce such rights. Also, the chapter 
addresses the problems faced by DCs/LDCs in negotiating free trade and bilateral 
trade agreements with the Quad Countries (United States, Canada, European 
Community and Japan), particularly as regards intellectual property rights. The 
chapter illustrates the higher standards required by the Quad on IPR negotiations with 
DCs/LDCs (so called TRIPS-Plus provisions). 
 
Chapter 9 looks at WTO rules on the classification of electronic intangibles and the 
tensions over a GATS (services) based classification for electronic intangibles as 
opposed to a GATT (goods) based classification. The chapter indicates that GATS is 
the preferred regulatory regime for those states (net importers of IP) who wish to 
discriminate on imports on the basis of cultural content as opposed to those who 
favour a GATT based regime (net exporters of IP) with rules on tariff reductions and 
rules of origin.  
 
Chapter 10‘s focus is on the Right To Development (RTD). The chapter looks at the 
RTD as a composite of rights and how several international human rights instruments 
currently regulate the RTD. Chapter 10 argues that in order to enhance the human 
capital base to address the digital divide, both civil and political, and economic, social 
and cultural rights need to be enhanced as a collective form of the RTD. Chapter 
10.10 introduces the concept of a RTD Tax relief based on a set of legal Terms and 
economic Measures to be determined by the WTO‘s Working Group on Technology 
Transfer (WGTT). The aim of the RTD Tax Relief is to provide an economic 
incentive to MNCs (or TNCs) in the developed world to transfer beneficial 
technology services to DCs/LDCs. Chapter 11 then looks at how the RTD Tax Relief 
could be operationalised at a country-specific level, taking the example of the UK, 
and through the mechanism of the UN‘s Universal Periodic Review (Chapter 11.4). 
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1.2.2 Specific Problems identified 
 
This section provides an overview of specific problems identified by the thesis 
(numbered 1-6 below) in the current regulation of sectors relevant to the digital divide 
and specific solutions to these problems (a-e). In reviewing the relevant law in 
Chapters 3 and 4 the thesis identifies the first four problems in IEL in the 
telecommunications and internet sectors that need to be solved if the Digital Divide is 
to be addressed:  
 
(1) A lack of awareness as to how the ‗international rules of the game‘ 
regulating international telecommunications can be used to assist 
DCs and LDCs to gain better terms for access and interconnection 
for both conventional voice and data circuits (Chapter 3); and 
(2) The inadequacy of WTO law to regulate IBPs who are fast 
upgrading their networks to NGNs and who enjoy market power 
and control of access through peering and transit worldwide to 
international Internet Exchanges (IXPs) to which DC and LDC 
operators seek access. The present WTO Regulatory Reference 
Paper does not adequately cover internet interconnection (Chapters 
3 and 4); 
(3) The incentives for IBPs to migrate smaller ISPs from settlement 
free peering agreements to paid transit contracts often governed by 
non-disclosure agreements and where terms are not negotiated on a 
transparent, non-discriminatory and cost-oriented basis (Chapter 4); 
and 
(4) The lack of IXPs in DCs and LDCs, particularly in Africa, that 
helps sustain the monopoly grip of large local incumbent 
telecommunication operators in the developing world (Chapters 3 
and 6). 
 
A further problem is the presence of a high concentration of IXPs located in 
developed countries, which require DC/LDC ISPs to transit their traffic to such 
exchanges (thus paying for the transport of large volumes of data).  
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To address these problems, the author recommends: 
 
(a) Incorporating a new Layering Theory to enhance effective 
competition in international backbone networks (and all the layers 
in NGN networks) in local laws at the national level that can be 
enforced by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)/National 
Competition Authorities (NCCs) in developed countries; at the 
regional level by powerful trade blocks and pan-regional regulators, 
such as the European Commission; and at the multilateral level by 
the WTO for the regulation of advanced cross-border 
communications networks (Chapters 4-6); 
(b) Applying the international rules of telecommunications in reverse 
to gain better terms by DCs and LDCs for access and 
interconnection to international voice and data circuits (Chapter 7); 
and 
(c) Incorporating the Layering Theory into domestic laws of DCs and 
LDCs and enforcing it at regional IXP exchanges in the developing 
world, particularly in Africa (Chapter 7). 
 
The author does not discuss the US regulatory system in the context of the Layering 
Theory. The author makes clear in Chapter 5 that the reason for this is that the US 
system is built on a silo approach, which is inflexible as compared with the EC‘s 
framework. The author argues that many DCs/LDCs--with the failure of the US 
system of regulation to deal with new advanced internet services--should look to the 
European framework as a future model for regulation of NGNs. More advanced DCs, 
such as China, India and South Africa are already in a position to immediately 
implement the Layering Theory. Already China and India are following EU policy on 
defining dominance (see below).  
 
The Layering Theory sets out a new interpretation of the test of dominance 
(Significant Market Power-SMP) within EC competition law, modifying the test as 
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established in the case of United Brands
44
. The theory aims to provide regulators with 
a tool to accurately define a relevant market, which as mentioned above for the 
electronic networks and services sector has proven difficult as evidenced by recent 
cases, such as Microsoft
45
. Chapter 6 makes clear that the implementation of the 
theory requires the installation of deep packet inspection (DPI) devices at internet 
exchanges which can measure the individual Component Parts that constitute an 
electronic service. Chapter 6 (6.3.3) defines a Component Part as ―a part of an 
Electronic Communications Service defined as either hardware or software and which 
falls into one of the Layers as defined in Figure 1. An Electronic Communications 
Service may consist of one or several Component Parts.‖ Figure 1 (Chapter 6) refers 
to the four layers that constitute the Layering Theory as follows: 
 
Content 
Applications 
Transport 
Access 
 
The Layering Theory makes it possible then to define any service that is required, 
simply by looking at which of the Layers that particular service‘s Component Parts 
fall into. A service may be made-up of multiple Component Parts or only one 
Component Part. It follows that we should then be able to determine how many times 
a particular operator provides a particular electronic communications service (through 
use of an efficient system of cost accounting), and therefore the number of times a 
Component Part may or may not be used over a defined period of time within each 
Layer.  
 
The economic significance of each Component Part is then determined by asking 
the question as to whether selling a smaller quantity of the Component Part at a higher 
price would be more profitable for the undertaking than selling a larger quantity at a 
                                                 
44
 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal v Commission [1978] ECR 
207, paragraph 65. 
45
 Microsoft Cases: United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation (364 U.S. App D.C. 330), and 
in Europe, Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2004] 5 
C.M.L.R. 21, COMP/C-3/37.792, 2001/462/EC, ECSC, OJ L162, 19.06.2001. Microsoft Corp v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (CFI). Microsoft Corporation v. Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] 4 C.M.L.R. 16. 
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lower price. This in turn will depend on how sensitive demand is to changes in price 
(the ―elasticity of demand‖46). The Author contends that with modern pricing 
methodologies currently available for packet-switched networks, data is now 
becoming available for National Regulatory Authorities (or Competition Authorities 
operating under the principle of concurrency) in the advanced developed countries to 
calculate the elasticity of demand for relevant Component Parts for IP-based networks 
for each of the Layers set out in the theory.  
 
DPI can be defined as a packet filtering technique used by Internet service providers 
(ISPs) to intercept and examine all unencrypted content exchanged over networks.
47
 
Although Chapter 6 makes clear that such measurements are not 100% perfect given 
that encryption techniques make it possible to ‗hide‘ Component Parts, modern 
techniques for DPI, which operators are currently using and which are in common 
use, allow for even encrypted components to be detected. For example, DPI is 
commonly used to shape traffic and to block unauthorised file sharing on peer-to-peer 
networks (P2P). In the United Kingdom, several ISPs have used a new DPI-like 
technology, known as Phorm, in order to establish targeted advertising
48
.  
 
In Chapter 6 (6.3.3), the author discusses the Commission‘s most recent approach to 
relevant product market definition in electronic networks and services
49
, and also the 
Commission‘s most recent Recommendation on access to NGNs (‗NGN 
Recommendation‘) issued in 2010. The EC has identified NGNs as being critical to 
the future delivery of broadband services in the EU. The 2010 NGN Recommendation 
is meant to address particular issues with competitive access and to increase 
competition in EU NGN markets. However, the author identifies as a specific 
                                                 
46
 The critical elasticity of demand is the value of elasticity of demand necessary to leave profits 
unchanged following a price increase. It should also be noted at this stage that in fast changing IP-
based technology network markets, there would also be a need to use ―competitive‖ rather than 
―prevailing‖ prices for Component Parts to avoid the ―Cellophane Trap‖. The Cellophane trap relates to 
the US case of United States v. El du Pont de Nemours & Co 118 F Supp 41 (D Del 1953) aff‘d 351 
US 377 (US Sup Ct 1956), where a dominant undertaking has already been able to increase prices to a 
monopolistic level, effectively creating a situation where those prices are artificially high. Any use of 
these prices by the SSNIP test might then yield erroneous results. See Rodger B., and MacCulloch A., 
Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK, Cavendish Publishing, Third Edition, 2004, pages 86-
87 for a more complete analysis of the Cellophane Trap. See also Graham C., EU and UK Competition 
Law, Longman, 2010, pp. 534-535. 
47
 EPIC, ‗Deep Packet Inspection and Privacy‘ at: http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/, accessed February 2011. 
48
 http://www.phorm.com/, accessed February 2011. 
49
 C(2007) 5406 rev 1. 
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weakness in the NGN Recommendation the focus on lower network ‗infrastructure‘ 
layers as opposed to the upper ‗messaging‘ layers50. For example, the NGN 
Recommendation is focused on network infrastructure operating at the lower level of 
the OSI stack (the Open Systems Interconnection stack, a model for describing the 
structure of a network). This is a weakness as a significant component of innovation 
and competition in broadband services in the NGN market will be focused in the 
upper messaging layers where most of the code for ‗content‘ is based.  
 
Section 6.3.3 thesis highlights the specific problem of access to NGNs and that 
current EC jurisprudence with regard to relevant market definition, and also Articles 5 
and 12 EC‘s Access & Interconnection Directive51 that regulate network access 
issues, are insufficient to deal with NGN access problems. The author argues that 
access is a subset of interconnection and that often for operators offering new and 
innovative services in the broadband market, it is the issue of access rights that are 
significant. The author argues that the Layering Theory operating across several 
different layers from infrastructure to content is uniquely positioned to deal with 
problems of access in broadband markets. 
  
The Layering Theory can be summarised as a new interpretation of the test of SMP. 
This new interpretation is defined as: 
 
An undertaking shall be deemed to have SMP if either individually or jointly 
with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance for the relevant 
Component Part in a particular Layer (as set out in Schedule 1) in the 
supplier’s relevant geographic market, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. 
 
The author argues that if such a framework was acceptable to the European 
Commission it could provide a very useful precedent for regulation elsewhere, for 
example in moving US regulatory policy away from its current ‗silo‘ approach to a 
                                                 
50
 Commission recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 
2010/572/EU, 20
th
 September 2010. 
51
 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and 
associated facilities. OJ L108/7 24.04.02. 
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more flexible ‗layered‘ approach (Chapter 5), and that in major developing countries, 
such as China 
52
 and India 
53
, where there is convergence with EU competition law 
jurisprudence (as both DCs have now adopted similar concepts of dominance to the 
test established in United Brands
54
), the Layering Theory could be adopted (Chapter 
6).  
 
Also the author argues how multilateral instruments, such as the WTO‘s regulatory 
Reference Paper could be amended in light of the Layering Theory. This will help to 
enhance competition on worldwide IBP backbone networks, bringing down the costs 
for internet access to end-users globally in much the same way as the current 
Reference Paper achieved further liberalisation and competition in telecommunication 
services when first bought into the GATS in 1998. Incorporating the theory into the 
RP would be a huge stepping-stone for DCs/LDCs in addressing the digital divide in 
giving competitive and regulated access and interconnection (peering and transit) by 
small ISPs in developing countries to large IBP networks. 
 
In Chapter 7, the Author looks specifically at this issue and how the Layering Theory 
could be used to the advantage of DCs and LDCs. The author raises the problem of 
acceptance of the theory in DC/LDC markets where national leaders may be sceptical 
of accepting a regulatory instrument either at the level of the WTO through an 
amended Reference Paper, or through amendments to their own domestic legal 
frameworks and following disappointment with the outcome of the Doha Round. The 
author argues however that there are strong incentives to do so, for example in 
gaining access to IBP networks in OECD markets on transparent, non-discriminatory 
and cost-oriented rates which would result in lower costs for export of more cheaply 
manufactured intangible products from DC/LDCs. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 identify two further problems in IEL: 
 
(5) The weakness of current international regulation to encourage 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), the primary source of 
                                                 
52
 See Chapter 3 (Article 17) Anti Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 2008. 
53
 See Chapter 2 (Section 4) Indian Competition Act 2002 (as amended 2007, 2009).  
54
 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European 
Communities [1978] ECR 207 paragraph 38. 
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technological know-how, to provide beneficial (and appropriate) 
technology transfer to producers in DCs and LDCs (Chapter 8); and 
(6) A lack of consensus on how electronic intangibles should be 
classified in law, whether as goods under the GATT, as services 
under the GATS, or even as a hybrid, as a form of intellectual 
property right under TRIPS. Also, that the current moratorium of 
not imposing customs duties on imports of electronic intangibles 
agreed at the WTO in 1998 is detrimental to the interests of DCs 
and LDCs in terms of loss of tariff revenues (Chapter 9); 
 
In Chapter 8, the Author raises the problem of a lack of compliance of developed 
countries on Article 66.2 TRIPS on technology transfer (Chapter 2 indicated the 
significance of technology transfer in addressing the Digital Divide). The author 
argues in Chapter 8 that the Layering Theory could be delivered to DCs and LDCs as 
part of a program of technology transfer from the developed world and in enforcing 
Article 66.2. Chapter 9 discusses the trade in electronic intangibles under both the 
WTO‘s GATT and GATS rules. The thesis suggests specific solutions to problems (5) 
and (6) above: 
 
(d) To help DCs and LDCs gain access to valuable know-how through 
technology transfer by: 
(i) Adopting legislation governing the transfer of technology 
into their territories that combine both ex-ante (sector 
specific) and ex-post (competition) measures; and  
(ii) Adopting harmonisation measures in bilateral and regional 
trade agreements between DCs so that resources for the 
regulation of competition and IPRs can be pooled (both 
discussed in Chapter 8); and 
(e) To help address the current stalemate on the trade and classification 
of electronic intangibles at the WTO by adopting the test set out by 
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project in the United States to 
distinguish between electronic goods and services and classify all 
electronic intangibles as goods. With a goods classification in 
place, to not renew the current moratorium of not charging import 
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tariffs on electronic intangibles and to allow charging in accordance 
with rules of origin (Chapter 9). 
  
1.3 Limitations 
 
In order to limit discussion to a manageable level within the thesis, policy level issues 
on economic sovereignty and good governance, although important to the economic 
well being of a country, will not be discussed in detail here other than in the 
examination of state sovereignty in relation to bilateral and free trade agreements.  
 
Also not discussed in detail is the role of various IEL institutions, such as the World 
Bank and IMF, other than only as they appear in the context of reviewing the sectors 
of IEL above, for example in discussing the position of DCs and LDCs in multilateral 
negotiations on trade and investment. Debt relief and fiscal monetary policy is not 
covered (for example, the G8 group of major developed countries agreement on debt 
relief agreed at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005). In terms of IEL institutions, the 
focus for discussion remains those institutions and programs central to the regulation 
of technology and trade, including the WTO, International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), WIPO, UNDP, UNCTAD, OECD, APEC, Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in the US, and the European Commission.  
 
The issue of the markets to study within the vast sector of technology and trade is also 
problematic. Although there are many markets for export that DCs and LDCs have 
historically been involved in including agriculture, commodities, textiles, movement 
of labour to name a few, but also new markets that such countries are increasingly 
being drawn to including software and hardware, electronic goods and services, 
biotechnology, plant products, and semiconductors etc., a full investigation of the 
application of economic law to both the high and low technology sectors would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The Author has focused therefore on the 
communications sector and specifically the market for electronic intangibles as being 
most directly linked to the Digital Divide. 
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In terms of ―Western best practice‖ in the regulation of the communications sector, 
the Author has looked specifically at EU and US markets, given that these two 
markets were the first to introduce competition in the delivery of telecommunications 
services by their national incumbent telecommunication carriers (AT&T in the US, 
and the various national incumbents, such as BT, France Telecom, and Deutsche 
Telekom in Europe) and on which many of the regulatory regimes of other countries 
are based
55
. Only recently, in the early 1990s did the Japanese government consider 
detailed regulation to take account of the dominant position that both NTT (domestic 
market) and KDD (international market) had on Japanese telecommunications 
markets
56
. Note also that the impact of reform of domestic regulation measures under 
Article VI GATS, particularly on mutual recognition agreements and standards setting 
in the communications sector is also an area that needs to be addressed by the WTO, 
but is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
In developing a new Layering Theory for the regulation of advanced digital networks, 
and suggesting how the Layering Theory could be applied to WTO 
telecommunications measures, such as the Reference Paper to the WTO‘s Fourth 
Protocol or Basic Agreement on Telecommunications (Chapter 3), the Author does 
not discuss the detailed WTO procedures that would need to be followed in order to 
bring about suggested amendments to the Reference Paper (the subject of potential 
further research). The discussion here is restricted by necessity to the merits of such 
an amendment in terms of increasing access to international telecommunications 
markets, particularly from the viewpoint of DCs and LDCs. 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Kariyawasam R. in Telecommunications Law (eds Walden I., and Angel J.), Blackstone Press, 
London, 2001., pp 153-156. Mention must also be made of the market in New Zealand, where the 
regulator introduced competition between the incumbent Telecom New Zealand, and Clear 
Communications. However, the regulation of interconnection in that jurisdiction posed particular 
problems and long-standing litigation between the two carriers.  
56
 Fransman M.,  ―Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry in the Internet Age‖ in Telecoms in 
the Internet Age From Boom to Bust to?, OUP, 2002 for a more detailed explanation of the Japanese 
fixed and wireless mobile sector and deregulation in that sector since the 1990s. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL NETWORKS: 
DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter attempts to do three things: (a) to provide a brief overview on the rise 
and structure of the internet and evolution to New Generation Networks (NGNs); (b) 
to set out some basic indicators of the Digital Divide (linkages) and clarify in outline 
the significance of these linkages in terms of helping us to identify the sectors of IEL 
that have the most relevance in addressing the Digital Divide; and (c) to review 
various definitions of the Digital Divide available in current literature so as to arrive 
at one overriding definition that can be used throughout this thesis. 
 
In the context of this thesis, an international digital network is a network that provides 
connectivity to the backbone internet, the global infrastructure of links connecting 
Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs). As such when reviewing the international Digital 
Divide, we first need to understand how the internet developed in the first instance. 
Given that this thesis is focused on law, the Author will not discuss the underlying 
development in technology or of the management of the domain name system
1
 
currently administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN)
2
, but will focus instead on the main technological milestones that allowed 
the infrastructure of the internet to develop. In section 2.2, the Author looks first at the 
emergence of the internet in the United States and the development of the two 
protocols that helped facilitate its growth, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
and the Internet Protocol (IP). The Author also looks briefly at other technologies that 
have helped to accelerate the development of the internet, such as the advent of Local 
Area Networks and fibre optic cable, and the migration of existing networks to NGNs. 
                                                 
1
 Domain names are structured into a hierarchy of levels including at the top the generic Top Level 
Domains (.com, .org, .net. .edu etc), and also Country Code Top Level Domains (ccLTDs), such as .uk, 
and second level domains, such as .gov.uk .net.uk etc. Third level domains are normally web addresses 
such as essex.ac.uk etc. 
2
 For a more detailed discussion of the work of ICANN and of the Domain Name Server (DNS) system, 
which is now administered through a series of ICANN contracts with separate domain name registries 
around the world, see the ICANN site at www.icann.org.  
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Section 2.3 discusses the linkages to the Digital Divide, and in the concluding section 
2.4, definitions of the divide. 
 
2.2 A brief overview of the evolution of the infrastructure of the internet 
 
The present day internet can be described as a ―network of networks‖, but the catalyst 
for its early development was the desire of the academic community to enable 
computers to interoperate with each other. In 1965, the US Defence Department‘s 
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) funded the first computer network, the 
forerunner to Advanced Research Projects Agency Network ARPANET (the first 
wide area network)
3
. By the later 1960s ARPA was using a variety of electronic, 
computer and communications technologies, and a decade later, when computer 
networking was beginning to really take-off, the use of Local Area Networks (LANs) 
began to proliferate. A fundamental idea of ARPA‘s research was a new approach to 
interconnecting LANs and Wide Area Networks (WANs) that became known as the 
―internetwork‖, later abbreviated to the ―internet‖. ARAPNET continued to grow 
steadily through the 1970s to include international connections to Norway and the 
UK, trans-Pacific connections to Hawaii, and domestic network of some 15-20 sites 
across the United States
4
.  In the early 1980s, the Personal Computer (PC) allowed 
intelligence in the network to move to Local Area Networks (LANs), whereas up until 
this point, networks consisted mainly of dumb terminals directly connected to 
centralised mainframe computers on a time-share basis. Easy access to computers 
meant that there was a need to ―scale-up‖ communications between these LANs (now 
consisting of intelligent terminals). One of the problems in achieving scalability was 
that much of the software used at the time by hardware vendors was proprietary and 
which prevented the portability of information technology between different hardware 
platforms. This problem was overcome eventually through the development of UNIX 
as the first open source software, and also the development of Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) standards in 1984
5
. The OSI standards set in place a common 
set of layers that designers could now build networks around and which would allow 
                                                 
3
 See the early history of the internet at: http://www.isoc.org/interent/history/brief.html, date accessed 
October 2010. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Cromer D., The Internet Book: Everything you need to know about Computer Networking and How 
the Internet Works, Prentice-Hall, United States, 1995 (―Cromer 1995‖).  
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different hardware and software protocols to interoperate. Particularly important was 
the innovative Internet Protocol (IP) software, which provides basic communications, 
and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) software, which provides additional 
features that internet applications require
6
. Both IP and TCP work together to send 
data reliably across the internet: IP provides a set of rules as to how to present packets 
of information, allowing an interconnected set of networks to operate like a single 
large network. The current version of IP is IPv4, sometimes referred to as the ―thin 
layer‖ due to the limited level of functionality that it provides, limited in terms of 
addressing availability
7
 and also in its ability (or lack-off) to facilitate real-time 
applications. The Internet Engineering Task Force is currently working on a new 
version of IP (IPv6) that will allow for increased addressing space and also for real-
time applications
8
. The TCP protocol revolutionised the way that traffic on networks 
could be conveyed
9
. 
 
As Vint Cerf once said: ―the internet problem…was to get host computers to 
communicate across multiple packet networks without knowing the network 
technology underneath.‖10 The network technology referred to by Cerf was the 
telecommunications carriers underlying network: the problem lay in the fact that 
different telecommunications carriers used different network technologies and the 
trick was to somehow make communications between computers transparent to the 
underlying network technology. The solution was IP
11
. Simultaneously, the US 
carrier, AT&T was developing a new form of data network (the underlying network) 
that would allow for increased throughput speeds between computer networks. This 
technology was based on a new form of switching called ―packet-switching‖ as 
                                                 
6
 Note however that both TCP and IP were invented in the early 1970s before the OSI standard was 
produced in 1984. 
7
 The number of available IP addresses that can be supported: every PC on a network will be allocated 
an IP address (similar to a telephone number). These addresses can be both dynamic (changing) or 
fixed depending on the type of network used. See Cromer (1995) for more information.  
8
 See IPv6 overview at: http://playground.sun.com/ipv6/, accessed October 2010. 
9
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 Cerf V., How the Internet Came To Be at: http://www.bell-labs.com/user/zhwang/vcerf.html, date 
accessed October 2010.  
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 By 1978, Cerf and Kahn proposed splitting the TCP protocol into a host-to-host protocol and an IP. 
The IP passed individual packets between machines (host to packet-switch or between packet-switches), 
whilst TCP ordered the packets into reliable connections between hosts. See Fransman M., Evolution 
of the Telecommunications Industry, in World Telecommunications Markets (ed Gary Madden), 
Edward Elgar, 2003, p.31. 
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opposed to the conventional technology of the time ―circuit-switching‖. 12 It was from 
this point that telecommunications carriers began the transition from analogue to 
digital signalling, which allowed for increased efficiency and the ability to transport 
multiple types of traffic
13
. The International cable systems were the first networks to 
be controlled by digital signalling
14
. During the mid 1970s to 1980s, data networks 
continued to be rolled-out separately to voice networks, and delivery speed and 
transmission capability improved with new digital technologies such as Integrated 
Switched Digital Network (ISDN), Frame-Relay, and Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
Technology (ATM)
15
. However, it was not until the invention of fibre-optic cable in 
the late 1970s that the great leap in transmission speed and capacity came. Fibre-optic 
cables allowed for a carrying capacity many times greater than conventional copper 
cables. This coupled with the advent of digital multiplexing, which allowed different 
digital traffic streams to be ―switched‖ or aggregated onto the same transmission 
channel really revolutionised switching technology and allowed data and voice 
networks to now share common switching and transmission facilities.
16
 
  
In 1991, after the National Science Foundation in the United States lifted the 
restrictions on commercial use of the internet, the Commercial Internet eXchange 
(CIX) Association was formed by several US companies including General Atomics 
(CERFnet), Performance Systems International (PSInet), and Uunet Technologies 
(AlterNet). From there the internet grew exponentially. New carriers, such as Colt 
(City of London Communications), MCI (later part of WorldCom), Level 3, 
WorldCom, Energis started rolling-out data networks which relied on heavy 
investment in R&D by their switch suppliers (Siemens, Ericsson, Alcatel, Nortel etc), 
and which utilised advanced packet-switch and multiplexing techniques, and that 
contrasted sharply with the old regime where incumbent operators such as AT&T, 
France Telecom, NTT, and BT had pursued R&D through in-house departments or 
                                                 
12
 A data communications network that uses packet-switching technology (a switching procedure 
whereby two parties have a logical connection across a network, but no dedicated facilities (unlike a 
circuit-switched network which sets up a dedicated connection), and where units of transmission have a 
maximum size (usually 128 or 256 octets): this is a store and forward technique where nodes in the 
network may store a packet for some time before forwarding it to the next node (or router) in line. See 
Kessler G., ISDN, McGraw-Hill, 1990, p. 281. 
13
 ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Council) report: 1234 Internet Interconnection, 2001, 
p. 8 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid p.9 
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specialised laboratories (Bell Labs-AT&T, Martlesham-BT, Electrical 
Communications Laboratories-NTT) which had been slower to adopt packet-
switching technology. As such, with fewer overheads and smaller operations, the new 
carriers were able to adapt to the changing communications market more quickly. 
Many of the new carriers were US financed and by the mid to late 1990s had rapidly 
started to roll-out pan-European networks
17
. In 1990, the World Wide Web was 
created by Berners Lee, Cailliau and others at CERN in Switzerland, and in 1994 
Mosaic Communications went onto develop Netscape, the first internet browser. By 
1995, Bill Gates of Microsoft had recognised the growing significance of the internet 
and the use of digital networks
18. With Microsoft‘s acceptance of the internet, the net 
spread exponentially in the US. 
 
In the rest of the world, particularly Asia, Europe, and Africa, the internet has had a 
more uneven and less meteoric rise. For example in Western Europe, the European 
Commission launched the e-Europe initiative in 1999 in order to accelerate the take-
up of the internet. The Commission‘s three main objectives for a cheaper, faster, and 
more secure internet was subsequently endorsed by the European Parliament. The 
Commission also saw accelerated unbundling of the local loop (the copper lines 
linking residential customers with the national telecoms network) as a means of 
increasing facilities based competition and take-up of broadband internet services by 
end-users. However the real problem remained the high cost of leased-line capacity 
that ISPs required in order to interconnect with the main (generally US) backbone 
operators. In 1998, EuroISPA, the association of European ISPs indicated that it was 
common practice for many European ISPs to route their European traffic through 
American peering points (either private or public)
19
. Following several competition 
enquiries by the European Commission into the cost of leased-lines within Europe, 
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 See Fransman M., Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry, in World Telecommunications 
Markets (ed Gary Madden), Edward Elgar, 2003, pp 18-21. 
18
 In May 1995 Bill Gates issued the now famous memo: ―The Internet Tidal Wave‖ that indicated 
Microsoft‘s acceptance of the internet. For more background, see Inside Microsoft (Part 2) at 
http://www.businessweek.com/1996/29/b34842.htm, accessed October 2010. 
19
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EAST in the United States or at private bilateral peering points. Transit by contrast involves a fee that 
one operator pays another to allow its traffic to transit across the paid operator‘s network either to 
terminate on a third operator‘s another network or the paid operator‘s network. For more details see 
Interconnection, Access and Peering: Law and Precedent, by Kariyawasam R., in Telecommunications 
Law, (eds Walden I., and Angel J.), Blackstone Press, London, 2001. 
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the costs for bandwidth have fallen substantially (also in part due to the increased 
take-up of fibre optic cable-discussed above), and the roll-out of pan-European 
networks by new Other Licensed Operators (OLOs).  In the last few years, entrants in 
the internet backbone market have rolled-out over 10,000 route miles of fibre optic 
network
20
. 
 
By contrast in Africa development has been slow. In 1999, the total number of 
computers permanently connected to the internet in Africa (excluding South Africa) 
broke the 10,000 mark as measured by Network Wizards
21
. However Network 
Address Translation, which allows re-use of the same IP address across a number of 
computers in different networks effectively means that many more users might be 
connected to the internet than otherwise indicated. In 2001, there were approximately 
1.3 million subscribers in Africa, 250,000 in North Africa and approximately 750,000 
in South Africa
22
. By 2001, most African capitals also had more than one ISP. 
Fourteen countries had five or more ISPs, while seven countries had ten or more 
active ISPs: Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Togo
23
. In the 
early 1990s, like Europe, African ISPs also suffered with the high cost of international 
bandwidth caused mainly by a monopoly stranglehold on international leased circuits 
by African incumbent telecommunication operators in that region. However this 
situation slowly changed and by 2001, the total international outgoing internet 
bandwidth in Africa was approximately 250Mps, which although tiny by Western 
standards (many multiples of this) was nevertheless an achievement. In Europe the 
position was accelerated due to the lowering of leased-line tariffs brought down 
through competitive pressure, but also increased regulation and competition authority 
oversight. By 2007, Africa still only had 17 IXP exchanges compared with 67 in the 
Asia-Pacific region, 107 in Europe, 20 in Latin America, and 87 in North America.
24
 
An IXP is a shared switching facility that allows ISPs to exchange traffic with each 
other through peering and transit agreements. IXP exchanges however are strongly 
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 Giovannetti E., Internet connectivity and competition policy, in Information Technology Policy and 
the Digital Divide: Lessons for Developing Countries, (eds Mitsuhiro K., Tsuji M., and Giovannetti E), 
London, Edward Elgar, 2004, pp 35-59. 
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 Jensen M., The African Internet-A Status Report, 2001, available at: 
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24
 Internet Governance Forum: Best Practices Session Report, Internet Society Reports, 2007, p. 6 at: 
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resisted by monopoly or incumbent operators, particularly in DCs and LDCs who 
view the IXP as another channel where competing services, such as Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) can be developed, bypassing the incumbent‘s lucrative voice 
services.  
 
Between 2000 and 2011, the average worldwide internet user growth rate was in 
excess of 528%, with the highest growth rate in Africa (2,988.4%), the Middle East 
(2,244.8%), Latin America and the Caribbean registering 1205.1%% with Asia at 
789.6%% (www.InternetWorldStats.com). More recent data indicates that the number 
of internet users worldwide is 2.26 billion (32.7% of world population)
25
. China has 
shown incredible growth with almost 477 million internet subscribers connected by 
March 2011 (although it still has a low computer penetration rate of 38.4%). Africa 
showed growth of 139.8 million users by 2011 (13.5% population). However 
according to UNCTAD‘s Information Economy Report 2010, in 2009 the overall gap 
in broadband access between developed and developing countries remains high (26 
fixed broadband subscribers 100 for developed countries compared with 3.5 for 
developing countries). Despite these statistics, according to UNCTAD‘s report of 
2010, by 2009, UNCTAD still found that a massive gap existed between developed 
and particularly (least developed countries), where ―a person in a developed country 
is on average over 600 times more likely to have access to fixed broadband than 
someone living in a LDC.‖26 However internet access via mobile phones is showing 
much better potential in DCs (Morocco and South Africa particularly where mobile 
broadband has exceeded fixed broadband subscriptions). According to UNCTAD at 
the end of 2009, about one third of ITU members-almost all developing countries-had 
yet to launch a mobile broadband service (ITU, 2010a). By contrast, in LDCs, one 
third (16) had launched mobile broadband networks by the end of 2009.‖27 This 
statistic reflects the fact that mobile infrastructure is often easier to put in place than 
fixed line infrastructure in environments where there are geographical constraints. As 
such, in UNCTAD‘s view mobile broadband has much greater potential to reduce the 
high speed digital divide, subject to spectrum availability and bandwidth.  
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The two most current important developments in internet architecture--and that will 
have important implications for network connectivity between the developed and 
developing worlds--are the migration of existing internet networks to a breed of New 
Generation Networks (NGNs) and the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses and the rollout of 
new IPv6 addresses in 2010/2011. A recent report by WIK Consult in 2008 highlights 
the significance of NGNs and the challenge for regulators: 
 
A number of technological and market developments pose challenges to IP-
based interconnection, and to traditional interconnection in the fixed (PSTN) 
and mobile (PLMN) networks as well. Notably, these networks are physically 
and logically converging to IP-based Next Generation Networks (NGNs). 
Interconnection arrangements for switched PSTN/PLMN networks have been 
markedly different than those for IP networks, not only at a technical level, but 
also in terms of associated regulatory obligations. The convergence of these 
networks raises difficult questions as to how interconnection should be 
regulated going forward. 28 
 
The report‘s authors make clear that the single most important driver of change is the 
convergence of the network, with a ―single integrated IP-based network (whether 
called an NGN or not) delivering some combination of data, voice and video.‖ This 
migration to NGN then makes it possible for different underlying platforms (for 
example, fixed telecommunications and cable television) to offer equivalent services, 
that has both the potential to benefit competition, but simultaneously enables bundled 
offers of multiple services to the end-user that could give rise to new anticompetitive 
concerns. Chapter 4 discusses anticompetitive effects and makes clear that although 
both bundling and price discrimination can be pro competitive, IBPs often migrate 
smaller ISPs from settlement free interconnection arrangements to paying transit 
agreements and it is this process that can give regulators cause for concern.  
 The NGN architecture is layered with the physical infrastructure layer at the 
bottom and the higher-end service layers built on top. A schematic of this new 
layering structure is given below in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The NGN Layered Structure 
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 European Commission, Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnection: Technical, 
Economic and Public Policy Aspects, January 2008, p. VI. 
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Source: Final Report: The Future of IP Interconnection (2008)
29
 
 
 
It is this layering concept that the new technology can deliver, making use of very 
high-speed communications through optical fibre and therefore delivery of high 
bandwidth applications, such as video over internet. The fundamental difference with 
existing legacy networks is the use of the IP protocol as the basic transmission 
standard for NGNs. The IP protocol allows for different types of network, whether 
cable or telecommunication to provide a wide array of broadband services seamlessly. 
For vertically integrated operators, this would then allow for complete control of all 
the layers of the NGN from the lower physical layers to the upper messaging and 
content layers. 
 
The layering concept provides for interconnection of networks at the lower physical 
(infrastructure layer) but also access to each of the layers above the infrastructure 
layer. The upside is that this more flexible structure provides for operators to provide 
a wide spectrum of services and networks within one or simultaneously several layers. 
The downside is the creation of a much more complex market environment where an 
operator may have market power in one layer, but not another, or the possibility to 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, p. 19: The authors cite Uebele and Verhoeyen‘s schematic in Uebele R. & Verhoeyen M. 
"Strategy for migrating Voice Networks to the Next Generation Architecture" in Alcatel 
Telecommunications Review, 2nd Quarter 2001, pp. 85-90. 
 50 
leverage its market power from one ‗downstream‘ layer to several ‗upstream‘ layers. 
This creates a potential regulatory nightmare for NRAs, who faced with the task of 
having to define a relevant market to check for potential abuse of market power for 
competition purposes, have to ‗unpick services‘ that interconnect and access 
simultaneously at different layers of the service stack (this is discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 6).  
 
The migration to NGN is taking place now in the developed world and in some more 
developed DC markets, such as China and India. The challenge for DC and LDC ISPs 
however in most of the developing world is to gain access to these NGN networks 
(and the separate layers) on equitable and transparent terms bringing the cost benefits 
of faster and more efficient communications to their end-users. A failure to do so will 
exacerbate the Digital Divide, the subject of the next section.  
 
2.3 The Digital Divide 
 
Bruno Lanvin argues that the major trends that characterize the end of the twentieth 
century are: 
 
(a) the globalization of the markets for trade, finance, technology and 
ideas, and the rapid expansion of a greater reliance on market mechanisms 
worldwide; 
(b) the globalization of information networks, accompanied and permitted 
by a continuous decrease in price-performance ratios, a steady process of 
convergence and digitalization, and the emergence of information as a 
central production factor and engine of growth, often at the origin of new 
business and industrial organization models, such as in the Internet realm; 
and 
(c) the emergence of a global role for non-governmental players and for 
civil society.
30
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Lanvin argues that this combination of trends has provided the basis for globalisation 
and that it is this globalisation that is providing the backdrop for the Digital Divide. 
There is no doubt some truth to this and yet the Digital Divide cannot just be 
explained in terms of globalisation as the divide does not appear to have any one 
single point of definition. As is clear from the brief history of the rise of international 
digital networks, many actors have played key roles in the development of internet 
technology and networks. Key issues are investment in R&D and the utilisation and 
innovation following-on from R&D. Before entering a more detailed discussion of the 
meaning and scope of the term ―Digital Divide‖, it is first important to define the 
meaning of the term ―Developing Country‖ and ―Least Developing Country‖, for the 
discussion of the Digital Divide in this thesis is with regard to DCs and LDCs (the 
―international Digital Divide‖) as opposed to the Digital Divide that may exist within 
a developed country, for example the United States due to issues of universal 
service/universal access, geography and differing levels of poverty.  
 
The WTO covered agreements do not include a specific definition of a Developing 
Country (although a ―small nation‖ is defined), but many of the agreements, 
particularly the GATS, GATT, and TRIPS do make specific reference to the term in 
relation to Special and Differential rights (rights that apply specifically to Developing 
Countries). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the World Bank considers countries with low 
or middle-income levels as ―developing‖.  In a recent classification, economies are 
grouped by using the 2009 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita figures. 
Economies are divided according to 2009 GNI per capita as: low income, $995 or 
less; lower middle income, $996 - $3,945; upper middle income, $3,946 - $12,195; 
and high income, $12,196 or more.
31
 The World Bank states that: ―Low-income and 
middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies. The 
use of the term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in the 
group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a 
preferred or final stage of development.‖ By using these measurements, countries 
with GNI per capita below US$12, 195 are classified as ‗developing‘. This thesis 
therefore will use the World Bank’s definition of a developing country as a country 
with a GNI per capita as below US$12, 195. The latest figures (2011) reveal that both 
                                                 
31
 See World Bank classification at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, accessed 
January 2011.  
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China at circa US$865 and India at US$441 will qualify as ‗DCs‘ under this 
definition.
32
  
 
The Committee for Development Policy (CDP and part of the UN‘s Development 
Policy and Analysis Division, the main research development division of the UN 
Secretariat
33
), has made clear recently the criteria to be used for classifying a country 
as a LDC. In the CDP‘s update of September 201134, the CDP builds on the initial UN 
criteria established in 1971 as requiring a low capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
and structural impediments to growth for inclusion as a LDC. At its plenary session in 
2011, however, the CDP now defines LDCs as ‗low-income countries suffering from 
the most severe structural impediments to sustainable development.‘35 With the more 
recent emphasis on sustainable development, the criteria for definition now include 
Gross National Income (GNI). The CDP uses three specific criteria that need to be 
satisfied: (a) Gross National Income per capita; (b) Human Assets Index (HAI), and 
(c) Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI).  For the GNI criterion, the threshold for 
inclusion is based on a three-year average of the level of GNI per capita, which the 
World Bank defines for indentifying low-income countries (discussed above). The 
HAI consists of a simple average of four sub-indicators (two for health and nutrition 
and two for education). The EVI criterion by contrast incorporates eight indicators, 
which are grouped into two broad categories (an exposure index and a shock index). 
Both these categories provide an indication of the risk of exposure of the country to 
external shocks that impact on a country‘s development. According to the CDP, the 
EVI threshold for inclusion is the ‗value of the index at the first quartile of the values 
of the reference group‘.36 Furthermore, the CDP has introduced a new criterion in 
addition to GNI, HAI and EVI, such that a country cannot be classed as a LDC if it 
has a population in excess of 75 million.
37
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This thesis therefore makes use of the CDP‘s definition of LDCs and therefore 
whenever the thesis refers directly to a LDC, it is referring to the list of countries as 
set out by the UN.
38
 Chapter 7 also makes the distinction between greater access to 
international backbone networks controlled by companies based in developed country 
markets, but also better access by smaller ISPs to the domestic incumbent networks of 
DCs/LDCS. As the discussion earlier in the introduction to this thesis noted, there is a 
further distinction to be made between the competitive environments in DCs to that of 
LDCs.  Chapter 7 makes clear that telecommunication markets in LDCs tend to be 
controlled by the dominant incumbent operator with a majority shareholding of the 
incumbent itself being held by the LDC‘s respective government. LDC markets 
therefore need a higher level of ex-ante or sector specific regulation as opposed to ex-
post or market competition regulation. For example, telecommunication markets in 
India, a pro competitive DC, are quite different to the markets of a number of sub-
Saharan African LDCs, such as Sudan, Ethiopia or Mali. And within the grouping of 
Sub-Saharan African countries there are also great differences in terms of 
telecommunications development within South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria 
demonstrating with greater telephone line density rates than Republic of Congo, 
Malawi, and Angola for example. 
 
The international Digital Divide in relation to DCs and LDCs has been a subject of 
intense research over the last five years. As mentioned above, there is no single point 
of definition. Fransman for example argues that the information (info) 
communications industry (based on content delivery over the internet and digital 
networks) is open with barriers to entry into the innovation system low and with entry 
facilitated by the widespread knowledge of the main operating systems, software 
languages and protocols which Fransman calls a ―common knowledge‖ effectively 
                                                                                                                                            
least twice the graduation threshold levels). Graduation refers to the process of the country under 
review moving out of the LDC country as its economic and sustainable development criteria improve 
with time. The UN (CDP) have established specific rules for graduation which have been refined over 
time, but the latest set of rules are set out in the UN‘s Handbook on the Least Developed Country 
Category at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_ldcs_handbook.shtml, accessed 
April 2012.   
38
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bought about by the defacto standardization of HTML
39
, TCP/IP and Wireless Access 
Protocol (WAP)
40
. He argues that this new info communications industry differs 
widely from the old telecommunications industry: the innovation process was only 
open to the monopoly network operator and favoured suppliers. This led to differing 
national standards and practices resulting in a fragmented knowledge base.
41
 The 
significance of this ‗standards‘ linkage to the debate on the Digital Divide is that 
many incumbent operators in DCs and LDCs still have control over their national 
telecommunications markets, resulting in the slower innovation and fragmented 
standards that Fransman speaks off, although on the standards side, many of these 
operators would also need to conform to international telephony rules (for example on 
signalling, network integrity etc) that the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) imposes
42
. The critical point however appears to be the lack of competition 
from alternative service providers and smaller more advanced network operators. In 
this way, there arises a ―Digital Divide‖. Both chapters 3 and 4 to follow will discuss 
the impact that monopolies have on domestic and international markets for voice and 
internet services. 
 
Another approach to the Digital Divide comes from the relative concentrations of 
Customer Premises/Information Communications Technology (ICT) Equipment 
available. James for example defines the Digital Divide as the unequal distribution of 
computers, internet connections, and fax machines between countries
43
. He describes 
it ―as another technological gap that emanates from and reflects the highly skewed 
distribution of global research expenditures between the north and the south.‖44 In 
Chapter 7 we will see that the WTO‘s Information Technology Agreement has made  
good progress in bringing down the cost of imports of IT equipment. The significance 
of this linkage is explored further in section 2.3.2 below on IT penetration. 
 
The electronic dictionary, Webopedia defines the Digital Divide as follows: 
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 Wireless Application Protocol, which performs a function similar to HTML, but used for access to 
wireless networks. 
41
 Fransman M., Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry, in World Telecommunications 
Markets (ed Gary Madden), Edward Elgar, 2003, pp 18-21. 
42
 See for example the Blue Book and Red Book rules of the ITU at www.itu.org. 
43
 James J., Bridging the Digital Divide, Edward Elgar, London 2003, p. 23. 
44
 Ibid. 
 55 
 
A term used to describe the discrepancy between people who have access to 
and the resources to use new information and communication tools, such as 
the Internet, and people who do not have the resources and access to the 
technology. The term also describes the discrepancy between those who have 
the skills, knowledge and abilities to use the technologies and those who do 
not. The digital divide can exist between those living in rural areas and those 
living in urban areas, between the educated and uneducated, between 
economic classes, and on a global scale between more and less industrially 
developed nations.
45
   
 
This is a useful definition, looking at the Divide that exists not only at an international 
level, but recognising that a similar technological divide exists within the nation-state 
itself. This thesis has as its emphasis the reduction of the Digital Divide as between 
developed and developing nations. But the definition appears vague. It brings together 
both the domestic and international divide. Is it possible to come to a sharper 
definition of the international divide? What factors might contribute to the 
international digital divide? The next section reviews research from several different 
perspectives, including internet diffusion/access, IT penetration, competition and 
telecommunications policy, and innovation/trade each of which make links to the 
digital divide. From these links, we can draw some general conclusions as to the 
factors that influence the Digital Divide. We can then use these factors in a review of 
a series of digital divide definitions in the available literature to come to one 
overriding definition that will be used throughout this thesis.  
 
2.3.1 Internet Diffusion/Access 
 
Kagami et al are more specific in narrowing the concept to internet diffusion, arguing 
that a critical measure of internet diffusion is the share of the US among global 
internet users, and that the growing disparity in internet access among countries or 
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socio-economic groups is called the ‗Digital Divide‘.46 By all accounts in terms of 
internet population and the penetration rate of internet access, the US leads the 
world
47. Kagami argues that ―a deepening digital divide in the Internet age is a critical 
policy issue because the Internet as a general purpose technology has become 
essential not only for communications needs but also in economic, social and political 
arenas.‖48  
 
At the multilateral level, the OECD has defined the Digital Divide as the difference in 
internet and electronic commerce access opportunities between OECD and non-
OECD countries. More specifically that the term Digital Divide refers to the ―gap 
between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-
economic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety 
of activities.‖ 49 The most basic indicator of the digital divide is the number of access 
lines per 100 inhabitants. In its report, Understanding the Digital Divide, the OECD 
also draws on the distinction between penetration rates in terms of the number of lines 
per 100 inhabitants, but also as to the level of digitalisation (the number of lines or 
switches that use digital as opposed to analogue technology
50
). Those countries with 
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by contrast is subtly different, setting out an obligation on an operator to provide a minimum level of 
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the least developed networks in terms of network reach but who have been able to 
quickly replace analogue switches with digital switches have had the highest 
digitalisation among non-member OECD countries for most of the 1990s, even 
though saddled with low penetration rates. A digital network is important for the least 
developed countries (LDCs) as it provides a basic platform upon which network 
extensions can be built: the digital divide is as much about network access as having 
the latest technology. 
 
One aspect of the digital divide concerns access to the telecommunications (voice) 
network, but another concerns pure internet access: here the OECD measures the 
digital divide (as regards the internet) in relation to the penetration rate for internet 
hosts (the number of internet hosts per 1000 inhabitants)
51
. The OECD reports that 
while Africa, Asia, Central and South America are increasing their penetration rates, 
the pace is very slow. Although by 31
st
 December 2011, total African internet users 
numbered 139.8 million (13.5% of the African population) with Nigeria the highest at 
45 million and Tunisia the lowest at 3.9 million, in Asia, the total number of internet 
users (2011) was 1.01 billion with China at 477 million and Malaysia at 16.9 
million.
52
 In Asia, the growth rate is mainly attributed to OECD Member countries. 
This means that the international digital divide, as measured by the number of internet 
users, is beginning to be addressed. For example, in October 1997, the digital divide 
in Internet host penetration between Africa and North America was a multiple of 267. 
By October 2000, this had grown to a multiple of 540
53
. According to the OECD 
(Communications Outlook 2011), as of January 2010, the number of internet hosts 
worldwide exceeded 730 million (up from less than 72 million in 2000).
54
 The 
number of webservers worldwide grew from 33 million in mid 2008 to nearly 46 
million in mid 2010. However, data growth almost halved from 67% (2006-08) to 
38% (2008-2010) because of economics of growth of cloud computing.
55
 As regards 
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the digital divide with respect to electronic commerce, the OECD defines a key 
indicator as the number of secure servers in each country
56
. In 2010, the OECD 
estimated that 63.3% of all secure servers are located in the OECD area, while the 
other 36.7% are attributed to firms in non-member countries.
57
  
 
Further analysis and measurement of the Digital Divide
58
 can be found in the research 
of Wong who evaluates the Digital Divide in Asian countries based on penetration 
levels of telephone main lines, PCs and internet use
59
. By analysing comparisons of 
the scale of IT adoption relative to national income, Wong finds that that the Digital 
Divide in Asia is wide and has the potential to become more severe. Kraemer and 
Dedrick look at a panel of 40 Asian and non-Asian countries over the period 1995-
2000 finding that there is a large and growing divide within the Asian block itself, and 
a large and growing divide between non-Asian and Asian countries
60
. 
 
What is the significance of this link between internet diffusion and the digital divide? 
We can summarise that the growing disparity in internet access among countries or 
socio-economic groups is called the ‗Digital Divide‘. Also that the divide refers to the 
gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different 
socio-economic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access information 
and communication technologies, the level of digitalisation, and the penetration rate 
for internet hosts.  
 
Therefore the important factors that could influence our definition of the digital divide 
should include the gap in opportunity to access information and communications 
technologies (which presumably would also indicate a disparity in internet access). To 
address the digital divide therefore, we need mechanisms in IEL to address any 
inequality of access to information and communications technologies.  
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2.3.2 IT Penetration 
 
In recent research, Dewan, Ganley and Kraemer examined a panel of 40 countries 
over the period 1985-2001 based on data from three distinct generations of 
information technology (IT): mainframes, personal computers, and the internet
61
. In 
terms of the empirical framework they use for measuring the Digital Divide, they 
argue that: 
 
The most common characterization of the global Digital Divide is in terms of 
the dispersion of in IT penetration across countries, under the premise that if 
there were no Divide then there would be no differences in IT penetration 
across countries
62
. 
 
To measure the Digital Divide they use per capita measures (IT penetration per 
capita) and also IT penetration per GDP, arguing that the latter measurement 
illustrates the tight association of digital access with income levels, and the co 
linearity of income with other factors such as education and telephone penetration.  
Within this framework, they also use a number of different variables classed into three 
different categories: (i) Economic which incorporates the income and cost factors that 
affect technology adoption decisions; (ii) Demographic which includes factors that 
affect the value of access to technology, such as the size of the urban population 
(population residing in urban areas) and also the stock of human capital, characterized 
by the average education level of the population in terms of years of schooling; and 
(iii) Environmental, which includes telephone infrastructure measured in terms of 
density of telephone main lines and also the importance of trade in the economy (the 
larger the trade sector the greater the pressures to conform to technology norms and 
practices of the network of global trading partners). In including these various 
variables in their survey, Derwan et al produce a very comprehensive view of the 
Digital Divide not just in terms of conventional measures (such as the number of 
internet hosts), but also a measure of the socio-economic impact of the divide. Before 
conducting their own research, they review fairly extensively existing econometric 
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studies on the Digital Divide, hoping to build on such work, some of which the 
Author discusses further below. Derwan et al’s results are quite revealing indicating: 
 
To the extent that the Digital Divide is a concept that relates IT adoption to 
national income, the quantile regression results for the GDP per capita variable 
are fundamental to illuminating the mechanisms behind the Divide. We find 
that not only is the association between GDP per capita and IT penetration 
positive and significant, but it is stronger at higher levels of IT penetration. 
This ―feedback effect‖ between GDP per capita and IT penetration drives a 
wedge between developed and developing countries, reinforcing the Digital 
Divide
63
.  
 
The results do not indicate whether the relationship works the other way around i.e., 
by increasing GDP, IT penetration also increases. They also find that DCs get 
disproportionate benefits to lowering their infrastructure costs, improving their human 
capital and increasing the participation in the global economy. Recognising that none 
of these can be achieved quickly, they suggest that long-term investments in these 
particular areas will ―offer the best levers to the developing countries for closing the 
Digital Divide over time.‖64 The report indicates that the Digital Divide appears to 
have largely stabilized and that although developed countries continue to have access 
to more digital resources than DCs, penetrations relative to the mean have shrunk and 
continue to do so at a slow pace. To help reduce the Digital Divide they urge policy 
makers in DCs and LDCs to reduce tariffs and taxes on IT products and services, 
encourage deregulation of telecommunication services and accelerate the pace of 
technology transfer from technology exporting countries
65
.  
 
Although Derwan et al acknowledge that future research would involve expanding the 
data set to allow for coverage of emerging countries that were underrepresented in 
their study, factors such as human capital and the size of the trade sector are having a 
stronger impact on encouraging internet use in DCs than they did with previous 
technologies: ―If internet use is the most important marker we have to date of the 
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Digital Divide, as many currently believe, then this is the opportunity that developing 
countries have been waiting for to catch up to their more advanced neighbours.‖66 
 
As with internet diffusion what is the significance of this link between IT Penetration 
and the digital divide? The research shows that the association between GDP per 
capita and IT penetration is both positive and significant, and is stronger at higher 
levels of IT penetration. Further that this ―feedback effect‖ between GDP per capita 
and IT penetration is maintaining the divide between developed and developing 
countries. Again, internet use appears to be an important marker for the digital divide. 
 
The important factors therefore that could influence our definition must include a 
reference to the disparity between countries in appropriating Information Technology 
Products (which presumably covers also internet use). 
 
2.3.3 Alternative Development 
 
Soeftestad and Sein in adopting a more policy-oriented approach have also 
conceptualised the Digital Divide by linking to a broader set of Information 
Communications Technologies (ICTs) (than say internet or telecommunication 
statistics). They argue that ICT magnifies the digital divide, the difference between 
knowledge and technological capabilities of the developed and developing world, and 
that the information gap leads to a competitive gap and the result is the development 
gap
67
. They cite an earlier study by Hamelink defining ICT in development as: 
 
ICTs encompass all those technologies that enable the handling of information 
and facilitate different forms of communication among human actors, between 
human beings and electronic systems, and among electronic systems. These 
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technologies can be sub-divided into: capturing technologies, storage 
technologies, communication technologies and display technologies.
 68
 
 
In contrast to the institutional approach of measuring the Digital Divide, such as the 
indices used by UNDP and OECD mentioned above, Soeftestad and Sein argue that 
many of these statistics hide a number of key aspects. They argue: 
 
…donor agencies are more preoccupied with numbers and the supply side of 
ICT. Thus such indicators as ‗numbers of phones‘ or ‗percentage of population 
with access to the internet‘ are taken to indicate ICT diffusion. Whilst these 
are necessary conditions to study the impact of ICTs on national development, 
they are far from being sufficient conditions. These statistics only represent 
the first and second order effects of technology diffusion in society…69 
 
The first order effect deals with simple substitution of old technology with new 
(mobile phones replacing letters and land phones) and the second order with people 
communicating more as a consequence of the first order effect. However the impact 
of ICT diffusion on a society according to Soeftestad and Sein can only be truly 
studied through measurement of a third order effect, which is the generation of new 
related businesses and societal change (virtual organisations, empowerment of women 
etc.)
70
 Soeftestad and Sein‘s argue that much more attention needs to be given to 
models of Alternative Development.
71
  
 
The link here is not to focus on the number and supply side of ICT as an indicator of 
the divide. Information gaps lead to competitive gaps, which then gives rise to 
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development gaps. A measure of the divide too is the ability of a society to use ICTs 
to both handle information and generate new related business, and societal change. 
 
The important factors therefore that could influence our definition of the divide 
should include a reference to the ability or not for a society to use information tools to 
innovate (which presumably would include the generation of new business and 
societal change).  
 
2.3.4 Human Capital Base  
 
Several research surveys point to the fact that addressing the Digital Divide cannot 
happen without investment in the human capital base, in other words the education 
and development of those in schools and colleges, and a general development in the 
level of literacy and media penetration.  In a separate panel of 100 countries measured 
over 1999, Arquette finds that the Digital Divide parallels the gap in economic and 
human development
72
. In a panel of 105 countries, Beilock and Dimitrova analyse the 
impact of GNP, measures of civil liberties, and infrastructure and regional variables 
on internet use on IT penetration or diffusion, finding that the most important factor is 
GNP, although increasing civil liberties also has a significant impact
73
.  
 
Kiiski and Pohjola use a panel of 60 countries over the years 1995-2000 looking at a 
range of variables including income per capita, telephone access costs and the 
average years of schooling, and also the five year growth rate of internet hosts
74
. 
Kiiski and Pohjola find that GDP per capita and internet access cost are important 
factors in OECD countries, but that the least important factor is education. However 
this position changes when DCs are included in the sample and education becomes an 
important variable in the penetration and diffusion of IT.  
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Quibria in separate analysis of 100 countries over 1999 seems to confirm this result
75
. 
Phojola confirms using a data set set over the years 1993-2000 that IT investment is 
tightly related to income measures and human capital
76
. Again these findings indicate 
that DCs and LDCs by focusing on effective education programs for their nationals 
can help to address the Digital Divide.  
 
Guillen and Suarez review a panel of 141 countries over the period 1998-1999 using a 
range of policy variables including telecommunications policy and infrastructure, as 
well as two variables that indicate to some extent the level of entrepreneurship in the 
country in question; predictable policy making and a democracy index
77
.  They find 
that the number of internet hosts and the number of internet users per capita are 
impacted by the policy variables when the entrepreneurship variables are left out, but 
that the policy variables loose their effect when the entrepreneurship variables are 
included. They conclude that public policy should look at general conditions 
supporting entrepreneurship and not just telecommunications policy. This again is an 
important finding indicating possibly that other legislative measures such as on 
competition policy, venture fund capital, and policies that stimulate local small 
business activity could have an impact on entrepreneurship other than just 
telecommunications policy.  
 
Norris examines the dispersion of internet use by grouping information on internet use 
in over 100 countries into a ―New Media Index‖ and comparing it with an ―Old Media 
Index‖ that indicates the level of penetration of radio, newspaper readership and 
television sets in each country
78
. She discovers that the two indices are highly 
correlated concluding that the problems of illiteracy and strict government controls on 
access to the Old Media also applied to the New Media and internet access. The issue 
then is whether increasing the democracy index could result in increased internet 
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hosts and internet users per capita: without investment in IT and telecommunications 
infrastructure of course this would not be possible. 
 
What is the significance of the link between the human capital base and the digital 
divide? The research indicates that the Digital Divide parallels the gap in economic 
and human development. Education is an important variable in the penetration and 
diffusion of IT, and investment in IT is tightly related to income measures and human 
capital. A disparity in education, specifically information literacy is therefore critical 
to any definition of the divide. 
 
2.3.5 Competition and Telecommunications Policy 
 
In terms of the effect of competition policy, Dasgupta et al examines internet use in a 
panel of 44 countries over the period 1990-1997 assessing the impact on the ratio of 
internet hosts/telephone mainlines of measures including urban population, income 
per capita, and an index of competition policy
79
. They find that the ratio is 
significantly and positively related to policy and percentage urban population, 
although income per capita was not found to be significant. Again this result is 
interesting from the point of view as to whether effective enforcement of competition 
policy could yield positive benefits for increased internet use. Chinn and Fairlie‘s 
results appear to confirm Dasgupta et al‘s finding of the ―regulatory factor‖ 
significance. For example, in a review of a panel of 161 countries over the period 
1999-2001, Chinn and Fairlie find that variables such as GDP, telephone density and 
regulatory quality (as measured by an index assessing market-friendly policies) are 
important for growth in PC and internet density
80
. Wallsten in a review of a panel of 
45 countries finds that the more formal and controlled a country‘s regulatory system, 
the fewer internet users and hosts
81. In a separate study for the United Kingdom‘s 
Department of International Development (DFID)
82
, completed by the Author as part 
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of a research team investigating the costs of internet access in developing countries in 
Cambodia, India, Nepal, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia, the team found that 
generally the costs for internet access varied considerably among the case study 
countries, and were generally lower in the larger and more competitive ones
83
. Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) costs generally accounted for under half of end user costs in 
these countries, with telecommunication operator charges (especially for higher users) 
comprising the greater portion. The research team found that liberalisation and 
regulation of telecommunications within DCs and LDCs, with a primary focus on 
effective competition for both international and domestic leased circuits and 
permitting internet telephony would accelerate the growth of internet markets in these 
countries
84
. Other conclusions included:  
 
 Liberalisation and regulation of telecoms within the developing countries, with 
a primary focus on effective competition for both international and domestic 
leased lines, and on permitting internet telephony; 
 Sharing between developing country carriers and ISPs the revenues paid by 
users for calls to the internet; 
 Making better use of scarce international bandwidth, for example by setting up 
local and regional internet exchange points and by caching content; 
 Developing alternative lower-cost technologies, with a focus on wireless and 
cheap terminal equipment; 
 Monitoring the competitive situation for the supply to developing countries of 
international bandwidth, and intensifying competition by helping developing 
country ISPs to get best available buys.
85
 
 
The DFID Internet Costs study reveals that the main problem for many DCs and 
LDCs (at least in the case study countries) remains extreme poverty, leading to small 
markets and an inability to take advantage of economies of scale. The study authors 
recommend that increased internet take-up by businesses and institutions, better-off 
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personal users and telecentres will build market size and attract more effective 
competition wherever this is permitted. In a similar study conducted by the Author as 
part of an Antelope Consulting research team (including the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation (CTO)) for the Department for Central and South 
Eastern Europe (CSEED) of DFID
86
, the team compiled information from the region 
on technical and regulatory structures
87
, and on the social utilisation of new 
Information Communications Technologies (ICTs).  The aim of the research was to 
inform CSEED‘s decision-making on how ICTs could be introduced and used in a 
more equitable and inclusive way. The team found that there was a much greater 
variation in the CSEE region than in Western Europe for telephone mainline density 
and internet use by capita. In 2000, telephone density ranged from 3 lines per hundred 
people in Albania to 37 in Slovenia. In Western Europe, the range at the time was 40 
per 100 in Portugal to 68 per 100 in Sweden
88
. The Team also found wide differences 
in the geographical coverage of telecommunications (and therefore also internet 
access).  In Western Europe both rural and urban areas had a near 100% network 
coverage, whereas in the CSEE region, urban coverage was good but rural penetration 
far from complete
89
. On average only 15% of rural households in the region had a 
telephone line. Romania, Albania and Poland all had several thousand villages with 
no network access at all
90
. No doubt these conditions have since changed, although 
the large differences in the levels of internet access and the wide range of country 
performance were due for the most part to low and varying economic achievement, 
although accession plans by a number of the countries to accede to the EU showed a 
willingness on the part of most of the countries to adopt EU policies in key enabling 
areas such as telecommunications. The research also indicated that the countries of 
CSEE were unequal societies with potential for social exclusion based on socio-
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economic group, ethnicity, sex and age, and that unemployment had greatly increased 
since the end of Communism, seriously affecting many groups, and especially the 
Roma
91
. The use of the Internet also tended to be concentrated among the urban, 
educated (perhaps male) young, and that although Governments in the region had 
policies for the Information Society, the take-up of ICTs was mixed: Central Europe, 
but less so in the Balkans, they had made considerable progress in establishing a 
presence on the web. Interactive services were generally not available however, partly 
because of resistance to transition from paper-based, physically signed and rubber-
stamped transactions
92
. Also commercial companies were responding rapidly to the 
new technologies, although, with the exception of vanguard software and e-commerce 
companies (of which most of the case study countries had a number), the picture was 
one of presence on the web rather than e-commerce. This was related to the low 
number of true credit cards used in the countries. At the time, the research indicated 
that areas for future development to make the Internet more accessible would include 
making telephone access cheaper, making electronic payment easier, providing public 
access points to the internet, and providing training in ICT skills and the English 
language. 
 
Both of these DFID studies (also discussed in Chapter 7) appear to point to the 
adoption of more effective telecommunications, IP, competition, and trade laws to 
help address the Digital Divide. This is borne out through more recent research by 
UNCTAD. For example in the World Investment Report 2008, UNCTAD states: 
 
As regards hard technology, in telecommunications for instance, market entry by 
international operators from both developing and developed countries has 
contributed to lowering the threshold of access to and use of information and 
communication technologies in developing countries.
93
 
 
Although, much of the research referred to above appears to point the way to 
increased flexibility in telecommunication policy possibly through the use of 
competition law in order to enhance IT penetration and internet use, it must also be 
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stressed that many of the developed countries‘ national telecommunication 
incumbents achieved their positions of market power over long periods of monopoly 
and that to suddenly open DC or LDCs national telecommunication markets to fierce 
competition in both basic and advanced services might not be the first step. For 
example, although DCs and LDCs may be willing to liberalise their national markets 
in order to attract increased foreign investment, they might also want to consider how 
legislative measures protecting those operators providing services of a general 
economic interest, such as universal service/access or broadcasting obligations 
(similar for example to the operation of Article 86 EC Treaty on liberalisation 
measures) might need to be implemented to protect domestic operators during a 
transitional phase to increased competition in the domestic market (Chapter 7 
explores this issue in more detail). 
 
The link here between telecommunications policy and competition and the digital 
divide indicates the significance of regulatory quality for growth in PC and internet 
density. Interest costs are lower in the larger and more competitive countries where 
liberalisation and regulation of telecommunications has led to more effective 
competition. Our definition of the divide therefore should include a reference to 
competition, as competition should result from increased liberalisation and 
deregulation. 
 
2.3.6 Innovation, Technology Transfer and Trade 
 
Another important aspect of the Digital Divide is gaining access to the necessary 
technology to help with the process of innovation and manufacturing in the country 
itself. Lal and Petrobelli argue in their discussion of sub-Saharan Africa:  
 
…technology is vital to industrialisation at all levels…Manufacturing is still 
the main engine for transforming the economic structure of low-income 
countries, letting them shift from slow-growing, low-return activities, with 
high productivity and strong growth potential. It is the most potent user and 
carrier of technology to the economy, the main agent for the creation, transfer 
and application of new technologies. It provides the hardware of production 
 70 
(machinery) to all economic sectors and catalyses new methods of 
management, organisation, ownership, financing, and governance…94  
 
Lal and Petrobelli suggest that some new forces are making it easier for developing 
countries to become competitive, such as the growth in TNCs in transferring new 
technologies across the world, and the availability of technology to local firms in the 
form of capital goods, licensing, consultancy or sub-contracting. They also argue that 
there are limits to the involvement of DCs in the globalisation of technology as ―many 
of the tools of industrial policy apart from import restrictions (local content rules, 
export subsidies, directed credit, reverse engineering) are being constricted or 
forbidden by international rules and agreements.‖95 These issues are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 8 on technology transfer. 
 
The lowering of tariffs on the trade in electronic intangibles is also key to DC/LDC 
economies. Research by UNCTAD shows that the switching of trade in physical 
products to electronic intangibles could have serious implications for developing 
countries in terms of loss of revenue from import tariffs if the current moratorium on 
not charging import duties on electronic intangibles agreed at the WTO in 1998 
remains in place. At present, DCs tend on average to charge much higher additional 
tariffs on imports on physical products that could in the future be substituted with 
electronic intangibles  (so called additional import duties and taxes, such as excise 
taxes, value-added taxes, and consumption taxes). At present, these high taxes are 
restricting access to content and also the corresponding ability of DCs/LDCs to trade 
and export electronic intangibles. However as the UNCTAD economist Teltscher 
argues: 
 
Whether zero tariffs would actually increase developing countries‘ exports on 
e-commerce goods is not certain. While a decrease in border tariffs is usually 
followed by an increase in trade, in the case of e-commerce, many developing 
countries do not have the telecommunications infrastructure or the human 
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 Ibid pages 4-5. 
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resources necessary to develop their e-commerce export capacities. Instead, 
they may face fiercer competition from outside and a growth of e-commerce 
imports. On the other hand, the gradual elimination of tariffs on certain 
electronic goods may have a beneficial effect on some countries‘ economies. 
For example, a reduction on software products could support domestic 
investment in high-technology sectors, an important industry for helping 
developing countries participate in e-commerce.96 
 
The significance of the link here between innovation and the digital divide is in 
gaining access to the necessary technology to help with the process of innovation. A 
failure to access appropriate technology will exacerbate the divide as technology is 
vital to industrialisation at all levels. Furthermore in terms of trade, the gradual 
elimination of tariffs on certain electronic goods could have a beneficial effect on DC 
and LDC economies as physical goods are substituted for electronic ones.  Our 
definition of the divide therefore should include failure to gain access to technology 
transfer and innovation as well as to successively reduce trade tariffs on goods 
relevant to e-commerce. 
 
The trade in electronic intangibles and the problems of classification of such goods 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
 
2.4 Conclusion: Defining the Divide 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Digital Divide has no single point 
of definition. The results of the published research reviewed above indicates quite 
clearly that the Digital Divide can be linked to several sectors including; 
telecommunications and competition policy, internet diffusion and access to 
infrastructure; IT penetration; alternative development; trade policy and a country‘s 
policies on transfer of technology (including IPRs)/innovation. 
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UNCTAD, October 2001, p. 10. 
 72 
From a review of the available research above which shows the significant links 
between the various sectors and the digital divide, the following list of elements 
emerge as central to any definition of the divide:  
 
 an inequality of access to information and communications technologies; 
 a reference to the disparity between countries in appropriating Information 
Technology Products (which presumably also covers internet use); 
 a reference to the ability or not for a society to use information tools to 
innovate (which presumably would also include the generation of new 
business and societal change); 
 a reference to the disparity in education, specifically information literacy; 
 a reference to competition (which presumably would result from increased 
liberalisation and deregulation); and 
 a reference to the failure to gain access to technology transfer and innovation 
as well as to successively reduce tariffs on trade (electronic intangibles). 
 
As can be seen, most of these elements have an inbuilt reference to time, for example 
with the need to enhance competition and to successively reduce tariffs on trade. 
Liberalisation and deregulation takes times and the benefits of increased competition 
will be only felt once policy changes have been made and enforced. Further, the 
ability to innovate will also depend on a successful transfer of technology over a 
period of time whether by technology transfer licensing or foreign direct investment 
(discussed in Chapter 8). In drawing together these elements, our definition of the 
digital divide therefore needs to be dynamic (as opposed to static).  
 
Before deriving a suitable definition for the divide, it will also be useful to look at 
other definitions that scholars have arrived at and which could inform the definition 
settled upon in this thesis. For example, Paliwala in his paper Digital Divide 
Globalisation and Legal Regulation talks of the divide as being: 
 
…defined in terms of differences in access to the essential tools of the 
information society and to the infrastructure of the networked society or 
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economy. These can be measured by surveys comparing access to computers, 
phones, cable, and other Internet-related technologies.
97
 
 
Paliwala cites Norris, who in turn defines the divide as: 
 
The digital divide is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon 
encompassing three distinct aspects. The global divide refers to the divergence 
of Internet access between industrialised and developing societies. The social 
divide concerns the gap between information rich and information poor in 
each nation. And finally within the online community, the democratic divide 
signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of 
digital resources to engage, mobilize, and participate in public life.
98
 
 
In his paper Digital Divide and Ethics, Koehler picks up on the point of the lack of 
access to information and the information society touched on by Norris in the research 
reviewed above: 
 
I suggest first that the digital divide can be defined in the context of three 
fundamental information ethics concerns: the right of access, literacy, and 
information literacy. Generally, "literacy" is defined as the ability to read and 
process intellectually the information acquired through reading. Reading of 
course is defined in its broadest sense. Information literacy would better be 
called information technology competence, for it implies the ability to use 
existing technology at a certain ability level in order to compete successfully 
with other exploiting information and information technologies.
99
 
 
Kamacho in her paper Digital Divide argues that the divide is much more complex 
than a simple division between ‗richer North and poorer South countries‘. The divide 
encompasses a densely woven tapestry of social divides, including between ―North 
and South, rich and poor, men and women, urban and rural populations, those with 
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access to information and those without. Such disparities are found not only between 
different cultures, but also within national borders.‖100 There are strong references 
here off course to ‗domestic‘ divide issues. But from a broader perspective, she argues 
that the digital divide needs to be understood as the conditions that are required to 
appropriate technologies on a continuous basis as and when they are developed (again 
providing some reference to time) and the capacity to incorporate them as tools into 
daily living. In this she agrees with the opinions of Soupizet that the divide reflects: 
 
The minimum capacity to appropriate information and communication 
technologies within a structural context of successive innovation is what makes 
the difference. In fact, in a world of globalization, this delay threatens to 
heighten all other disparities, the reason for which special attention is given to 
the digital divide.
101
 
 
Where in many LDCs the need to have access to clean drinking water and stable 
power supplies are the predominate concerns, this reference to a ‗minimum capacity‘ 
to acquire appropriate technology is also key from our perspective of understanding 
the Digital Divide. What is the point of importing refrigeration cooling trucks for the 
transportation of fresh food if the state does not also have access to a minimum level 
of know-how and the knowledge to maintain the cooling technology found within the 
trucks? As the technology for storing and transporting food improves, so must the 
state be ready to innovate, building on previous technologies to improve food hygiene 
and distribution (as Camacho/Soupizet argue, ‗working within a structural content of 
successive innovation‘). Any definition of the international Digital Divide needs to 
reflect not only the failure by states to access appropriate ICTs but also the failure of a 
state to take advantage of a ‗structural context of successive innovation‘. This also 
indicates a dynamic form of definition for the divide. In compiling these different 
viewpoints, one can argue that the international Digital Divide is linked to several 
elements: lack of access to appropriate infrastructure and ICTs; education; the ability 
to successively innovate, compete and trade; access to media and effective 
competition between service providers; and also bearing in mind that the divide exists 
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very much intra the nation-state as well as inter nation states, the author suggests that 
the international Digital Divide can be summarised as: 
 
A failure between those users in countries who have access to 
communications infrastructure, services and tools to aid literacy and 
information literacy, and those who do not, to access the minimum available 
capacity of communication technologies and information within a structural 
context of successive innovation, competition and trade.
102
 
 
In looking at the definition, when we talk of a ‗minimum capacity…‘ we are talking of 
those countries that by conventional measurements (reviewed above--telephone line 
penetration, internet host penetration, numbers of servers etc.) fall to the lowest 
quartile on international measurement indices by comparison with other countries, 
and who are: 
 
 Failing to gain access to telecommunications and internet networks 
specifically the international backbone networks over which information flows 
(appropriating communication technologies); and 
 Failing to gain access to the content and know-how that can help with 
educating their human capital bases (appropriating information). 
 
The phrase,‗..within a structural context of successive innovation, competition and 
trade’ is a reference to the success or failure of a country to appropriate 
communication technologies and information as a direct result of either implementing 
or not implementing effective policies on technology transfer, competition and the 
trade in electronic intangibles over a period of time. As such, the reference makes 
reference to the dynamic nature of the definition in that it captures the failure of the 
state to make policy adjustments (consecutively) over time in the relevant areas to 
improve access to communications technologies and information. The reference to 
‗innovation‘ is a broader term that captures the success or failure of a country‘s 
policies on technology transfer, specifically the absorption and spillover of 
technology transferred from foreign companies into the host state. These terms are 
further examined in chapter 8 on technology transfer. Absorption can be defined as 
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the ability of local firms to make use of knowledge spillovers from external actors. 
Spillovers occur when the entry or presence of a foreign Multinational Corporation‘s 
(MNC‘s) affiliates leads to productivity or efficiency benefits for a host country‘s 
local firms.
103
 The references to competition and trade are there to incorporate the 
other elements from the list of elements given above.  
 
‗Literacy‘ can be defined in its ordinary meaning as the ability to read and process 
information acquired through reading. ‗Information literacy‘ has a broader meaning, 
referring more to the ability to use ICTs to compete with others making use of 
information and information access tools. The term ‗users‘ also can encompass SMEs, 
corporations, and end-users.  
 
From the definition of the divide above, we can condense down further and identify 
four specific sectors in which to investigate the operation of IEL, and thereby help 
address the Digital Divide:  
 
 Competitive access to communications and information technology networks 
(this is the heart of the definition above: an investigation into the rules and 
regulations applying to access is crucial for addressing the divide); 
 The transfer of technology (this as we have seen is linked not only to 
innovation but also in gaining access to information, know-how and 
improving information literacy, key aspects of the definition); and  
 The trade in electronic intangibles (research reviewed above shows that the 
current moratorium of not imposing tariffs on electronic intangibles can be 
detrimental to DCs and LDCs, affecting their ability to raise revenue and to 
invest back in their infrastructure requirements and capacity building 
programs). 
 The human capital base (research reviewed above shows that addressing the 
digital divide will require a human capital base sufficiently educated and 
trained to deal not only with the spillover of technology transfer, but also the 
absorption of that technology. Enhancing the human capital base will require 
                                                 
103
 See Chapter 8, section 8.4. 
 77 
the strengthening of civil and political rights, and economic, social and 
cultural rights in DCs/LDCs). 
 
In this thesis therefore, the investigation of IEL starts first by looking at the law 
applying to access to communications and information technology networks, which as 
this chapter has shown, are now in the process of converging to become NGNs. This 
sector by far is the most complex and to which much of this thesis is dedicated. 
Chapter 3 looks at the international regulation of telecommunications and access to 
infrastructure. Chapter 4 looks at internet interconnection and NGNs and the potential 
anticompetitive practices of large IBPs who control the access to the backbone 
networks that make up the internet. Chapters 5-7 continue with the investigation of 
competitive access to communications and information technology networks, but also 
provide solutions to improving access in the form of the Layering Theory and the 
applicability of the theory to DCs and LDCs. Chapters 8 and 9 look at the sectors 
emerging as significant to our definition of the Digital Divide: the transfer of 
technology and the trade in electronic intangibles respectively. Finally, Chapters 10 
and 11 look at how civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights can be 
enhanced collectively in the form of the Right To Development. Chapter 11 looks 
specifically at how the RTD can be operationalised.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As an economic sector, telecommunications is generally a vertically integrated sector 
generating economies of scale with very low marginal costs. Telecommunications as a 
technical sector is covered by a number of international treaties including the Outer 
Space Treaty 1967, the Intelsat Agreement 1971, the Convention of International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU Convention), the World Administrative Telegraph 
and Telephone Conference (WATTC), and the Conventions on Satellites. However, 
the aim of this chapter is not to discuss telecommunications as a technical subject, but 
to discuss telecommunications as a sector of international trade. In light of this, the 
chapter will discuss the most relevant treaties that cover telecommunications as an 
economic sector, specifically the WTO covered agreements
1
. The Author contends 
that of all the multilateral institutions that will shape the focus of international 
telecommunications in the decades ahead, the WTO, and to a lesser extent the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) will take this role in terms of 
regulatory measures affecting trade in telecommunications. The ITU will retain its 
position of significance as regards the gatekeeper of telecommunication technical 
standards given its long policy making history in this area, but its role as a de facto 
regulator, for example in areas of competition and market access, are easily eclipsed 
by the emerging role of the WTO. There is also however, an increasing reliance by 
the United States and the EU on FTAs and bilateral trade agreements. A glimpse of 
the rising role of the WTO is reflected in the recent Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
case between the United States and Mexico on interconnection fees between 
incumbent telecommunication carriers
2
. The Mexico-Telmex Case is a landmark case, 
marking the first panel ruling by the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body in the 
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 GATS, GATT, TRIPS, and Information Technology Agreement (under the GATT). 
2
 Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services 1
st
 June 2004, DS204 (referred to in this 
chapter as the ―Mexico-Telmex‖ Case).  
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telecommunications sector. The WTO‘s DSB is perhaps the only international 
regulator, which has an enforcement procedure with ―real teeth‖, in that failure to 
implement its rulings could (eventually) result in trade sanctions.  
 
This chapter, in discussing the role of the WTO in increasing international trade in 
telecommunications, will discuss the need for the WTO Secretariat to reform existing 
measures and deal with five significant challenges: (a) clarifying its role with that of 
the ITU
3
; (b) resolving classification issues of new internet services that will be 
important for all network-based transactions
4
; (c) developing existing provisions on 
competition built into the GATS, Annex on Telecommunications and regulatory 
Reference Paper
5
; (d) clarifying the system by which international telecommunication 
operators settle inter-carrier payments (Accounting Rates)
6
, particularly as more 
traffic is now switched through packet-switched networks
7
; and (e) increasing the 
participation of developing countries
8
. The aim of this chapter is to describe the 
―international rules of the game‖ as regards to telecommunications, with the main 
emphasis being on the role of the WTO in this sector. As the Author suggests in 
Chapter 1, Chapters 3-5 set out the framework of IEL that applies to 
telecommunications at a multilateral level, but also taking the example of the 
European Community (and to the United States to a lesser extent) (Chapter 5). In 
Europe for example, the European Commission has put in place a far-reaching 
regulatory framework for regulating electronic communications networks and 
services, which seeks to separate the regulation of digital content from the digital 
networks that carry that content, but applying the principles of technological 
neutrality that seek to embrace both elements of competition law and sector-specific 
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4
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8
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regulation
9
. By contrast, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the 
United States still labours with the distinction between an information service and a 
telecommunication service that has created disparities in regulating different 
communication sub-sectors, such as the cable and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
networks, resulting in costly litigation and regulatory uncertainty
10
. In Chapter 6, the 
Author discusses a Layering Theory, which he argues could be used to modify WTO 
measures on telecommunications, such as the regulatory Reference Paper, introduced 
in this chapter. How such a modified RP could benefit developing countries is 
discussed further in Chapter 7 (Developing Countries and Telecommunications).  
 
This chapter looks briefly at the international framework for telecommunications, 
reviewing the main WTO measures including the Annexe on Telecommunications 
(AT), regulatory Reference Paper (RP), the Mexico-Telmex case, and ITU 
Recommendations D.50 and the ―APEC principles‖, the latter two issues being 
potentially significant for developing countries
11
. The AT, one of the first multilateral 
WTO instruments on telecommunications and negotiated as part of the Uruguay 
Round culminating in the formation of the WTO, provides a level of regulatory 
certainty for foreign investors requiring access to the target state‘s incumbent 
telecommunications carrier‘s network in order to provide services (for example 
financial) that have been scheduled as commitments in the target state‘s schedule of 
specific commitments. The AT applies to valued added or enhanced 
telecommunications services mainly (as opposed to basic or voice 
telecommunications services, usually the subject of a monopoly by the target state 
incumbent telecommunications operator). The RP, negotiated much later than the AT 
and coming into force in 1998, applies specifically to basic (or voice) 
telecommunications services. The RP‘s significance lies in a set of regulatory 
principles, the most important being the ―interconnection‖ principles that provide the 
basis for further liberalisation of a WTO member‘s telecommunications sector. The 
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RP is classed as an additional commitment and therefore not compulsory for WTO 
Members to adopt (as opposed to the AT, which being an annexe to the GATS is 
mandatory), but nevertheless is often required to do so as a condition of further 
foreign investment into the sector (see discussion below).  
 
The Mexico-Telmex case is the first dispute case (reaching a WTO panel) in 
telecommunications at the WTO and demonstrates the significance of 
telecommunications as a strategic economic sector within international trade. It also 
demonstrates the absolute need for governments to have effective and transparent 
measures in place that will stimulate both competition and innovation. The case 
hinges on the interpretation of the regulatory principles enshrined in the RP that apply 
to competition. There has been considerable disagreement over the DSB panel 
decision in Mexico-Telmex (discussed below) and the interpretation of the term ―anti-
competitive practices‖ as found in the RP. This case looks to set an important 
precedent for future potential disputes in this sector and introduces crucial elements of 
competition law into the WTO framework within the school of ―Modernization‖ as 
mentioned in Chapter 1 and despite the absence of any official compact on 
competition policy at the level of the WTO.  
 
As mentioned above, following the adoption of the AT, RP, and the settlement in 
Mexico-Telmex, the WTO appears to be in the ―driving seat‖ as regards international 
regulation of telecommunications with the ITU a technical standard setter and 
important provider of technical support to developing countries. The chapter will start 
with an assessment of the role of the ITU in the three significant areas mentioned 
above (accounting rates, interconnection, and VoIP) and the ITU‘s somewhat 
conflicting position (particularly in recent years) with that of the WTO; the role of the 
WTO in issues of classification of telecommunication services (current service 
classifications are in urgent need of revising); the contentious view of whether or not 
current schedules of specific commitments need to be revised to include new internet 
services and network-based transactions and finally with the increasing take-up of 
digital networks as data signals surpass voice, the role of the international regulation 
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of internet infrastructure services
12
. By understanding the role of these institutions in 
the important areas of telecommunications and internet interconnection policy that 
most directly impacts developing countries, we can then lay the foundation for the 
chapter on developing countries that follow (Chapter 7). 
 
 
3.2 The ITU  
 
The ITU was established on the principle of cooperation between governments and 
the private sector
13
. Founded over 135 years ago, it is the oldest international 
organisation in the world
14
, and its current membership includes regulators, network 
operators, equipment manufacturers, hardware and software developers, regional 
standards-making organizations and financing institutions. As Codding argues, the 
ITU has ―survived two world wars, a cold war, and at least one major depression.‖15 
In the last decade, the ITU membership has faced rapid evolution given the changes in 
the way telecommunication services are delivered and the convergence of 
telecommunication, information technology, and broadcasting networks, resulting in a 
wide range of new content rich network-based transactions. Furthermore, the 
liberalization and deregulation of the telecommunication sector in many countries has 
pushed its membership, particularly many of the developing countries, to encourage 
the ITU to take a greater role in international policy making. 
The ITU is divided into three broad Sectors - Radiocommunication (ITU-R), 
Telecommunication Standardization (ITU-T), and Telecommunication Development 
(ITU-D). These Sectors cover all aspects of telecommunication, from standards 
setting on interworking of equipment and systems worldwide to operational 
procedures for wireless services and designing programmes to improve 
telecommunication infrastructure in the developing world. Each of the three ITU 
Sectors works through conferences and meetings, where members negotiate the 
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chapter. 
13
 See the ITU‘s website at: www.itu.org, date accessed November 2010. 
14
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agreements which form the basis of telecommunication standards and services. Study 
groups made-up of experts drawn from separate national Public Telecommunication 
Operators carry out technical work, preparing the detailed studies that lead to ITU 
Recommendations.  ITU-R draws up the technical characteristics of terrestrial and 
space-based wireless services and systems, and develops operational procedures. It 
also carries out technical studies which serve as a basis for the regulatory decisions 
made at radio communication conferences. ITU-T experts prepare the technical 
specifications for telecommunication systems, networks and services, including their 
operation, performance and maintenance. Their work also covers the tariff principles 
and accounting methods used to provide international services. Finally, ITU-D 
prepares recommendations, opinions, guidelines, handbooks, manuals and reports, 
which provide decision-makers in developing countries with `best business practices' 
guidelines on standards and systems. Currently there are 24 study groups spanning the 
Union's three Sectors (7 in ITU-R, 14 in ITU-T, 2 in ITU-D), which together produce 
around 550 new or revised Recommendations every year
16
. All ITU 
Recommendations are voluntary agreements. The ITU is also responsible for the 
International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs), which had their origins in the 
19
th
 Century and remain one of the oldest of the ITU treaties
17
. ITRs cover the 
international telecommunications business setting out rules for administrations 
(government department responsible for telecommunications and not private 
undertakings) to put in place procedures for running international telecommunications 
networks and services
18
, mutually agreed routing
19
, charging and accounting
20
, and 
special arrangements which allows not only administrations but also private 
organisations or persons to conclude special arrangements for the establishment, 
operation and use of special telecommunications networks (for example money 
transfer through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT) or navigation, such as International Maritime Satellite Organisation 
(INMARSAT)
21
.  The current ITRs were adopted in Melbourne in 1998 and appear in 
the Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference 
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(WATTC-88). The ITRs are a binding treaty instrument and form part of the 
Administrative Regulations of the ITU: they are to be amended through subsequent 
WATTCs
22
. The ITRs are in need of amendment to keep pace with the rapid change 
of technology and the introduction of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) as the basic production standard of telecommunications networks, 
but there has been resistance within the ITU membership. Many of the developed 
countries see the ITRs as having been superceded by the WTO‘s Fourth Protocol and 
Reference Paper, although the terms of these measure remain vague. Many DCs and 
LDCs that still retain monopoly markets would like to see the ITRs amended and 
revived
23
. The position has yet to be confirmed. 
 
In 1996, the ITU initiated the World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF) to 
harmonize telecommunication policies on issues that have a transnational nature. The 
forum is organised on an ad-hoc basis determined by the ITU's executive policy- 
making body, the Plenipotentiary Conference in conjunction with its annual 
governing body, the ITU Council.  
 
3.2.1 Cooperation Agreement between the ITU and WTO 
At the 1994 Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference, one of the landmark conferences in 
the history of the ITU, members recognised the need to develop closer working 
relationships with other international institutions including the WTO, OECD, and the 
World Bank. The ITU‘s Strategic Plan 1995-1999 highlighted the need to ―maintain 
ITU‘s claim to global technical pre-eminence in matters relating to 
telecommunications, the Union should continue to keep pace with developments in 
the areas of telecommunications policy, law, regulation, and trade.‖24 In fact, a 
cooperation agreement between the ITU and WTO was not signed until six years later 
in November 2000, when the then WTO Director General, Mike Moore and ITU 
Secretary-General, Yoshio Utsumi, agreed to strengthen relations between the two 
organizations, by signing a Cooperation Agreement which was approved by the 2000 
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Session of the ITU Council, and later ratified by the full ITU membership in a 
Plenipotentiary Conference.   
The Agreement was to foster cooperation activities between the WTO and ITU on 
matters at the intersection of trade and telecommunication policy, to provide 
assistance to ITU members interested in WTO accession and to allow for each 
organization to participate as an observer at specified meetings of the other. The 
agreement also provided for the ITU to receive information on dispute resolution 
matters. 
It is difficult to assess the effect of the cooperation agreement in the day-to-day 
business of the two institutions. WTO advisers do sit on ITU expert groups. Further 
the work of the ITU in technical areas, such as interconnection, accounting rates, and 
standard setting for emerging technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), will most certainly have an important bearing on the future direction of the 
work of the Council for Trade in Services and the WTO Secretariat in reforming 
existing WTO measures on telecommunications, such as the regulatory Reference 
Paper to the Fourth Protocol (the Basic Agreement on Telecommunications). It is in 
perhaps these three areas: accounting rates, interconnection and VoIP that we will 
expect to see the greatest overlap between the work of the WTO and ITU. Each is 
discussed in the next three sub-sections.  
3.2.2 Accounting Rates and New Modes of Operation 
 
In recent years, reform of the international accounting rate system in 
telecommunications has been one of the most fiercely contested issues between the 
developed and developing countries. The traditional accounting rate regime clearly 
contravenes the MFN principles as set out in Article II GATS as the regime provides 
for states to set differential rates for terminating telecommunications (mainly voice) 
traffic within their borders according to political and economic interests. Article II 
requires non-discriminatory treatment between WTO members, and as a general 
clause, cannot be contravened, unless an exception is scheduled at the time of 
accession. However, when the Fourth Protocol was being negotiated by the 
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Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications following the Uruguay Round
25
, it 
was agreed that a ―gentleman‘s agreement‖ should be reached whereby international 
accounting rates would fall outside the purview of the GATS, but subject to review at 
the next trade round
26. This position has now been ―qualified‖ somewhat by the WTO 
DSB‘s panel ruling in Mexico-Telmex, discussed later in this chapter27. 
 
Accounting rates are generally straightforward to apply: in the telecommunications 
sector, when an international telephone call is transmitted from one country to 
another, the PTO in the country that originates the call has usually made a 
compensatory payment to the operator in the country that receives the call. Payments 
arise when the traffic in one direction exceeds the level of traffic flowing in the other 
direction. The level of payment is based on bilaterally negotiated ―accounting rates‖28. 
Developing countries have long argued that international settlements are required to 
continue to invest and upgrade existing legacy infrastructures, which in the developed 
world have been the preserve of monopolies for many decades. They argue that such 
settlements are not only used for telecommunications, but also used by national 
treasury departments in upgrading general infrastructure, such as power and water 
facilities. By contrast developed countries argue that net-payments based on 
artificially high settlements do not reflect actual cost structures, which are falling due 
                                                 
25
 The Fourth Protocol (sometimes referred to as Protocol 4 or as the Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement) was signed in March 1997. 
26
 This is widely known as the Understanding on Accounting Rates, which is contained in a Report by 
the Group on Basic Telecommunications made on 15
th
 February 1997 at the close of negotiations on 
the Fourth Protocol (BTA). The Report which appended the draft Schedules of Specific of Specific 
Commitments states:  
 ―7. The Group noted that five countries had taken Article II exemptions in respect of the 
application of differential accounting rates to services and service suppliers of other Members. In the 
light of the fact that the accounting rate system established under the International Telecommunications 
Regulations is the usual method of terminating international traffic and by its nature involves 
differential rates, and in order to avoid the submission of further such exemptions, it is the 
understanding of the Group that: 
  -the application of such accounting rates would not give rise to action by Members 
under dispute settlement under the WTO; and 
  -that this understanding will be reviewed not later than the commencement of the 
further Round of negotiations on Services Commitments due to begin not later than 1 January 2000.‖ 
27
 See section 3.4.2 on the Reference Paper in light of Mexico-Telmex. 
28
 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com03/accounting-rate/, date accessed November 2010. The 
accounting rate revenue division procedure envisages an international call as a single ―joint-service‖ 
for which the two operators negotiate an agreed ―accounting rate‖. The accounting rate is then divided 
in half (the ―settlement rate‖) and applied to traffic flows in both directions. As both traffic flows are 
priced at the same rate, the scheme results in an overall net payment from the operator originating more 
traffic to the operator originating less traffic, based on the volume of traffic in each direction. See 
Accounting Rate Reform Undertaken by ITU-T Study Group 3, Communication from the ITU, 
Informal Note, Council for Trade in Services Job.2947, 11
th
 May 2000, paragraph 2. 
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to improved transmission efficiencies, resulting therefore in net overpayments. The 
International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), discussed above, an 
international treaty administered by the ITU, sets out the accounting rate regime. ITRs 
in turn are complemented by the ―D-Series‖ of Recommendations, which are the work 
of the ITU Study Group 3, charged with the thorny task of reforming the accounting 
rate system. Reform has been aggressively pushed for by net-paying countries, such 
as the United States, which in its unilateral attempt to accelerate the process by 
introducing FCC benchmark levels on accounting rates, has run into stiff opposition 
from developed and developing countries alike in arguments on extending 
territoriality of FCC jurisdiction and US courts to foreign based PTOs.  It is however 
generally accepted now by the ITU membership that reform is required. Three main 
multilateral institutions have worked (and are still working) on the problem: (i) the 
OECD is seeking to develop a consensus among governments in developed countries; 
(ii) ITU Study Group 3 is studying the sector (discussed later); and (iii) the informal 
expert group, appointed by the previous ITU Secretary General (Dr Pekka Tarjanne) 
put forward a set of ―guiding principles‖ which favoured increased competition and 
the ―move to transparent, non-discriminatory, cost-orientated settlement 
arrangements.‖29  
 
The Fourth Protocol to the GATS has already introduced market access 
opportunities
30
 and cost-based interconnection rates by way of the regulatory 
Reference Paper
31
. The GATS regime has effectively signalled the end of traditional 
correspondent-type relationships on accounting rates, replacing the old regime with a 
new regime of facilities-based interconnection. This new regime has resulted in ―new 
modes of operation‖ by developed countries in bypassing traditional incumbent 
carriers in developing countries, and therefore operating outside the conventional 
accounting rate regime. By operating outside the conventional accounting rate system, 
                                                 
29
 See Tarjanne‘s speech on the ITU website at www.itu.org, date accessed November 2010. 
30
 Article XVI GATS, which must be read in conjunction with the Member‘s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, which sets out any exceptions the Member may have taken in the four different modes 
of supply under the GATS (Mode 1: cross-border, Mode 2: consumption abroad, Mode 3: commercial 
presence, Mode 4: movement of natural persons). 
31
 Article 2.2(b) Reference Paper to the Fourth Protocol of the GATS. 
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foreign carriers are able to avoid paying settlement rates that exceed the actual cost 
for transmission. The new modes of operation can be summarised as
32
:  
 
 International simple resale (ISR): this involves the resale of leased-line 
(private line) capacity to provide a public switched international telephone 
service. Calls originating on a Public Switched Telephony Network (PSTN) in 
one country are effectively aggregated and transported via a leased-line to 
terminate on the PSTN of the destination country. Competition in leased-lines 
whether domestic or international is one of the building blocks of effective 
competition in international telecommunications. With access to leased-lines, 
operators can build a global Virtual Private Network (VPN) using lines leased 
from incumbent carriers in different countries, and if local law allows, break-
out calls onto the local PSTN. 
 Foreign Points of Presence (PoPs): here an operator in one country is 
permitted to build-out its network into the destination country, interconnecting 
with the destination domestic carrier by way of a point of interconnection. 
PoPs effectively replace the need for one carrier to negotiate for access in the 
destination country by using half-circuits ordered from the destination 
country‘s incumbent, a process that could be both costly and slow. With the 
right to install foreign PoPs granted by way of the GATS (provided that the 
destination country has scheduled appropriate specific commitments in the 
leased-lines market), the originating carrier is free to provide transmission 
capacity for the whole link, a system sometimes referred to as ―self-
termination‖. 
 Refile: sometimes referred to as hubbing, re-origination or anonymous refile, 
where an operator directs its international traffic to a country where low 
charges apply for forwarding traffic to its ultimate destination or third county. 
As far as the third country is concerned, the traffic would appear to be 
originating from the country where refile is occurring. Refile depends on 
whether or not the refile country has a more advantageous settlement rate with 
the third country. If it does, then it makes sense to hub traffic through the 
                                                 
32
 For a more extensive analysis see the ITU paper: Transforming Economic Relationships in 
International Telecommunications, Chairman‘s Report of the Seventh Regulatory Colloquium, Geneva, 
December 1997. 
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refile country. Refile could take place at several hubbing points before the 
traffic reaches its final destination. This has been made possible through 
digital technology where the quality of the signal does not degrade in the same 
way that analogue signals over older circuit-switched networks degraded with 
distance. 
 International alliances: here alliances (whether by joint venture or merger) 
between operators who aggregate traffic over combined networks, serving 
mainly the needs of the Multinational Corporation. Conventional accounting 
rates are bypassed as the alliance provides an end-to-end or one-stop service 
both originating and terminating calls at either end of the global network.  
 Internet Telephony: two general modes apply Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP), which is predominately used over private networks proving a higher 
quality service and Voice over Internet, which is the transmission of voice 
calls over the public internet providing a generally lower quality of service. 
Because of its use of packet-switched networks internet telephony falls outside 
the conventional accounting rate system. Several jurisdictions including the 
US and Europe have looked at the possible regulation of internet telephony as 
a voice service, but have to date not sanctioned regulation or imposed 
universal service obligations or mandatory interconnection obligations on the 
providers of such services on grounds that internet calls are not directly 
substitutable for conventional voice calls primarily due to quality. With 
improvements in technology however, this situation is fast changing. 
Interconnection and internet telephony are discussed in more detail in sections 
on Interconnection (Section 3.2.3) and Developments in Multilateral 
Telecommunications measures (Section 3.4) below. 
 
International settlements based on correspondent relations between operators are 
negotiated by the operators themselves and not by governments. As such, the WTO as 
a diplomatic agreement between nation states is not directly concerned with 
negotiations between private entities, but would have relevance for example where 
differential accounting rates are inconsistent with obligations under the GATS, and 
where specific commitments in telecommunications have been scheduled. This is 
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exactly what happened in the Mexico-Telmex case
33
. As mentioned earlier, this 
inconsistency has been allowed to continue as a result of a gentleman‘s agreement 
during the talks on the Fourth Protocol (Basic Agreement on Telecommunications). 
The GATS provides for the replacement of the accounting rate regime with a cost-
oriented interconnection regime
34
. As such, accounting rate reform has been the 
subject of intense discussion by the Council for Trade in Services
35
.  
  
Presently, ITU-D Study Group 3, charged with accounting rate reform, is developing 
a set of general principles for accounting rates that will include the cost components 
to be included in such rates, costing methodologies for determining rates, and 
providing for transition periods for developing countries. Clearly the intention is to 
move towards a cost-orientated system of interconnection payments for both call 
origination and call termination as called for by Article 2 Reference Paper. The ITU‘s 
study group is working with the Council for Trade in Services to achieve a workable 
compromise, given that accounting rate reform will have a significant effect on trade 
in telecommunications
36
. In the interim, the ITU‘s Understanding on 
Telecommunications Accounting, part of the ITU‘s Telecommunications Regulations 
will continue to apply
37
, although it should be emphasised that the terms of the 
Understanding on Telecommunications have now been ―qualified‖ to some extent by 
the decision of the WTO‘s DSB panel in the Mexico-Telmex case38. 
 
3.2.3 Interconnection 
Interconnection is the foundation for competition in telecommunications. 
Interconnection in telecommunications is based on the fundamental principle of `any 
to any connectivity'.  Control of interconnection by any undertaking whether private 
or state-owned is essential to the control of the network and therefore the market for 
interconnection services, and the wider markets for domestic and international 
telecommunications. The upshot of this is that the regulation of wholesale 
                                                 
33
 Discussed in more detail in section 3.4.2 on The Reference Paper in light of Mexico-Telmex below. 
34
 Article 2.2 WTO Reference Paper. 
35
 Job No. 2974, WTO, June 2000. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Section 3.2 above. 
38
 See section 3.4.2 on The Reference Paper in light of Mexico-Telmex below for a more detailed 
discussion of this case and its effect on international accounting rate settlements. 
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interconnection is now seen as an important lever for telecommunications regulation. 
Furthermore, in an IP-based network environment 39 , interconnection (and the 
corresponding right of ―access‖) is increasingly needed over different layers and 
platforms. 
The voice telecommunications network is founded on the principle of universal 
connectivity: the integration of networks to enable a customer connected to one 
carrier‘s network to call a customer connected to another carrier‘s network. A 
handset, a subscription, and a number is understood to mean that the customer can 
reach all other numbers and can itself also be reached. No one network can stand in 
isolation: To give customers value for money, a network operator is compelled to 
interconnect with others so as to increase the overall reach of its services. The right to 
interconnection is necessary in a deregulated telecommunications market.  Indeed, 
interconnection can be described as the key fundamental to the viability of 
competition in telecommunications 40 . However, the principle of `any to any 
connectivity' is not the only concept as regards the regulation of interconnect.  Two 
other important concepts also play an important role.  They are: 
Equal access – this denotes the ability of the customer directly connected to the 
incumbent network to access retail services of the new entrant on a seamless 
and equivalent basis to that which the customer accesses the same retail 
services of the incumbent; 
Non-discrimination – this denotes the ability of the new entrant to be provided with 
interconnection services on no less favourable terms than the incumbent 
provides to itself. 
Other forms of regulation also assist in the governance of interconnect, such as 
guidelines on pricing and on the way negotiations should be structured. In Europe, for 
example, the European Commission has issued the Access and Interconnection 
                                                 
39
 Discussed in more detail in section 3.4.3 Internet Interconnection  
40
 See for example Colin Long's discussion of interconnection in Telecommunications Law & Practice 
S&M 2
nd
 edition, 1996. 
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Directive 41  to help National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in the various EC 
Member States deal with regulating interconnect.  
Most countries that have opened their telecommunications markets to competition 
have also established general principles, which must be followed by the incumbent in 
order to provide interconnection. Furthermore, at least 72 Member States, 
representing 93% of worldwide telecoms turnover have taken Specific Commitments 
under the Fourth Protocol (Basic Agreement on Telecommunications) that came into 
force on the 5
th
 February 199842. In addition, some Members took an Additional 
Commitment in the form of the regulatory reference Reference Paper which details, as 
part of a legal framework for liberalisation, specific rules on interconnection. Section 
2.2 Reference Paper sets out obligations on major suppliers43 for interconnection. 
Under Section 2.2 (RP), interconnection must be provided: 
 at any technically feasible point in the network; 
 on non-discriminatory terms, rates and of a quality no less favourable than 
for the incumbent‘s own supply; 
 in a timely fashion and on terms that are transparent and reasonable; 
 at cost orientated rates; and 
 on an unbundled basis so that a buyer does not pay for unnecessary 
services. 
                                                 
41
 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access and 
Interconnection Directive). The EC‘s new regulatory framework for electronic networks and services is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this book. 
42
 The Council of the European Communities ratified the Fourth Protocol by Decision 97/838 [1997] 
OJ L336.1. 
43
 A Major Supplier is defined in the Reference Paper as one who has market power because of; (a) its 
control over an essential facility or (b) its position in the market. The important doctrine of `Essential 
Facilities' is discussed further at the section 3.4.1on the Annexe on Telecommunications and the 
Reference Paper below. 
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Not all WTO Members took out the additional commitment of the Reference Paper, 
applying the above principles of cost-based interconnection44. In effect, each country 
will have its own framework and principles of interconnect45.  The structure of an 
interconnect agreement itself will be closely linked to and depend on the regulatory 
framework within which that agreement sits. However, the GATS now provide a 
gateway to a legal framework for cost-based international interconnect, and the 
provisions of the GATS are binding. For example, interconnection payments were the 
basis of the dispute between the United States and Mexico, which resulted in the 
Panel ruling in April 2004. 
Since the coming into force of the Fourth Protocol in February 1998, new 
commitments have been made either by new Members, upon accession, or in a 
unilateral fashion by an existing Member. New negotiations on services, including 
telecommunications, were started at the Doha Round in 2000. Within the timeframe 
of the overall negotiating deadline of 1 January 2005, paragraph 15 of the Doha 
Development Agenda established that ―participants shall submit initial requests for 
specific commitments by 30 June 2002 and initial offers by 31 March 2003‖. Pursuant 
to the Doha mandate, participants in the services negotiations exchanged bilateral 
initial requests since 30 June 2002. Between 31 March 2003 and 30 October, 39 
Members had submitted initial offers46. Since the collapse of the Doha Round in 
2006, negotiations have now come to a standstill. 
 
Clearly the ITU has an important part to play in continuing to develop standards for 
interconnection both at the circuit-switched and packet-switched level. These 
standards in turn will need to be reflected in progressive amendments to the 
regulatory Reference Paper in successive trade rounds. In this way the apparent roles 
of the ITU and WTO become clearer to see. In the next sub-section, the last on the 
                                                 
44
 For a full list of current Member commitments, see the WTO website at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_commit_exempt_list_e.htm, date 
accessed November 2010. 
45
 Although WTO law does not usually have direct effect, under European law (Cases 267-269/81 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stat v SPI and SAMI [1983] E.C.R. 801), measures converting 
WTO obligations into European law have to be interpreted in accordance with WTO law (Case 69/89, 
Nakajima All Precision Co Ltd v Council of the European Communities [1991] E.C.R 2069). It can be 
implied therefore that EU Member States should directly or indirectly apply WTO and therefore 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) law. 
46
 See WTO website at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm, date accessed 
November 2010. 
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ITU, we see the role that the ITU has taken in the development of standards relating 
to VoIP. 
 
3.2.4 VoIP 
 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is another crucial area where the work of the 
WTO and ITU could overlap and where a commonality of approach will be required. 
One main reason for this is that calls via the internet will soon move from its 
prototype status to becoming a major mode of operation for carrying commercial 
traffic. This could happen entirely outside the conventional regulatory framework, and 
certainly outside the traditional settlement system. This is because VoIP unlike most 
other technologies, for example wireless technology, allows operators to bypass the 
conventional accounting rate regime by sending voice calls in digital packets over an 
internet network (packet-switched network) as opposed to over a conventional circuit-
switched voice network. The costs for transmission are far cheaper and consequently 
the marginal costs for the service are lower. The downside with VoIP has always been 
a quality issue in that calls over the internet have traditionally not been equivalent in 
terms of quality to calls over conventional voice telephony networks. This position 
however is fast changing. It is also important to distinguish between VoIP and Voice 
over the Internet. VoIP is a technical standard for internet calls over private networks 
whereas Voice over the Internet is a technical standard for internet calls over the 
public internet. VoIP over a closed private network is able to generate a much higher 
quality call than Voice over Internet. The question that regulators are asking, 
particularly at the national level, is as internet calls come closer in quality to matching 
conventional voice calls, whether the providers of such calls should be regulated in 
the same way as conventional telecommunication operators? In Europe, the European 
Commission has been active in this area. In June 2004, the EC issued a 
Communication on the treatment of VoIP under the EU Regulatory Framework
47
. The 
                                                 
47
 European Commission. The Treatment of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) under the EU 
Regulatory Framework. European Commission.  DG Information Society. Brussels, 14 June 2004. See: 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/doc/useful_information/library/commiss_serv_d
oc/406_14_voip_consult_paper_v2_1.pdf. The Communication explains the conditions that apply to 
each different kind of VoIP and the level of obligations that each provider will face according to the 
type of services offered. The 2004 Communication classifies VoIP services into three main categories 
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Commission was building on the work of two earlier notices that it had issued on 
VoIP in coming to its more recent Communication
48
. Under these two earlier notices, 
VoIP was effectively exempted from regulation in the European Union in that the 
regulatory framework that applied to conventional voice telephony calls did not apply 
to VoIP. However, under the Commission‘s new regulatory framework for electronic 
networks and services
49
, and following the principle of technological neutrality, all 
digital networks and services including VoIP services are covered by the EC‘s new 
framework including obligations for interconnection. In the United States, VoIP has 
been classified as an unregulated information service under the US 
Telecommunications Act 1996
50
 effectively exempting it from common carrier 
regulations under the US Telecommunications Act. 
 
At the multilateral level, ITU-T is responsible for studies, naming, addressing and 
numbering, resource assignment for IP telephony and technical standards for IP 
telephony (H.323 Series). The work of the ITU-T will feed into the work of the 
Council for Trade in Services in discussing telecommunications. This will be 
particularly important for classification issues. The World Bank has already 
commissioned field research to determine how nation-states worldwide are classifying 
their telecommunication and internet services
51
. This is in part to determine a better 
system of more accurately classifying telecommunication services. Clearly there is a 
problem at present with the classification of telecommunication services, as the 
current Services Sectoral Classification List in Telecommunications service sectors 
(MTN.GNS/W/120), is woefully out-of-date as regards new internet-based services, 
                                                                                                                                            
(i) Self-provided with no specific service provider charging a fee for providing a VoIP service: this 
category of service will fall outside the scope of the EC‘s Framework Directive because there is no 
service provided by a provider with the intention of making a profit taking it outside the scope of an 
―electronic communications service‖(Article 1 Framework Directive); (ii) Corporate Private 
Networks/Internal Use: private electornic communication services will fall within the scope of both the 
EC Framework and Authorisation Directives; and (iii) Publicly Available IP Telephony: this provision 
is more complex and the type of regulation that will apply will generally depend on the whether the 
VoIP service ―looks‖  more like an electronic communications service or whether it looks more like a 
conventional voice service and therefore regulated as a Public Available Telephone Service (PATS) 
under the EC‘s Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC (Article 2(c)). See the EC 2004 VoIP 
Communication for more details. 
48
 Commission notice on the legal status of Voice on the Internet under Directive 90/388/EEC OJ C6, 
10.1.1998  and Commission Communication on VoIP OJ C369, 22.12.2000.  
49
 Discussed in detail in section 3.3.1on Classification of Telecommunications Services below. 
50
 See FCC website at: http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/voip.html, date accessed September 2005. 
51
 Discussed in section 3.3.1 below (Classification of Telecommunications Services). 
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such as VoIP. Classification of telecommunications services is discussed below 
(Classification of Telecommunications Issues).  
 
3.3 The WTO 
 
The WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement (―BTA‖) is a plurilateral agreement, 
although only a subgroup
52
 of the WTO‘s 144 members have made specific 
commitments for basic telecommunications, the full WTO membership can take 
advantage of the trade benefits conferred by those commitments. Most countries 
making specific commitments under the BTA did so as part of negotiations of the 
BTA, but countries may continue to make new (or improved) commitments through 
three principle routes: (1) when joining the WTO; (2) as part of a formal ―round‖ of 
negotiations; or (3) unilaterally.  
 
In telecommunications, the last decade saw unrivalled privatisation and corpratisation 
programmes in many countries all over the world generating the free flow of capital 
into the sector. The BTA played an important role in putting in place a basic 
regulatory framework that would assist in protecting such investment. But where did 
this new capital come from? Large increases in international and domestic calls and 
reduced costs through more efficient transmission allowed firms to generate increased 
margins in conjunction with increased earnings, which in turn were retained in the 
sector fuelling new investment.  Telephone companies became increasingly profitable 
and with the glimpse of the new economy, such operators were able to attract 
investment from other sectors. The present decade however is completely different. 
Now, telecommunication operators are faced with managing increasing levels of debt 
rather than investing in new capital. Furthermore, the industry is yet to prove that 
technological changes and new service development will have a net impact other than 
in reducing the cost base and adding intense pressure on current market prices. 
Coupled with debt arising from huge sunk costs, the advent of IP as the basic protocol 
and foundation stone for the production of new telecommunication services, the 
                                                 
52
 As at 2008, there were at least 89 countries who had made specific commitments on 
telecommunications. See WTO telecom specific commitments at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_commit_exempt_list_e.htm, accessed 
October 2008. 
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industry is fast transforming its whole production function. In this way, the Doha 
Round was completely different to that of the earlier Uruguay Round. The Uruguay 
Round culminated in the BTA, the Doha Round ended in a breakdown of 
negotiations, albeit with some small steps forward, notably as regards developing 
countries
53
.  
 
In the Doha Round of negotiations, launched in November 2001, WTO members 
sought to address how the special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions of the 
various WTO agreements might better be used to serve the interests of developing 
countries (which comprise the majority of the WTO membership). In the original 
timetable of the Doha Round, requests for market access were due by June 30, 2002, 
and initial offers of market access by March 31, 2003. The negotiations were set to 
conclude by January 1, 2005 as part of a single undertaking, with the original 
intention that virtually every item of the negotiation was part of a whole and 
indivisible package and which could not be agreed separately – ―Nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed.‖ Unfortunately, some commentators would argue that little 
has been agreed, although the WTO is keen to stress the more recent agreements at 
Cancun
54
. The introduction to this thesis set out an important distinction between DCs 
and LDCs. The distinction is important in that LDCs are able to gain more extensive 
access to S&Ds than otherwise available to DCs as a group. For example, at the time 
of writing, the Ministerial Declaration agreed at the Sixth Session of the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, specifically included two 
important provisions on S&D rights for LDCs including: 
 
 Providing duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all 
products (97% of products for countries unable to provide 100%) 
originating from all LDCs by 2008; 
 Ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from LDCs 
are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access
55
. 
 
                                                 
53
 See the Doha Round section of the WTO‘s website at: www.wto.org, date accessed November 2010. 
Developing countries and telecommunications is discussed in Chapter 7. 
54
 See the outcome WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun in September 2003 at www.wto.org, 
data accessed September 2005. 
55
 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22
nd
 December 2005, Annex F, para 36. 
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In future trade rounds, a major bottleneck will be on negotiations on mode 4 within 
GATS (movement of natural persons). Developing countries are pushing for increased 
liberalisation by developed countries under this mode and also of services of export 
interest to developing countries. DCs and LDCs are reluctant to make any further 
services concessions without more progress in this area, particularly de-linking the 
need by developed countries to link movement of natural persons only with 
commercial presence (mode 3)
56
. In telecommunications, the World Bank has already 
commissioned research that will seek to answer a range of fundamental questions that 
will impact on whether or not members make new commitments in future rounds. 
These questions include
57
:  
 
 To provide an analytical framework for understanding, with specific 
reference to the telecommunications sector, the potential economic 
benefits and risks of accession and/or an enhanced offer under 
GATS/WTO.   
 To explore the relationship between the WTO offer and the processes of 
domestic policy reforms within the telecommunications sector and other 
relevant policy developments, such as may be the case with competition 
policy.  
 To demonstrate, through the use of case studies and other ‗primary‘ data 
from selected developing countries, the economic benefits and risks that 
have resulted from the BTA offers made under the 1996/7 GATS/WTO 
framework.  
 To consider the ways in which new trade agenda items may redefine the 
benefits and risks associated with the WTO Doha negotiations in 
telecommunications and to consider some of the new trade issues that are 
emerging as a result of broader deployment of ICTs across an economy.   
 
In defining the work of the WTO post Doha in telecommunications, greater emphasis 
will be placed on the new trade agenda items cited above. Defining these items is 
                                                 
56
 Wunsch-Vincent S. and McIntosh J., WTO, E-Commerce, and Information Technologies: From the 
Uruguay Round through the Doha Development Agenda, Markle Foundation, 2004, p.77 citing GATS 
Council-Special Session, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/9, June 
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difficult as technology changes so rapidly, and so perhaps we need first to understand 
the key dynamics influencing the telecommunications industry, before beginning to 
define possible new trade agenda items. Key dynamics will include new technologies 
and data services, particularly technologies that will continue to lower international 
transmission costs, such as optical fibre quite often used for transmission within cities 
as well as national and international transmission, satellite channels, Digital 
Subscriber Loop (DSL) technology which can enhance the capacity of the local loop 
offering broadband-type functionality, the next generation Internet Protocol IPv6
58
, 
and fixed wireless access. For developing countries, wireless access has been 
particularly important in reaching rural or mountainous areas difficult to serve with 
conventional fixed-line networks. As such, the reduction in the price of mobile 
network infrastructure and the success of operators in countries often considered to be 
too poor to offer commercial potential have influenced the priorities for negotiations 
under Doha and will do so in the future. It is anticipated that this will continue with 
the establishment of 3G technologies giving the potential to reduce the value of wire-
based access in countries that do not already have viable wireline access 
infrastructure.  
 
Besides the new technologies, there will be new industry commercial structures, for 
example multinational corporation consolidation, and the emergence of multi-
technology operators and service providers through joint ventures, mergers or other 
technology transfer arrangements. Market structures have fundamentally changed 
away from legacy circuit-switched networks to packet-switched networks, giving rise 
to new categories of operator, such as internet backbone operators, transit operators, 
and application service providers. Together with the new operators have come 
changes in the way in which such operators interconnect to exchange traffic, often 
based on an exchange of leased-line capacity on a settlement-free basis (peering) and 
                                                 
58
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moving to sophisticated methods of negotiating transit on a payment basis (see 
Chapter 4). Regulators have mostly exercised forbearance in regulating such 
agreements between Internet service providers, but have been slowly moving in this 
direction as greater volumes of Internet traffic are originated and terminated. Other 
key dynamics would include the effect of huge sunk investments by operators and 
service providers, explaining their waning interest in entering new, developing and 
higher risk markets, and finally, the effect of new regulatory mechanisms, such as 
auctions (e.g. for UMTS), and the large investment in new licenses.  
 
These industry dynamics will shape the emerging new trade issues, for example 
bilateral trade and investment agreements. The emergence of bilateral and multilateral 
trading blocs through free-trade area agreements and customs unions will have a 
significant impact on future trade policy in telecommunications. At the bilateral level, 
the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) covering FDI in services reached 2, 
265 by the end of 2003, and involving 175 countries
59
. There is a risk of multiple 
standards emerging when agreements are signed outside of the global multilateral 
trade institutions, which may reduce WTO negotiations to a ‗lowest-common 
denominator‘. However, regional initiatives can also assist WTO accession, through 
technical assistance programmes implemented at a regional level, or through the 
aggregation of regional demand (particularly where investors may be wary of 
investment in smaller countries, e.g. island states), for instance through customs 
unions or other regional regimes. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004, 
highlighted the shift to services, and the greater reliance placed on bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. At the time of writing, the World Investment Report 2005 
indicates that during 2004, 73 new bilateral investment treaties were concluded, 
bringing the total number to 2, 392
60
. According to UNCTAD, the largest number of 
the new BITs signed during 2004 was between developing countries. This has been 
reflect4ed in increased investment. UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2008 
records: 
After four consecutive years of growth, global FDI inflows rose in 
2007 by 30% to reach $1,833 billion, well above the previous all-time high 
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set in 2000. Despite the financial and credit crises, which began in the second 
half of 2007, all the three major economic groupings – developed countries, 
developing countries and the transition economies of South-East Europe and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – saw continued growth in 
their inflows.
61
 
 
The report indicates that increased investment in infrastructure is needed, particularly 
in developing countries as investment is anticipated to decline in 2008 as the credit 
crunch bites. Fortunately the 2008 report indicates that, ―telecommunications is the 
only infrastructure industry in which FDI has been the dominant form of TNC entry in 
developing and transition economies.‖62 As mentioned above, internet networks have 
transformed the production function of telecommunications. For this reason, it will be 
necessary to consider the potential impact of the ITU‘s Recommendation D.50 on 
international internet interconnection agreed at the WTSA in October 2000. This 
recommends that "administrations [i.e. telecommunications operators] involved in the 
provision of international Internet connections negotiate and agree to bilateral 
commercial arrangements enabling direct international Internet connections that take 
into account the possible need for compensation between them for the value of 
elements such as traffic flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and cost of 
international transmission amongst others." The implications of Recommendation 
D.50 are hard to gauge at this stage, but it could have far reaching ramifications on the 
international trade of Internet traffic between operators, and therefore indirectly affect 
consumer welfare
63
. New trade issues will also include, on the part of developed 
countries, the strengthening of competition principles, either at the WTO level or 
through some form of amendment to the Reference Paper
64
, through reforms required 
as a condition of World Bank funding of infrastructure or new legislative programs, or 
perhaps through a separate plurilateral agreement. The extent to which existing 
commitments under the GATS, and the Services Sectoral Classification List cover 
new service delivery sectors, such as services delivered over Transmission Control 
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Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) ("internet networks,") for example electronic 
commerce services will also be included. In conjunction with this, the likelihood of 
"bundled" sectoral commitments in complimentary service sectors, such as computer, 
audiovisual, distribution, advertising, and financial sectors that seek to facilitate 
"network-based transactions" in these sectors will also be a target, particularly for 
countries, such as the United States who has actively pursued a ―Digital Trade 
Agenda‖ as part of its negotiations for bilateral and Free Trade Agreements with a 
range of countries including Singapore, Jordan, Australia, and Thailand
65
. Finally, 
new trade issues in telecommunications post Doha could also include new 
commitments on technical cooperation and capacity building made by member 
governments in the Doha Declaration. 
 
 
3.3.1 Classification of Telecommunications Issues 
 
As mentioned earlier, the classification of telecommunication services is important 
given that telecommunication services serve as valuable input in the production and 
distribution of other services. The classification of telecommunication services must 
be distinguished however from the classification of electronic intangibles discussed in 
Chapter 9 (The Classification of Electronic Intangibles in the WTO). The two are 
related but very distinct. In this sub-section (3.3.1), we discuss the classification of 
telecommunication infrastructure and services by which electronic intangibles are 
delivered to final customers, and not the electronic content that is carried over such 
infrastructure. Given the rapid rate of convergence in this sector (broadcasting, 
information technology and telecommunications networks coming together) made 
possible through digital technology, the need to accurately classify relevant 
telecommunication services into their distinct service schedules is necessary for the 
trade negotiators to enter into request and offer negotiations as part of the trade round 
(often bilateral as offers are targeted at particular WTO members or groups of 
members). Classification of electronic intangibles is briefly mentioned in sub-section 
3.3.3 for the sake of completeness. A more complete analysis is set out in Chapter 9. 
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The current classification system used by trade negotiators in telecommunications 
broadly splits telecommunication services into eleven basic categories, the most 
important of which include: fixed, wireless, national, international, satellite, and data 
services. Many of these service offerings have now become blurred with the take-up 
of digital technology. For example, there is now a distinction to be made between 
geographic (identified by location) and non-geographic services (independent of 
location), conditional access systems (pay-per-view broadcasting systems) and video-
on-demand. Currently, the WTO Agreements make use of two classification systems: 
the harmonised commodity description and coding system (HS), which applies to 
goods under the GATT, originally created under the auspices of the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO), and the classification list (W/120)
66
, which is based to a great 
extent on the United Nations‘ central product classification (UNCPC), and applying 
mainly to services under the GATS.   Although both the HS and the UNCPC were 
originally developed for statistical purposes most scheduled commitments of WTO 
members are based on these classification systems.   The HS provides a system for the 
identification of products (product lines) that help Members identify the customs 
duties payable, and the collection and comparison of trade statistics.  The HS is made 
up of a number of chapters that separate products, by their physical characteristics 
rather than their end-use criteria.  The chapters are further divided by headings, 
subheadings, and finally, the six-digit HS code number. The HS nomenclature is used 
to classify anything that qualifies as a good and in accordance with its physical 
characteristics.   
 
To add another layer of complexity, the United Nations also defines services as 
comprising all economic activities included under the ―tertiary sector‖ in the United 
Nations International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)(Rev. 3.1). 
Telecommunications and Posts is just one category that falls under the ISIC. Also 
included are financial services, business services, television broadcasting and 
entertainment. At the time of writing, the United Nations Statistical Classifications 
Section ha now started its fourth revision of the ISIC for use from 2007, to take 
account of changes in technology as well as deregulation, liberalization and 
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privatization of previously state controlled operations
67
. A new information and 
communication category is planned with second-tier groupings for 
telecommunications, broadcasting and internet providers (currently grouped under a 
sub-set of ―transport, storage and communications‖). The UNCPC mentioned above 
provides a greater level of disaggregation than the ISIC in that it specifies individual 
product categories (more than 600) as opposed to the ISIC‘s general service 
descriptions
68
.  
 
Leading up to the negotiations on the BTA, the WTO Secretariat prepared an informal 
note on the full list of telecommunication services sub-sectors from the W/120 
Classification List to help participants to the Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunications in drafting their Schedules of Specific Commitments under the 
GATS
69
. The informal note and Notes for Scheduling of Specific Commitments under 
the GATS
70
 were later incorporated into a final version of the Guidelines for the 
Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the GATS in 2001
71
. 
 
Most WTO members have made commitments using the W/120 classification list
72
, 
but some have used their own method of classification, and some a combination of the 
two
73
. The W/120 classification list basically divides telecommunications services 
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into two broad categories: (a) Basic telecommunications services which include all 
telecommunication services, both public and private that involve end-to-end 
transmission of customer supplier information
74
; and (b) Value-Added 
telecommunication services which include services for which suppliers ―add value‖ to 
the customer‘s information by enhancing its form or content or by providing for its 
storage and retrieval. As of March 204, forty-one WTO members still used the W/120 
classification list to submit their initial offers in the telecommunications services 
sector as part of the Doha Round. There are however on-going problems with the 
continued use of W/120, which include the fact that many sub-sectors set out in 
W/120 are not technologically neutral which will inevitably lead to redundant 
classifications as technology changes, that a number of service sub-sectors do not 
correspond with modern trade in telecommunications (telegraph and telex services
75
), 
that categories of services potentially overlap particularly in light of converged digital 
services, that the link with the UNCPC creates confusion in that the UNCPC is itself 
not up-to-date, and that a number of telecommunication services now overlap with 
that of the computer related services sector. Taiwan for example has proposed that 
convergence services such as internet-based telecom services and the delivery of 
multimedia content should be covered solely by the telecom and audio-visual sectors 
and not computer services
76
. In light of these difficulties, the European Commission 
in 2004 issued a non- paper setting out suggestions for revision of the W/120
77
. The 
EC‘s primary suggestion is to simplify the classifications based on the complex and 
out-of-date W/120 by defining telecommunication services as ―any service consisting 
of the transmission and reception of signals by any electromagnetic means‖. 
Commitments for all telecommunication services can then be made with that 
definition in mind
78
, and where members do not wish to make a commitment for a 
specific service (for example for broadcasting transmission), they would simply 
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inscribe under the market access and national treatment columns ―none except for 
broadcasting transmission‖79.  
 
The EC‘s definition will likely remove the artificial construct now existing between 
basic and value-added telecommunication services and that is fast becoming 
increasingly redundant given the switch to transmission production based on the IP 
prototcol. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the existing WTO member Schedules on 
market access and national treatment in telecommunications will not be able to deal 
with the evolution of technology in this sector. The question remains as to whether the 
EC‘s suggested revision goes far enough to cover the new range of internet services or 
so called ―complementary services‖ based on transmission production switching to 
TCP/IP?  
 
3.3.2 Network-based transactions and Complementary Services 
 
The United States has for some time discussed the need for other WTO Members to 
schedule commitments in basic and value-added telecommunications services but also 
in ―complementary services‖, such as distribution, express delivery, computer, 
advertising, and certain financial services that can be integrated into network-based 
transactions
80
. The US argues that increased market access, particularly in GATS 
modes 1 (cross-border supply) and 3 (commercial presence), is a necessary step for a 
WTO member to create an environment attractive to increased foreign investment. 
Increasing market access commitments for services enhanced through the use of 
networks, encourages both growth of the underlying network and the services that 
ride over them. Such new services could include banking, accounting, legal, market 
research, medical and dental, adult education, R&D services (natural science), news 
agency services, and audiovisual. For DCs and LDCs, many of these services can 
directly and indirectly impact on the UN‘s Millennium Development Goals such as 
reducing poverty, improving literacy and healthcare. Given the US position of 
dominance as regards electronic commerce services, arguing for increased market 
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access in complementary services makes sense. But such an argument could also 
apply to other WTO members active in developing their technology service exports. 
This would also depend crucially on whether technology service exports (electronic 
intangibles) were classed as goods under the GATT and therefore potentially liable to 
tariffs or services under the GATS and liable to governmental measures (discussed in 
the next section). Putting the problem of classification to one side, increased market 
access commitments in complementary services could not only benefit the US but 
also a number of developing countries, which have successfully grown their in-house 
software and hardware industries, such as Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Chinese Hong 
Kong, Korea, and India as selected examples. All of these countries have benefited 
from MNCs mainly in the developed world outsourcing back office and front office 
functions (business process outsourcing)(see Chapter 8 on technology transfer). The 
continued success of such outsourcing will also depend to some extent on potential 
protectionist measures imposed in the West to protect home market jobs
81
.  
 
Under Article 5(b)(3) of the Annexe on Telecommunications service suppliers are 
guaranteed that they can employ the protocol of their choice in delivering any service 
over a telecommunications network that has been scheduled by the WTO member 
concerned as a specific commitment. This is an extremely important provision and 
could cover the cross-border delivery of internet services, although not all members 
would agree with such an interpretation. The Annex on Telecommunications of 
course, unlike the Reference Paper applies to value-added services. The OECD has 
also undertaken research on considering various services as necessary ―inputs‖ for the 
facilitation of electronic commerce
82. The OECD argues that the ―rationale for a 
cluster approach in services negotiations is to allow an appropriate recognition of the 
commercial linkages between selected service sectors, without disturbing the Services 
Sectoral Classification List, on which existing schedules of specific commitments are 
based.‖83 The OECD argues that a basic cluster of services necessary for internet-
based commercial transactions would include: telecommunications services, banking 
services, computer and related services, and delivery services (postal and courier). A 
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more extended cluster could also be envisaged as including: advertising, legal, market 
research, photographic, web-site design, and distribution
84
. However for DCs and 
LDCs keen to facilitate growth of IT goods and services exports, none of these 
provisions will mean much unless the Quad countries for example go some way in 
eliminating other trade barriers, such as excessive requirements for temporary entry 
and exit of specialised technical personnel, discriminatory tax treatment for foreigners 
and excessive capital transfer and/or repatriation taxes, all of which could act as 
barriers to their exports. Other concerns include qualification requirements and 
procedures, licensing and local authentication requirements, and technical standards 
that act as non-tariff barriers
85
.  
 
3.3.3 Electronic Intangibles 
 
The previous section discussed complementary services, services that can be 
delivered as network-based transactions and the clusters of commitments required to 
be scheduled in order for such services to be provided through any of the modes of 
supply under the GATS. No doubt, such commitments if scheduled would advantage 
any member who is in a position to exploit the new market access opportunities, 
presently the developed countries, and in particular, the United States, but also an 
increasing number of DCs and LDCs as mentioned above.  
 
The whole approach to network-based transactions and seeking commitments from 
WTO members that will allow for complementary services that could run over a 
telecommunication network is simply a stepping-stone to generating increased trade 
in electronic commerce. As mentioned, at present, the United States will be an 
obvious winner of increased commitments, reflecting clusters of services and 
complementary network based transactions, given its strength in exporting electronic 
products, in this chapter referred to as electronic intangibles
86
. As trade in electronic 
intangibles increases, there will however be another problem that will need to be 
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resolved in the course of time, again linked to the problem of classification. Just as the 
WTO is facing the issue of how to refine and redefine the W/120 classification system 
for telecommunication services under the GATS, so too is it facing difficulty in 
defining whether electronic intangibles should be classed as goods under the GATT or 
as services under the GATS or as some form of hybrid product. US-Gambling has set 
an important precedent in this area, particularly as regards the applicability of the 
GATS to the trade in cross-border electronic services. This important issue is 
discussed at length in Chapter 9 (Section 9. 6)
87
. 
 
 
 
3.4 Developments in Multilateral Telecommunication Measures 
 
The aim of this section is to discuss the most interesting new developments emerging 
in the regulation of international telecommunications. It examines the current 
weakness of the Reference Paper in light of recent case law and the need for the 
Reference Paper to be amended as IP networks begin to dominate. The section begins 
with a discussion of the two most important WTO instruments affecting trade in 
international telecommunications, besides the schedules of specific commitments of 
the WTO members themselves (both the 1994 and 1997 commitments). Section 3.4.1 
below discusses the Annexe and Reference Paper, and section 3.4.2 discusses the 
weaknesses of the Reference Paper in light of the recent Mexico-Telmex case heard by 
the WTO‘s DSB88 in 2004.  
 
3.4.1 Annexe on Telecommunications and Reference Paper  
 
Annexe on Telecommunications_The Annexe on Telecommunications is a separate 
Annex to the GATS and negotiated at the time of the Uruguay Round. The Annex 
applies to measures of a member that effect access to and use of public 
telecommunications transport networks and services by basic telecommunication 
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suppliers of any other member
89
. The Annex does not apply to measures affecting 
cable or broadcast distribution of radio or television programming
90
. Furthermore the 
obligations contained in the Annex are aimed at facilitating the exploitation of 
scheduled commitments only, and do not create a right to supply a service where no 
scheduled commitment for that service exists
91
. The Annex is basically an instrument 
that provides a certain level of security for those investors investing in ancillary 
service markets, such as banking and insurance, where market access commitments 
have been scheduled, and which require access to the local Public Switched 
Telephony Network (PSTN) to provide such services. Importantly, the Annex at 
paragraph 5(e) provides for service suppliers to be able to interconnect with the 
incumbent‘s network using any interface protocol to do so. The question arises then 
as to whether the Annex provides for access to internet networks and also for the 
interconnection of an internet network with the local Public Switched Telephony 
Network (PSTN)? The issue is still under debate within the Council for Trade in 
Services, with many developing countries arguing that no such access was scheduled 
for in many members‘ commitments. However within the GATS Council, Members 
have suggested that the AT will apply to access to and use of an internet network, 
where that network is defined within domestic law as a public telecommunications 
transport service and/or network i.e. a public network
92
. In the UK, an early starter for 
developing pro-competitive regulatory regimes in telecoms, the national 
telecommunications regulator OFTEL (now OFCOM) considered that an internet 
network could be a public network if addresses on that network (IP addresses for 
example) were available through a national numbering plan
93
.  
 
Reference Paper_Whereas the Annex applies to value-added services, the Reference 
Paper applies to basic telecommunication services
94
. The regulatory Reference Paper 
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to the BTA takes the form of an additional commitment to a member‘s schedule. As 
of March 2004, thirty-five WTO members have taken out an additional commitment 
in the form of the Reference Paper in its entirety or with modifications and 
extensions. The Reference Paper (―RP‖) is a deceptively simple instrument and yet its 
effect, particularly on the domestic telecommunications policy of any one member is 
potentially very far reaching ushering in competition-type provisions to check abuse 
of monopoly power and interconnection safeguards to guarantee interconnection to 
the local incumbent‘s (publicly available) telecommunications network95. The RP sets 
out rules for governments on regulating ―major suppliers‖ of basic 
telecommunications services, major suppliers being defined as: 
 
―a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of participation 
(having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunication services as a result of: 
 
(a) control over essential facilities; or 
(b) use of its position on the market.‖ 
 
Essential facilities in turn being defined by the RP as: 
 
―…facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or service that 
 
(a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number 
of suppliers; and 
(b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to 
provide a service.‖ 
 
These terms seek to import an essential facilities doctrine at the multilateral level in 
terms of regulating telecommunications. The essential facilities doctrine concerns 
mandated access to an incumbent‘s network, where the incumbent has refused to 
grant access, and for no objective reason, or has withdrawn supply, or is applying 
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some form of discriminatory policy in granting access (for example treating its own 
subsidiaries more favourably). In Europe, a string of cases including Stena Sealink
96
, 
Magill
97
, and European Night Services
98
 sought to introduce the essential facilities 
doctrine into European law, but was eventually made more difficult to apply pursuant 
to the test adopted in the case of Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint
99
. The Bronner 
judgement effectively heralded the end of the practical use of the doctrine in Europe 
unless the limbs of the Bronner test could be satisfied
100
. 
 
Instead of using a term such as ―major supplier‖ to describe dominance, under its new 
regulatory framework for electronic networks and services, the European Commission 
has instead decided to opt for a definition of Significant Market Power as being 
equivalent to dominance and defined under Article 14(2) Framework Directive
101
: 
 
An undertaking shall be deemed to have Significant Market Power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to 
dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers.
102
 
 
The European Commission‘s new regulatory policy for electronic networks and 
services is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Unlike the definition of SMP used 
by the EC, the WTO‘s reference to major supplier does not appear to cover a situation 
of joint monopoly or a potential oligopoly, where none of the operators alone in the 
market would appear to enjoy dominance, but collectively either actively or passively, 
                                                 
96
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97
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they could enjoy dominance. In this respect, the EC‘s definition of market power is 
more far reaching.  
 
The RP also requires governments to take measures ensuring that major suppliers do 
not engage in anti-competitive practices such as cross-subsidisation
103
, using 
confidential information  (for example on interconnection) in an inappropriate way, or 
unnecessarily withholding technical information (for example on standards) from 
competitors. Also covered are requirements for cost-orientated interconnection (which 
is not defined under the instrument), mandated interconnection with major suppliers 
networks for the provision of basic telecommunications services, and unbundled 
services so that users are not paying for network components or facilities that they do 
not actually require
104
. Provisions also exist for maintaining policy measures to 
achieve universal service (left to the discretion of the member), the creation of 
separate regulatory bodies from incumbent operators to allow for arms-length 
regulation of the operator, and the use of transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedures for allocation and use of scare resources (such as spectrum and 
numbering)
105
. Probably most importantly, the RP provides for dispute settlement on 
interconnection at Article 2.5. Although the RP refers to the dispute settlement body 
as being the independent regulator envisaged by Article 5 RP, in fact, the settlement 
body could be any independent domestic body, or if the dispute is between 
governments as opposed to private entities, perhaps the Dispute Settlement Body of 
the WTO itself. Within the WTO membership, it is widely recognised that most 
disputes do not end up before a panel, having being settled by the respective 
governments as part of the procedure envisioned by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding
106
. The combination of political pressure and threat of litigation before 
a WTO panel often strengthens the position of the regulatory authority that favours 
increased competition (Cowhey and Kilmenko). This is exactly what happened in the 
Mexico-Telmex case discussed in the next section. 
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3.4.2 The Reference Paper in light of Mexico-Telmex
107
 
 
Mexico-Telmex is a landmark WTO case, the first heard by the WTO‘s DSB in the 
telecommunications sector. The panel‘s report stretching to over 238 pages has 
already produced intense discussion on its possible future implications for WTO 
members, particularly those who still rely on high international accounting rate 
settlements to fund their domestic infrastructure. Effectively, the case leads the way 
for a cost-based interconnection framework for the termination of international calls 
and for the interpretation of the term ―anti-competitive practice‖ as found in the 
Reference Paper. The case also demonstrates how WTO law can impact private 
undertakings and state monopolies. The Author‘s intention in this section is to discuss 
some of the main issues arising from the panel‘s ruling rather than to describe the 
detail of the historical relationship between the United States and Mexico and that led 
to the dispute
108
.  
 
In Mexico-Telmex, the United States presented three main claims: (1) that Mexico had 
failed to ensure that its major telecommunications supplier provided interconnection 
on ―terms, conditions…and cost orientated rates that are…reasonable‖ in accordance 
with section 2 of its Reference Paper commitments; (2) that Mexico had not 
maintained appropriate measures to prevent Telmex, a major supplier, from engaging 
in ―anti-competitive practices‖ in accordance with section 1 of its Reference Paper 
commitments; and (3) that Mexico failed to ensure ―access to and use of‖ its public 
telecommunications transport networks and services, including private leased circuits, 
on ―reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions‖, in accordance with its 
obligations under section 5 of the GATS Annexe on Telecommunications
109
. In brief, 
the panel accepted claims (1) and (2) of the US claim. However on claim (3), the 
panel argued that a specific provision in Mexico‘s GATS schedule allowed Mexico to 
prohibit the supply of cross-border services using leased-line capacity in Mexico. 
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An important element of the case focuses on cross-border interconnection rights. The 
US argued that the existence of an international accounting rate regime that may 
apply in certain cases to cross-border interconnection did not mean that cross-border 
interconnection is excluded from the scope of the Reference Paper
110
. In contrast, 
Mexico argued that the provisions of the Reference Paper on interconnection do not 
apply to the cross-border supply of a service. It argued that the Reference Paper 
commitments were additional commitments undertaken under Article XVIII GATS, 
and could not therefore apply to cross-border interconnection, a market access issue 
covered under Article XVI. The panel however accepted the US position that the term 
interconnection ―does not distinguish between domestic and international 
interconnection, including through accounting rate regimes‖ and that ―term 
interconnection within Mexico‘s Reference Paper does not justify a restricted 
interpretation of interconnection…which would exclude international interconnection, 
including accounting rate regimes, from the scope of Section 2 Reference Paper.‖111 
 
Another important ruling that the panel made which will affect international 
telecommunications is its decision on qualifying the Understanding on Accounting 
Rates on whether or not Members‘ accounting rate settlement regimes will be 
shielded from dispute settlement, which the Understanding provides for
112
. The panel 
argued that the accounting rates described in the Understanding should be 
―understood to be limited to: (a) traditional accounting rate that is not cost-oriented; 
(b) that can be interpreted as a measure of a Member, or that triggers a Member‘s 
obligations under Article VIII on monopolies; and (c) that applies discriminatory rates 
on the basis of the national origin of the cross-border traffic, and thus may be 
inconsistent with the MFN principle in Article II.‖ 113 The crucial upshot of this is that 
first, not all international interconnection pricing is excluded from dispute settlement 
by the Understanding, only traditional accounting rate regimes with ―differential 
rates‖, and second, that the exclusion applies solely to dispute settlement not from the 
substantive obligations of the GATS, including the schedules of specific 
commitments. In effect the panel argued that the Understanding does not allow for all 
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forms of cross-border interconnection to be shielded from dispute settlement
114
. This 
ruling in discussing the provisions of the Understanding, which although not a legally 
binding instrument was long held to be a form of a gentleman‘s agreement, now 
effectively dilutes it.  
 
The panel then went onto to determine whether Telmex was a major supplier under 
the terms of the Reference Paper and also accepted that it had to define the ―relevant 
market‖ and whether Telmex had ―the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation…in that market,‖ and decide whether that ability resulted either from 
―control over essential facilities‖ or ―from use of its position in the market‖. 
Accordingly, the panel found the ―relevant market‖ to be the termination in Mexico of 
international calls from the US.
115
 The panel also determined that Telmex was a major 
supplier with respect to call termination in that it had the ability to materially affect 
the price of termination of calls from the United States into Mexico, as a result of its 
special position in the market, which allows it to set a uniform price applying to all its 
competitors on terminating calls from the United States
116
. Furthermore, the panel 
determined that the price Mexico was charging for terminating incoming international 
calls
117
 , was not in accordance with the principles of cost-orientation as set out in 
Section 2.2 Mexico‘s Reference Paper118. The panel‘s extensive discussion on the 
meaning of the term cost-orientation, running to several pages of its decision (and 
based mainly on US supplied methodologies which was for some reason not refuted 
by Mexico), will almost certainly be used in further DSB proceedings on 
interconnection in future years. This is an important precedent in international 
telecommunications, in that the term ―cost-orientation‖ was never defined in the 
Reference Paper. 
 
The final significant element of the panel‘s ruling concerned the interpretation of 
―anti-competitive practice‖ and is probably the one section of the ruling that has been 
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the subject of criticism in terms of legal reasoning and methodology
119
. The panel 
found that Mexico had a special obligation to control Telmex as a ―major supplier‖ to 
ensure that it did not engage in ―anticompetitive practices‖. Anticompetitive practices 
are not defined as a term in Section 1 of Mexico‘s Reference Paper. The panel instead 
turned to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and the Merriam Webster dictionary 
references to define terms such as competition (―rivalry in the market, striving for 
custom between those who have the same commodities to dispose of‖) and anti-
competitive (―tending to reduce or discourage competition‖).120 The panel also found 
that the meaning of ―anticompetitive practices‖ was informed by related provisions of 
some international instruments that address competition policy, for example, Article 
46 of the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation already 
recognised that restrictive business practices, such as price-fixing and allocation of 
markets and customers, could adversely affect international trade by restraining 
competition and limiting market access
121. The panel also argued that ―the importance 
of ensuring that firms refrain from engaging in horizontal price-fixing agreements, 
market or customer allocation arrangements and other forms of collusion is likewise 
emphasised in the United Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices‖122. The panel felt that it 
was also worth pointing out that both Mexico and the US are members of the OECD, 
and that the OECD has adopted a Recommendation calling for a strict prohibition of 
cartels
123
. It is interesting to note however that in negotiations for the Reference 
Paper, none of these treaties were discussed or referred to in a similar way. In short 
that the panel‘s interpretation of the competition provisions as set out in the Reference 
Paper were not envisaged by the WTO membership at the time of its negotiation
124
.  
 
In conclusion at paragraph 7.238 of its ruling, the panel found that ―the term 
―anticompetitive practices‖ in Section 1 of Mexico‘s Reference Paper includes 
practices in addition to those listed in Section 1.2, in particular horizontal practices 
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related to price-fixing and market sharing arrangements.‖ This is perhaps one of the 
most contentious issues in the panel‘s ruling as it effectively sets aside Mexican law 
(state action doctrine) on the application of uniform rates for call termination. Mexico 
had argued that practices required by regulation could not be ―anticompetitive‖ as 
they were mandated by ―ILD rules that are part of the regulatory framework of laws 
intended to increase competition‖ by preventing predatory pricing by foreign 
entrants
125
. The European Communities, as a third party to the proceedings, agreed 
with Mexico on this point arguing that: ―the fixing of a uniform price cannot be an 
anti-competitive practice since uniform prices are required by law.‖126 The panel 
agreed that pursuant to doctrines applicable under the competition laws of some 
members, a firm complying with a ―specific legislative requirement of such a member 
(eg a trade law authorising private market sharing agreements) may be immunized 
from being found in violation of the general domestic competition law‖, however the 
panel also argued that international commitments made under the GATS ―for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers…‖from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices‖ are however designed to limit the regulatory powers of WTO members127. 
This is a remarkable finding in that the panel is using principles of international 
economic law (WTO law) to subvert national state doctrines. It must be said however 
that the European Commission has also found ways to circumvent the application of 
the state doctrine in DGIV Competition cases, for example in the Deutsche Telekom 
(DT) decision
128
. In the DT case, which concerns margin squeezing by the dominant 
incumbent Deutsche Telekom for wholesale prices offered for unbundled access to 
Deutsche Telekom‘s local loop network, although it was accepted that an undertaking 
could not be held responsible for breach of the antitrust rules if such a breach occurs 
because of the State having imposed on the undertaking a specific course of action (in 
this case the imposition of a price cap for local loop prices by the German regulator, 
RegTP), the Commission was still able to show that within the State mandated action, 
the undertaking could have avoided the margin squeeze and subsequent infringement 
of Article 82 Treaty of Rome (abuse of a dominant position)
129
. Clearly the European 
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Commission‘s circumvention of the state action doctrine in Deutsche Telekom is not 
as direct as the panel‘s ruling in Mexico-Telmex, however, the Author submits that 
the panel in Mexico-Telmex perhaps went a little too far in its interpretation of the 
term ―anti-competitive practice‖. For example in finding as an example the use of 
price-fixing cartels as an anti-competitive practice, the panel read into the 
interpretation of the Reference Paper an example of an anti-competitive practice 
(price-fixing cartel) that has never been agreed by WTO members in their schedules 
of additional commitments or in any WTO covered agreement. This aspect of the 
panel‘s ruling is perhaps a worrying precedent for future WTO cases in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
Further to an agreement between the governments of Mexico and the United States, 
Mexico has decided not to appeal the case and will comply with the panel‘s 
recommendations. However it did add that: ―the flaws in some of the panel‘s 
reasoning and findings were particularly important in the light of the ongoing service 
negotiations.‖130 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has reviewed the international regulatory environment for 
telecommunications, in particular looking at WTO provisions covering the sector. We 
have seen that the WTO‘s Basic Agreement on telecommunications has created 
important changes in the industry, with the provisions on interconnection in the 
regulatory reference paper creating a shift from accounting rate settlements to cost-
oriented interconnection. The case of Mexico-Telmex confirmed this shift. We have 
also seen that changes in technology, particularly with the internet and use of digital 
protocols for the transmission of information, such as TCP/IP. The introduction of 
new digital services, such as VoIP will have (and are having) major implications for 
the design and rollout of telecommunication networks and the services that flow over 
them. The Digital Divide is very much about having access to the necessary 
technology (a subject we will address in Chapter 9 on technology transfer), but it is 
also as we have seen in Chapter 2, about building efficient telecommunications 
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infrastructure and gaining access to international digital networks. This Chapter has 
reviewed the ‗international rules of the game‘ as associated with telecommunications. 
Many of the legal provisions covered however as associated with the regulation of 
‗circuit switched‘ networks, that is networks that use analogue (as opposed to digital) 
technology to convey most voice. The future is with digital technology and 
particularly with internet interconnection as we will see in the next chapter. 
 
The law and cases reviewed in this chapter still have relevance as they regulate 
telecommunications as a sector, but we also need to look at how ‗digital‘ 
communications are regulated. Digital communications has already replaced many 
analogue networks worldwide (viz the rapid expansion of the Internet). Up until very 
recently, digital communications was regulated mainly by private contract. New 
regulatory frameworks, such as the EC‘s New Regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, was introduced to deal with the converged 
sectors of telecommunications, broadcasting and information technology. This new 
framework was only touched on in this Chapter. It will be more fully discussed in 
Chapter 5. The next Chapter 4 on Internet Interconnection is focused on the private 
regulation of digital networks and the problem of gaining equitable access to 
international NGN (internet) networks. At present a few large international backbone 
operators control the market for international digital networks and services. Access to 
these networks is governed by what is known as peering and/or transit agreements as 
we touched on in Chapter 1. Chapter 4 covers internet interconnection in detail, 
reviewing possible anticompetitive practices and the problems that smaller Internet 
Service Providers (such as in DCs and LDCs) have in gaining equitable access. 
Chapter 5 then discusses the EU and US law underpinning the Layering Theory, 
which as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, seeks to enhance effective 
competition in the market for international digital networks and services. The 
Layering Theory is discussed in full in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNET INTERCONNECTION
1
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter to this thesis discussed the international regulatory environment 
under WTO rules for cross-border interconnection of circuit-switched (voice) 
networks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, voice networks are now being upgraded to 
NGNs which use the internet protocol (IP) as the core transmission standard allowing 
for voice, data and video to be integrated and for different transmission technologies 
to be consolidated into one layered network model. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
fundamental difference with existing legacy networks is the use of the IP protocol as 
the basic transmission standard for NGNs. The IP protocol allows for different types 
of network, whether cable or telecommunication to provide a wide array of broadband 
services seamlessly. For vertically integrated operators, this would then allow for 
complete control of all the layers of the NGN from the lower physical infrastructure 
layers to the upper messaging and content layers. 
 
This transition to NGN creates two main issues for regulators. The first issue is 
whether NGN operators, and specifically those who control international backbone 
networks, IBPs, can leverage their dominance from wholesale into retail internet 
markets, or who can degrade the quality of interconnection and access. There is no 
doubt that IBPs do have incentives to interconnect and access, or more specifically in 
the internet sector, to provide peering and transit services to other ISPs. One incentive 
is to extend the reach of their own networks through peering and transit services. The 
other is to gain extra revenue from transit. IBPs will bundle a range of services and 
will discriminate as to price. As this chapter notes in the sub-section below on 
Settlements (see section 4.4.1) both bundling and price discrimination can be pro 
competitive. For example, when competition takes the form of bundle v. bundle, 
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bundling will only be abusive if the price of the entire bundle is predatory. However, 
problems often arise with transit agreements in that IBPs have incentives to migrate 
smaller ISPs from settlement free peering relationships to more costly transit services. 
Also, where IBPs have contractual relationships with state controlled incumbents in 
DCs/LDCs, the absence of international WTO rules on internet interconnection can 
result in terms for peering and transit with smaller ISPs being negotiated on 
discriminatory, non-transparent and non cost-orientated rates which can result in 
higher end-user costs, exacerbating the digital divide. Often, because of the absence 
of a regulatory framework for internet interconnection, peering and transit agreements 
are the subject of non-disclosure agreements and are therefore not submitted to the 
national regulator for scrutiny.  
 
The second issue is whether regulators faced with a complex array of new services 
can unpick services from a layered NGN structure to define accurately enough a 
relevant product market for the purposes of a competition investigation. 
 
The first issue is discussed in this Chapter 4. The second issue is discussed in Chapter 
6. 
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is fourfold: (a) to provide an overview of the 
interconnection of digital networks through peering and transit in the internet 
industry; (b) to describe the structural breakdown of a typical international backbone 
operator; (c) to summarise the major current policy/regulatory issues relating to 
internet interconnection at the level of the WTO, which includes three main areas of 
regulatory concern; 
 
 Traffic exchanged by operators with market power 
 Competition issues arising from vertical integration of backbone and service 
providers; and 
 Increased pressure for arrangements for sharing the costs of connectivity between 
facilities-based international backbones (IBPs);  
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and finally; (d) to highlight issues arising from (a)-(c) that impact on ISPs in the 
developing world so that these issues can be more fully discussed in Chapter 7 
(Developing Countries and Telecommunications).  
 
Chapter 4 describes the problems associated with internet interconnection, 
demonstrating how a few large international backbone operators control the 
international market for connectivity to the internet. Also, this chapter demonstrates 
that incumbent telecommunication operators and IBPs have the power to leverage 
their dominance from the network infrastructure market to the retail market, where 
local end-users will wish to gain access to the internet. With the upgrading of legacy 
networks to NGNs by IBPs, there is a fear by content providers, such as Google, 
Skype and Microsoft that ‗differentiated charging‘ (discussed in section 4.4.1) could 
lead to a ‗two-tier‘ internet to which content providers have responded with a call for 
‗net neutrality‘, treating all traffic as equal regardless of the protocol of transmission.2 
The chapter argues that the potential for a concentration of Tier 1 IBP operators 
(particularly with a potential shakeup of the communications sector anticipated in the 
fall-out to the credit crunch crisis arising from the sub-prime mortgage debacle in the 
United States) could give rise to a number of anticompetitive practices, and that these 
together with differentiated charging could spell difficulties for DC and LDC ISPs. 
The chapter concludes that unless there is effective competition at all levels of the 
network, then digital divide issues will arise. Chapter 4 therefore sets out the issues 
that the Layering Theory, discussed in Chapter 6, intends to address.  
 
4.2   Overview of internet peering and transit 
 
Internet Protocol (IP) networks can transport huge volumes of traffic more efficiently 
and at much lower cost than traditional networks. The Public Switched Telephone 
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Network (PSTN) is a circuit switched network, a design that has not changed for a 
century. Circuit switched technology dedicates a fixed amount of capacity for the 
duration of a call, thereby tying up an entire circuit or portion of the network for its 
duration. Internet Protocol (IP) based packet switching technology splits the 
information into discrete packets, sends them across the network using the most cost-
effective route
3
 and using far cheaper routers
4
, and then reassembles them at the other 
end. IP technology thus makes much more efficient use of the transmission pipe, and 
consequently, the cost of moving information through an IP network can be much 
lower than through a traditional circuit switched network.  
 
Peering and transit agreements allow smaller ISPs to extend their reach into regions 
where they would otherwise lack infrastructure, and keep traffic on Internet Protocol 
(IP) networks longer before it reaches a gateway to the pricey Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN/PSN), where the call is completed.
5
 Such interconnections 
are vital for smaller ISPs since only by interconnecting can the IP traffic travel 
furthest and the cost benefit of using the net be maximised
6
. For developing country 
ISPs this is even more critical where access to the incumbent‘s network might be 
restricted through high tariffs for interconnection and where access to a local internet 
exchange providing interconnection to an international backbone‘s network may be 
the only way to bypass the incumbent.  
 
Most ISPs maintain both peering and transit agreements with local ISPs via the 
various public internet exchanges, as well as peering/transit with one or more service 
providers or clearing houses in the US through international private leased circuits or 
Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) in submarine cables, or satellite links.  Many of the 
smaller ISPs in developing economies (and even developed economies) rolling out a 
service will therefore need to consider what network architecture they wish to adopt 
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and to what extent interconnection with these various exchanges will be sufficient to 
provide a narrow band service initially.  
 
The ISP will also need to consider whether it should be party to a multilateral Peering 
Agreement at public internet exchanges or whether it should make its own bilateral 
arrangements with other ISPs at private peering points. The latter often has the 
advantage of coming with guaranteed levels of service through a Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) with the TSP or IBP, with the caveat that the terms to be included 
within the SLA are often set by the more dominant player. 
 
Service providers interconnect with one another through what is called a peering 
agreement. Peering is defined as: 
 
An interconnection of two public networks that provide connectivity to hosts 
whose routes are advertised on the global internet, on a settlement free basis 
that allows customers of one network to exchange traffic to customers directly 
on the second ISP's network.
7
 
 
In a peering arrangement, two service providers agree to exchange traffic that 
originates from an end user connected to one provider and terminates with an end user 
connected to another. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission‘s 
(ACCC) consultation paper on internet interconnection defines peering more simply 
as ‗the establishment of a connection between computers and/or networks.‘8  It leaves 
out the basis of peering as being settlement free.  
 
The ACCC in its detailed examination of the Australian internet industry believes that 
peering has moved on from a straightforward settlement-free basis and considers that 
the financial and other administrative arrangements governing peering should be 
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referred to separately as ‗settlement arrangements‘.9  This is probably the correct 
approach, although in this thesis, and for the sake of simplicity, peering is described 
as an arrangement that has two main characteristics.  
- First, in general, peering is settlement free i.e. the service providers do not 
charge each other for terminating traffic. This will normally be the case where 
the two networks are of roughly the same size, size being defined by the 
number of customers that each provider has on their respective networks, 
backbone capacity, and traffic volume.  
- Second, one peer will not allow traffic from another peer to transit its network 
to a third IBP.  
 
The alternative to peering is a paying transit relationship. A transit arrangement 
differs from peering in two respects: 
 First, in contrast to peering in which service providers generally exchange traffic 
without charge, in a transit arrangement one provider pays the other to carry its 
traffic.  The amount of this charge generally depends upon the capacity of the 
connection or the volume of traffic flowing across the POI.  
 Second, in contrast to peering in which service providers only terminate each 
other's traffic, in a transit arrangement a provider agrees to deliver all Internet 
traffic that originates or terminates on the paying provider regardless of the 
destination or source of that traffic10.  
 
Negotiations for peering do not just occur horizontally between ISPs but also 
vertically between `small local ISPs' and `large national TSPs or IBPs'.  In the latter 
case, the large national IBPs have a stronger bargaining position because they not 
only provide access to their customer and content base, but also act as a gateway to 
                                                 
9
 See ibid at p.33 of the ACCC paper. 
10
 It is important to appreciate that with packet-switched networks, traffic could be coming onto the 
paying provider's network from anywhere in the world (regardless of source). Likewise traffic could be 
leaving the network for onward transmission to any point (regardless of destination). In other words, to 
avoid traffic congestion and also put in place a framework for revenue generation, peering agreements 
permit deliver of packets only to the address space controlled by the network concerned, whereas 
transit agreements generally guarantee delivery not only to this address space but also to the remainder 
of the global internet address space. 
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the rest of the Internet. This inequality of bargaining power can result in anti-
competitive practices emerging in peering/transit negotiations, particularly in the 
negotiation of the terms in the agreement itself (see sections 6 and 7 below). The 
Layering Theory, if implemented into national law could provide a means of legal 
redress if the incumbent is found to be dominant in the relevant market for wholesale 
interconnect. 
 
4.3 Overview of the players in the internet market and structural breakdown of a 
typical international backbone operator 
 
The internet is the interconnection of a range of packet switched networks, some of 
which are virtual, most of which are in the public domain, and some of which are 
private. There are three basic classes of participant in the internet: 
 End users;11 
 Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet Portals, and Internet Commerce 
Companies12; 
 Transit Service Providers (TSPs) and Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs).13 
 
End users send and receive information. ISPs allow end users to access TSPs and 
Backbone networks. IBPs route traffic between ISPs and TSPs, and interconnect with 
other IBPs. In general, the global market can be very roughly divided into 60+ 
backbone operators, the majority of whom will have entered into private 
peering/transit agreements with each other (very concentrated), +/-6000  ISPs, and 
millions of content providers/end-users.
14
 
                                                 
11
 This category will include residential and small business end-users (SMEs) and the large 
corporate end-user, all of whom will be contracting with the ISP on a retail basis. 
12
 Grouped together as often ISPs will also function as portals and commerce outlets involved in the 
provision of retail internet services to subscribers as opposed to the infrastructure and carriage 
providers (TSPs and IBPs) who tend to offer wholesale services only, but will also have separate 
subsidiary ISPs offering retail (eg MCI/WorldCom, C&W). 
13
 This category will include the carriage service providers and the equipment vendors. 
14 
According to the WIK Consult report at footnote 75 of the report: ―More than 46,000 Autonomous 
System numbers have been assigned to ISPs, to multi-homed organisational users, or to the Regional 
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IPCs, by contrast, are providers of content, often not charging subscription fees, and 
either functioning as search engines for ISPs and/or providing a ‗click through‘ 
service on their websites to other search engines. Examples include Lycos, Yahoo, and 
Alta Vista. IPCs derive much of their revenue from contracts with advertisers or other 
content providers, guaranteeing a certain number of image impressions or ‗hits‘ on the 
website of the advertiser's banner. Closely connected with IPCs are the ICCs, which 
are companies that conduct business solely through the internet. Examples include 
Amazon.com. IPCs also include the increasingly successful business-to-business 
companies (B2B) and B2B internet exchanges, such as Covisint, a consortium formed 
by General Motors, Ford and Daimler Chrysler to connect the world's top automakers 
and their suppliers. B2B exchanges have come under the closer scrutiny of the anti-
trust authorities.
15
 
 
The role of the TSP is more difficult to define. The use of the backbone network to 
aggregate the traffic of smaller, geographically-remote networks introduced the 
concept of transit.  Transit across one or more networks is necessary when a user on a 
smaller ISP wishes to send an e-mail or a file to a user on a remote network.  If the 
two networks do not have a direct connection, communication can occur only through 
a third or more network(s).  In this sense transit networks perform a wholesale 
function, and, at some point, a transit network will be indistinguishable from a 
backbone network. Generally what will separate a TSP from a IBP is that the latter 
will have invested a great deal in international infrastructure either in the form of 
leasing international private leased circuits (IPLCs) or having ownership of capacity 
of submarine cables through an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) or on satellite links. 
 
Before going on to consider internet interconnection in greater detail, it would be 
useful to see how a backbone is structured and how it interacts with end-users, ISPs, 
                                                                                                                                            
Internet Registries (RIRs) for assignment. This number represents a very coarse upper bound on the 
number of independent IP networks, but it also shows that the upper bound is large.‖ Marcus J., 
Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, Economic and Public Policy Aspects, January 
2008, p.47. 
15
  For example Covisint has been the subject of an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission 
in the U.S., and MyAircraft.com by the European Commission. 
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and other backbones. Figure 1 below illustrates both the customer and network 
interfaces of a typical IBP. 
Figure 1: Internet network architecture 
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The top part of the figure illustrates a corporate network linking a number of personal 
computers (PCs)  by way of a Local Area Network (LAN). The LAN is connected by 
way of a router
16
 and Frame Relay connection to IBP A. Corporate data networks tend 
to generate a lot of bursty traffic. Frame relay is often considered here for connecting 
to IBP A as frame relay cells are of variable size and can handle such variable traffic 
flow.
17
 But frame relay is not good for time-sensitive applications, such as voice and 
video. 
 
The middle section of Figure 1 illustrates another corporate network but  utilising an 
intranet. An intranet is a private network that uses the internet protocols (TCP/IP) and 
net applications such as e-mail, file transfer, and the web. Connection to the IBP may 
be by dedicated E1 lines in Europe, T1 lines in the US, and general leased lines or 
private circuits in other parts of the world. 
 
                                                 
16
 A Router is a device, which connects two separate Local Area Networks (LANs) using the same 
protocols. 
17
 The superior (and more expensive) option is to use a technology called Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode (ATM). 
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An intranet is often a combination of private facilities and public presence. Although 
an intranet is a network of private-leased circuits, it can also be built using the internet 
(a public network) as its connectivity. Because of this, intranets must have 
authentication, security and encryption. Extranets, by contrast, are virtual networks 
formed by the partial interconnection of several different companies' intranets. Again 
security is required in the form of firewalls.
18
 The bottom part of Figure 1 shows the 
dial-up user accessing the internet by way of a modem and the PSTN. In the 
developed world, dial-up access will transform with the take-up of xDSL and cable 
modem technologies offering "permanently-on" connections as the local loop of the 
incumbent is unbundled. There is also evidence from some developing countries, such 
as India, that cable and xDSL markets will grow to a lesser extent.
19
 
 
To the right of the figure, we see the various interconnects between IBP A and other 
backbone networks (or even transit networks) at the network interface. What is not 
shown in the figure for reasons of simplicity is the internal structure of the IBP itself. 
The IBP's internal structure will consist of three principle sections; the access server, 
the application servers, and the internal network. The IBP's access server will consist 
of a customer interface, effectively a modem pool for dial-up users, and for 
permanently connected customers (such as the large corporates), and an access router, 
which at a minimum could have eight ports supporting 30 ISDN channels.  
 
The application server will consist of a series of partitioned servers or separate servers 
dedicated to each application being offered by the IBP, such as e-mail, web hosting, 
newsfeeds, interactive relay chat and games. Some IBPs also offer a managed access 
service for corporate clients, also known as virtual hosting.
20
 The IBP's internal 
network will depend on the number of Points of Presence (PoPs) it has. Customers 
like to connect to a PoP in a local call zone so that timed charges for long distance 
                                                 
18
 A Firewall will use hardware but, more often than not, software to protect a networked system 
from damage by outsiders (hackers), while maintaining connectivity. The Firewall will 
generally sit between the LAN of the customer and the telecommunications link to the internet 
server of the IBP. 
19
 See India case summary in Reducing the costs of internet access in developing countries. Overview 
Report produced for DFID, Antelope Consulting 2001 at: 
http://www.antelope.org.uk/telecommunications_development/DC_overview.pdf, accessed October 
2010. 
20
 This service involves setting up a router and leased line to the customer's premises and 
management of the firewall between the customer and the internet. 
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tariffs can be avoided. For this reason, to offer a uniform service quality and to take 
advantage of economies of scale, the IBP may need to have a number of PoPs, each 
permanently connected by a Permanent Virtual Circuit (PVC) leased from carriers.
21
  
 
The interconnect arrangements on the network side of the IBP will generally be at a 
wholesale level
22
 and interconnect may be by way of private bilateral or multilateral 
peering or transit agreements, or by peering at public network access points, such as 
the London Internet Exchange (LINX) situated at London Telehouse in the UK, or 
Major Internet Exchange  US West Coast (MAE-WEST) and MAEAST in the U.S., 
the Hong Kong Internet Exchange, or the Japan Internet Exchange (JPIX) for 
example. 
 
4.4  Anticompetitive effects of internet interconnection 
 
Now that we have an understanding of some of the structural issues relating to 
internet interconnection we can turn to the policy issues, and particularly areas where 
the potential abuse of dominance by large backbones and telecommunication 
incumbents can restrict effective competition. The internet industry has witnessed in 
recent years a certain amount of laissez faire on regulatory intervention by regulators 
as regards internet interconnection and wholesale traffic carriage. This is down to 
three main factors:  
 
 the degree of competition in the market for internet traffic carriage has been 
reasonably significant alleviating to some extent concerns about bottlenecks; 
 the supply of bandwidth for internet traffic has generally outstripped demand 
leading to reduced prices for bandwidth; 
 regulators have learned well from the general telecoms industry, particularly the 
cable industry, that to encourage investment in infrastructure, it is better to leave 
well enough alone. 
 
                                                 
21
 In the UK, the need for an ISP to have a series of PoPs is minimised through use of BT as an 
originating carrier and the purchase of Number Translation Services (NTS) services to route 
the customer's call to the relevant ISP. 
22
 As opposed to interconnection at a retail level which would describe the access by the corporate 
or dial-up customer to the ISP's modem pool. 
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These circumstances are now changing however. Some argue that as bandwidth 
hungry applications become more popular, existing capacity will become scarce, and 
that in such a climate, increased concentration in the market for example through 
mergers will raise competition concerns. Market power issues in the internet sector 
have already been evidenced in merger reviews such as MCI/WorldCom/Sprint
23
, Bell 
Atlantic/GTE
24
, and AT&T/TCI
25
. As the recent report produced by WIK Consult for 
the European Commission in January 2008 makes clear: 
 
IP-based traffic continues to grow dramatically, but the rate of growth 
(contrary to what many have assumed) is gradually slowing in percentage 
terms over time, with a current global average of 50-60% growth per year and 
a European average perhaps slightly higher. Video over the Internet is likely to 
represent a major driver of future traffic growth. Peer-to-peer traffic will 
continue to grow, but will decline somewhat as a fraction of all Internet traffic. 
Voice over IP (VoIP) usage will continue to grow, but will never represent a 
large fraction of total Internet traffic.
26
 
 
Besides this growth in traffic (and particularly video), there are three further issues 
that could warrant regulatory intervention from regulators particularly in the US, 
Japan, and the EU: 
 
 Whether regulation is required to prevent dominant backbone operators from 
abusing market power individually or collectively by colluding in structuring 
peering and transit agreements to either limit new entry at a regional level or to 
push up transit charges; 
 Whether regulation is required to ensure that large vertically integrated operators 
are not acting anti-competitively by unduly favouring affiliated ISPs 
 Whether regulation is needed on certain international routes dominated by a few 
large IBPs, where the cost of international leased-line connectivity remains high. 
                                                 
23
 Case No COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom / Sprint, June 2000. 
24
 Case No. 1:99CV01119, Department of Justice, May 1999. 
25
 Case No. 1: 98CV03170, Columbia District Court, 1998. See also EC Case No IV/M.1252-
AT&T/TCI, December 1998.  
26
 Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, Economic and Public Policy 
Aspects, a study for the European Commission, January 2008, p.9. 
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The first two bullet points are discussed in greater detail below in sections 4.4.1-
4.4.2. The last bullet however is worth a mention here as it is particularly relevant 
to US connectivity issues, where there is continued pressure on US regulators to 
address the issue of cost recovery for facilities connecting non-US ISPs (such as 
from DCs/LDCs) with US backbone providers. Non-US ISPs must generally pay 
for the full cost of the international transmission of internet traffic to and from the 
US. They also have to pay for the domestic tail lease and port charges to connect 
the dedicated international leased line capacity from the terminal end of the 
international carrier to the internet access point as well.
27
 
 
As non-US markets are now beginning to develop large customer bases of their own 
and developing valuable content, non-US ISPs argue that US ISPs are free-riding. To 
counter this, US ISPs argue that: 
 
 content is still mainly US sourced. As such, non-US ISPs should pay 
disproportionately more for transport; 
 to avoid international costs for transmission, non-US ISPs should encourage 
greater production of local content or make better use of caching facilities, 
proxy servers, or mirrored sites for localising content; 
 the US still remains the global hub, and therefore US ISPs continue to bear 
infrastructure development costs for transiting traffic from non-US ISPs; and 
 greater liberalisation and competition in foreign markets will bring down the 
costs of regional transmission, fostering lower regional connectivity prices 
which will encourage regional links, eventually leading to reduced US 
hubbing.
28
 
 
These arguments are (potentially) persuasive, for all backbones fear regulatory 
intervention. For most backbones, revenue streams from IP traffic exchange, IP access 
and connectivity (in the near future VoIP, virtual call centres and IP call centers), not 
to mention web hosting and e-commerce solutions, could account for up to 40% of 
backbone revenues with the remaining 60% coming from voice.
29
  
                                                 
27
 See DFID Internet Costs report, Annex G (Rohan Kariyawasam), ibid footnote 1, pp 14-16. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
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Most backbones will want to minimise regulatory intervention. This is despite the fact 
that some backbones will have peering partners or even affiliates or subsidiaries in 
other parts of the world, where these affiliates and subsidiaries are also paying high 
costs for international transmission to connect with their parents or partners back in 
the US. But the advantage the backbones possess is that as they continue to develop 
and roll out their own backbone infrastructures, creating nodes in say Latin America, 
Asia or Africa, they will be able to internalise these costs groupwide as the global 
network develops, but still continue to charge higher prices for peering, and 
particularly transit, to non affiliated ISPs. 
 
This will be the case unless there is adequate regulatory oversight and potentially, 
intervention. Regulatory intervention could result in reduced wholesale revenues as a 
consequence of peering (and particularly transit) terms being made more transparent, 
reduced competitiveness as competitors are able to gain access to IBP networks either 
for free or at reduced rates, and for backbones interconnecting with non-US ISPs, 
increased costs for facilities as a result of international infrastructure cost sharing (for 
example through the enforcement of the ITU's Recommendation D.50, discussed 
below in Section 4.6). 
 
4.4.1.  Further Anti-competitive practices 
Over the last few years, there have been fundamental trends that have shaped the 
development of the internet industry and which have brought about calls for 
regulating internet interconnection. These trends can be summarised as follows: 
 Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) are shrinking due to consolidation (viz 
BT/AT&T, GTE/Bell Atlantic, MCI/WorldCom, and the failed WorldCom/Sprint 
mergers); 
 The differences between IBPs and ISPs are growing wider; 
 There is a trend by IBPs and Transit Service Providers (TSPs) to peer less with 
smaller ISPs; 
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 Often the terms for peering by IBPs are generally kept private, and when ISPs do 
peer with IBPs they are often forced to sign non-disclosure agreements; 
 The termination of a peering agreement by IBPs can require very little notice in 
advance; and finally  
 The technical dialogue that takes place between IBPs between themselves and 
between IBPs and larger telecommunication networks can be regular and private, 
often to the exclusion of smaller ISPs. 
 
There is also potential with the rollout of New Generation Networks (NGNs) by IBPs 
for these potential practices to continue. The WIK Consult report completed in 2008 
looks at the potential for operators rolling out NGNs based on an IP network core to 
potentially abuse their positions of dominance (SMP—discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6 when looking at dominance and the Layering Theory): 
 
It is worth noting that literal barriers to interconnection at the IP and the 
service level do not represent the only potential threats to competition as 
networks evolve in the direction of NGN. The Commission‘s 2003 study and 
also Ofcom‘s consultations, have explored the possibility that emerging IP-
based networks might introduce new ―choke points‖, new threats to 
competition. The 2003 study saw location information, as well as customer 
identity systems, as particularly relevant. As the 2003 study observed, 
―Essentially, NGN has the potential of providing a more open and competitive 
service environment. Paradoxically, this potential may also lead to additional 
sources of market power. Whereas traditionally, all elements of service 
creation were controlled by a single operator, the NGN environment enables 
many of these elements to be provided competitively. Where such elements 
have to be chained together in order to create an end-user service, it follows 
that control over any single element in the chain would provide control over 
the whole chain. … the battle for market power will be fought on 
many different fronts.‖30 
                                                 
30
 European Commission, Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, 
Economic and Public Policy Aspects, January 2008, p. 124. The authors were referring to a study 
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The authors when commenting on these ‗choke points‘ are not just referring to the 
European market for NGN services and networks, but worldwide. The recent credit 
crunch crisis spurred by the sub-prime mortgage debacle in the United States will 
make more difficult access to capital to fund network rollout. Increased consolidation 
is likely both at a horizontal level in terms of service delivery and also vertically with 
wholesale and retail network provision. Increased consolidation, although likely to 
rationalize costs could also have the effect of diluting effective competition in the 
international backbone market as operators leverage their market dominance from 
wholesale into retail markets. How backbones can do this is clarified in the next 
section. 
 
4.4.2 Abuse of market position 
 
The larger the market share of the IBP or TSP, the more important it will be for the 
smaller ISP to interconnect with the IBP/TSP so as to reach the larger operator‘s 
customers. Due to network externalities, IBP/TSPs can therefore have the potential to 
hold a dominant position in the relevant market for backbone connectivity (and as 
mentioned above, have the potential to leverage this dominance into downstream 
retail markets in high-end service provision at different layers both for content and the 
underlying physical network infrastructure that transports this content—this concept 
of ‗layering‘ is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). In DCs and LDCs, the problem 
is more complex as often the telecommunications incumbent is also the owner of the 
data TCP/IP network and is often opposed to the creation of an IXP exchange where 
bilateral and multilateral peering can take place. For example, a recent Internet 
Governance Forum report states: 
 
…that mandatory multilateral peering policies may not be successful in more 
mature markets, as large operators can perceive it as a requirement to enter 
into an open ended contract with unknown signatories…in Latin America, 
mandatory multilateral peering has discouraged some large carriers and 
                                                                                                                                            
completed for the European Commission by Cullen International: Cullen International/ Devoteam 
(2003): Regulatory Implications of the Introduction of Next Generation Networks and other New 
Developments in Electronic Communications, Report for the European Commission, Brussels, 2003. 
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content providers from connecting to an IXP….that government policies that 
encourage competitive access to leased lines and wireless connections help 
lower the costs associated with connecting to an IXP….governments can play 
a positive role by restraining anti-competitive behaviour of incumbents, 
including attempts by large carriers to block the development of IXPs.
31
 
 
In more developed markets, the fear that a large IBP or a number of IBPs could 
eventually emerge to abuse their dominance in the market for backbone services 
proved to be effective in helping block the WorldCom/Sprint merger. Furthermore, 
smaller ISPs argue that the industry is fast moving to an environment where smaller 
ISPs are becoming downstream paying transit customers of the larger backbone and 
transit operators. 32   They argue that there is an increased need for greater 
transparency and guidelines on interconnection in the industry. This is primarily 
because of the potential for monopolistic pricing and anti-competitive behaviour i.e. 
the ability of one competitor to raise the costs of others for a service element needed 
by all competitors and supplied by one or few operators, or by using various 
techniques for degrading the quality of interconnect. The WIK Consult report of 2008 
for the European Commission argues that: 
 
It may be necessary for NRAs to take action from time to time (possibly ex 
post) to ensure that operators subject to an SMP remedy do not take actions 
that would render the IP-based voice service interconnection ineffective or  
unusable. This is not to suggest that a new remedy is needed; rather, it means 
that NRAs must be empowered to ensure that standard interconnection 
remedies (updated to deal with new technology) are not subverted. It might be 
insufficient to require that the overall quality of IP-based voice 
interconnection that an SMP voice operator provides to competitors cannot be 
unjustifiably inferior to that which it supplies to itself (a condition more akin 
to equivalence of input than to non-discrimination).33 
                                                 
31
 Internet Governance Forum 2007: Best Practice Session Report, IXP Exchanges at: 
http://www.isoc.org/educpillar/resources/docs/igf-ixp-report-2007.pdf, accessed October 2008. 
32
 See executive summary, DFID Internet Costs report, supra note 20. 
33
 Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, Economic and Public Policy 
Aspects, a study for the European Commission, January 2008, p. XIV. 
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The report‘s authors also argue that interconnection fees should be much lower than 
they are today, preferably zero, and that the huge disparity between mobile 
termination rates and fixed should be much lower.  
 
There is no doubt that in time to come, the larger TSPs and IBPs with SMP will 
increasingly want to interconnect at private peering points rather than continue to peer 
at the larger public Network Access Points (NAPs) on a settlement-free basis with 
other service providers, particularly the smaller ISPs and TSPs.
34
 This has led to the 
policy of differentiated charging in the United States, where operators have been 
allowed to charge in accordance with differing quality of service standard and service 
level agreements. Differentiated charging has also led to conflict with content 
providers and smaller ISPs fearful of the creation of a two-tier internet (discussed 
below).  A move to private peering is due to the increased flow of traffic over TCP/IP 
networks as PC internet penetration increases worldwide and the increased revenues 
that the larger TSPs and IBPs can earn from increasingly sophisticated settlement 
mechanisms at private peering points rather than having to peer on a settlement free 
basis at public exchanges. Settlement mechanisms are discussed in the next section 
below. 
 
This trend by the backbones to switch to private peering/transit is particularly 
disadvantageous for developing nations, as unless the market for international private 
leased circuits becomes more competitive driving down prices, or the larger (mainly 
US) backbones build out their networks to Asia and Africa to include Network Access 
Points at either public exchanges (unlikely) or at private exchanges (likely), the costs 
for interconnect for developing nation ISPs will remain high. Also, there are risks that 
operators who control the infrastructure at either end of a private leased circuit could 
raise the costs for access to that circuit (so called ‗IPLC price-lifting‘) thus driving up 
the costs for interconnecting ISPs at either end that might be forced then to pass these 
increased costs onto their end-users. Price lifting would mean the operator at either 
end of the IPLC (whether developing country or developed if the IPLC is on an 
international circuit linking two countries for example) raising their IPLC prices by 
                                                 
34
 See for example the Report on OECD Workshop ‗Internet Traffic Exchange‘, Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, Berlin, Germany, June 2001 at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/55/1894684.pdf, accessed October 2008. 
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more than a reasonable margin above cost on smaller and less competitive routes. In 
economic terms, price lifting would be an attempt by the operator to increase its share 
of the joint monopoly profits being made on the route.  
 
This will off course work to enhance the Digital Divide rather than address it given 
higher levels of poverty in most DCs/LDCs as compared with developed nations. The 
opportunity of IPLC price-lifting is particularly problematic in developing countries, 
where telecommunication incumbents hold dominance over network infrastructure 
and where regulatory oversight might be weak.  The Layering Theory is meant to 
enhance effective competition both in infrastructure and content markets by providing 
regulators with a more accurate definition for a relevant product market and therefore 
a better measure of dominance by an undertaking on that market.  
 
In Asia, the APEC ICAIS report (Internet Charging Arrangements for Internet 
Services) did identify several practices that could work to the disadvantage of smaller 
ISPs
35
. Potential anti-competitive practices include a ‗refusal to deal‘, which is an 
attempt to drive a competitor out of business or to raise the costs of doing business 
with the impact of reducing its marketplace attractiveness. Another would be to apply 
a price squeeze, i.e. an attempt to raise competitors' costs and lower their marketplace 
attractiveness by increasing the cost of an essential facility, bottleneck or service 
element needed by the smaller ISP to provide a complete end-to-end service.
36
 Anti-
competitive behaviour could also include predatory pricing and/or using deliberate 
below cost rates. The IBP could also leverage its market power in more specific ways 
by: 
 
- extracting from smaller ISPs agreements not to compete in certain service or 
geographical markets; 
- setting a price floor on the service offered by the smaller ISP; 
                                                 
35
 It must be stressed however that the ICAIS consultants did not find evidence of such practices in 
interconnection arrangements in Asia. See ICAIS report at: 
http://www.tmdenton.com/pub/reports/icais_mod1_ch1.pdf, accessed October 2008. 
36
 A margin squeeze was a concern of the UK regulator OFTEL in its determination of an internet 
interconnection dispute between BT and WorldCom on unmetered internet access in the UK. 
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- linking the smaller ISP's access to a desired service; e.g., long-haul backbone 
trunks; or 
- forcing a commitment to buy or lease less desirable and/or less competitively 
provisioned services. 
In 2007, the ITU in a symposium on international internet interconnection discussed 
the lack of transparency in internet interconnection with new generation networks 
(NGNs) and the rise in ‗differentiated charging‘ (the process by which operators 
charge in accordance with the type of network protocol being used—see Chapter 6 
where in discussion of the Layering Theory, the author discusses charging by 
protocol), and that increasingly in order to recover costs, Tier 1 operators (IBPs) are 
looking for differentiated charging and to enter the downstream service provision 
market themselves.
37
  
 
This concept of differentiated charging, pushed by the large backbone operators has 
led to a counterargument for the need for ‗net neutrality‘, that is, arguing that all 
network application needs should be met equitably i.e. any particular internet host, 
protocol or application should not receive preferential treatment. In other words that 
operators might degrade the quality of interconnect or access to favour their own 
affiliates or business partners. In the United States, where differentiated charging is 
most common, there has been strong opposition to differentiated charging by service 
and content providers such as Google, Microsoft, and Skype, who do not own their 
own network infrastructures and who fear the higher costs for access that might 
result.
38
 If content providers as large as these are fearful of the implications for 
differentiated charging, what chance do content providers in the developing world 
have when negotiating with powerful IBPs? The fear of the content providers arises 
because there is a difference between interconnection and access (this is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5). Generally speaking one can argue that interconnection is a 
specific subset of access. In Europe, NRAs have been faced with equally contentious 
access problems as well as interconnect. The authors of the WIK Consult report on the 
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future of IP interconnect argue however that net netrality has been more an issue in 
the United States than Europe where competition in broadband markets has been 
hampered by: (1) the FCC eliminating obligations of non-discrimination toward 
content for providers of broadband access to the Internet; (2) the wholesale ADSL 
market segment in the U.S. collapsing; and (3) the U.S. telecommunications industry 
undergoing significant consolidation, where two of the largest Internet backbones 
were acquired by dominant local incumbents.
39
 The authors go on to argue that: 
 
Network Neutrality is a many-faceted problem. A common concern has been 
that a network operator might either block or degrade access to disfavoured 
content in order to favour its own content or affiliated content. For now, we do 
not see a need for comprehensive new regulation to address Network 
Neutrality challenges. European underlying markets are either competitive or 
well regulated, and the European regulatory framework provides adequate 
tools to address problems should they emerge.
40
 
 
However, in the report produced for the ITU symposium on internet interconnection 
in 2007, Lie states that: 
 
In the absence of countervailing influences, the international internet market 
risks a return to the questionable competitive environment of the late 1990s 
where market concentration in the hands of a Tier-1 ISPs led to high prices for 
international internet connectivity.
41
 
 
The ITU has generally been considered as a better forum for DCs and LDCs to 
express their concerns rather than the World Bank or WTO. Lie argues that to offset 
the potential for ‗unconsidered de facto determination of international NGN 
interconnection norms‘ by the larger backbones, that stakeholders need to engage as a 
matter of priority in policy development on internet interconnection. In the United 
States however, the Justice Department seems (at this point) to be favouring the 
infrastructure providers and large IBPs (to the consternation of content providers, 
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such as Microsoft and Google) by accepting the argument for differentiated charging 
and against the principle of net neutrality. In September 2007, in a BBC report on 
two-tier charging, the US Justice Department was quoted as saying: ―It was opposed 
to ‗network neutrality‘, the idea that all data on the net is treated equally.‖42 
 
4.4.3 Settlements 
 
We have touched on ‗differentiated charging‘ above. ISP interconnection increasingly 
requires complex settlement mechanisms to compensate both parties for transporting 
traffic. Many ISPs in the developed economies are now offering a wide range of high-
speed digital applications such as IP telephony, on-line video games and web hosting. 
 
Further, ISPs who are also infrastructure providers (backbone operators) may offer 
switched co-location for internet access, private line services (dedicated telephony 
and voice), Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and non-switched IP telephony. Some of 
these applications will not necessarily be suitable for developing economies in the 
early stages of IP infrastructure rollout and so the settlement mechanisms will need to 
be commensurate with the services offered with particular care taken to agree the 
appropriate form of settlement to avoid anti-competitive practices, such as margin 
squeezing and bundling. For example with margin squeezing, the European 
Commission has also distinguished between broadband and narrowband internet 
access over DSL and cable networks, 43
 
and more recently wholesale and retail 
internet services in allegations of margin squeezing in Deutsche Telekom v. European 
Commission44, and Wanadoo Espana v. Telefonica.
 45
 
 
As regards bundling, it should be noted however that pro competitive and aggressive 
bundling could also be of benefit to consumers. For example, when competition takes 
the form of bundle v. bundle, bundling will only be abusive if the price of the entire 
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bundle is predatory.
46
 In 2005, the European Commission released a discussion 
paper
47
 on Article 82 following the CFI‘s judgement in GE/Honeywell48. In that 
discussion paper, the Commission set out a test where four conditions needed to be 
satisfied for exclusionary bundling to be proved: (1) there is pre-existing dominance; 
(2) the two (or more) products that are tied or bundled are distinct; (3) the practice is 
likely to have a foreclosure effect; and (4) there is no efficiency or objective 
justification for the practice. It is clear that following this test, there will be many 
examples of bundling which will not fall foul of Article 82 and which can be pro 
competitive. The same would apply to price discrimination where discrimination per 
se is not anticompetitive. In fact price discrimination can be explained and justified by 
differences in underlying costs, due for example to purchases of larger volumes 
and/or higher marketing costs. However, under EU law, the practice of applying 
different prices for equivalent transactions can fall foul of Article 82(c) EU Treaty 
(now Article 102 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, ‗TFEU‘). This has 
relevance also to DCs/LDCs given that both China 
49
 and India 
50
 often seen as 
leaders in WTO negotiations of the group of developing countries (G90), have 
adopted similar concepts of dominance to the test established in United Brands.
51
  
 
Settlements for circuit-switched interconnect are commonplace and through the years 
many forms of interconnect pricing have emerged with most operators settling on a 
form of Long Run Incremental Cost as the basis for pricing interconnect services. 
Settlements between circuit-switched networks are determined mainly on the basis of the 
volume of traffic flowing across the Point of Interconnect (POI) with the traffic being 
measured through the use of servers at the POI and the basis of billing dependent on the 
processing of Call Detail Records (CDRs). Customers are identified for billing purposes 
through the exchange of Calling Line Identification (CLI) numbers and provisions are 
agreed for bad debts.  
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In the TCP/IP world, however, there are no similar arrangements although some 
commentators have argued for some form of standardised record of usage similar to the 
CDR to help with interconnection payments and to help as a reference model for billing 
systems as TCP/IP networks and the applications that run over them proliferate
52
. Such a 
move will no doubt help the position of certain APEC countries who backed 
Recommendation D.50 in its original form. 
 
Settlements for specialised or general internet traffic would radically alter the Net's 
current economic model: at present it is generally settlement-free between backbone 
networks, which generally sell connectivity based on leased-line capacity rather than 
actual usage, although other models for payment also exist. Variations on forms of 
settlement, of which some more than others can lead to anti-competitive effects (eg 
margin squeezing, bundling), include; 
 
- supplier-customer model; 
- sender keeps all; 
- bilateral settlement; 
- multilateral settlement; and 
- discounted settlement. 
 
Each of the large global backbones will have their individual peering and transit 
policies setting out their settlement arrangements. Peering policies for public 
internet exchanges will usually be made available in the public domain, but 
private peering and transit agreements will often be subject to non-disclosure 
provisions. However, most peering and transit agreements share a group of 
common principles. For example, in a competitive and unregulated market, 
peering between a global backbone and a smaller backbone, TSP or ISP will 
generally take place if and only if: 
 
 peering is cost effective, which means that the peering policy will contain 
terms on minimum network-to-port speed, minimum-at-port speeds, minimum 
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traffic flow between peers, and a minimum number of route announcements 
advertised for significant hosts; 
 peering distributes both the costs and benefits equitably within the geographic 
coverage of the peering agreement, which means that peers must demonstrate 
a presence of substantial traffic sources near all points of interconnection, and 
minimum outbound to inbound ratios of traffic; 
 peering provides each of the partners with similar network infrastructure with 
respect to both geographical coverage and network quality, which means that 
the peers must agree on a minimum aggregate network capacity between 
interconnect points, a number of diverse interconnects (different cities or 
different countries or at a minimum agreed essential points of presence), and a 
manned network operating center that can handle faults reliably; 
 peering partners agree on symmetrical technical rules, which means the use of 
similar protocols, filters for non pre-registered routes, do default routes of last 
resort, and a requirement to only announce their own customer routes 
 peering agreements will contain flexibility to change peering points when 
reasonable notice is given, and also violation procedures and corrective 
measures.
53
 
 
Given the above, it is easy to see that there are a number of reasons as to why a 
large backbone operator might impose a paying transit agreement on a smaller 
backbone or TSP or ISP, particularly from a DC or LDC which has little choice in 
terms of IBPs with whom it can negotiate. The problem is the lack of transparency 
in peering/transit negotiations given that operators are not required to submit these 
agreements to NRAs as part of a process of disclosure for regulated 
interconnection. As stated above, a number of the larger backbones quite often 
require that peering partners be willing and able to interconnect at a number of 
geographically diverse locations. If smaller operators fail to meet this peering 
criteria, a paying transit agreement may be the only option. 
 
Furthermore, backbones may refuse to peer with other ISPs/TSPs/IBPs hosting a 
high proportion of content providers on the grounds that they are bearing the 
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expense for more capacity than the backbone that is actually hosting the content 
that utilizes this capacity. Again in these cases a paying transit agreement may be 
the only option. But are there problems with paying transit? For example, can the 
imposition of a paying transit arrangement raise any specific anti-competitive 
concerns or is such an arrangement just simple commercial reality? Having denied 
peering to smaller backbones, TSPs or ISPs, could global backbones either refuse 
to provide transit to smaller backbones or simply increase the cost of transit in 
order to squeeze out the smaller rivals. 
 
There are two reasons that this would be unlikely in a competitive backbone 
market; (a) backbones will often compete with each other to win transit 
customers, and (b) backbones will compete for the transit business of smaller 
backbones in order to increase their revenues, which will keep transit prices down. 
Although backbones are unlikely to do themselves out of business by squeezing 
transit customers out of the industry, that does not mean that cartel type 
arrangements could not arise between backbones to artificially keep transit prices 
high.  
 
For example, with conventional voice traffic in telecommunications, it is well 
understood in the industry that the transit market for traffic does lead to anti-
competitive pricing and "cartel" type practices between the large incumbents. 
There is no reason to suppose, that as the transit market for TCP/IP traffic matures 
as more and more smaller developing country ISPs and backbones come on-line, 
that the business practices that we see now in the voice world should not be 
adopted in the packet-switched world. To quote from an ITU report, which 
highlights some of the anti-competitive business practices in the market for voice 
transit: 
 
The lack of transparency in transit traffic is not a sign, as some optimistically 
claim, of a competitive market working under conditions of confidentiality, 
but rather of a small number of large players dividing up the market in an 
oligopolistic manner. Operators in land-locked or remote countries, which rely 
on transit traffic are unwittingly drawn into a web of silence and deceit in the 
mistaken belief that they are actually benefiting from secret reductions. But 
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the real victims are the citizens of these countries, who for too long, have been 
charged rates which are too high for telephone calls as a result of the operation 
of the transit cartel.
 54
 
 
Taking these points on board, to avoid a transit cartel developing in the TCP/IP 
world, in a competitive backbone market, transit prices should reflect costs, and 
should not put entering backbones at a competitive disadvantage. It is this issue of 
costs, which can cause the greatest problems in terms of anti-competitive concerns 
for smaller IBPs, TSPs and ISPs, particularly in the developing world, and which 
is something that regulators must begin to understand.  
 
As such, it is essential that regulators begin to look at the actual costs for peering 
and transit incurred by global backbones and verify whether they reflect the cost 
issues associated with the technical aspects of peering. The cost base of the 
backbone will include: 
 
 the cost of routers 
 nodes 
 cost of customer backhaul (dependant on the number of customers) 
 cost for total number of customer facing ports (higher capacity ports have 
higher costs); and 
 the cost of provisioning capacity on network rings (as transit traffic quite 
often fills up the core network, there is a need to determine the cost for that 
core network). 
 joint and common costs.  
 
The method of cost analysis should also be determined. The current trend by most 
regulators in telecommunications is to look at the long run incremental costs of each 
of the elements as opposed to taking the historical cost. Therefore, even if their was a 
specific transparency requirement that operated globally (eg through WTO 
mechanisms or regionally at the level of the EU, NAFTA and APEC) for example to 
require global backbones to submit their peering and transit agreements for inspection 
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by local NRAs, only by first understanding the costs of the backbones, will the 
regulators be able to fully appreciate the contractual terms that they find in the 
agreements. 
 
As backbones begin to evaluate the costs of their actual core networks, they will 
transpose such costs into their commercial decisions on pricing, as the core network is 
the future of the backbones' business. In conclusion therefore, if a transparency 
requirement allowed regulators to view backbones' peering and transit agreements, 
there must also be equivalent cost accounting and accounting separation 
requirements that would allow regulators' access to the cost base of the backbones' 
network. The IBPs will resist such a move arguing excessive regulatory burden and 
increased costs for compliance. The WIK Consult Report of 2008 for example does 
not recommend such obligations. Nevertheless, these provisions look for greater 
transparency for infrastructure arrangements. It may well be that certain backbones 
have dominance for the routes where they provide peering and transit, particularly to 
DCs and LDCs where the number of Internet Exchanges (IXPs) are small (for 
example only 17 in the whole of the African continent—see Chapter 7), and therefore 
have the potential to abuse their dominance. For example, for routing arrangements, 
the terms found in peering and transit agreements can be complex. Each ISP network 
advertising its routes is assigned an Autonomous System (AS) number.  The AS 
number is included in all IP packet headers, and so is relatively easy to track. IP 
headers also contain source and destination addresses, allowing tracking of which 
domains are sending/receiving traffic. For example ASxxxx might refer to the link of 
A's network between New York and Hong Kong. If A suggests that it intends to peer 
on this route on a settlement free basis with B, then B may check the traffic patterns 
on this route and determine that the traffic flowing across the route is so negligible 
that it does not warrant peering on a settlement free basis. In this case, B may demand 
to peer on the complete A network, including all of A's more profitable routes and not 
just the ASxxxx route that A had originally selected. The smaller player A may have 
no choice in the matter. Therefore A must have a good idea of the traffic flowing 
across its different peering routes (sometimes called "strings") before entering into 
negotiations with B, and decide on a bottom-line position on peering routes sought 
and offered. 
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There may also be prohibitions on transit traffic. Definitions of transit traffic 
(sometimes called third party traffic) vary by agreement, but generally transit traffic is 
defined as traffic between destinations, where neither of the destinations is a 
subscriber (or the customer of a subscriber) of the other party. Limiting transit traffic 
is important, as excessive traffic will lead to congestion on the network, which in turn 
will effect the quality of service to existing customers. The only way of limiting 
transit traffic is to define carefully the class of end-users and customers belonging to 
each of the negotiating parties to the agreement. However, some backbones may 
attempt to restrict an ISP's dealings with third party operators in order to either restrict 
the territorial coverage of that ISP's operations or to prevent competitors from 
contracting with the ISP. In other words using a transit traffic clause to create an 
exclusive dealing arrangement or a restrictive trade practice, both of which could fall 
foul of conventional competition law principles. But of course without a requirement 
to lodge the peering or transit agreement with a regulator, such practices remain 
unregulated. 
 
In a study of internet interconnection, Roseman cites a report produced by China 
submitted to the ITU Study Group 3 on charging arrangements for internet 
interconnection: 
 
As China puts it, ―ISPs and Internet users outside North America are  
significantly subsidizing US ISPs and their customers…China calls for  
.diversification in the settlement system, [in particular] a special policy for the  
world.s least developed countries  in order to prevent global internet  
development appearing polarized..‖  This polarization of rich and poor is 
another expression for the Digital Divide.
55
 
 
In the same paper, Roseman cites a report by the Australian Government: 
 
Tier-1 [IBPs] operating together are in a strong market position, both  
because of their high number of subscribers in the market and their  
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ownership of the infrastructure.  It is possible that they could be classified  
jointly as a major supplier.
56
 
 
In a more recent report for the European Commission on the future of IP 
interconnection in 2008, the WIK Consult Group (in discussing the migration of IBP 
networks to NGNs) states: 
 
As long as European regulators maintain competition in underlying markets, 
notably including the consumer broadband market such that most European 
end-users are able to choose among three or more providers, there is a good 
likelihood that Network Neutrality will not turn into a noteworthy problem in 
Europe. Moreover, an overly stringent obligation of non-discrimination 
obligations could do more harm than good, preventing the evolution of 
positive service differentiation. Nonetheless, regulators may need to have the 
authority to intervene for certain kinds of violation of neutrality. The 
violations that are most worrisome are those that imply economic foreclosure: 
For example, a network operator blocks or degrades the quality of access 
to some website that competes with a website affiliated with the network, or 
blocks access to an independent VoIP service provider who competes with the 
network operator‘s own voice services…The one area that we have identified 
where possible new obligations might prove necessary is in the IP data 
interconnection used to support voice interconnection, especially at such time 
as existing switched voice interconnection is withdrawn…57 
 
It is important to stress that the WIK authors do not recommend any mandated IP 
interconnection obligation, but they do recommend that NRAs have adequate powers 
to deal with potential abuse of dominance by SMP operators. We will return to some 
of the WIK recommendations in Chapter 6 when discussing the Layering Theory. 
Moving now from specific examples of potential anticompetitive practices that might 
apply both within a country and regionally between countries, we shall see in the next 
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section, that current regulation at the (multilateral) level of the WTO is presently 
inadequate to address the market dominance of the global backbones.  
 
4.5 Internet Interconnection under the WTO  
 
Given the panel‘s potentially wide and far-reaching ruling in Mexico-Telmex 
discussed in Chapter 3, the panel nevertheless did not have to rule on issues in relation 
to internet traffic. The relevant market considered in the case was the termination of 
international voice calls in Mexico, calls that had originated in the US. These calls 
were conventional voice calls transmitted over circuit-switched networks. The 
position might have been very different if the nature of the calls were internet calls or 
calls transmitted across packet-switched networks. Given the move by 
telecommunication operators to the transmission production of voice and data calls 
based on the IP protocol, future cases before the WTO‘s DSB might very well involve 
internet calls. In which case, we need to pose the question: what is the relevance to the 
international trade in telecommunications of the interconnection model under the 
BTA‘s Reference Paper to internet networks? For example, what effect would a move 
to include VoIP as either a voice or a packet-switched data service have on the 
Specific Commitments of two of the most powerful actors in international 
telecommunications, either the US or EU to the WTO?
58 
As part of a legal framework 
for liberalisation, the Reference Paper details additional commitments on regulatory 
principles, including specific rules on interconnection. Section 2.2, Reference Paper 
sets out obligations on major suppliers for interconnection.
59 
 
 
The coverage of some internet related services, for example internet access services, 
by the BTA requires clarification. Some members have explicitly scheduled these 
services, whereas others regard internet access as being covered either by basic or 
value-added telecommunications commitments. Furthermore when an internet 
network is defined as a public telecommunications transport service and/or network 
by a member, the Annexe on Telecommunications will apply to access and use of the 
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network, guaranteeing access and use of the network for any service scheduled as a 
specific commitment. It is not entirely clear however to what extent this position is 
accepted by the majority of the WTO membership and whether the Annex ensures 
access to internet networks and services for service suppliers
60
. 
 
The point of interest is that for the supply of voice or packet-switched data 
transmission services (i.e. TCP/IP services) for all modes of supply covered under 
both the US and the EU's Specific Commitments made as part of the BTA 
negotiations, i.e.: (1) cross-border supply (2) consumption abroad (3) commercial 
presence and (4) movement of natural persons, both the US and EU Member States 
(for existing commitments) have placed no restrictions on market access or national 
treatment.
61 
This would mean that if VoIP was classed as either a voice or packet-
switched data service, then the interconnection obligations that both the US and EU 
have decided to accept as an Additional Commitment under their Schedule of Specific 
Commitments (i.e. the Reference Paper) would apply to all major suppliers of such 
services in both the US and EU
62
. This in turn would place an obligation on the major 
suppliers to interconnect with ISPs (including ISPs in developing countries who are 
member states of the WTO) in accordance with WTO guidelines in the following 
way: 
 
 
 At any technically feasible point in the network; 
 On non-discriminatory terms, rates and of a quality no less favourable than  
 for the incumbent‘s own supply; 
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 In a timely fashion and on terms that are transparent and reasonable; 
 At cost-orientated rates; and 
 On an unbundled basis so that a buyer does not pay for unnecessary 
services. 
 
This obligation to interconnect by a major supplier would benefit any Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) providing public telecommunications transport networks or services. 
The transparency obligation in particular when applied to negotiations between large 
global Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) and smaller ISPs, where the larger IBP is 
found to be a major supplier, would undermine the current industry practice of the 
IBP requiring negotiations to be governed by a non-disclosure agreement.  
 
In other words, IBPs who are classed as major suppliers could be required to ‗come 
clean‘ with their terms on peering and transit (interconnection agreements used for 
packet-switched networks). In addition, an ISP with third-country stakeholders could 
threaten to complain to the WTO if the IBP refuses to structure its peering 
arrangements on non-discriminatory terms with all its downstream customers, 
regardless of whether or not those customers are the IBP's own affiliates. The upshot 
of this would be that an IBP would no longer be able to give preferential terms for 
peering to its own downstream affiliates. Such a position could have major 
implications for US IBPs' revenue streams. 
 
Interestingly however, in the offer it made to the Doha negotiations
63
, the United 
States classified packet-switched services as information services (packet-switched 
information services) without any reference to the UNCPC coding system discussed 
earlier. Under the US Telecommunication Act 1996, information services are not 
classed as telecommunication services and can therefore not be regulated as basic 
telecommunication services. Furthermore, VoIP services under US law are also 
currently classed as information services
64
. The Reference Paper only applies to basic 
telecommunication services. It would appear therefore that the US in classifying 
packet-switched services as information services has moved the regulation of these 
services away from regulatory capture by the Reference Paper (with its strict 
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interconnection obligations) and under the capture of the Annexe on 
Telecommunications (which catches only those services that have been scheduled as 
specific commitments). 
 
The obligation to interconnect on non-discriminatory and transparent terms would 
only appear to cover all major suppliers under the Reference Paper. The term ‗major 
supplier‘ is of course defined in the Reference Paper as one who has control of an 
essential facility and is able to use its position in the market to influence competition 
and price. This definition follows competition law principles, but there is an important 
difference between the WTO's definition of "major supplier" and the term 
‗dominance‘ used by the European Commission as its new threshold for Significant 
Market Power (SMP) under the EC‘s Framework Directive65 (discussed in Chapter 5).  
 
It is quite clear that the WTO's major supplier term refers to the concept of ownership 
of an essential facility, which would seem to cover only those operators who were 
‗super-dominant‘66, whereas the term for ‗dominance‘ used by the Commission in the 
Framework Directive is based on an economic analysis test,
67
 where dominance could 
include any operator who could consistently keep prices high independently of 
competitors regardless of whether or not that operator owned an essential facility.
68
  
 
Also, the WTO's definition of major supplier refers to an operator's "position on the 
market". This is fairly vague wording and it is not entirely clear whether such a 
definition would in competition law terms fall squarely within the definition for SMP 
(dominance) as used by the Commission. It may be that this distinction between 
‗major supplier‘ under the WTO Reference Paper, and ―dominance‖ under the EC‘s 
New Regulatory Framework (discussed in Chapter 5), will become crucially 
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level of ‗super-dominance‘ that would catch only those operators who would have enjoyed special or 
exclusive rights before the European 1998 telecommunications liberalisation watershed (Full market 
liberalization: Council Resolution 1994 OJ C 379/4 sets target date for 1st January 1998 for removal of 
special and exclusive rights of European telecommunications operators). 
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important as regulators become more experienced with anti-competitive practices 
arising in the new TCI/IP markets. 
 
4.6 ITU Recommendation D.50 and the APEC Principles 
 
Effective Internet interconnection is heavily dependant on gaining access to the bare 
infrastructure in the first place. The bare infrastructure will consist mainly of access to 
international leased lines (IPLCs).  There has in recent years been fierce debate as to 
which operators should bear the cost of the international leased line to and from third 
countries to the United States, where the third country hosts a substantial amount of 
content in the US or hubs a substantial amount of data traffic through US servers. 
Following the APEC Cancun Ministerial Statement in the spring of 2000, there has 
been extensive international debate of the principle of ―appropriate mutual 
compensation‖ for the use of internet resources.  Relevant work continues in various 
public industry fora, and in closed commercial circles. The most vocal proponents of 
mandated cost-sharing have been the relatively developed Asian economies, plus 
Australia. The major telecommunications carriers in these countries, such as 
Singapore Telecom and VNSL in India are all are vying to become major internet 
traffic hubs. They see sharing the costs of international connections as a necessary 
step towards putting their cost bases on a more even footing with those of the USA
69
. 
The less developed Asian economies recognise that they would not have much to gain 
from traffic-based cost-sharing in the short term, because the direction of traffic is 
strongly asymmetric towards them
70
. VoIP could change this picture in that traffic 
flow will be bi-directional as opposed to traffic generated from requests to access 
websites, which is more unidirectional. This would mean a lot more traffic being 
carried by Asian operators out to US hubs reinforcing the argument for a more 
balanced division of infrastructure costs between Asian ISPs and US backbone 
operators (currently titled in favour of the US market players).  
 
Activities surrounding this issue seem to have shifted from debate towards practical 
implementation with the increasing role of commercial negotiators advancing internet 
                                                 
69
 See the research report produced for the UK‘s Department for International Development and co-
authored by the Author on Reducing the costs for internet access for developing countries 2001, at: 
http://www.wesra.com/cost1.htm. 
70
 As the biggest part of the traffic is Web pages downloaded from the USA to the developing country. 
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interconnection arrangements. The proposed role of central authorities seems to have 
shrunk to one of possible competition law enforcement, should infringements be 
found. 
 
Traffic-based interconnect has already been introduced between major operators for 
certain services for commercial reasons (for example, global mobile roaming and 
VoIP). This is not a trivial step, as it entails measuring traffic and assessing its type, 
source, and/or destination. Once implemented, these techniques may also be 
applicable to general internet traffic exchange. 
 
The ITU debated this issue at the World Telecommunication Standardization 
Assembly 2000 (WTSA 2000). At the assembly, the United States voiced strong 
objections over the purpose of mutual charging arrangements, warning that it could 
have an adverse effect on the successful development of the internet. In the WTO, 
Australia and Chinese Taipei have proposed that where there are dominant players or 
de facto monopolies, members must play a role in promoting fair competition
71
. 
Colombia has called for the elimination of barriers to access specifically the high 
interconnection tariffs that backbone ISPs charge for connection to international 
backbone networks
72
. Mexico has called for internet interconnection principles to 
encourage the use of the internet for economic development
73
. Internet charging 
arrangements between providers of network services should be commercially 
negotiated and, among other issues, reflect: 
 
 
(a) The contribution of each network to the communication; 
(b) the use by each party of the interconnected network resources; and 
(c) the end-to-end costs of international transport link capacity. 
 
APEC eventually adopted these provisions at Cancun. The ITU in Recommendation 
D.50 adopted a more diluted approach at Montreal in October 2000: 
                                                 
71
 S/CSS/W/17, December 2000. 
72
 GATS Council-Special Session, Communication from Colombia, Telecommunications Services, 
S/CSS/W/119, November 2001. 
73
 GATS Council-Special Session, Communication from Mexico, Telecommunications Services, 
S/CSS/W/101, July 2001. 
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That administrations involved in the provision of international internet 
connections negotiate and agree to bilateral commercial arrangements 
enabling direct international internet interconnections that take into account 
the possible need for compensation between them for the value of the elements 
such as traffic flow, number of routes, geographical coverage and cost of 
international transmission amongst others.
74
 
 
In December 2000, a decision was reached in an ITU-T study subgroup to implement 
Recommendation D.50 on a global basis.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
It is still too early to determine the effect of the APEC provisions or the ITU‘s 
Recommendation D.50 on international internet communications. An ITU Study 
Group (Study Group 3) followed up the recommendation with research on internet 
interconnection eventually producing a set of guidelines to go with the 
Recommendation D.50 and which were adopted by the ITU in June 2004. The 
guidelines include supporting the need for traffic aggregation at local and regional 
exchanges to reduce the volume of internet traffic being hubbed abroad (usually in the 
US). The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) discussed in Chapter 7 
(Developing Countries) has also reviewed the position of DCs and LDCs and internet 
interconnection costs and has called for funding to enhance connectivity and the 
creation of internet exchanges. This kind of infrastructure development may be well 
suited to private sector intitiatives as part of the WTO/World Bank‘s Aid For Trade 
(AfT) program. At this stage, implementation will be at the commercial rather than 
regulatory level, and if commercial, then will depend entirely on the bargaining 
positions of the parties concerned. The position of developing countries under the 
APEC rules and ITU Recommendation D.50 is discussed more fully in Chapter 7 
(Developing Countries and Telecommunications).  
 
                                                 
74
 ITU Recommendation D.50 available on the ITU website at www.itu.org.  
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This chapter has demonstrated the potential for anticompetitive practices by large 
backbones when negotiating peering and transit agreements with smaller ISPs. 
Whether the backbone is an international gateway provider providing for international 
connectivity between countries or whether the backbone exists within a country 
providing connectivity between regions, there is clear potential as we have seen for 
the backbone to abuse its dominant position. In DCs/LDCs, IBPs do have incentives 
to peer with the equally large internet subsidiaries of state controlled 
telecommunication incumbents, but equally as this chapter makes, such IBPs also 
have incentives not to peer with smaller downstream DC/LDC ISPs and to require 
transit terms that are not negotiated on a transparent, non-discriminatory and cost-
oriented basis. The lack of IXP exchanges in Africa for example only consolidates the 
problem. 
 
Also, we have seen the emergence of differentiated pricing in the United States and 
the response to this by content providers, such as Google, Microsoft and Skype for a 
‗net neutrality‘ model. The content providers fear a two-tier internet developing with 
higher costs for interconnection, and particularly access, resulting. The most recent 
report on internet interconnection by WIK Consult for the European Commission in 
2008 has argued that no mandated interconnection obligation for IP is necessary (at 
least by the European Commission), and neither is there a need for specific 
regulations to ensure net neutrality. Nevertheless the WIK Consult authors do 
recommend that NRAs are vigilant in checking for potential foreclosure of 
competition by operators with SMP. The problem is to determine SMP in new and 
sophisticated NGN markets. It is this very problem of defining SMP that the Layering 
Theory set out in Chapter 6 is concerned. 
 
Also it is important to note that the WIK authors excluded a discussion of access in 
their report. The rise of differentiated charging, the lack of IXP exchanges in DCs and 
LDCs together with a concentration of a limited number of IBPs on international 
routes spells continuing problems for DCs and LDCs. For example in Kenya, a recent 
OECD report states: 
 
…that the primary role of an IXP is to keep local traffic local and reduce costs 
associated with traffic exchange between Internet Service Providers (ISPs). In 
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many developing countries, poor connectivity between ISPs often results in 
the routing of local traffic over expensive international links simply to reach 
destinations within the country of origin. In some countries, government 
regulations require that independently operated ISPs transit their traffic 
through the incumbent telecommunications operator. Both of these scenarios 
can place additional costs on ISPs. Mr. Mwangi explained, for example, that 
prior to the establishment of the Kenyan Internet exchange point (KIXP), ISPs 
were required to connect through the incumbent operator which bundled 
transit prices for both local and international traffic. As a result, local traffic 
was billed to the originating ISP at the same expensive international transit 
rates.
75
 
 
The problem of IXP exchanges in Africa is discussed more in Chapter 7.  The 
Layering Theory, if implemented through OSI Layer 5-7 packet filtering technology 
being put in place at each IXP exchange with the corresponding data being made 
available to a locally trained NRA (both through an effective program of technology 
transfer—discussed in Chapter 8) could help address the market distortions described 
in the citation above. The Layering Theory is based on aspects of the EU‘s new 
regulatory framework (discussed in the next Chapter 5), an understanding of which is 
first required before discussing the theory in full in Chapter 6. The author argues in 
Chapter 6 that the EU law-based theory could form a useful precedent for DCs and 
LDCs for future regulation of NGNs. The practical relevance for the Layering Theory 
to DCs and LDCs is then set out more fully in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
75
 Internet Exchange Points: Lowering costs and promoting internet development, African realities and 
the Kenyan experience at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/15/43759912.pdf, accessed April 2012. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
1
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It is very clear that the advent of digital networks and the increasing power and 
capacity of microchip technology has given rise to a vast new range of electronic 
services: And with the rise of such services, the emergence of new corporate 
relationships between operators at different levels of the delivery chain. Recently, 
Nokia, the mobile telephone manufacturer signed an agreement with the software 
giant Microsoft, and the US music download service provider, Loudeye, that will 
allow users to download music and ringtones to Nokia handsets equipped with 
Microsoft‘s digital music playing software2. The company has also announced a range 
of handsets that will compete both with the digital camera market and Apple‘s iPod 
MP3 player
3
. Regulators are always playing catch-up with technology, and although 
the European Commission has put in place an excellent and far-reaching regulatory 
framework for regulating electronic communications networks and services, which 
seeks to separate the regulation of digital content from the digital networks that carry 
the content, and applying the principles of technological neutrality that seek to 
embrace both elements of competition law and sector-specific regulation
4
, the 
question remains as to whether this new framework will remain adequate to deal with 
the complex range of protocols, layers, and applications that constitute such new 
services . Regulators are used to dealing with single-application networks, but 
increasingly face the challenge of multi-application networks. For example, one of the 
main problems that judges had in the Microsoft case, where the major concern was the 
leveraging of monopoly power from the Intel-compatible PC operating system market 
                                                 
1
 A version of this chapter has been published in the monograph by Kariyawasam R., International 
Economic Law and the Digital Divide: A New Silk Road? Edward Elgar, 2007. 
2
 See BBC news release: Nokia announces Microsoft tie-up (February 2005) at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4264161.stm, accessed April 2005. 
3
 See BBC news release: Nokia offers new range of phones (April 2005) at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4489485.stm, accessed April 2005. 
4
 Which would draw on jurisprudence from the European Court of First Instance and European Court 
of Justice, together with cases decided by the European Commission itself.  
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into the internet browser market, was first being able to determine the relevant 
market, and then being able to measure market power within that market
5
. Also in a 
different case involving Sun Microsystems and Microsoft, where Sun sued Microsoft 
in an attempt to prevent the capturing of the open standard of Java, and turning it into 
a closed standard, Sun failed to establish any antitrust claim because the Court of 
Appeals in applying standard competition analysis found that there could be no 
market distortion in the absence of a strict market definition, as a prerequisite to 
identifying any market distortion is a clear definition of the relevant market
6
. By 
contrast, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States has 
laboured with the distinction between an information service and a telecommunication 
service that has created disparities in regulating different communication sub-sectors, 
such as the cable and Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) networks, resulting in costly 
litigation and regulatory uncertainty.  
 
This chapter looks briefly at the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications. 
By doing so, the Author attempts to put in place the basic principles required to 
understand the more detailed Layering Theory that the Author discusses in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 looks briefly at US regulatory principles and also reviews a growing body 
of academic thought that seeks to apply a Layered Policy Model for regulating a new 
generation of packet-switched networks that draws its origins from computer science 
theory. Chapter 6 then discusses how the Layered Policy Model might be adapted in 
the form of a new Layering Theory that could be applied to multilateral instruments, 
such as the WTO‘s Annex on Telecommunications and particularly the regulatory 
Reference Paper. The advantages of adopting a layered approach to regulation at the 
multilateral level for DCs and LDCs are more fully explored in Chapter 7. In this 
chapter (Chapter 5), the Author starts with a brief review of the EC‘s consultation 
with industry and regulators in Europe, which led to the introduction of a new 
regulatory framework for electronic networks and services that came into force in July 
2003. The chapter discusses the main objectives of the new regulatory framework, the 
instruments in the form of the directives that the European Commission used to bring 
                                                 
5
 United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation (364 U.S. App D.C. 330), and also the Microsoft 
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, 2001/462/EC, ECSC, OJ L162, 19.06.200. Under US law, the question of 
market definition arises in US antitrust actions under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the 
amended Clayton Act involving mergers.  
6
 See section 4.3.1 below. 
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the new framework into force, the basic structure of the framework, and key issues, 
including for example a new test of significant market power in the form of 
dominance. 
 
5.2 The European Commission’s (EC’s) new regulatory framework for 
electronic networks and services (“New Framework”) 
 
The New Framework built on earlier consultations with European industry and 
regulators as part of the 1999 Communications Review: the New Framework was the 
genesis of this earlier work. The Communications Review highlighted the plethora of 
directives, recommendations, notices that existed in the communications sector and 
which provided regulatory overload.  
 
5.2.1 Objectives 
 
The main objective of the New Framework was to streamline European policy 
instruments into five basic directives that would cover both the wholesale and retail 
sector (universal service and privacy). At the heart of the New Framework would be 
an engine working on both competition and ex-ante (sector specific) drivers that 
would lift the regulatory burden on operators, leaving them free to operate in markets 
where effective competition was proven to be in place. In line with the EC‘s previous 
regulatory policy, the regulation of content was strictly separated from the regulation 
of infrastructure, although the New Framework was to cover the emerging broadband 
networks based on the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
7
, 
including wireless, conditional access, and broadcasting systems.  
 
5.2.2 Instruments 
With the objectives discussed above in mind, a new regulatory package including one 
Framework Directive
8
 and three directives on access, authorisations, and universal 
service respectively was adopted by the Commission in July 2002
9
. A few months 
                                                 
7
 Defined in Chapter 2. 
8
 Directive 2002/21/EC ―on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services‖, Framework Directive, OJ L 108/33, 24.4.2002. 
9
 Directive 2002/19/EC ―on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and 
associated facilities‖, Access Directive, OJ L108/7, 24.4.2002; Directive 2002/20/EC ―on the 
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later, directives on privacy
10
 and competition
11
 were adopted. All new directives came 
into force in July 2003. The directives are meant to be technologically neutral in that 
no distinction is to be made between an internet and any other type of network. The 
new framework now refers to ―electronic communications‖ and not 
―telecommunications‖, and the same principles apply regardless of which kind of 
technology is used. So for instance, an ―electronic communications network‖ is 
defined at Article 2 Framework Directive as: 
 
transmission systems, and where applicable, switching or routing equipment 
and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, 
by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, 
fixed (circuit-and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial 
networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the 
purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television 
broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of 
information conveyed. 
 
Similarly, an electronic communications service is defined under the same Article as: 
 
a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly 
in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, 
including telecommunication services and transmission services in networks 
used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial 
control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks 
and services; it does not include information society services, as defined in 
Article 1 of Directive 98/34/EC
12
, which do not consist wholly or mainly in 
the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks. 
 
The Framework Directive makes a distinction between an electronic communication 
service and an information society service. Recital 10 of the Framework Directive 
makes clear that electronic mail conveyance and voice telephony are in the scope of 
                                                                                                                                            
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services‖, Authorisation Directive, OJ 
L108/21, 24.4.2002; Directive 2002/22/EC ―on universal service and users‘ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services‖, Universal Service Directive, OJ L108/51, 24.4.2002. 
10
 Directive 2002/58/EC ―concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector‖, OJ L201/37, 31.7.2002. 
11
 Directive 2002/77/EC ―on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and 
services‖, OJ L249/21, 17.9.2002. 
12
 Directive 98/34/EC ―laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations‖ OJ L204/37, 21.7.1998 as amended by Directive 98/48/EC. 
 165 
the definition of an electronic communications service, but the hosting of web-based 
content for example, is not. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear from Recital 10 
exactly which information society services are to be excluded from the definition of 
an electronic communications service. In this way, the New Framework also suffers 
from a lack of a clear distinction found in the US Telecommunications Act 1996, 
when distinguishing between an information service and a telecommunications 
service (discussed in Chapter 6).  
 
5.2.3 Significant Market Power 
 
Another important aspect of the EC‘s New Framework is the new definition of 
Significant Market Power (SMP), akin to a position of dominance as defined by EC 
competition jurisprudence
13
, and adopted by the Commission at Article 14(2) 
Framework Directive. This provision was introduced earlier in Chapter 3. The 
importance of an operator being designated as having SMP by a regulator (and 
following the procedures for conducting a market analysis set out under Articles 15 
and 16 Framework Directive) is twofold: (a) the finding of an undertaking with SMP 
on a relevant market indicates (according to the Framework Directive), that effective 
competition does not exist in that market; and (b) ex-ante obligations, such as pricing 
obligations, might be imposed on an undertaking found to have SMP
14
. In this way, 
the Commission quite effectively merges both the use of conventional competition 
type procedures (defining a relevant market) with ex-ante (sector-specific) measures. 
To assist in the definition of markets, the Commission has also published a set of 
guidelines
15
 on SMP together with a revised Recommendation on relevant products 
and service markets within the electronic communications sector adopted in 2007
16
.  
 
                                                 
13
 Specifically United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] ECR 207. 
14
 Except for the special cases listed in Article 8(3) Access Directive.  
15
 Guidelines of the Commission ―on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power 
under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services‖, OJ 
C 165/6, 11.7.2002. 
16
 Commission Recommendation ―on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communication networks and services‖, OJ L114/45, 8.5.2003. This Recommendation was revised in 
2007, C(2007) 5406 rev 1. See Chapter 6, section 6.4 (The Layering Theory and SMP Reinterpreted) 
below for a discussion of the revised Recommendation.  
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Another important aspect of the New Framework is the Commission‘s thinking on 
access. There has long been a subtle distinction between the right to interconnect and 
the right of access in European telecommunications policy. The precursor to the 
Access Directive was the Interconnection Directive 97/33 (ICD)(now annulled), one 
of the Directives that fell under the Commission‘s Open Network Provision (ONP)17. 
Under the ICD, the Commission set out a mandatory right to interconnect to a 
providing operator‘s network for those requesting operators who fell into Annexe II of 
the Directive
18
, where the providing operator had SMP
19
. However SMP operators 
were only required to meet all reasonable requests for access
20
.  
 
The Commission soon discovered however through its consultation with industry and 
regulators as part of the 1999 Communications Review, that access was proving to be 
the subject of many complaints to national regulators under both domestic 
telecommunications and competition law. Access, of course, is in many respects as 
important as interconnection in that it provides access to infrastructure for those 
service providers who do not own infrastructure of their own, but also because of the 
network effects generated by the access granted
21
. In the Communication Review, the 
Commission also recognised the difference between interconnection and access: while 
access to a network or facility is required to establish a commercial relation with the 
other network‘s customer, in interconnection there is no direct commercial 
                                                 
17
 Other directives included the Leased Lines Directive 92/44, the Licensing Directive 97/13, and the 
Revised Voice Telephony Directive 98/10. All these directives have now been replaced with the New 
Framework of directives. 
18
 Article 4(1) Interconnection Directive 97/33 (now repealed). Basically any operator who was 
licensed and controlled the means of access to one or more network termination points identified by 
unique numbers in the national numbering plan. There was uncertainty at the time whether this 
definition included Internet Service Providers, and therefore whether ISPs could claim interconnection 
rights, as ISPs controlled IP addresses and not numbers in the national numbering plan. However, ISPs 
argued that they were controlling access by having IP addresses allocated in accordance with a global 
addressing scheme. As such, some European Member States, including the UK and Germany allowed 
certain ISPs to fall into Annex II and claim interconnection rights. 
19
 Defined differently to the concept of SMP under the New Framework. The Interconnection Directive 
at Article 4(3) defined SMP if an undertaking had a market share in excess of 25% in the markets 
defined in an Annexe to the Directive (in summary, markets for fixed and mobile public network 
services, interconnection services, and leased lines). The SMP test has now been replaced with a new 
concept of SMP akin to dominance (40%) as defined in Article 14(2) Framework Directive. 
20
 Article 4(2) Interconnection Directive imposed on SMP operators to meet all reasonable access 
requests in accordance with the principles of (non-discrimination, transparency, cost-orientation, 
unbundled charges, reference interconnection offer) set out in Articles 6 and 7 Interconnection 
Directive. 
21
 Koenig C. and Loetz S., ―Framework for Network Access and Interconnection‖, in Koenig C, 
Bartosch A., and Braun J.D (eds) EC Competition and Telecommunications Law, Kluwer Law 
International 2002, p.365. 
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relationship between the called customer and the provider requesting 
interconnection
22
. The Commission defines Access at Article 2 Access Directive as: 
 
access means the making available of facilities and/or services, to another 
undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive 
basis for the purpose of providing electronic communications services. 
 
Interconnection is defined at Article 2 Access Directive as: 
 
the physical and logical linking of public communications networks used by 
the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the users of one 
undertaking to communicate with users of the same or another undertaking, or 
to access services provided by another undertaking. Services may be provided 
by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the network. 
Interconnection is a specific type of access implemented between public 
network operators. 
 
Given the increased significance of access by third party operators to an incumbent‘s 
network, particularly access to digital networks based on the TCP/IP protocol, the 
Commission also included at Article 12 Access Directive a much more powerful 
provision on access which would give regulators greater discretion to intervene on 
access disputes, and if necessary, impose access controls on undertakings, even in the 
absence of Significant Market Power. The first paragraph of Article 12 sets out that 
National Regulatory Authorities may require operators ―to meet reasonable requests 
for access to and, use of specific network elements and associated facilities‖. Article 
12(1) Access Directive then sets out a list of possible obligations including:  
 
 providing access to networks and facilities; 
 unbundled access to the local loop; 
 not withdrawing any existing supply of access; 
                                                 
22
 Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services: 
The 1999 Communications Review, COM(1999)539, p.25-26. 
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 providing open access to technical interfaces, middleware, protocols or other 
key technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or 
virtual network services; and 
 sharing physical facilities and providing co-location.  
 
Article 12 clearly recognises the significance of the new TCP/IP protocol as the basic 
transmission production standard of all modern packet-switched networks and 
attempts to put in place an access regime that can deal with the many services and 
applications that could run over such networks. The Article recognises that software 
just as much as hardware can function as an access bottleneck, and gives the regulator 
wide powers to deal with distortions on competition arising from such bottlenecks. 
However, it can be argued that even the far reaching provisions on access defined at 
Article 12 Access Directive may not be sufficient in dealing with the range of access 
issues that can arise with IP-based networks, particularly where a service consists of 
different Component Parts, with each component operating at a different level of the 
TCP/IP Protocol Stack.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
As digital services become more complex with an intricate mix of protocols operating 
at different service and infrastructure layers (some through software and some 
through hardware), and with differentiated charging being introduced by network 
operators (in conflict with then ‗net neutrality‘ principle discussed in Chapter 4), 
being able to define the relevant market for a particular service will become 
increasingly complex. Regulators risk facing an uphill struggle, and as Denton aptly 
states: ―Telecommunications policy makers are thus experts at regulating single 
application networks. Since the advent of packet-networks, the job of the regulator 
has become much more complicated as networks are no longer limited to one 
application.‖23 The internet has made the new environment for the trade in digital 
services much more complex, as protocols are stacked one on top of the other. As 
such, regulators need to take account of the arrangements of telecommunication 
operators with their competitors at Layers above that of the physical connection of 
                                                 
23
 Denton T., Protocol interfaces are the new bottlenecks: What the Internet means for telecom 
regulation at www.tmdenton.com, date accessed November 2004, p. 10. 
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devices and examine the competition implications of the software by which the 
applications that run over telecommunication networks operate.  
 
In January 2008, WIK Consult produced a report for the European Commission on the 
future of IP (internet protocol) interconnection. The Authors to that report said: 
 
A number of technological and market developments pose challenges to IP-
based interconnection, and to traditional interconnection in the fixed (PSTN) 
and mobile (PLMN) networks as well. Notably, these networks are physically 
and logically converging to IP-based Next Generation Networks (NGNs). 
Interconnection arrangements for switched PSTN/PLMN networks have been 
markedly different than those for IP networks, not only at a technical level, but 
also in terms of associated regulatory obligations. The convergence of these 
networks raises difficult questions as to how interconnection should be 
regulated going forward.
24
 
 
The report‘s authors argue that those operators who offer IP interconnect services 
with SMP might be in a position to degrade the quality of service or interconnection 
standard in order to thwart competition. They suggest that existing remedies under EU 
law should be sufficient, although state that, ‗We do not advocate an interconnection 
obligation as regards IP data traffic in general, and we do not see a need to mandate 
any-to-any peering; however NRAs must be able to intervene if interconnection 
breaks down, especially where this is a manifestation of some form of market 
power.‖25 
 
The report is restricted to IP interconnection only and does not discuss the problem of 
access to IP networks (interconnection being a specific example of the much broader 
right to access—discussed in Chapter 5). But it is this problem of access that is 
important. In the 1999 Communications Review completed by the European 
Commission
26
, the Commission found just as many problems with access issues as 
                                                 
24
 Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, Economic and Public Policy 
Aspects, a study for the European Commission, January 2008, p.9. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services: 
The 1999 Communications Review, COM(1999)539, p.25-26. 
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with interconnection (albeit in the circuit-switched world).  For this reason, the 
Commission put in place Article 12 of the Access & Interconnection Directive 
discussed above.
27
 Article 12 clearly recognises the significance of the new TCP/IP 
protocol as the basic transmission production standard of all modern packet-switched 
networks. However, even Article 12 Access Directive may not be sufficient in dealing 
with the range of access issues that can arise with IP-based networks.  
 
In this regard, the Author explores a new way of looking at regulating complex digital 
networks that seeks to apply a layered approach to regulation, and proposing a new 
Layering Theory for increasing transparency and accurately assessing market power, 
which is discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 6).  
 
                                                 
27
 Directive 2002/19/EC ―on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and 
associated facilities‖, Access Directive, OJ L108/7, 24.4.2002. 
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CHAPTER 6
1
 
A NEW LAYERING THEORY FOR REGULATING COMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS AND SERVICES? 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 reviewed the potential for IBPs with dominance to abuse their positions of 
dominance. By nature of the structure of the internet, and a lack of effective 
competition and availability of internet infrastructure in their own markets, DC and 
LDC ISPs are often forced to obtain routes and interconnect at IXP exchanges in the 
developed world. The implications for DCs and LDCs were clear in that smaller ISPs 
in these developing countries could face potential anticompetitive practices both at 
network access points in the developing and developed worlds unless NRAs are in a 
position to intervene, if necessary. Also we saw in Chapter 4 that even in developed 
markets, such as the European Market, the authors of the most recent report to the 
European Commission on IP interconnection in 2008, WIK Consult, warned of the 
dangers of NGN operators with SMP potentially foreclosing competition on 
interconnection with their networks. Although the WIK Consult authors have not 
called for mandatory IP interconnection obligations, they have called for NRAs to be 
vigilant in checking for abuse of operators with SMP. The problem is off course, that 
in a new era of NGNs and services, and with IPv6 replacing IPv4 in 2010/2011 
(discussed later in this chapter) and a plethora of new TCP/IP services and NGNs 
becoming available worldwide, are NRAs in a position to define relevant markets 
accurately enough to measure for dominance? The Author argues at Section 6.3.3 that 
current assessment of market definition by the EC in internet cases is flawed and that 
market definition in NGN markets will become even more problematical. The Author 
argues that the Layering Theory, discussed in this chapter, will address the problem of 
market definition in the NGN sector. Further, that the theory could be of great benefit 
to DCs and LDCs not only in improving effective competition in their own markets 
                                                 
1
 A version of this chapter has been published in the monograph by Kariyawasam R., International 
Economic Law and the Digital Divide: A New Silk Road? Edward Elgar, 2007. 
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(by helping local ISPs take on the large dominant monopolists in their own regions 
and subject to the Layering Theory being implemented into local laws and then 
enforced), but also by ensuring that NRAs in developed countries are in a position to 
guarantee developing country ISPs non-discriminatory access should DC/LDC ISPs 
complain of IBPs at IXP exchanges in the developed world not granting non-
discriminatory access and interconnection.  
 
Most DCs and LDCs look either to the US or EU systems of law for guidance on the 
regulation of telecommunications (and increasingly internet) networks and services. 
Many DCs and LDCs view the European regulatory framework for electronic 
networks and services positively given the problems that the US market has had with 
the collapse of its DSL sector, the conflict with cable, and with regulatory uncertainty 
over internet services (discussed in Chapter 4). There are problems with US law, 
particularly its asymmetrical and ‗silo‘ structure on defining telecommunications and 
internet services. It is for this reason and to show how the Layering Theory moves 
away from this ‗silo‘ structure that US law is briefly discussed. By contrast, the 
European model is highly attractive. For example, one of the largest markets for 
telecommunications in the world, China, is currently reviewing its own regulatory 
framework with the European model in mind. Furthermore, with financial assistance 
for the amendment of local laws in developing country states by the World Bank, 
WTO or UNCTAD, it might be possible to envisage the European test of SMP being 
adopted as a precedent for operators with market power in the regulatory frameworks 
for NGNs and services in DC and LDC markets in time to come.  
 
In summary, this chapter argues that the Layering Theory can help address the Digital 
Divide in two main ways by: (a) enhancing effective competition in NGNs and 
services in Europe by ensuring non-discriminatory access by DC and LDC ISPs to 
IXP exchanges in Europe (achieved through implementing the Layering Theory in EC 
law); and (b) enhancing effective competition in world markets for NGNs and 
services so that DC and LDC ISPs can gain access to any IXP exchange in any OECD 
member market (subject to scheduled member GATS commitments) through effective 
enforcement of interconnection obligations of the WTO‘s Reference Paper (achieved 
through implementing the Layering Theory as an additional commitment in the form 
of a revised Reference Paper at the WTO).  
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There is a third way, connected to the discussion of the Layering Theory in this 
chapter, but more fully elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8 that follow. These chapters 
show how effective competition can be enhanced in local domestic DC and LDC 
markets by ensuring ISP non-discriminatory access and interconnection (by way of 
the Layering Theory) to IBP and local monopolist networks at IXP exchanges in 
developing country markets (Chapter 7), which in turn can be achieved through 
implementing the Layering Theory as part of a program of technology transfer and 
technical assistance through enforcement of developed country obligations under 
Article 66 TRIPS (Chapter 8). 
 
6.2 The Layered Policy Model 
 
The idea of a Layered policy approach to regulating telecommunications has been 
discussed by several US authors in different ways, for example, Werbach
2
, Denton
3
, 
and Frieden
4
, but further developed by Sicker and Mindel
5
. The Author builds on the 
work of these Authors by putting forward a new Layering Theory for the regulation of 
complex digital networks, which seeks to more accurately identify those operators 
having actual market power. In doing so, the Author argues, National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) and/or National Competition Authorities (NCAs) acting under 
principles of concurrency will be able to accurately impose either sector-specific 
measures or competition measures to adequately regulate for effective competition. 
The Author argues that one important by-product of that process for DCs and LDCs 
interested in exporting electronic services and network products to developed 
countries by way of digital networks, would be greater transparency and non-
discrimination in third country operator access to the international backbone networks 
that can then provide the infrastructure to deliver electronic goods and services to 
developed (mainly OECD) country markets (discussed in Chapter 7). Also this 
                                                 
2
 Werbach K., A Layered Model for Internet Policy, The Regulation of Information Platforms, 
J.Telecomm & High Tech. Law, 2002. 
3
 Denton T., Protocol interfaces are the new bottlenecks: What the Internet means for telecom 
regulation at www.tmdenton.com, date accessed November 2004. 
4
 Frieden R., Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison 
of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, Penn State University, 2002. 
5
 Sicker C.D., Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, Paper of the 
Department of Interdisciplinary Telecommunications, Department of Computer Science, University of 
Colorado at Boulder, January 2001.  
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enhanced access works both ways, enabling operators and content providers in 
developed economies to provide more efficient services into DC/LDC markets. In 
developing the argument, the Author starts with the framework for 
telecommunications regulation in the United States, but with its inherent problems of 
asymmetry, moves quickly to the European Commission‘s model as the basis for the 
Layering Theory.  
 
6.2.1 The United States 
 
In the United States, under the Telecommunications Act 1996 (the ―Act‖), the ―silo 
model‖ for regulation of telecommunications applies in that each title of the Act 
imposes regulatory conditions based on the type of infrastructure on which a 
telecommunications service is offered. So for example, Title II Act regulates wireline 
telephone networks as common carriers, Title III regulates wireless networks, and 
Title IV regulates cable networks. However because of the move to the IP protocol as 
the basic transmission production standard for packet-switched networks, voice, 
audio, and video as packetized service can now travel over any digital network. The 
effect of this (in the United States) has been to cause asymmetry of regulation over 
the different modes of transport, for example broadband services for residential and 
for small businesses provided by Digital Subscriber Loop (DSL) technologies over 
the PSTN are required to be unbundled, whereas broadband services provided by 
cable modems over HFC cable networks operated primarily by pay TV operators are 
not
6
. Frieden discusses this asymmetrical approach very coherently arguing that: 
 
[The Federal Communications] Commission deems telephone company 
provided broadband access a telecommunications service, but it has strongly 
indicated the desire to convert the classification of these offerings into the 
information services category. Such a flip in vertical food chains evidences 
how inflexible and unworkable the definitions have become, particularly 
                                                 
6
 Hausman J., Competition and Regulation for Internet-related Services: Results of Asymmetric 
Regulation, MIT, August 2001. 
 175 
because a competing technology, cable modem access, already qualifies for 
the unregulated information service classification.
7
  
 
In addition in the US, following the Computer Inquiries
8
, a different set of rules 
emerged for the regulation of services that travelled over a telecommunication 
network, and the regulation of the network itself. Two classifications emerged, basic 
and enhanced. Basic services are classed as common carrier services and are 
regulated, whereas enhanced services are not. The Computer Inquiries effectively 
separated the basic transport network from that of the services that travelled over 
them, defining the original version of the Layered model. The Act continued the 
separation of basic and enhanced services providing for telecommunication services 
(regulated) and information services (not regulated). Under the Act, a 
telecommunication service: 
 
means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to 
such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, 
regardless of the facilities used
9
 
 
Telecommunications:  
 
means the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of 
information of the user‘s choosing, without change in the form or content of 
the information as sent and received.
10
 
 
An information service under the Act is defined as: 
 
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, 
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
                                                 
7
 Frieden R., Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison 
of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 2002, p. 23.  
8
 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Federal Communications Commission‘s Rules and Regulations 
(Second Computer Inquiry) CC docket No. 20828 (note that this has been considered and further 
reconsidered in several further FCC hearings); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Federal 
Communications Commission‘s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry) CC Docket No. 85-
229 (as with the Second Computer Inquiry, the Third Computer Inquiry has also been considered and 
further reconsidered in several subsequent FCC hearings and cases). For more details see FCC website.  
9
 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). 
10
 47 U.S.C. § 153(48). 
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telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include 
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications 
service.
11
 
 
The Layered Policy Model suggested by Sicker et al, moves away from the vertical 
―silo‖ concept adopted by the Act to a more horizontal approach, which borrows its 
structure from that used to describe the TCP/IP protocol stack
12
. In the Layered Policy 
Model (as suggested by Sicker) the following structure applies: 
 
 
CONTENT 
APPLICATIONS 
TRANSPORT 
ACCESS 
Figure 1 (Source: Sicker) 
 
Sicker argues that interconnection ―will be at the heart of this model‖13 and that 
providers of access, transport, and applications may be subject to interconnection 
obligations on terms defined by their market power. He uses the concept of significant 
market power, but does not make clear in his paper what this means. However, for 
players who do have significant market power, a pricing condition could be invoked. 
Sicker states that: ―This condition will vary depending on power exerted: whether the 
player controls multiple Layers or significantly controls a particular Layer. For 
                                                 
11
 47 U.S.C. § 153(41). 
12
 Sicker in his paper stresses that while there is a correspondence with the TCP/IP protocol stack, the 
policy Layers of the new model represent the providers of services at each of these Layers and not the 
protocols or the implementation of these protocols. It should also be stressed that the TCP/IP protocol 
stack actually consists of seven Layers: (i) Physical: hardware medium for signals such as cable, 
satellite; (ii) Data link: splits data into packets; (iii) Network: sends packets to addresses; (iv) 
Transport: ensures that packets arrive, are error-free and are in the current order; (v) Session: 
establishes and coordinates connection between computers; (vi) Presentation: allows transfer of files 
between different formats; and (vii) Application: e-mail, file requests, file transfers etc. (See Denton, 
supra footnote 3 at p. 11). The TCP/IP Protocol stack roughly follows the Open Systems 
Interconnection Model (OSI Model). The goals of the OSI model are to expedite communication built 
by different manufacturers and to make applications independent of the hardware on which they 
operate. However the OSI Model was not fully followed by the designers of the internet: the session, 
presentation, and application Layers of the OSI Model are compacted into one: See Kessler G., ISDN, 
McGraw-Hill, 1990. 
13
 Sicker C.D., ―Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy”, Draft Paper of the 
Department of Interdisciplinary Telecommunications, Department of Computer Science, University of 
Colorado at Boulder, January 2001, p.14. 
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example, many cable and LECS [local exchange carriers] would be viewed as 
significantly controlling the access Layer. Other players, such as AOL/TW, would be 
viewed as operating in multiple Layers.‖ Fransman, in an earlier work, had arrived at 
a very similar structure, although stopped short of proposing a Layered model as a 
model for a new regulatory structure. Unlike Sicker and Mindel, who push for four 
Layers, Fransman in his Infocommunications model suggests six: 
 
 First (bottom) Layer: Equipment & Software Layer, describing for example 
switches, transmission equipment, routers, servers, customer premises 
equipment, and billing software. Vendors such as Nortel, Lucent, Cisco and 
Nokia would operate at this Layer. 
 Second Layer: Network Layer, describing optical fibre networks, DSL, local 
networks, radio access networks, ethernet and frame relay, ISDN and ATM 
networks. At this Layer, vendors such as AT&T, BT, NTT, Quest, and Colt 
operate. 
 Third Layer: Connectivity Layer, describing internet access and web hosting, 
the IP interface, where operators such as Internet Application Providers and 
Internet Service Providers function. 
 Fourth Layer: Navigation & Middleware Layer, describing browsers, portals, 
search engines, directory assistance, security, electronic payment, where 
companies such as Yahoo and Microsoft operate. 
 Fifth Layer: Applications Layer, including contents-packaging, describing 
web-design, on-line information services, broadcasting services, where 
Bloomberg, Reuters, AOL-Time Warner, MSN, and Newscorp all operate. 
 Sixth Layer: Customer Layer, where finally the market for customers is 
defined.
 14
 
 
Werbach has gone on to suggest five layers; physical, logical, application, interface, 
and content layers
15
. Whichever model is preferred all models suggest a horizontal 
approach to the treatment of the different Layers that apply in IP-based transmission 
                                                 
14
 Fransman M., Telecoms in the Internet Age From Boom to Bust to?, OUP, 2002, p. 66. 
 
15
 Werbach K.,  Breaking the Ice: rethinking telecommunications law for the digital age, draft 
December 2004, available at: http://werbach.com/docs/breaking_the_ice.pdf, accessed July 2005, p. 14. 
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systems. Sicker (as well as Werbach) go further than Fransman in suggesting the 
Layered structure as a new model for regulation. In the next section, the Author 
builds on this Layered Policy Model to suggest a new Layering Theory for regulating 
complex TCP/IP-based networks. 
 
 
6.3 A new regulatory framework for TCP/IP networks? 
 
In this section, the Author takes the Layered Policy Model and goes further in 
defining an electronic communications service by reference to a new term, its 
Component Parts, where each Component Part would fit into any one of the Layers 
that Sicker describes. It is important to note that Sicker does not suggest this. Instead 
he suggests that the Layers operate as policy Layers ―which represent the providers of 
the services, not the protocols or the implementation of these protocols….Therefore 
we should not confuse the technical implementation of the Internet with the policy 
goals of a Layered model.‖16 
It seems sensible not to confuse the Layered Policy Model with the TCP/IP 
Protocol Stack. However rather than describing each of the Layers as representing the 
providers of the services as Sicker suggests, this Author argues that an electronic 
communications service could either fall in its entirety into one of the access, 
transport, application, or content Layers, or will have Component Parts that will fit 
into any one or several of the Layers simultaneously. We can therefore define an 
electronic communications service by reference to the Layers. In this way, any 
electronic communications service that exists now or is yet to be invented can by 
defined by reference to the Layers.  
This can only be achieved if it is possible to take any service delivered over an 
IP network and be able to separate the Component Parts of that service and then 
allocate each Component Part to a specific Layer, and then price the relevant 
Component Part. With modern packet filtering technology (deep packet inspection, 
DPI)
17
 it is now possible to perform content filtering based on the type of data being 
sent. These devices work by inspecting the payload of an IP packet and detecting the 
protocol in use. The detection works by matching a sequence of data with a 
                                                 
16
 Supra footnote 13, pages 8-9. 
17
 Such as OSI 5-7 Layer filtering technology. 
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predefined signature, although in practice the processing power needed to perform 
this sequence matching can be substantial. For example, a request for a web page 
from a web server is sent via the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol over a 
TCP connection. The first part of an HTTP request to retrieve a web page is usually a 
GET request
18
, a content filter works by matching the first part of the data portion of 
the IP payload with an internal signature file. From this, the protocol in use can be 
derived. Because this filtering of the data portion of the IP packet is at a higher level 
in the OSI 7 layer model, the decision on whether to allow, disallow or record this 
traffic does not necessarily rely on the TCP/IP ports being used to transfer the data. 
DPI can be defined as a packet filtering technique used by Internet service providers 
(ISPs) to intercept and examine all unencrypted content exchanged over networks.
19
 
Although such measurements are not 100% perfect given that encryption techniques 
make it possible to ‗hide‘ component parts, modern techniques for DPI, which 
operators are currently using and which are in common use, allows for even encrypted 
components to be detected. DPI is commonly used to shape traffic and to block 
unauthorised file sharing on peer-to-peer networks (P2P). For example, in the United 
Kingdom, several ISPs have used a new DPI-like technology, known as Phorm, in 
order to establish targeted advertising
20
. 
The ability to detect specific types of TCP traffic means that decisions can be 
made about which services are allowed or denied. The layer 5-7 devices allow 
enforcement of services. However once an operator has the ability to detect and 
measure which TCP services are in use, it can then charge for the use of such 
services. Deep packet inspection can lead to a process of differential charging based 
on the protocol in use. Traditionally, costing has been based around network usage; 
the amount of data transferred is usually multiplied by a cost (usually per megabyte). 
However, and as described above, now that the ability to detect and measure the usage 
of a TCP service is technically possible, it is feasible to create a charging structure 
based around protocol usage. It is around this concept of charging by protocol where 
the system of differentiated charging arises. Differentiated charging by ISPs is highly 
controversial and has been seen as an attack on the net‘s neutrality (discussed below). 
                                                 
18
 There are other types of HTTP request but for the sake of simplicity we are only considering this 
one.   
19
 EPIC, ‗Deep Packet Inspection and Privacy‘ at: http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/, accessed November 
2010. 
20
 http://www.phorm.com/, accessed November 2010. 
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It follows then that that an operator will be able to charge a premium per 
megabyte of high value content traffic (such as MP3 files transferred using the Kazaa 
protocol for example
21
-discussed further below), whereas HTTP protocol-based 
traffic may be priced at a cheaper rate. 
This ability of an operator/undertaking to charge in accordance with protocol 
usage will lead to an increased complexity of charging structures. Content providers, 
such as Google and Skype, are concerned that this will lead to increased 
interconnection costs as well as anticompetitive behaviour, such as discriminatory 
practices when network providers enter into competing downstream service markets.
22
  
With the transition of legacy internet networks to NGNs worldwide, there are 
moves now by the large internet infrastructure owners to shift to a position of 
differentiated charging, charging according to the type of information being sent over 
the network: This is linked not just to interconnection of networks as between two 
different infrastructure owners, but also to the problem of access to networks by 
content providers. Microsoft, Google, and Skype are strongly resistant to 
differentiated charging, preferring instead a ‗net neutrality‘ model, where all data is 
treated the same regardless of the protocol being used for transmission. Content 
providers fear that the costs to end-users will rise if infrastructure providers succeed 
with their model of differentiated charging. Already, in the United States, the Justice 
Department has indicated its support for differentiated charging. The implications for 
Developing Country (DC) and Least Developing Country (LDC) Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) and content providers--heavily reliant on access to developed 
country operator international circuits and content--are onerous.  
There are many different types of services that are available over the Internet, 
and there are new protocols being developed yearly. However not all protocols are 
easy to decode and measure. This is due to the immaturity of detection methods. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that these detection methods will improve for all 
                                                 
21
 The Kazaa protocol, owned by Sharman Networks was the subject of litigation by Metro Goldwyn 
Mayor film studios in 2006, which resulted in a substantial settlement payment. See 
http://www.jenner.com/news/news_item.asp?id=13608724, accessed July 2010. Other operators have 
now since replaced Kazaa using similar protocols  for P2P file swapping such as Limewire, e-Mule and 
BitTorrent. See Christina J. ―Angelopoulos, Modern Intellectual property legislation: warm for reform‖ 
Ent.L.R. 2008, 19(2) 35 at 36, for other examples of copyright infringement via P2P networks. 
22
 Lie E., International Internet Interconnection, Next Generation Networks and Development, Global 
Symposium for Regulators, Dubai, 2007, discussion paper available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR07/discussion_papers/Eric_lie_international_interconnection.pdf, 
accessed November 2010, p. 9. 
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protocols in the future as much will depend on the complexity of the protocol being 
used.  Also, if one protocol is encapsulated in another protocol, problems with 
detection are heightened, for example, if the HTTP protocol is encapsulated in a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel, should the traffic be charged at the HTTP rate, 
or at the VPN rate?  
This raises another more fundamental question: what if the protocol cannot be 
detected at all? Encrypted traffic, such as HTTPS, encapsulates traffic in a way that an 
intermediary (such as a layer 5-7 device) cannot intercept/detect. So it would be 
possible for an operator/individual to circumvent the charging by encapsulating 
expensive service protocols over a cheaper services protocol, which is encrypted. In 
this situation, there may be a need to fall back to the customary usage charging 
method of ―per megabyte‖ charges. It should be noted however that operators are now 
using more sophisticated forms of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) that can overcome 
the problems given above. For example, ISPs, such as Comcast and Bell Canada, have 
used DPI technology to either disrupt peer-to-peer file sharing programs
23
 or to shape 
traffic.
24
 As mentioned above, several ISPs in the UK have used a new DPI-like 
technology, known as Phorm, in order to establish targeted advertising.  
At this stage in the discussion it might now be useful to look at a specific 
example of an electronic service and its constituent component parts to see how the 
Layering Theory might work in practice. As the Kazaa protocol has already been 
mentioned above it might now be useful to consider the different protocols used when 
transferring MP3 music files over the Internet using Kazaa software. The online 
music market has already attracted a great deal of attention with discussion of digital 
rights management technology and legislative provisions on anti-circumvention
25
. 
Kazaa software was originally developed to allow users to transfer files via distributed 
network architecture. While the underlying Kazaa technology will transfer any type of 
file, the name Kazaa has become synonymous with swapping MP3 files over the 
                                                 
23
 DeepPacketInspection.ca, ‗American and Canadian Politics Surrounding Deep Packet Inspection‘ 
<http://www.deeppacketinspection.ca/background-to-north-american-politics-of-deep-packet-
inspection/40, accessed November 2010. 
24
 EPIC, ‗Deep Packet Inspection and Privacy‘ <http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/, accessed November 2010 
25
 A discussion of online music infringement is outside the scope of this paper. For more details see the 
range of court cases listed by the Recording Industry Association of America (―RIAA‖) in the US 
concerning online music at: www.riaa.com/news/filings/dafault.asp, accessed November 2010.  
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public internet
26
. For convenience, we can call this service S. If we now imagine the 
originating user connecting to the internet using, for example, an Asynchronous 
Digital Subscriber Loop (ADSL) connection provided by the ISP (through a contract 
with the underlying network operator), then at the Access Layer, the ISP will use a 
least cost routing function to find the cheapest way of transferring that file between 
the two points on the internet (originating and terminating). The least cost routing 
function will then be that part of Service S that can be allocated to the Access Layer. 
Similarly, to transport the file, the ISP uses the same ADSL connection
27
 to transport 
the file between the originator and the ISP‘s servers and then to send them on over 
various peering and transit points to the ISP that will terminate the traffic at the 
receiver‘s machine. This process will include all the error-correcting features of both 
the TCP and IP protocols to ensure that the data arrives as a complete package. Again, 
the costs for transport will be covered by the charging arrangements of the ISPs for 
peering and transit, together with any subscription charges paid by the transmitter for 
using the originating ISP‘s network. All these costs can be allocated to the Transport 
Layer. At the Application Layer, the ISP will use a protocol that conforms with the 
Kazaa software and that allows the originator and receiver to communicate with each 
other. The ISP will charge for the use of that protocol and will know how much of the 
protocol is being used, following for example, the methodology described above
28
. As 
such, the use of the protocol will be that part of service S that can be allocated to the 
Application Layer. Finally, we have the MP3 file itself which will sit in the Content 
Layer: the use of the sound file will be governed by a copyright license and that use 
will be the part of Service S which can be allocated to the Content Layer. In this way, 
each Component Part of Service S can be allocated to a specific Layer and can be 
priced
29
. 
                                                 
26
 Kazaa, Morpheus and other file-swapping programs are based on the technology of Gnutella, which 
is a decentralized file-swapping program. As mentioned in footnote 22, the Kazaa program has now 
been closed down following an out of court settlement. The program enabled users to search for files 
on the internet without recording any information on the servers of the company that distributed the 
software, with no files being copied onto the company‘s server (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 259 F. 
Supp. 2d 1029). Since the court settlement, the Kazaa network now operates as a subscription only site 
allowing for music downloads. 
27
 The ISP could also use alternative transport technologies, such as DSL, cable, fibre-optic, satellite 
etc. 
28
 As mentioned earlier, this can be checked using complex (and expensive) OSI Layer 5-7 filtering 
technology, which will unpack the payload of the IP packet and inspect that payload.  
29
 With the price cost margin defined (the gap between the price and the marginal cost of each 
Component Part). However, defining these costs terms is a complex business. The marginal cost can 
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Using the Layered Policy Model, and adapting it, we can now define any 
service that is required, simply by looking at which of the Layers that particular 
service‘s Component Parts fall into. A service may be made-up of multiple 
Component Parts or only one Component Part. It follows that we should then be able 
to determine how many times a particular operator provides a particular electronic 
communications service (through use of an efficient system of cost accounting), and 
therefore the number of times a Component Part may or may not be used over a 
defined period of time within each Layer.  
This layered approach of looking at services is a natural complement to the 
European Commission‘s model for Significant Market Power (SMP), which is 
flexible and operates without distinction to the type of service being offered or the 
network over which the service is delivered. The definition for SMP under the 
European framework is given by Article 14 (2) Framework Directive: 
 
An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either 
individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to 
dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers.
30
 
 
Also, the Framework Directive at Article 14(3) makes a specific reference to the 
leveraging of market power between two closely related markets: 
 
Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it 
may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related 
market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the 
market power held in one market to be leveraged into the other market, 
thereby strengthening the market power of the undertaking. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
rarely be known with any precision and, although estimates of demand elasticity can be made, they are 
not readily available and in the context of an antitrust case are likely to be seriously disputed. 
30
 Directive 2002/21/EC ―on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services‖, Framework Directive, OJ L 108/33, 24.4.2002. This is the test established in the case of 
United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission of the European 
Communities [1978] ECR 207 at paragraph 38. 
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Under current definitions for relevant product/geographic markets in internet cases 
whether this provision will be able to catch potential dominant operators supplying 
complex TCP/IP services over NGNs remains to be seen. A market analysis for the 
purpose of the Framework Directive will depend on an overall forward-looking 
assessment of the structure and the functioning of the relevant market.
31
 Market 
definition is discussed next.  
 
 
6.3.1 How does the Commission define markets? 
 
Market definition is often used as a tool to identify and define the boundaries of 
competition between undertakings
32
. In the US and Europe, the SSNIP test is used 
(―Small, but Significant, Non-transitory Increase in Price‖) to help define the relevant 
market.
 33
 There are limits to SSNIP, for example in its reliance on the assumption 
that the initial price for the relevant product is set at a competitive level, and which 
also requires the collection of relatively accurate data over a substantial period of time 
(which is not always possible). Bird & Bird‘s detailed study on market definition in 
the media sector points out a further problem with SSNIP in its emphasis on a 
quantitative approach to substitutability:  
 
―[SSNIP tests] the reaction of consumers to a variation in price. Consequently 
[the SSNIP] test takes little if no account of qualitative criteria such as 
strategic competition and innovative decisions, on the grounds of which a 
company may decide to compete not only on prices but also on services.‖34  
 
                                                 
31
 ERG, ‗Report  on  Transition from sector-specific regulation  to competition law‘ (40) 2009, p 6 at 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/2009/erg_09_40_erg_report_on_the_transition_to_competition_
law_final.pdf, accessed July 2010.  
32
 Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 1997 
OJ C 372/5, 9
th
 December 1997. 
33
 The SSNIP test was first used in the US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 1982, and later 
adopted by the European Commission in its Notice ―on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law‖ OJ C 372, 9.12.1997. It is important to note that the SSNIP 
test is only one of a possible number of tests for market definition.  
34
 Bird & Bird Market Definition in the media sector: a comparative analysis, Executive Summary, 
para 26, December 2002 available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/legal_analysis.pdf, accessed July 2010. 
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In the relevant market for Component Parts in TCP/IP services and applications, 
competition will be based just as much on innovative service delivery as on prices. 
The European Commission has used SSNIP extensively in competition cases, but it is 
not the authoritative legal test: for that, the judgements of the European Community 
courts need to be examined.
 35
 Like SSNIP, the European courts‘ traditional test is 
also based on the concept of substitution of products, or interchangeability of 
products. The European courts use the economic test of cross-elasticity of demand, 
where high cross-elasticity will mean that any increase in price will result in 
significant shifts by consumers to other products.
 36
 When determining the relevant 
market, the Courts will also look at the physical characteristics of the product, the 
price, and its intended use. The Courts will also consider supply-side substitutability: 
if other suppliers, currently manufacturing other products, can switch production to 
the relevant products and market them in the short term without incurring significant 
additional costs.
 37
  
 
The Courts will also consider the geographic market for the product. For complex 
electronic networks and services, the definition of the geographic market can be as 
equally difficult to define as the product market. In several EU competition cases 
involving the media sector for example, the geographic market has generally been 
limited by factors such (i) language; (ii) cultural preferences; (iii) regulatory barriers; 
(iv) content; and (v) price differentiation among different member states
38
. As regards 
complex internet networks and TCP/IP services, some of these factors would be 
irrelevant, and more important might be a test of network externalities, for example 
issues such as the interconnection of networks allowing a Component Part to have a 
wider geographic reach, such as a roaming application in voice telephony which 
allows (for example) a 3G mobile telephony service to achieve wider geographic 
                                                 
35
 Rodger B., and MacCulloch A., Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK, Cavendish 
Publishing, Third Edition, 2004, p. 87. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 See paragraph 39 of the Commission Guidelines on ―market analysis and the assessment of 
significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communication 
networks and services‖ (2002/C 165/03), July 2002. It is important to note that these Guidelines are 
based on earlier Commission ―soft law‖ in the form of the Commission Notice on ―Market Definition‖ 
OJ 1977, C372/5, and Notice ―on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector‖ OJ C 265, 22.8.1998. 
38
 See MSG Media Services M.469, 6.06.1994, paragraph 46. See also cases such as Bertelsmann/News 
International/Vox IV/M.489, 6.09.1994, and BIB/Open IV/36.539, 15.09.1999. 
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coverage other than the national home market for the service operator or end-user
39
. 
However to extend the geographic market in this way (as regards a supplier of a 
relevant Component Part) would depend entirely on whether the supplier is able to 
fulfil the same customer requirements in different geographic markets. If it can, then 
the geographic market can be extended. Usually, however, as regards conventional 
voice telephony services, suppliers are to some extent restricted by regulatory 
controls, such as the need to obtain a license or class permit to operate in the country 
in question, which failing that would naturally restrict the relevant geographic market. 
For telecommunications, the European Commission‘s approach to classifying relevant 
product and geographic markets was initially summarised in the 
Olivetti/Mannesmann/Infostrada case
40
, where the Commission established basic 
practice for telecommunications as categorising relevant product markets as domestic 
and international voice and data telecommunication services, and geographic markets 
as the extent and coverage of the network and the customers that can be economically 
reached and whose demands could be met (network reach-first limb)
41
, and the legal 
and regulatory system in place (regulatory constraints-second limb)
 42
. In more recent 
cases, the Commission has tended to follow regulatory constraints as being the more 
decisive factor in determining the relevant geographic market
43
. However, with the 
advent of the Commission‘s New Framework, and the move to a class based system 
of licensing requiring notification only for undertakings providing electronic 
communication services, the regulatory constraint factor as the sole element in 
classifying the relevant geographic market might become less relevant: the rapid 
increase of TCP/IP services as the core transmission standard for undertakings 
providing electronic services might mean (instead) that the ―network reach‖ factor 
will become more significant.   
                                                 
39
 See the case of Omnitel, Case IV/M.538, 27.03.1995, where the Commission had to consider the 
effect of a number of roaming agreements, concluding that such agreements should be taken into 
account when considering mobile services. As such, the coverage for such services was held to be EU 
wide.  
40
 Case IV/M.1025, 15.01.1998. 
41
 See also cases such as International Private Satellite Partners Decision 94/895, 15.12.1994, and 
GTS-Hermes Inc./Hit Rail Case IV/M.683, 5.03.1996, which seem to confirm network reach as the 
basis of the geographic market test.  
42
 For a very good and detailed discussion of European Commission practice in defining relevant 
product and geographic markets in telecommunications see the book by Pierre Larouche, Competition 
Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing, London, 2000. 
43
 See for example cases IV/M.853 Bell CableMedia/Cable & Wireless/Videotron, 11.12.1996, and 
IV/M.865 Cable & Wireless/Nynex/Bell Canada, 11.12.1996. See also MetroHoldings Limited [1999] 
OJ C 19/18, 23.01.1999. 
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Continuing the discussion of market definition, in applying the SSNIP test to the 
Layered Policy Model (as adapted), we would start with the smallest possible market, 
which would be the relevant market for a Component Part in Layer   where   can 
range from 1 to 4, corresponding to each of the Layers in the Layered Policy Model 
(as seen in Figure 1 above). We would then ask the question if a 5 to 10% increase in 
price for the Component Part is profitable for the ISP. If not, then the ISP does not 
have sufficient market power to raise the price for that Component Part. In other 
words, if there is evidence that customers would switch to purchasing other 
Component Parts from other ISPs when faced with a price increase, the original 
Component Part and substitute Component Part are considered to be in the same 
market. The procedure is then repeated until the point is reached where a hypothetical 
monopolist could profitably impose a 5 to 10% price increase. The relevant market for 
that Component Part in that Layer is then defined. Once the relevant market has been 
determined, SMP can then be assessed, and if present, then appropriate regulatory 
obligations can be applied to the undertaking that is found to have SMP in the 
relevant Layer.
 44
 
 
The type of relevant market definition set out above is quite a departure from the 
European Commission‘s general practice. Traditionally, the Commission has used 
two broad market definition categories in internet cases: internet access services and 
internet content services. Internet content services can be further divided into internet 
content, internet advertising, website production and internet portals.
 45
 This is 
discussed further in Section 6.3.3 below, but first we will look at how market share is 
assessed before turning specifically to Internet-related cases.  
 
6.3.2 Market Share 
 
                                                 
44
 For example, once an undertaking has been found to have SMP under the New Framework, the 
National Regulatory Authority can then determine whether to impose, maintain, amend or withdraw 
obligations on undertakings under Articles 16, 17, 18 or 19 of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service 
Directive), or Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive). Obligations can be applied to 
both wholesale and retail markets.  
45
 See Bird & Bird report ―Market Definition in the Media Sector-Comparative Legal Analysis‖ Report 
for the European Commission, December 2002, p.108-110 at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/legal_analysis.pdf.  
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In assessing SMP, once the relevant market has been defined
46
, the next step is to 
measure the ISPs actual market share in the relevant market for Component Parts. 
According to European Commission guidelines, market shares are often used as a 
proxy for market power, although a high market share alone does not necessarily 
establish a position of dominance
47
, as a dominant position can arise from other 
factors, such as an absence of potential competition, barriers to expansion, and the 
overall size of the undertaking
48
. In the context of IP-networks, as regards the 
methods for measuring market size and market share, both volume sales of the 
relevant Component Part and value sales could be used
49
. The criteria to be used to 
measure the market share of the ISP will depend on the characteristics of the relevant 
market for that Component Part. Under the EC‘s New Framework for example, the 
National Regulatory Authority (NRA) will need to decide which criteria to apply in 
measuring market presence. For instance, Component Part revenues or the numbers of 
Component Parts sold in a particular Layer are possible criteria. As mentioned, this 
will depend on the Layer involved. For example at the Transport Layer, the revenues 
accrued for each Component Part may be the appropriate measurement because the 
use of revenues (rather than the volume of Component Parts sold) takes account of the 
fact that that different transport technologies (ADSL, cable, satellite etc) are priced 
differently and provides a measure of market presence that reflects both the number of 
customers and network coverage
50
.  
 
6.3.2.1 Collective Dominance/Interdependent Markets 
 
A further issue to consider, when considering IP networks, is whether collective 
dominance is relevant, particularly with network externalities
51
, and the evolution of 
                                                 
46
 A full analysis would also include assessing the relevant barriers to entry together with measuring 
any potential competition in the relevant market. 
47
 Commission ―Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under 
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services‖, 2002/C 
165/03, 11.7.2002., paragraph 75. 
48
 Ibid, paragraph 78. See also footnote 68 below for network externalities. 
49
 Generally, value sales are used for differentiated and/or branded products and volume sales for bulk 
sales. Much will depend on the commoditisation of specific TCP/IP services. See Article 76, ibid. 
50
 Ibid Paragraphs 76-77. 
51
 Elkin-Koren N., and Salzberger M. E., Law, Economics and Cyberspace: The effects of Cyberspace 
on the Economic Analysis of Law, Edward Elgar, 2004, p.44. 
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vertically integrated markets in the communications sector
52. Annex II of the EC‘s 
Framework Directive sets out a number of criteria to ascertain collective dominance 
including low elasticity of demand, similar market shares and similar cost structures 
amongst others
53
. Furthermore, in the case of Irish Sugar, the Court of First Instance 
also considered collective dominance to be either joint (collective) dominance 
between competitors or undertakings in a vertical relationship
54
. Collective 
dominance and the concept of secondary/interdependent markets are likely to 
increasingly feature in cases involving packet-switched (IP) services. As regards 
secondary markets, the NRA will need to look carefully both upstream and 
downstream from the access market itself, and the (relative) dependence of retail 
services on wholesale access/transmission services. The Framework Directive at 
Article 14(3) makes a specific reference to the leveraging of market power between 
two closely related markets: 
 
―Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it 
may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely related 
market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the 
market power held in one market to be leveraged into the other market, 
thereby strengthening the market power of the undertaking.‖ 
 
6.3.3 Weaknesses in current tests of market definition in Internet cases  
 
As regards cases involving the Internet, as mentioned above, traditionally, the 
European Commission has used two broad market definition categories: internet 
access services and internet content services. Internet content services can be further 
divided into internet content, internet advertising, website production and internet 
portals. 55
 
On the internet access side, the Commission has also found separate markets 
                                                 
52
 See De Streel, A., ―The new concept of Significant Market Power in Electronic Communications: the 
Hybridisation of the Sectoral Regulation by Competition Law‖, (2003) 24(10) ECLR 540 for a further 
discussion of the concept of collective dominance. 
53
 Directive 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, March 2002. 
54
 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission [1999] 5 CMLR 1300. 
55
 See Bird & Bird report ―Market Definition in the Media Sector-Comparative Legal Analysis‖ Report 
for the European Commission, December 2002, p.108-110 at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/studies/legal_analysis.pdf, accessed November 
2010. 
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for dial-up internet access and dedicated internet access for residential users and small 
businesses, and corporate customers. 56 The Commission has also distinguished 
between broadband and narrowband internet access over DSL and cable networks, 57
 
and more recently wholesale and retail internet services in allegations of margin 
squeezing, for example in Wanadoo Espana v. Telefonica
58
 and in Deutsche Telekom 
v. European Commission59 where in October 2010 the European Court of Justice 
upheld a finding against Deutsche Telekom for margin squeezing.
60
  
In most of these cases however, the nature of the digital service offered to 
customers was relatively straightforward. However as digital services continue to gain 
in complexity with ever increasing network externalities, market definition will 
become equally complex.
 61
 As mentioned earlier, one of the main problems that 
judges had in the Microsoft case, where the major concern was the leveraging of 
monopoly power from the Intel-compatible PC operating system market into the 
internet browser market, was first being able to determine the relevant market, and 
then being able to measure market power within the market.
 62
 Identifying the relevant 
market is crucial in any antitrust analysis because it is central to the assessment of 
market power.
 63
 However, in dynamic, innovative markets, such as NGNs, the 
identification of market power is much more sophisticated, where rivalry in 
                                                 
56
 See European Commission cases BT/Esat COMP/M.1838, 27.3.2000, Telia/Telenor COMP/M.1439 
13.10.1999 and Telia/Telenor/Schibsted Case NoIV/JV, 1 27.05.1998. 
57
 See EC cases AOL/Time Warner, Case COMP/M.1845, OJ 2001 L268/28 and UGC / Liberty Media, 
Case No COMP/M.2222, 24.04.2001 Notification of 16 March 2001 pursuant to Article 4 of Council 
Regulation No 4064/891. 
58
 COMP/38.784. 
59
 Case 271/03. OJC 128 of 24.05.2008.  
60
 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, Case C-280/08 P, EU Press Release 104/10 at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-10/cp100104en.pdf, accessed December 
2010. 
61
 Network externalities emerge when the use of one product is more beneficial to a user when more 
people use it. Network externalities are present in a network environment, such as the internet, which is 
a network of networks, since it is based on connectivity and protocol compatibility. In an on-line 
environment, services have to be interoperable to achieve connectivity, and therefore network 
externalities can limit competition by increasing the costs of entry, providing a significant advantage to 
first comers who can establish services as the standard for future services. See Elkin-Koren N., and 
Salzberger M. E., Law, Economics and Cyberspace: The effects of Cyberspace on the Economic 
Analysis of Law, Edward Elgar, 2004, p.44. 
62
 United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation (364 U.S. App D.C. 330) and also the European 
Commission Case COMP/C-3/37.792. Under US law, the question of market definition arises in US 
antitrust actions under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the amended Clayton Act 
involving mergers.  
63 
A. D‘Ignazio and E. Giovannetti, ―Antitrust Analysis for the Internet Upstream Market: A Border 
Gateway Protocol Approach‖. 1 JCLE 27, 2008. 
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competition may be Schumpeterian.
 64
 Also, in complex digital markets with services 
being run over several layers of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) stack, 
market structures are successively redefined. In dynamic markets, the standard 
approaches to application of competition ―runs the risk of rapidly becoming 
irrelevant‖.65 
In Microsoft, the Commission stated that Microsoft had a dominant position 
both in the client PC operating market and the work-group server operating system 
market
66
. In the more recent 2009 judgement on Microsoft‘s claim for annulment of 
the Commission‘s compensation order, the CFI argued: 
 
8. The Commission found that both of these relevant product markets were 
of worldwide dimension (recital 427 to the 2004 Decision). It further 
considered that Microsoft held a dominant position on both of these 
markets, namely that for client PC operating systems (recitals 429– 472 to 
the 2004 Decision) and that for work group server operating systems 
(recitals 473– 541 to the 2004 Decision).   
 
9. The Commission took the view that Microsoft had violated art.82 EC by 
committing two abuses of its dominant position on the market for PC 
operating systems, one of which is relevant to the present case. Microsoft 
was held to have abused its dominant position by refusing to supply 
competitors with certain interoperability information (― interoperability 
information‖) and to allow them to use it for the purpose of developing and 
distributing competing products on the market for work group server 
operating systems, from October 1998 onwards (recitals 546– 791 and 
art.2(a) of the 2004 Decision).
67
   
 
                                                 
64
 ―In network markets subject to technological progress, competition may take the form of a 
succession of ―temporary monopolists‖ who displace one another through innovation. Such 
competition is often called Schumpeterian rivalry‖. See J. Farrell and M. Katz, Competition or 
Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets, University California Berkley Discussion 
Paper, 2001 at: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~farrell/ftp/predation.pdf, accessed August 2010. 
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 Tambiana M., ―Innovation and Market Definition under the EU Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications‖ 29(1) World Competition (2006) 3. 
66
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2004] 5 C.M.L.R. 21. 
See also Case COMP/C-3/37.792. 
67
 Microsoft Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities [2009] 4 C.M.L.R. 16 
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The judgment of the CFI has been much critized by various scholars on focusing too 
much on the structural issues of competition as opposed to whether actual harm had 
been caused to consumers
68
. The judgement concludes harm to consumers and harm 
to innovation by harm (or even likely harm) to competitors. Such a conclusion, says 
Marsden, is ―obvious (…) just difficult to prove – and the Commission doesn't 
propose to try‖, and that the General Court went onto confirm that it did not have to.69 
A likelihood of harm is not enough to find an abuse, as any dominant undertaking can 
exploit and exclude, but dominance per se is not prohibited.
70 
The Commission fined 
Microsoft an amount of €497,196,304, the highest fine issued to date.71 Also in a 
different case involving Sun Microsystems and Microsoft, where Sun sued Microsoft 
in an attempt to prevent the capturing of the open standard of Java, and turning it into 
a closed standard, Sun failed to establish any antitrust claim because the Court of 
Appeals in applying standard competition analysis found that there could be no 
market distortion in the absence of a strict market definition, as a prerequisite to 
identifying any market distortion is a clear definition of the relevant market.
 72
  
Also, high technology markets are known for wide product differentiation 
where market assessment can be difficult and sometimes misleading. As Padilla 
argues:  
…high-tech products are highly differentiated, revealing considerable price 
and performance variations. For example, firms offer different versions of the 
same underlying product, each of which is customized for a specific group of 
users. Different versions have different prices and also different 
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 See for example: A. Witt, 'The Commission's guidance paper on abusive exclusionary conduct - 
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on the Economic Analysis of Law, Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 44 (citing the case of Sun Microsystems Inc, 
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functionalities. This heterogeneity makes it difficult, if not practically 
impossible, to define an appropriate benchmark.
73
  
 
Also temporal advances (for example, a seasonal distribution of goods, fluctuation 
with offer/demand) are capable of affecting the relevant market and market positions. 
The size of market shares of undertakings offering NGN services may change quickly 
with time.
 74
  
With the Layered Policy Model (as adapted), defining the relevant market 
becomes easier. The main question with the Layered Policy Model is to determine the 
Component Parts of a service and then allocate these Component Parts to a particular 
Layer.
 75
 Once this is achieved, close substitutes and chain substitution to the 
Component Parts for that Layer can then be found, and the relevant market for 
Component Parts for that Layer defined. In this way, it is possible to create very 
complex IP-based services involving multiple Component Parts, but still come to a 
determination of actual market power that is both accurate and relevant in defining the 
access bottleneck.   
The power of the Layering Theory is that it addresses SMP within an IP 
network context, at the appropriate Layer, and so enables effective competition within 
that Layer. It offers a solution for the future regulation of complex NGNs and for the 
enforcement of any non-discrimination and transparency obligations that could 
guarantee net neutrality. It has no relevance to conventional services offered over 
circuit-switched networks, but helps define the relevant market for the supply of 
services running over complex TCP/IP networks by examining the Component Parts 
of a service in any one Layer.  
The main issue for an ISP is whether selling a smaller quantity of the 
Component Part at a higher price would be more profitable than selling a larger 
quantity at a lower price. This in turn will depend on how sensitive demand is to 
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 Padilla J., The Role of Supply-Side Substitution in the Definition of the Relevant Market in Merger 
Control, A Report for DG Enterprise A/4, Madrid, June 2001, at p. 68. See also, Pleatsikas C., and 
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 With modern systems of cost accounting currently being used in the telecommunications sector, cost 
accountants are already able to split a service into its Component Parts, pricing each part accordingly 
for the purposes of interconnection, and for the purposes of determining joint, marginal, and total costs 
for a particular service.  
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changes in price (the ―elasticity of demand‖76). The Author contends that with modern 
pricing methodologies currently available for packet-switched networks, data is now 
becoming available for National Regulatory Authorities (or Competition Authorities 
operating under the principle of concurrency) in the advanced developed countries to 
calculate the elasticity of demand for relevant Component Parts for IP-based networks 
for each of the Layers of the Layered Policy Model (as adapted).  
The Author argues that (and depending on the accuracy of allocating the 
Component Parts of any one service to its appropriate Layer), it should be possible to 
measure SMP both at the level of the relevant Layer and at the level of the service. 
Therefore, if we were to now adopt the European Commission‘s model for SMP77, 
and adapt it to take account of the Layered Policy Model, then SMP (dominance) can 
be interpreted as: 
 
An undertaking shall be deemed to have SMP if either individually or jointly 
with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance for the relevant 
Component Part in a particular Layer (as set out in Schedule 1) in the 
supplier’s relevant geographic market, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the relevant layers. In a similar way, new definitions can 
be found for other headings. These definitions include: 
 
 Electronic Communications Networks means ―transmission systems, and 
where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which 
                                                 
76
 The critical elasticity of demand is the value of elasticity of demand necessary to leave profits 
unchanged following a price increase. It should also be noted at this stage that in fast changing IP-
based technology network markets, there would also be a need to use ―competitive‖ rather than 
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87 for a more complete analysis of the Cellophane Trap. See also Graham C., EU and UK Competition 
Law, Longman, 2010, pp. 534-535. 
77
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permit the conveyance of signals over any of the Layers as defined in 
Schedule I irrespective of the type of information conveyed.‖ 
 Electronic Communications Service means ―a service normally provided for 
remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks, and whose Component Part(s) fall into 
any of the Layers as defined in Schedule I, but excluding services providing, 
or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic 
communications networks and services.‖ 
 Component Part means ―a part of an Electronic Communications Service 
defined as either hardware or software and which falls into one of the Layers 
as defined in Figure 1. An Electronic Communications Service may consist of 
one or several component parts.‖ 
 
With these definitions in hand, we can now incorporate them into a new regulatory 
Reference Paper. The form of this new RP, which includes the layers that constitute 
the Layering Theory (Figure 1), is set out at Annex 1 to this thesis. Annex 1 is based 
on the existing form of the RP, but amended to take account of the new definitions 
given above. It is important to note that the existing RP does not refer (at all) to 
electronic networks or services.   
 
Also, it is equally important to stress that the Author is not suggesting a new 
definition for SMP, but suggesting instead a new way of interpreting SMP 
specifically for the communications sector. The Layering Theory would act as 
guidance for regulators when seeking to define relevant product markets for complex 
digital applications and networks. The Commission has already issued a 
Recommendation on relevant products and markets for the electronic communications 
sector (the ―Recommendation‖)78, which is intended to guide NRAs in their approach 
                                                 
78
 Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services C(2003)497, February 2003. The Commission issued a public 
consultation on a revised version of this Recommendation {SEC(2006) 837, 2
nd
 Edition June 2006} 
which closed in October 2006. The need for revision is in line with Article 15(1) Framework Directive 
(OJ L 108, 24.4.2002), which requires that the Commission regularly reviews the Recommendation in 
line with changing products and services, and corresponding changes in demand and supply side 
substitution. The Commission adopted a new Recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets in 2007, Recommendation C(2007) 5406 rev 1. 
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to defining markets. In its Recommendation, the Commission sets out the ―three 
criteria‖ test in helping Member States define the product and service markets to 
review: (i) the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry; (ii) the absence of 
dynamic market conditions tending towards effective competition; and (iii) the 
insufficiency of competition law alone to address adequately any related market 
failure. The original (2003) Recommendation set out the test in Recitals 9 to 16 of the 
Recommendation. The revised Recommendation 2007 moved the test into the main 
body of the Recommendation at Article 2 and reduced the number of relevant markets 
to seven including one retail level and six wholesale level markets.
79
 The revised 
Recommendation will still serve as guidance and although NRAs must regard it with 
the utmost importance, NRAs can deviate from the Recommendation subject to the 
notification procedure set out in Article 7 Framework Directive.  
Further, the Commission released in 2010 a new Recommendation on 
Regulated Access to Next Generation Access Networks (‗NGN Recommendation‘),80 
which sets out requirements for increased transparency and access obligations to SMP 
operators of NGN networks, and requirements to share collocation and duct capacity 
for fibre optic networks. The NGN Recommendation reflects the seriousness to which 
the EC regards NGNs as crucial for the future delivery of broadband services in the 
EU. The NGN Recommendation is focused on network infrastructure operating at the 
lower levels of the OSI stack, rather than the upper messaging layers, for example. 
This is a weakness as a significant component of innovation and competition in 
broadband services in the NGN market will be focused in the upper messaging layers 
where most of the code for ‗content‘ is based. Also, for wholesale broadband access, 
the earlier draft (2008) NGN Recommendation stated at Article 23: ―Unless there are 
clear indications of a break in the chain of substitution as compared to current product 
markets, services provided over NGA networks should be considered as incremental 
upgrades and therefore not treated as new markets.‖81 The potential impact of this was 
unclear, but it indicated that the Commission viewed existing jurisprudence on 
internet networks as satisfactory, a point which is questionable given the concerns 
                                                 
79
 C(2007) 5406 rev 1. 
80
 Commission recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 
2010/572/EU, 20
th
 September 2010. 
81
 C(2008) Draft commission recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access 
Networks. 
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over discrimination and net neutrality voiced above. Interestingly, this provision was 
deleted in the final recommendation published in 2010. 
Also, it remains to be seen how the formation of the new Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) under the EC‘s Regulation of 
2009 establishing BEREC will deal with market definition.
82
 BEREC will have the 
authority to deliver opinions on draft measures by National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) concerning market definition or the designation of undertakings with SMP.
83
 
The Author has used the European Commission‘s approach, as set out in its 
New Framework for regulating electronic communications networks and services, in 
adapting the Layered Policy Model. This is because the flexibility of the 
Commission‘s approach (the Author contends) makes it highly suitable as a 
foundation for regulating TCP/IP-based networks. Furthermore, because of the rapid 
change and proliferation of the applications that will run over such networks (multi-
application networks), the New Framework will in anycase at some future stage need 
to be modified to allow for a more accurate interpretation of Dominance (Significant 
Market Power). To some extent, IP traffic already exceeds conventional voice traffic 
in terms of volume, and most of the developed world will also soon be moving away 
from the use of IPv4 to IPv6, which will allow for a greater number of available IP 
addresses and enhanced product and service functionality, but at the same time an 
exhaustion of existing IP4 addresses by 2011/2012.
84
 Further change is coming. In 
Europe for example, there is increased diversity with the accession of ten new 
Member States to the European Union. As their telecommunication incumbents roll 
out NGNs based on IP in network cores, national circumstances will diverge and the 
NRAs in these countries may well have to adopt market definitions different to that 
envisaged in the revised Commission Recommendation 2007 on relevant product and 
service markets.  
The WIK Consult report of 2008 argues that the Commission does have 
sufficient regulatory remedies in place should the potential for anticompetitive 
practices arise with NGNs. The report‘s authors argue that: 
 
                                                 
82
 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European parliament and of the council of 25 November 2009 
establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 
L337/1. 
83
 Article 3(1)(a) ibid. 
84
 European Commission, Marcus J., Elixmann D., The Future of IP Interconnect: Technical, 
Economic and Public Policy Aspects, January 2008, p. 138. 
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The one conspicuous challenge that might emerge going forward is the 
possibility that an ECN (Electronic Communications Network [Operators]) or 
ECS (Electronic Communications Service [Operators]) might have market 
power by virtue of network externalities rather than according to standard tests 
of market power in one of the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, and 
might be disinclined to offer fully effective interconnection in order to exploit 
its market power. The European regulatory framework does not provide a 
comprehensive solution to interconnection problems in the absence of 
conventional SMP; however, Article 5(1) of the Access and Interconnection 
Directive provides NRAs with a sufficient tool to take appropriate measures 
should this still somewhat hypothetical scenario emerge.
85
 
 
However, this assumes that the Commission will be in a position to accurately define 
the relevant market for the particular service in question, which as this chapter 
illustrates may be difficult given current TCP/IP services, and potentially more 
difficult, as current IP networks migrate to NGN networks. Furthermore, at a footnote 
to the WIK Consult report, the authors themselves query the regulatory clarity of 
Article 5 of the Access & Interconnection Directive (2002/19/EC): 
 
The NRA should bear in mind, however, that Article 5 needs to be used with 
caution and restraint, inasmuch as it is not linked to a finding of SMP. Further, 
it is not altogether clear what specific powers Article 5 confers on the NRA.
86
 
 
So first there is the problem of defining SMP and then there is the lack of clarity as to 
what powers Article 5 provides? Article 5 Access & Interconnection Directive 
provides for NRAs within the EU to impose interconnection obligations on providers 
of end-to-end services as well as access obligations on providers of Electronic 
Program Guides and Application Program Interfaces to ensure delivery of digital 
radio and television services to end-users.
87
 Given these powers, the WIK Consult 
Report authors argue that at present there is no requirement to impose a mandated 
interconnect obligation for IP voice traffic: 
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 Ibid, p. 140. 
86
 Ibid, p. 146, footnote 230 (to the report). 
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 Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) Directive 2002/19/EC ―on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communication networks and associated facilities‖, Access Directive, OJ L108/7, 24.4.2002. 
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In terms of a policy response, we do not see the need for a new remedy for IP 
interconnection in support of voice. Rather, we see the need to ensure that 
NRAs have any necessary authority to ensure that voice interconnection 
remains effective as networks migrate to an IP basis. This might take the form 
of requiring ex ante that SMP operators not provide IP-based access to their 
voice services under quality, terms or conditions substantially inferior to those 
which the SMP operator provides to itself; alternatively, the NRA (or NCA) 
might take action ex post if an SMP operator were to fail to do so.
88
 
 
This is reasonable and the author would agree that a mandated regulatory obligation 
on NGN operators would increase their regulatory burden and costs. However, the 
Layering Theory does not call for mandated interconnection or access (importantly 
the WIK Consult Report excludes a meaningful discussion of access in their report). 
Although (this) author agrees with WIK Consult on the point of minimising 
regulatory intervention, it is submitted that NRAs need better regulatory tools to cope 
with possible abuse of dominance in NGN markets, particularly as regard access 
problems where for example with NGN networks most of the anti-competitive 
problems likely to arise will be in the more content rich ‗messaging layers‘. It is 
important to get this right as an accurate test for SMP in the NGN environment will be 
crucial given its significance in EU law.  For example, the WIK Consult Authors 
recognise the dangers of NGN operators with SMP: 
 
The presence or absence of SMP is a central theme in European regulation, 
and this is likely to continue to be the case as networks evolve to NGNs. The 
evolution may change the character of market power, but is unlikely to 
eliminate concerns with SMP. Last mile bottlenecks are likely to remain for 
some time, as will the call termination monopoly; moreover, new bottlenecks 
might emerge in the upper layers of the network, even as other SMP 
manifestations may be ameliorated by new forms of competition. SMP shapes 
the migration path, and also conditions the corresponding regulatory response. 
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SMP thus represents a common thread through our assessment of regulatory 
needs during the transition to NGN.
89
 
 
As discussed in this chapter, an accurate definition of a relevant market is crucial to 
an investigation of SMP. It is this problem with defining a relevant market that the 
Layering Theory is concerned. As the Layering Theory operates across several 
different layers from infrastructure to messaging, the theory is uniquely positioned to 
deal with problems of access. With both products and services continuing to rapidly 
change and becoming more interdependent and complex, there is a certain 
inevitability that the Commission‘s guidance to NRAs on future markets to review 
will result in a series of revised ―Recommendations‖ in time to come. Although the 
European Commission has planned for this in its cycle of reviews envisaged under 
Article 15(2) Framework Directive, the Author argues that the Layering Theory might 
provide the basis for one overarching framework for defining new product and service 
markets in the electronic communications sector. If such a framework was acceptable 
to the European Commission it could provide a very useful precedent for regulation 
elsewhere, for example in the US, and major developing countries, such as China 
90
 
and India 
91
, where China and India in particular have adopted similar concepts of 
dominance to the test established in United Brands
92
, and where therefore, there is 
regulatory convergence in competition law jurisprudence. 
This discussion of SMP has centred on European regulatory policy, upon 
which the Layering Theory is based. NGNs however are being rolled out worldwide 
and not just in Europe. In the next section, the Author shows how the Layering 
Theory might apply to increase effective competition in electronic communication 
markets at the multilateral level. 
 
6.4. Applying the Layering Theory at the Multilateral Level 
 
With the Layering Theory incorporated into the definitions given above, it then 
becomes possible to conceive of an amended version of the existing Reference Paper 
                                                 
89
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(reviewed in Chapter 3) that could apply to modern IP cross-border networks. The 
Author has outlined the draft of such a version in Annexe I to the thesis. As 
mentioned, this draft follows the format of the existing Reference Paper to the WTO‘s 
BTA, but with crucial modifications, for example adding a new definition for ―major 
supplier‖ and moving away from an essential facilities-type doctrine, inserting instead 
definitions for an ―electronic communications network operator‖ and ―electronic 
communication network service provider‖, and also new provisions for 
interconnection and access. The Author has used the European Commission‘s 
approach, as set out in its New Regulatory Framework for regulating converged 
networks in revising the Reference Paper. It is interesting to note that the original 
deliberations of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications drew heavily on 
previous EC and US policy in telecommunications, which is why the current RP 
makes references to the concept of an ‗essential facilities‘ doctrine for example. The 
interconnection and anti-competitive provisions of the RP discussed in Chapter 3 are 
good examples of EU/US telecommunications practice. DCs and LDCs might 
therefore be naturally hostile to the adoption of a revised RP that also draws on 
EU/US jurisprudence, but the Author contends that there are numerous advantages in 
DCs and LDCs taking this approach. These advantages are more fully discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
 
The Author contends that the flexibility of the Commission‘s approach in its new 
regulatory framework makes it highly suitable as the basis for a new Layered 
Approach to regulating IP-based networks, which are changing rapidly. The aim of 
the revised Reference Paper, set out in Annex I, is to address this new world of 
packet-switched technology. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the RP as it currently 
stands does not regulate interconnection on internet networks. This is a significant 
weakness in WTO policy for the telecommunications sector.  
 
IP traffic already exceeds conventional voice traffic in terms of volume
93
. As 
mentioned above, most of the developed world will also soon be moving away from 
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the use of IPv4 to IPv6, which will allow for a greater number of available IP 
addresses and enhanced service functionality. At some point in the future, if WTO 
law is to keep pace with changing technology, the Reference Paper  (RP) will also 
have to change. By amending the rules on interconnection at section 2 of the RP to 
make it applicable to NGNs, ISPs in DCs and LDCs will be in a much better position 
to command non-discriminatory interconnection at IXP exchanges both in the 
developed word and with each other in the developing world. Annex 1 to this thesis 
shows how Section 2 RP has been modified by incorporating the definitions for 
‗electronic communications network‘ and ‗electronic communications service‘ into 
the current wording for Section 2.  For example, the current wording on Section 2 RP 
reads as follows: 
 
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public 
telecommunications transport networks or services in order to allow the users 
of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to access 
services provided by another supplier, where specific commitments are 
undertaken. 
 
 Annex 1 to this thesis, sets out the new wording as follows: 
 
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public electronic 
communications [my emphasis] networks and services in order to allow the 
users of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to 
access services provided by another supplier, where specific commitments 
are undertaken.   
 
As can be seen, the amendment is subtle making a reference to a ‗public electronic 
communications‘ network as opposed to a ‗public telecommunications transport‘ 
network. However, the amendment is dramatic as the change incorporates the new 
definitions for public electronic communications networks and services given above. 
For example ‗major supplier‘ is defined in the existing RP as:  
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A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the 
terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant 
market for basic telecommunications services as a result of: 
(a) control over essential facilities; or 
(b) use of its position in the market. 
 
The new definition of major supplier set out in Annex 1 to this thesis is: 
 
Major Supplier means ―a supplier who either individually or jointly with 
others, enjoys a position equivalent to dominance for the relevant Component 
Part in a particular Layer (as set out in Schedule 1) in the supplier‘s relevant 
geographic market, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers.‖ 
 
We can see from this definition that the term ‗major supplier‘ now incorporates the 
concept of dominance (SMP) as reinterpreted through the Layering Theory. Gone is 
the reference to ‗essential facilities‘ (effectively an argument for superdominance) and 
control over a market. By substituting with the term ‗dominance‘ and interpreting 
dominance in line with the Layering Theory, the ‗major supplier‘ definition in the RP 
now reflects the EU position on dominance (and as mentioned above followed by the 
major trade blocks of China and India), and captures internet interconnection, and 
therefore makes the revised RP applicable to broadband NGNs . With this definition 
in hand, it then becomes possible to read the existing obligation to interconnect as 
established in the RP as follows: 
 
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured 
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically 
feasible point in the network. Such interconnection is provided:… 
 
but that now the term ‗major supplier‘ in 2.2 is to be  interpreted in accordance with 
‗dominance‘ as interpreted by the Layering Theory. 
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Annex 1 shows the full revised form of the RP. For example, the layers that have been 
incorporated into the RP at Annex 1 are those as displayed in Figure 1 to this Chapter. 
Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction), the procedure by how a revised RP 
might be introduced into WTO law is beyond the scope of this thesis, but if we 
consider however how the RP came into being, it could be argued that a very similar 
plurilateral negotiating process might be used to revise the RP in line with modern 
technology, and that a revised RP could also be taken in the form of a GATS 
Additional Commitment in future WTO rounds. Alternatively, a revised RP might be 
elevated in status taking on the form of an Annex, if agreed by the majority of the 
WTO membership and similar in status to the Annex on Telecommunications, 
currently a mandatory part of the GATS. This latter approach is unlikely however 
given the need for consent by the majority of the WTO membership. Also current 
adoption of the RP by DCs and LDCs has been relatively mixed, and future adoption 
of an amended RP that would apply specifically to internet networks is likely to be 
met with scepticism, unless DCs and LDCs can directly see the commercial 
advantages in doing so (discussed more fully in Chapter 7).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the Layering Theory very much applies to the 
regulation of both electronic networks and services in terms of ensuring effective 
competition to ensure principles of non-discrimination, any-to-any connectivity, 
interconnection and equal access, the fundamental principles of good regulation, and 
which were discussed in Chapter 3. The Layering Theory is not so much concerned 
with content, i.e. the electronic content that flows over the infrastructure. The theory 
is linked to content only in so much as to determine the relevant Layer that the content 
falls into (more likely the Application or Content Layers) for the purpose of 
determining SMP in the that Layer, and whether effective competition exists. The 
Layering Theory is an example of a combined sector-specific/competition law 
approach.  
 
The Author has suggested that the Layering Theory be incorporated into the WTO 
framework agreements, possibly as a form of an additional commitment (for example 
through a revised Reference Paper) at the multilateral level. In this way, effective 
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competition will be maintained both at the infrastructure and the content lawyers for 
all providers of electronic networks and services in all modes of supply under the 
GATS (a more detailed discussion of modes of supply and particularly as regards the 
delivery of content is provided in Chapter 9 and in the discussion of the US-Gambling 
case). 
 
Even as far back as 1998, in a background note to negotiations on telecommunication 
services produced by the WTO‘s secretariat, the WTO was warning of the potential 
need for regulatory action as regards IBPs: 
 
Also, as the Internet matures, larger internet access providers are buying 
smaller ones and large incumbent telecom operators are acquiring internet 
access providers to supply these services.  There is a prospect that the largest 
Internet access providers may dispense with the mutual fee-less peering 
arrangements devised when Internet was more a non-profit endeavour rather 
than a commercial activity.  In this, there is a risk that that large access 
providers could gain a market position permitting them to dictate terms, 
conditions and prices of access by smaller providers.  Finally, as more telecom 
providers become global companies, it is increasingly likely that some of their 
activities may fall outside the jurisdiction of any single national competition 
body or other relevant government authority. In such situations, enhanced 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation on competition policy may have an 
important role to play.
94
 
 
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 7, we discuss how DCs and LDCs can use 
telecommunications law and the Layering Theory to enhance effective competition in 
their own markets as well as gain access to markets overseas.  
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CHAPTER 7  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1
 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Previous chapters have focused on the international regulation of telecommunications, 
and on US and EU markets in particular, where competition was introduced early, and 
liberalisation pushed (particularly by the European Commission in the EU) to 
encourage greater competition and end-user choice. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
aim of the earlier chapters was to set out the ―international rules of the game‖, the 
rules of IEL that apply to the technology sector as regards the trade in 
telecommunication network capacity and services. We have seen how internet 
interconnection of packet-switched networks has surpassed interconnection of circuit 
switched or voice networks, and how a select number of international backbone 
operators control access to these networks. To truly address the Digital Divide 
between developed and developing nations, ISPs in DC countries will need to gain 
access to these networks at equitable rates. This applies as much to access to 
electronic networks and services in developed countries as it does in developing. In 
Europe, the European Commission has bought in the new regulatory framework to 
deliver effective competition. In Chapters 5-6, the author argued that the Commission 
should go a step further in introducing the Layering Theory. The author also called in 
Chapter 6 for incorporating the Layering Theory into a revised Reference Paper on 
basic telecommunication services at the WTO as a form of additional commitment for 
members in future trade rounds. This latter point will be explored in more detail in 
this Chapter. With some of the international rules now in hand we can now turn our 
attention to see how these rules might affect DCs and LDCs.  
 
                                                 
1
 A version of this chapter was published in International Economic Law and the Digital Divide: A 
New Silk Road? Edward Elgar, 2007. 
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This chapter discusses the implications of cost-oriented interconnection rates and a 
framework for call termination introduced by the Basic Agreement on 
Telecommunications (BTA) (or Fourth Protocol) to developing countries. In Chapter 
3, we saw how developed countries are using the New Modes of Operation to 
effectively bypass the international accounting rate regime and thereby escape having 
to pay high international accounting rate settlements mainly to DCs and LDCs. In this 
chapter, we will see how DCs and LDCs can use the New Modes of Operation in 
reverse, clawing back some of the disadvantages that they would otherwise face. We 
also saw how adoption of the RP effectively means a move away from international 
accounting rates to a cost-based interconnection regime. We will see in this chapter 
that there are both advantages and disadvantages to this approach.  
 
Chapter 4 also introduced the concept of the ITU‘s Recommendation D.50, which 
deals with the cost implications of internet traffic flows. In Chapter 7, we will look at 
the implications of Recommendation D.50 for DCs and LDCs. Will the 
Recommendation lead to more transparent and fairer sharing of costs for conveying 
data traffic between developed and developing countries and vice-versa? Also, 
although a number of G-90 countries did not even take out the additional commitment 
of the regulatory Reference Paper in its current form, this chapter argues that there 
might be reasons for some G-90 countries in adopting a revised Reference Paper for 
IP-based networks based on the Layering Theory, which will allow for increased 
transparency and non-discrimination by DC ISPs not only when negotiating access 
and interconnection for electronic networks and services with operators within 
Europe, but also with third country operators, and ensuring effective competition by 
more clearly identifying those operators with SMP in the kind of relevant markets that 
DCs and LDCs operators are likely to supply.
2
 In this Chapter, the Author clarifies 
how the Layering Theory can benefit DCs and LDCs wishing to gain access to OECD 
country markets in order to export electronic intangibles into such markets. Finally, 
the World Summit on the Information Society is discussed: the first phase of the 
summit having already being held in Geneva in 2003, with the second phase in 
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 Off-shore value-added services, front and back-end office functions, medical, educational, financial, 
architectural, computer design etc., that could be performed remotely, and other kinds of electronic 
service provision including the supply of electronic fast moving consumer goods. 
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Tunisia in 2005. The aim of the summit was to set out a long-term policy framework 
to assist DCs and LDCs in addressing the Digital Divide. 
 
7.1.1 Background 
 
In the area of telecommunications and over the period of the 1990s, the West saw 
unrivalled privatisation of their national telecommunication incumbents, which has 
led to lower prices and also expanded service functionality. In Europe for example, 
the European Commission was eager to break the power that individual European 
Member States had over their respective national telecommunication networks, and 
where there was too close a relationship between government and the main incumbent 
telecommunications operator. This was partly achieved through regulation (a series of 
liberalisation and harmonization directives under Articles 86 and 95 of the EC Treaty 
(then Articles 95 and 100) and partly by exploiting the commercial interests of some 
of the large operators that wished to merge or form joint ventures, such as Deutsche 
Telekom and France Telecom
3
. The Commission allowed the joint ventures but only 
on condition of their Member State governments passing national measures to 
introduce greater competition, for example in the area of interconnection (discussed in 
Chapter 3). Deregulation in Europe eventually led the way to a greater arms length 
relationship between national regulator and incumbent operator, which in turn led to 
increased competition and lower end-user prices.  
 
However many DCs and LDCs have been reluctant to liberalise their 
telecommunications markets and accept the regulatory Reference Paper. This is 
despite evidence available in the public domain that liberalising telecommunications 
can help address the Digital Divide (discussed in Chapter 2). There are various 
reasons for this including political, economic and social. In many DCs and LDCs 
liberalisation of international leased lines, domestic leased lines and long distance 
telephony would also lead to the withdrawal of cross subsidies to traditional loss-
making markets of local access and calls, with consequent price rises in local 
                                                 
3
 See for example Atlas-Case No IV/35.337 [1996] L239/23 and Phoenix/Global One-Case No 
IV/35.617 [1995] JO C 337. 
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telephony markets
4
. For DC and LDC governments such a move could lead to 
political tension and destabilization. Another adverse economic effect could be 
increased unemployment as privatisation leads to a loss of jobs in the incumbent and 
loss of government revenue (if the monopoly operator was previously publicly 
owned). Liberalisation carried out in compliance with WTO or World Bank funding 
can also lead to expensive and counterproductive disputes between the Government 
and operators in the newly liberalised market segments and can be the reason for 
external entities exerting influence over the domestic telecommunications 
liberalisation agenda. Particularly important to DCs and LDCs are the international 
funding organisations in respect of ICT use, and the ways in which multilateral donor 
organisations, such as the World Bank, UNCTAD, and developed-country specific 
donor organisations, such as the UK's DFID, work together to meet international 
development goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Nevertheless the greatest problem for end-users and ISPs in DCs and LDCs, and 
therefore an impediment to addressing the Digital Divide, is for these end-users and 
ISPs negotiating cost-oriented access and interconnection agreements with their own 
incumbents who maintain monopolies over telecommunication and internet 
infrastructures, and peering/transit agreements with the IBPs who control international 
internet routes.
5
  
 
Furthermore, the extent of increased telecommunications liberalisation reflected in 
any one country's Schedule of Specific Commitments under the GATS will indirectly 
impact on the levels of ICT penetration and access in urban and rural areas. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, greater liberalisation and policies that encourage further 
competition in the domestic market, have a positive effect on reducing the Digital 
Divide. This approach of increased liberalisation and further deregulation goes hand 
in hand with greater commitments under the WTO Information Technology 
Agreement (a GATT agreement) which seeks to lower the tariffs paid on the import of 
information technology products (mainly hardware) into a member country. By 
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 DFID report by Kariyawasam R, Collins H., Dixon M., Garthwaite N., Gillwald A., Groves T., 
Hunter J., Jensen M., Lucas W., Milne C., Unadkat C., and Wirzenius A., Reducing the costs for 
internet access in developing countries. Report produced for Department for International 
Development, UK Government (2001), Antelope Consulting, 2001, published on the internet at: 
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5
 Ibid at section 3.3 overview client report. 
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simultaneously reducing the cost of IT equipment, end-user choice is enhanced and IT 
penetration increases. This in turn has a positive effect on the Digital Divide as 
evidenced by some of the studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Also the extent to which 
ICTs are considered in domestic policy making (e.g. in respect of the delivery of 
services such as in employment, social services, social welfare benefits, and 
education) will have a knock-on effect on the use of ICTs for economic and social 
development and governance, and on the level of expertise and availability of 
resources in the countries concerned.  
 
In the telecommunications sector, priorities for negotiations under Doha were greatly 
influenced by the reduction in the price of mobile network infrastructure and the 
success of operators in countries previously considered too small or poor to offer 
commercial opportunities. For example, VoIP (Chapter 3) and other internet-based 
services have had a significant effect and the rise of third generation mobile 
technologies (3G) is already reducing the value of fixed-line access in countries that 
do not already have established fixed-line access infrastructure.  At the regional level, 
the rise of bilateral and multilateral trading blocs through free-trade agreements and 
customs unions that have schedules on services will have an impact on future trade 
rounds given the recent collapse of talks at Doha with the risk of multiple standards 
emerging when agreements are signed outside of the framework of the WTO. 
 
7.2 Developing Countries, the Reference Paper and the Layering Theory 
 
As seen Chapter 6, the Layering Theory is a regulatory tool that will allow NRAs 
greater power to accurately determine market power in the communications sector. 
The Author argues that this theory should be adopted into the regulatory frameworks 
of both developed and developing countries. It should also form part of a revised 
reference paper at the next multilateral trade round, or failing that, be incorporated 
into the services schedules of new preferential trade, regional trade and bilateral trade 
agreements of the Quad countries (US, Canada, European Communities and Japan), 
given that the rise in PTAs/RTAs is likely to continue to circumvent the multilateral 
trading process over the next five to ten years. For example, as at July 2007 the WTO 
have on record 380 PTAs – 205 of which are adopted. The majority (over 90%) are 
Free Trade Agreements, with less than 10% being Custom Union Agreements. By the 
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year 2010, the WTO anticipates circa 400 PTAs being in force.
 6
  The Author 
contends that as more traffic is switched over TCP/IP networks, it will become 
increasingly important for regulators to accurately determine where the access 
bottlenecks are so as to regulate for effective competition. For example in the EU, the 
provisions of Article 12 Access & Interconnection Directive will become crucial in 
helping service providers gain access to incumbent networks in order to deliver 
electronic services to customers connected to these networks. The EC‘s new 
regulatory framework for electronic networks and services (discussed in Chapter 5) 
has now simplified the licensing procedures for service providers wishing to offer 
electronic services in the EU, creating a simple ―notification of services‖ system to 
NRAs replacing the older ―individual‖ and ―class‖ licensing systems. Subject to 
adequate network security issues, it has never been easier for DC and LDC third 
country operators to notify and provide electronic services within the EU. And by 
satisfying notification requirements in one EU Member State for example, because of 
the free movement of goods and services provisions of the EC Treaty (Articles 49-
51), such operators will be able to offer pan-European services. The function of the 
Layering Theory is to increase effective competition both within the EU, and if 
reflected in a revised RP, at the multilateral level. The Theory allows for operators 
that would otherwise not be caught by current competition jurisprudence (for example 
due to the difficulty of defining an appropriate relevant market) to be caught and in 
appropriate cases, access mandated. Such a power is particularly important in markets 
where electronic applications are driven by software just as much as hardware (e.g. 
electronic program guides, the production/manufacture for which could be outsourced 
in a third country). Furthermore, by applying the theory at the multilateral level by 
amending WTO measures such as the RP (as suggested at Annexe 1 to this thesis), the 
Author is advocating for increased effective competition at the multilateral level for 
cross border electronic services under mode 1 or consumption abroad of electronic 
services under mode 2 GATS. Subject to the (separate) classification issue of 
electronic intangibles (as to whether electronic intangibles should fall to be regulated 
under the GATS, GATT or TRIPS for example--discussed in Chapter 9), the Layering 
Theory will allow for increased market access and national treatment for any operator 
(whether from a developed or developing country) to deliver electronic intangibles 
                                                 
6 WTO, ‗Regional Trade Agreements‘ available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> 
accessed September 2008.  
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into the target WTO member state, more likely OECD countries that are dependent on 
access to lower cost high technology services. Naturally, adoption of a revised RP in 
light of the Layering Theory works both ways; DC and LDC markets will be just as 
open to competition by aggressive and efficient foreign operators as developed 
country markets by DC and LDC operators who are able to undercut on costs for 
innovation and service delivery due to access to a cheaper workforce. How DCs and 
LDCs can protect their national markets to some extent (and developed countries 
cannot, due to the pace of regulatory change and existing measures in the 
communications sector in these countries) is discussed below. 
 
Many developing countries failed to take out the additional commitment in the form 
of the regulatory Reference Paper, or if they did make a commitment, made only a 
partial commitment
7
. A number of developing countries objected to the requirements 
to liberalise domestic national telecommunications as a consequence of adopting 
certain provisions in the Reference Paper, particularly provisions on interconnection. 
For example, a number of African and Caribbean countries in particular Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Trinidad & Tobago respectively have argued that developing countries 
should be left free to liberalise in accordance with their own national policy objectives 
and under Article VI GATS, be left free to develop domestic regulation
8
.  
 
The significance of maintaining flexibility for determining national policy has been 
adopted as a policy objective at the recent UNCTAD XI Conference in Sao Paulo 
(June 2004)(the Sao Paulo Consensus) which states at paragraph 8 that:  
 
The increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world 
and the emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations 
have meant that the space for national economic policy, i.e. the scope for 
domestic polices, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial 
development, is now often framed by international disciplines, commitments 
and global market considerations. It is for each Government to evaluate the 
trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and 
                                                 
7
 See the telecommunications services section of the WTO website at www.wto.org. The WTO 
database holds a list of the telecommunications commitments of each of the WTO member states, 
which can be accessed from the WTO (GATS) services site. 
8
 Elements of a G-90 Platform on the Doha Work Programme WT/L/577, July 2004. 
 213 
commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is 
particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind development 
goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for 
appropriate balance between national policy space and international 
disciplines and commitments.
9
  
 
Given that many DCs and LDCs did not take out the additional commitment of the 
existing Reference Paper, it is hard then to imagine why many of these WTO 
members would be interested in the amended version of the Reference Paper in light 
of the Layering Theory and suggested by the Author and included in this thesis at 
Annexe I. This is particularly the case where members have not scheduled internet (or 
internet access) services as part of their schedules of specific commitments. In fact, in 
future rounds a number of G-90 countries will seek diplomatic understanding on the 
decline of international accounting rates before agreeing to any new measures on 
electronic commerce or the internet, which they perceive as favouring the developed 
countries, particularly the Quad Countries. International Accounting Rates have 
already been discussed in Chapter 3. The ITU‘s International Telecommunications 
Regulations (ITRs) sets the framework for international accounting rates. By contrast, 
many developed countries, who make net accounting rate settlements to DCs and 
LDCs in light of increased traffic being terminated in the developing countries (i.e. 
more outgoing calls from developed to developing countries
10
), see the ITRs as 
having been superseded by the WTO‘s Fourth Protocol and Reference Paper, which 
introduces a cost-based approach to the conveyance of international telephony traffic, 
although the precise terms of these WTO measures remain vague. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, a cost-based regime dramatically reduces the cost of terminating 
international traffic (to cost). Furthermore, the Mexico-Telmex case (discussed in 
Chapter 3) has set an important precedent as to how the WTO measures could be 
interpreted both now and in the future, and mainly in line with a cost-based 
interconnection regime, effectively ―sidelining‖ the gentleman‘s agreement on 
accounting rates agreed in the early negotiating stages of the Fourth Protocol at the 
                                                 
9
 UNCTAD, TDL/L.30, June 2004. 
10
 This is unlikely to change even with internet traffic, where traffic patterns are asymmetric. With most 
websites being hosted in the US, requests for webpages from these sites generates increased traffic 
flow in the direction of the subscribers requesting the content (generally in the developing countries). 
See Section 2.3 of the DFID Internet Costs Study. 
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WTO
11
. This is not good news for the DCs and LDCs that still retain monopoly 
domestic markets in telecommunications, and who would like to see the ITU‘s ITRs 
amended and revived
12
. As mentioned in Chapter 3, at the time of writing the position 
has yet to be confirmed. 
 
G-90 countries could also seek a phased implementation for any revised Reference 
Paper in light of the Layering Theory applying to packet-switched networks. Many of 
the LDCs have not made the switch from legacy circuit-switched networks to packet-
switched technology for obvious costs reasons and therefore would have little interest 
in any revision of the Reference Paper as it stands. However as UNCTAD‘s World 
Investment Report 2004 has shown, a number of DCs, such as China, India, and Korea 
are not just magnets for inward foreign direct investment (FDI), but also are becoming 
suppliers of foreign direct investment themselves, and usually through technology 
orientated companies, such as Singapore Telecom and the Hong Kong-based 
Hutchinson Telecom. This trend has continued. The World Investment Report 2005 
lists Hutchinson Whampoa (Hong Kong, China), Singtel (Singapore), Petronas 
(Malaysia), Samsung (Republic of Korea), and Cemex (Mexico) as the top five 
developing country TNCs
13
. The 2008 World Investment Report indicates a similar  
pattern. Countries, such as India have also proven that a successful outsourcing 
operation can be developed with appropriate human resources and technological 
capability at home. Furthermore, this chapter discusses below how DCs can use the 
New Modes of Operation in reverse, aggregating traffic for termination in developed 
countries. In the next trade round or more likely in subsequent rounds, if G-90 
countries were to seek from the Quad countries GATS specific commitments in 
network-based transactions and complementary services (services ancillary to 
telecommunication services, such as financial, distribution, computer, audiovisual 
etc), DCs and LDCs who are able to attract sufficient FDI into their home markets and 
who can utilise beneficial technology transfer to innovate themselves based on a well 
trained resource of human capital, will be able to make use of such commitments to 
generate an export portfolio of advanced network electronic services and goods into 
markets in the developed world. Imagine a situation where a number of developing 
                                                 
11
 See Section 3.2.2 above. 
12
 Sections 3.1-3.2, Chapter 3. 
13
 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005, p. 17. 
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countries are now able to develop complex TCP/IP-based services in-house and at 
much cheaper production costs than available in the United States, Canada, Japan or 
the EU? The incentive would be to export these services over modern IP networks 
back into domestic developed country (mainly OECD) markets for use as electronic 
communications services by developed country consumers in both front-end and 
back-end functions
14
. All of these business practices however require appropriate 
market access commitments and also regulatory frameworks that can deal with IP-
based networks. For these reasons, some members of the G-90 should look carefully 
at the Reference Paper for bits and bytes revised in the light of the Layering Theory 
and set out in Annexe 1 to this thesis. In conjunction with a revised RP, DCs and 
LDCs will also need to lobby hard to enforce the provisions of the ITU 
Recommendation D.50 (discussed below in section 7.4) that seeks to generate more 
equitable payments by DC and LDC ISPs in interconnecting with the mainly 
(developed country) international internet backbone networks. 
 
It is important to stress that DCs and LDCs in acceding to greater liberalisation 
commitments, as set out in the revised RP should only accept such commitments in 
line with their domestic liberalisation agendas. There is no reason why DCs and LDCs 
should adopt any revised RP as a consequence of WTO procedure. If not restricted by 
onerous provisions on trade in telecommunications in bilateral/FTA agreements with 
other countries, DCs and LDCs will be free to adopt into their own domestic law as a 
matter of their own domestic policy choice only those provisions that seem 
appropriate. The fear of developing country administrations is an attack on the 
monopoly operation of LDC and DC incumbent telco operations and the consequent 
loss of monopoly rents. However, commitments to a revised RP can still be made so 
long as adequate measures to protect domestic incumbent telcos have been 
implemented into national law prior to such a commitment being made. For example, 
DC and LDC governments can choose to introduce legislation that will protect any 
incumbent telco from new competition measures (bought in for example by adoption 
of a revised RP) that is responsible for services of a general economic interest 
(SGEI), for example universal service/universal access and public broadcasting 
                                                 
14
 Front-end functions apply to the group of services either hardware or software that directly interact 
with the customer (Electronic Program Guides for set-top boxes for example). Back-end functions 
relate to the range of services that are required to support the front-end functions (billing, network 
security, data collection and retrieval etc). 
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functions. The European Commission was successful in protecting its Member States‘ 
national telco incumbents in just this way through the operation of Articles 86(2) and 
86(3) of the EC Treaty for example, which sets out the framework for SGEI in 
Europe. Article 86(1) effectively protected operators that had been granted special 
(available only to a limited class of operators-eg. sale of leased-lines) and exclusive 
(available only to one or two operators-eg., basic voice services) rights by NRAs. 
With the gradual withdrawal of special and exclusive rights over time, particularly in 
telecommunications, the relevance of Article 86 to this sector has gradually 
diminished, although it remains necessary in the area of public service broadcasting, 
where exclusive licensing rights still exist to some extent. DCs and LDCs could learn 
from the EC‘s experience however and retain in their regulatory frameworks a 
position for special and exclusive rights in certain telecommunication sub-sectors (for 
example international cable landing stations or basic electronic voice telephony 
services offered to the public)
15
. The important point to note however is that within 
the EC, special and exclusive rights have been mainly removed, which allows third 
country operators who have notified to provide electronic services in the EU 
(conforming to the principles of the EC‘s Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC for 
example) the chance to compete with national incumbent telcos
16
.  
 
The other argument that needs to be made in favour of developing countries is that as 
a number of these countries develop their ICT industries, invest in IP-based 
infrastructure, develop the necessary human resource skills in areas of protocol 
design, coding, hardware and software development, and begin to identify technology 
service products that are suitable for export over network-based technologies 
(―complementary services‖), such countries will then need to enforce the provisions 
of Article IV GATS which deals with increasing the participation of developing 
                                                 
15
 The NAFTA tribunal case United Parcel Services (UPS) v. Government of Canada is an important 
precedent here. The case concerned whether the right of a State to maintain state monopolies in certain 
sectors of business could be challenged. UPS claimed damages under the NAFTA agreement alleging 
that Canada Post was benefiting from undue privileges as a government-owned corporation. In a 
decision by a NAFTA Tribunal in June 2007, UPS‘s claims were dismissed. The decision effectively 
strengthens the argument for state monopolies to protect certain business sectors from private 
competition. See case notes at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/disp-diff/parcel_archive.aspx?lang=en, accessed October 2008. 
16
 Note that most electronic services fall under the enhanced service category in US and EU markets 
(data services) and which were deregulated in anycase. However with the advance of technology, VoIP 
services are now just as effective as basic voice telephony services, and until VoIP is regulated in the 
same way as voice (being considered), third country operators could provide such services within the 
EU (if registered in accordance with the Authorisation Directive). 
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countries in international trade in services
17
. The positive list approach of the GATS 
and Article IV could allow for increased participation of developing countries in 
services technology trade, but Article IV dealing with the Special & Differential 
Treatment of developing countries needs to be enforced by the WTO membership as a 
collective
18
, 90% of which consists of developing country members. For example 
paragraph 5 Article IV discusses the desire ―to facilitate the increased participation of 
developing countries in trade in services and the expansion of their service exports 
including inter alia, through the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and 
its efficiency and competitiveness‖. Furthermore subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV 
mentions better market access for developing country services exports through 
liberalisation in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them. Subparagraph 
1(b) goes onto discuss access to developed country distribution channels and 
information networks. Neither distribution channels or information networks is 
defined in Article IV, but it would be reasonable to argue that such networks and 
channels would include developed country telecommunication networks, including 
IP-based networks. In future trade rounds, it is in such areas where the thrust of 
negotiating resource should apply, at least in the technology sectors. It may well be 
that the terms of Article IV will come to be interpreted through a future dispute 
settlement case in a way similar to the terms of the RP were discussed in the Mexico-
Telmex or US-Gambling cases. 
 
As well as developed countries having an obligation to consider modes of supply and 
sectors of interest to developing countries, developing countries also are afforded 
protection under the GATS to open markets selectively. For example, Article XIX 
GATS that mandates successive rounds of negotiations and which provided the legal 
basis for the now defunct Doha Round is also linked to the provisions of Article IV 
GATS. Paragraph 2 Article XIX provides for some practical examples of 
implementing the objectives of Article IV by mandating that (1) the process of 
                                                 
17
 For an excellent discussion of the need to implement Article IV GATS, see the Communication from 
Cuba, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe on Increasing 
Participation of Developing Countries in International Trade in Services: Effective Implementation of 
Article IV GATS, S/CSS/W/131, December 2001. 
18
 Virtually all WTO agreements have special provisions with respect to developing country members, 
known as Special and Differential Treatment terms. See the WTO report, Implementation of Special 
and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/77.  
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liberalisation shall take place with due respect for national policy objectives and 
levels of development of Members; and (2) there shall be appropriate flexibility for 
developing countries to open fewer sectors, to liberalise fewer types of transactions, to 
extend market access in line with their development situation and to attach conditions 
to this access.  
 
With the failure of the discussions at Doha, there should perhaps be further movement 
here. For example, in a Decision (General Cancun Decision) adopted by the WTO‘s 
General Council in August 2004, the Council instructed the Committee on Trade and 
Development to ―expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement-
specific proposals [on special and differential treatment] and report to the General 
Council, with clear recommendations for a decision….‖19 At the time of writing, the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration at the Sixth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong in December 2005
20
 agreed a number of S&D rights for LDCs (as 
opposed to DCs as a whole group-see the distinction in the UN‘s definition in the 
introduction to this thesis) including: 
 
 Providing duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all 
products (97% of products for countries unable to provide 100%) originating 
from all LDCs by 2008; 
 Ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from LDCs are 
transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access. 
 
The collapse of the Doha talks has now put such provisions in jeopardy. We will, 
however, have to wait and see to determine whether the review mentioned above will 
have any meaningful outcome for DCs and LDCs
21
.  
 
 
                                                 
19
 Clause 1(d), WT/L/579. 
20
 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22
nd
 December 2005. 
21
 In October 2004, the WTO Committee on Trade and Development did produce a report listing all the 
special and differential treatment provisions to be found in the WTO covered agreements for LDCs. 
See WT/COMTD/W/135, October 2004. The report simply lists the provisions, but makes no 
recommendations going forward. In December 2007, however, the United States did set out in a paper 
to the WTO new provisions for tax exemptions or tax liability reductions to private institutions and 
foundations engaged in international development work: IP/C/W/497/Add.5, (3 December 2007). 
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7.3 Using the new modes of operation in “reverse” 
 
The Author mentioned above, the possibility for DCs and LDCs to use the new modes 
of operation in reverse. These new modes of operation work outside the conventional 
accounting settlement regime, bypassing international accounting rates, and 
increasing the pressure on such rates to fall. To most DCs and LDCs, which are 
dependent on international accounting rate settlements to earn foreign currency and 
invest in local network infrastructure, the new modes introduced by way of the BTA 
of the GATS are a serious threat to revenue. How then can these modes benefit 
developing countries? In a paper looking at transforming economic relationships in 
international telecommunications
22
, the ITU argues that developing country 
telecommunication operators need to find ways of aggregating their traffic to achieve 
economies of scale, and then terminating that traffic at cost-based rates in net-paying 
developed country markets, such as the United States: This could be achieved by 
petitioning the FCC to grant full interconnection rights and for an extension of the 
developing country operator‘s network into the United States (via Points of Presence 
in the US owned by developing country operators)
23
. Operators, such as Singapore 
Telecom, have already been very successful in acting as a regional hub for other 
Asian operators, and VNSL in India is also playing a similar role. For such operators, 
terminating aggregated traffic via Points of Presence in developed country markets 
would be one example of using the new modes in reverse. Another approach is to use 
―turnaround arrangements‖ in developed country markets through the use of calling 
card or country –direct services. Developing countries would also need to negotiate 
asymmetrical interconnection or termination charges with their developed country 
counterparts. Here the overall level of the charge is reduced, but the legitimate cost-
based case, setting higher rates in developing countries than in developed countries to 
take account of higher transmission costs and reduced efficiencies, is recognised
24
.  
 
In addressing the Digital Divide, DCs and LDCs will also need to liberalise their 
home markets. The DFID report on reducing the costs of access to the internet in 
                                                 
22
 International Telecommunications Union Transforming Economic Relationships in International 
Telecommunications, Chairman‘s Report of the Seventh Regulatory Colloquium, Geneva, December 
1997. 
23
 Ibid, p. 51. 
24
 Ibid, p.53. 
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developing countries referred to in Chapter 4 discusses a number of possible sectors 
to liberalise to quickly bring down the cost of accessing the internet in the hope that 
internet penetration would then spread thus addressing the divide
25
. The sectors to 
target include: international leased lines; domestic leased lines; long distance 
telephony; Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) connections (ISPs in Africa for 
example use satellite based channels for incoming data, often for cost reasons 
aggregating outgoing data on shared International Private Leased Circuits); and 
Internet telephony.
26
 
 
The DFID Internet Costs report makes clear however that liberalisation of the first 
three (traditionally profitable) markets often means the withdrawal of cross-subsidies 
to the traditionally loss-making markets of local access and calls, with consequent 
price rises. This has serious political overtones for local government as raising the 
cost of local calls would an unpopular step for voters. In recent years internet use has 
reduced the need for such ―rebalancing‖ (as lost revenues are recouped from 
additional internet use, up to the limits permitted by network capacity). However, the 
DFID report recommends that moderate local price rises are usually worth paying for 
the benefits of liberalisation
27, 
and that Permitting private VSAT connections with 
both-way transmission could allow major cost reductions for leased line customers 
(usually the small ISPs in Africa or Asia dependent on the large incumbent telcos), 
especially as new lower-cost satellite offerings become available. Also, the DFID 
report suggests that liberalising internet telephony could be particularly beneficial for 
both ISPs and users
28
, though often initially unwelcome to incumbents. Internet 
telephony could provide extra traffic to ISPs who choose to offer telephony, enabling 
economies of scale and eventually lower internet access costs to be achieved, as well 
as cheaper phone calls for end users
29
. The DFID report argues that liberalisation of 
internet telephony could generate sufficient additional traffic to compensate the 
incumbent telco for any lost revenues.  
 
                                                 
25
 See section 5 of the DFID Internet Costs Report. 
26
 Ibid, p.47. 
27
 The DFID report argues that some countries may want to consider special price plans for low users, 
who suffer the highest price rises through rebalancing. 
28
 The DFID report uses the term to mean a phone-to-phone service accessed by dialling a prefix and 
carried over  the internet. 
29
 Ibid., p.47 
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In surveying the case study countries in Africa and Asia, the DFID report also finds 
that complaints are common that the ISP run by the main incumbent telco has unfair 
advantages over all other ISPs
30
. For example, the incumbent telco is in a position to 
apply a margin squeeze on the inputs of other competing ISPs and yet possibly (and 
illegally if the law is in place) allows the incumbent to cross-subsidise its own ISP 
downstream subsidiary (from say revenues generated through its monopoly voice 
business). To prevent this, accounting separation (and structural measures) introduced 
by NRAs may be required in enforcing the strict separation of ISPs from incumbent 
telco operations.  Structural separation may well be the better course. There is a 
further distinction to be made between the competitive environments in DCs to that of 
LDCs.  Telecommunication markets in LDCs tend to be controlled by the dominant 
incumbent operator with a majority shareholding of the incumbent itself being held by 
the LDC‘s respective government. LDC markets therefore need a higher level of ex-
ante or sector specific regulation as opposed to ex-post or market competition 
regulation. For example, telecommunication markets in India, a pro competitive DC 
are quite different to the markets of a number of sub-Saharan African LDCs, such as 
Sudan, Ethiopia or Mali. And within the grouping of Sub-Saharan African countries 
there are also great differences in terms of telecommunications development within 
South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria demonstrating with greater telephone line density 
rates than Republic of Congo, Malawi, and Angola for example. 
 
Another important change would be to allow ISPs in both DCs and LDCs to aggregate 
their TCP/IP traffic through internet exchanges (IXPs) where capacity on networks 
can be traded at cost prices. The creation of national or regional IXPs that could 
aggregate traffic would also make interconnection between these IXPs and 
international backbone providers more attractive. Without ISPs in developing 
countries being able to gain access and to interconnect on non-discriminatory and 
transparent terms with the international backbone operators, who control the internet 
(and also the national monopolists who control access to international gateways, such 
as international cable landing stations and satellite uplinking facilities), the Digital 
Divide cannot be addressed.  
 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 
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Unfortunately, monopoly telcos often oppose the creation of IXPs
31
. As the OECD 
states: 
The barriers to developing countries taking advantage of the new  
environment are their monopolies.  The creation of IXPs, for example,  
would create places where traffic aggregations would make it more  
attractive for global backbone networks to connect their infrastructure.  This  
would increase the opportunities for peering and make the transit market  
more competitive. . an even more fundamental step than establishing  
IXPs is to create conditions in which ISPs can develop and grow the overall  
market.  These ISPs will then look for the best commercial arrangements  
for themselves and their customers. 
32
 
 
In this regard, the Layering Theory if implemented at a national or regional level will 
help deal with abuse of dominant positions by incumbents, subject to suitable 
competition law being in place. Furthermore, the Layering Theory is dependant on 
OSI Layer 5-7 filtering technology and cost accounting software being available to 
the regulator. For most DCs/LDCs such technology may be beyond their reach unless 
made available through technology transfer and technical assistance from the 
developed world, for example through the technical assistance program of the World 
Bank (see Chapter 8). The lack of IXP exchanges in Africa is a real impediment to 
lowering the costs for internet access to end-users and thereby reducing the Digital 
Divide. As we saw in Chapter 4, there are around 17 IXP exchanges in Africa. 
Countries such as South Africa and Botswana, which have more developed 
telecommunication infrastructures and regulatory regimes might be in a position to 
amend national laws to incorporate the Layering Theory and put in place server 
technology at each of the IXP exchanges in its territory to monitor internet traffic and 
thereby enforce the Layering Theory. By enforcing the theory in this way, NRAs will 
be able to guarantee non-discriminatory access to the networks of IBPs and also local 
monopolists upgrading their networks to NGN. At 4%, South Africa has the highest 
internet per capita penetration in Africa. The South African internet market comprises 
some 70 to 80 ISPs, with about 750,000 dialup subscribers and an estimated 1.8 
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 UNCTAD Information Economy Report 2005, p. xix. 
32
 OECD, Internet Traffic Exchange and the Development of End-to-End  International 
Telecommunication Competition., DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2001)5/final, 13  March 2002, p.11. 
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million users.
33
  Adoption of the Layering Theory in these countries could serve as an 
invaluable precedent to the rest of Africa. 
 
7.4 ITU Recommendation D.50 and Packet-Switched Networks 
 
Chapter 4 introduced the ITU‘s Recommendation D.50 and the APEC pricing 
principles agreed at Cancun in Spring 2000. This section now looks at the application 
of these principles and Recommendation D. 50 to DCs and LDCs. As mentioned in 
the section above we are witnessing a major shift in the movement of traffic from 
legacy circuit-switched networks to packet-switched networks based on the TCP/IP 
transmission protocol set. Internet traffic therefore will be crucially important to DCs 
and LDCs in the decade ahead, if not immediately to selected DCs, such as Indonesia, 
Korea, China, India, South Africa and the North African states. The underlying 
concept of directional internet traffic-based cost-sharing is that each party should bear 
those costs for which they are responsible. As the DFID report makes clear, this 
would be a valid model between parts of the world with similar levels of internet 
development, for example between the USA and Australia or Europe. However 
developing country ISPs host much of their content in North America
34
, and route 
much of their domestic or regional traffic via North America (although this is 
changing). A high proportion of the traffic in both directions is therefore instigated 
by, and is for the benefit of, the developing country. The high prices of international 
private leased circuits (IPLCs) in many countries are at the heart of the problem.  As 
the DFID report points out: ―If both half-circuits were priced at similar levels, it might 
seem more reasonable to request cost-sharing – but the need for it would also be less‖ 
35
. Several commentators in the report suggest that reductions in the cost of links to 
the USA without at least corresponding reductions elsewhere would further reinforce 
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 DFID Internet Costs report, p. 74. 
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 See Section 2.3 DFID report. Often hosting skills are in North America, and hosting services there 
are well priced, if not free, which contrasts with high local prices and scarcity of regional links in parts 
of Africa and Asia. In addition, expatriates living abroad form a substantial proportion of requests for 
web content from servers located in the US, but hosting content uplinked by webmasters (those who 
control the websites) in Asia and Africa for example. Interestingly remittances from expatriates living 
abroad to the developing world are a key source of finance for developing countries, and globally have 
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Commission for Africa report ―Our Common Interest‖, remittances are now the second largest source 
of development finance, after FDI. See page 295 Africa Report. 
35
 Section 2.3 DFID Internet Costs report. 
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the position of the United States as the global internet hub
36
.  Other ISPs in Australia 
or Asia for example view US ISPs bearing their share of international infrastructure 
costs as important to their own economies‘ chances of competitiveness, whether 
competition takes place in local or global markets (bearing in mind that often traffic 
sent between two ISPs in the same city might be redirected to a hubbing point in the 
US).  
 
The Kenyan Internet Exchange (KIXP) as an example of a new regional hubbing 
point in Africa demonstrates the value in ensuring that traffic is exchanged as close to 
the source of content as possible (rather than being hubbed in the US). Michuki 
Mwangi argues that prior to the KIXP locally hosted sites were 1.2s away (dual 
satellite hop), which introduces a high latency (delay) value for Internet data 
disrupting real-time applications, such as video and voice calling over TCP/IP 
networks (viz Skype calls).
37
 Mwangi argues that post KIXP, most locally hosted sites 
are now less than 100ms away which has significantly improved the access of locally 
hosted content in Kenya, and regional sub-Saharan African countries. More regional 
IXPs in Africa will lead to greater local creation and local hosting. Also, Mwangi 
argues that the regional Kenyan exchange has led to considerable ‗ripple effects‘ such 
as: 
 
 ―Reduced dependence on International Links 
 Outages on International links (Satellite and Fiber) does not affect local traffic 
flow 
 Reduced capital flight resulting from savings made on peered traffic 
 Only transit traffic capacity is bought from upstream providers 
 Skilled technical capacity resulting from exposure to technology 
 Interconnection techniques 
 Competitive pricing for local links It costs about $75 per Mb in Kenya for a 
local loop link on Fiber.‖ 
 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Internet Exchange Points: Lowering costs and promoting internet development, African realities and 
the Kenyan experience, Michuki Mwangi at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/15/43759912.pdf, 
accessed April 2012.  
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There is no doubt that similar exchanges in other parts of Africa, particularly sub-
Saharan Africa could yield considerable benefits to both smaller ISPS and end-users 
in the region. In short, it seems that the APEC proposals were neither primarily 
designed to benefit developing countries, nor likely soon to have been very beneficial 
to them. The principles have however raised the political profile of the mutual 
compensation issue, which is now likely to be taken forward on a commercial rather 
than a mandated basis
38
. Therefore, for developing country ISPs, nothing much will 
change, unless these ISPs are able to aggregate traffic at a regional level (for example 
through local and regional IXPs) and therefore gain the necessary bargaining power to 
demand commercial arrangements that take into account compensation for traffic 
flow. The other avenue that could be explored is the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). A conflict over charging arrangements could be referred to the WTO‘s DSB 
provided that internet services that are the subject of the dispute can be captured by 
the Reference Paper. This will depend to what extent in future trade rounds members 
are willing to consider internet services as falling under their existing commitments or 
are willing to make new commitments incorporating internet services. It will also 
depend on whether certain publicly available internet services can fall under the 
regulatory capture of the Reference Paper, as discussed in Chapter 3. Perhaps this will 
be an issue that will come to determined by some future WTO DSB panel? As we saw 
in Mexico-Telmex, the panel in that case came to some surprising results
39
.  
 
The fact remains however that most developing country governments lack the 
necessary resources and technical skills to frame a complaint through the WTO
40
. In 
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 They could however frame a complaint as a collective, possibly with a regional regulator or 
regulatory institution, such as in Africa through the Telecommunications Regulators' Association of 
Southern Africa (TRASA). A collective action in telecommunications would be ground breaking as far 
as WTO case law is concerned given that the first WTO case in telecommunications between the US 
and Mexico is so recent. As the Fourth Protocol is effectively a diplomatic agreement between nation 
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Resolution Understanding of the WTO, diplomatic negotiations would then begin (in the event of a 
dispute with the US) between the USTR and the developing nation state's trade office. In the event of a 
dispute with the United States for example, a collective complaint could also be framed against the 
USTR. WTO case law precedent does exist for collective actions, for example in the collective action 
brought against the EU by the US and various Latin American states in the Bananas case. In the light 
of a number of bilateral and Free Trade Agreements however signed by the US and the European 
 226 
fact most recent WTO complaints in the communications sector have been by the 
United States! For example, in the telecoms industry in general, there has been more 
widespread take up of potential referrals to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Body 
(DSB) by the US in recent years
41
. A decision to go to the WTO's DSB would depend 
to a large extent on the value of the Internet interconnection agreements in dispute, 
which if following current market research, is likely to rapidly increase.
42
 Another 
important factor would be the willingness of the DSB to involve itself in areas that, 
some would argue, might be better handled by national regulatory authorities. 
However history has proved, as in Mexico-Telmex, that the WTO‘s DSB is very 
happy to fill in the gaps created by instruments such as the Reference Paper. If 
necessary, it will even create policy that has not been agreed at the WTO‘s General 
Council, for example in the finding of cartels by the WTO‘s panel in Mexico-Telmex 
as being an example of an ―anti-competitive practice‖ listed in the RP.43.  
 
7.5 Classification of telecommunications services in the next trade round 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in a recent offer to the Doha negotiations, the United 
States has classified packet-switched services as information services (packet-
switched information services) without any reference to the UNCPC coding system 
discussed earlier
44
. Under the US Telecommunication Act 1996, information services 
are not classed as telecommunication services and can therefore not be regulated as 
basic telecommunication services. Furthermore, VoIP services under US law are also 
currently classed as information services
45
. The Reference Paper only applies to basic 
                                                                                                                                            
Communities with various DCs and LDCs, the chance of a collective action as described above 
remains remote. 
41 
See, e.g., the entries in Total Telecom at http://www.totaltele.com/results.asp: ‗US slams BT over 
DSL access‘ (17th April 2000); ‗US threatens to take Mexico to WTO‘ (4th April 2000), U.S. threatens 
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world (CWI 13th March 2001). A month later, the US said that it was seeking action by Colombia, 
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telecommunication services or potentially face cases before the WTO (CWI, 3rd April 2001). 
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The Internet hardware provider, Networks, estimates that more than 25% of the world-wide voice 
traffic will be voice over IP by 2010. See Klaus-Jurgen Kraatz, Voice over IP - a Challenge to 
Regulation, International Business Lawyer (May 2000). 
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 See Marsden P., WTO decides its first competition case, with disappointing results, Competition Law 
Insight, May 2004, p.8. 
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 TN/S/O/USA, April 2003. 
45
 See Section 3.3.1 on classification of telecommunication services in Chapter 3. 
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telecommunication services. It would appear therefore that the US in classifying 
packet-switched services as information services has moved the regulation of these 
services away from regulatory capture by the Reference Paper (with its strict 
interconnection obligations) and under the capture of the Annexe on 
Telecommunications (which catches only those services that have been scheduled as 
specific commitments). For many DCs and LDCs currently considering future trade 
rounds and schedules of commitments, they would be wise to consider carefully the 
US domestic legislative position on information services and consider whether 
domestic legislative changes are required to create distinctions in law between 
advanced and basic services in their own domestic markets, and also a new category 
of service, the information service. The European Commission also has separate 
definitions for an electronic communications service and an information service
46
.  
 
The Significance of classification of electronic intangibles and network-based 
transactions to developing countries 
 
DC and LDC Governments will also need to consider very carefully the extent (if 
any) of commitments for market access and national treatment given under the GATS 
in the Doha round. As noted above, commitments on market access and national 
treatment made within any of the telecommunications sub-sectors defined in the 
Services Sectoral Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/120) will be binding and required 
to be transposed into domestic law. Particularly where the incumbent is still state-
owned, increased competition resulting from liberalisation will have an immediate 
impact on the government's monopoly rents. At the same time, these governments 
will need to consider the potential for ICTs in their home markets and determine 
whether specific technology markets in developed countries should be targeted. This 
concept has already been mentioned above and in Chapter 3.3.2 when discussing 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Developing countries such as India and Costa 
Rica with established BPO operations submitted specific commitments for BPO 
within the Doha Round
47
. Countries such as China, Vietnam and Poland, Hungary and 
Russia are sure to follow in future rounds. In Africa, the take-up of BPO has been 
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Uruguay Round through the Doha Development Agenda, Markle Foundation, 2004, p. 133. 
 228 
slower. However, in Uganda for example, a BPO operation working via the Ugandan 
Outsourcing Association between a local Ugandan outsourcing company, Cayman, 
and a large accountancy practice in Canada has led to real developments in local 
Ugandan telecommunications law. According to Cayman, ―the major obstacle was the 
slowness and high cost of Internet lines - US$ 700 per month in Uganda, compared to 
US$ 50 in Canada. There were also confidentiality issues. Several of [the Canadian] 
Wall & Associates' clients were reluctant to share information online. In addition, 
until recently, Internet policy in Uganda did not allow for Voice Over Internet 
Protocol, which was part of Wall & Associates' system.‖48 Further to consultations 
with the Ugandan government, the outsourcing association was able to persuade the 
local Ugandan government of the advantages of the new export market potential for 
outsourcing for Uganda which led to changes in the law. According to the Ugandan 
Outsourcing Association, ‗Today, connectivity costs in Uganda have been slashed by 
half because the Government understood the predicament of small providers and 
allowed other telecommunication companies to build the necessary infrastructure and 
offer access at a cheaper rate.‘ 
 
To develop effective services, telecommunications policy as reflected in the Ugandan 
example above needs to be adequate to allow for the clustering of electronic services. 
As discussed earlier, this could be a significant problem for LDCs. However, there 
may be advantages in regional DCs/LDCs ‗pooling‘ resources. Hoekman and Matoo 
argue, ―For smaller countries, regulatory cooperation may allow the substantial fixed 
costs associated with regulatory bodies to be shared. For example, in basic 
telecommunications, apart from spectrum monitoring equipment, computers and 
programs, there is the cost of professional assistance for activities such as 
interconnection, cost estimation and spectrum management. An example is the 
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL), the first regional 
telecommunications authority in the world. Although the member countries retain 
their sovereign power over licensing and regulation, ECTEL provides technical 
expertise, advice and support for national regulations. Apart from the economies of 
scale in establishing a common regulator, there are at least three other advantages. It 
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will promote the development of harmonized and transparent regulation in the region, 
allow for a greater degree of independence (and hence credibility) in regulatory 
advice, and enhance bargaining power in negotiations with incumbents and potential 
entrants.‖49 
 
Clusters of complementary services in the area of network-based transactions or 
increased commitments under CPC classification headings, such as for ―Business 
Services‖ (CPC 87) might be a way forward not only for DCs and LDCs to gain 
access to overseas technology markets, but also to liberalise service delivery within 
their own markets where ICTs could play an important role, for example in health 
services, educational services, company registration, local and national government 
intranets, tax, land, customs, and banking systems. By making these areas more 
efficiently through effective use of linked databases and front-office and back-office 
functionality, DC and LDC governments may be in a position to attract increased 
FDI. Furthermore, the effect of the US-Gambling case (discussed in Chapter 9) is to 
make any restriction of mode 1 cross-border trade in electronic services a potential 
violation of GATS Article XVI on market access. US-Gambling establishes a 
distinction between regulation impacting foreign suppliers of electronic services and 
the consumption of such services by consumers in the importing state. Restrictions in 
the former could be seen as a restriction on trade, whereas restrictions on the latter 
viewed as being in compliance with Article XIV GATS on measures to protect public 
morality and to maintain public order. US-Gambling for example concerned cross-
border trade in electronic gambling and betting services from Antigua into the United 
States. Nevertheless for DCs and LDCs who export electronic services, such as 
outsourcing services from India and China, US-Gambling provides a powerful market 
access precedent.  
 
 
7.6 World Summit on the Information Society 
 
                                                 
49
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In the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society held in Geneva in 
2003, one of the principle aims of which is to reduce the digital divide between the 
developed and developing worlds, various Member States of the United Nations
50
, 
including the European Communities, the US, Japan, and many other developed and 
developing nations committed to a Declaration of Principles which contained three 
main Articles on technology transfer
51
: 
 
33. To achieve a sustainable development of the Information Society, national 
capability in ICT research and development should be enhanced. Furthermore, 
partnerships, in particular between and among developed and developing 
countries, including countries with economies in transition, in research and 
development, technology transfer, manufacturing and utilization of ICT 
products and services are crucial for promoting capacity building and global 
participation in the Information Society. The manufacture of ICTs presents a 
significant opportunity for creation of wealth. 
 
40. A dynamic and enabling international environment, supportive of 
foreign direct investment, transfer of technology, and international 
cooperation, particularly in the areas of finance, debt and trade, as well as 
full and effective participation of developing countries in global decision-
making, are vital complements to national development efforts related to 
ICTs. Improving global affordable connectivity would contribute significantly 
to the effectiveness of these development efforts. 
 
63. We resolve to assist developing countries, LDCs and countries with 
economies in transition through the mobilization from all sources of 
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financing, the provision of financial and technical assistance and by 
creating an environment conducive to technology transfer, consistent with 
the purposes of this Declaration and the Plan of Action.  
 
One of the main objectives of the WSIS is to achieve by 2015, the following targets as 
set out in Article 6 WSIS Action Plan
52
: 
 
a) to connect villages with ICTs and establish community access points; 
b) to connect universities, colleges, secondary schools and primary 
schools with ICTs; 
c) to connect scientific and research centres with ICTs; 
d) to connect public libraries, cultural centres, museums, post offices and 
archives with ICTs; 
e) to connect health centres and hospitals with ICTs; 
f) to connect all local and central government departments and establish 
websites and email addresses; 
g) to adapt all primary and secondary school curricula to meet the 
challenges of the Information Society, taking into account national 
circumstances; 
h) to ensure that all of the world's population have access to television 
and radio services; 
i) to encourage the development of content and to put in place technical 
conditions in order to facilitate the presence and use of all world 
languages on the Internet; 
j) to ensure that more than half the world‘s inhabitants have access to 
ICTs within their reach. 
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The second phase of the WSIS took place in Tunis in November 2005. The Tunis 
Summit reviewed the implementation of the Geneva Action Plan and set new and 
more detailed goals over the period 2005-2015. The Tunis Summit was to some extent 
overshadowed by discussion on the future governance of the internet, the current 
international domain name system, internet protocol addresses, and the root server 
system currently being managed by ICANN, with country specific domain names 
being managed through a network of worldwide internet registries also licensed by 
ICANN. Established in 1998 by the US government, ICANN‘s authority for internet 
governance faced challenged by the EU and a number of developing countries in the 
months preceding the Tunis Summit for other bodies, such as the ITU to have a 
greater say in internet governance. The EU in particular called for a ―new cooperation 
model‖ for internet governance53.  In the end, the WSIS agreed to maintain the status-
quo with ICANN continuing in its present role as mantle holder. However the stage is 
now set for future change and it is likely that the US will have to relinquish some 
form of sovereignty over management of internet governance through ICANN. The 
WSIS agreed that: 
 All governments should play an equal role and have equal responsibility for 
Internet governance while ensuring its continuing stability, security and 
continuity; 
 Nations should not be involved in decisions regarding another nation‘s country 
code top level domain (ccTLD); 
 There is a need for strengthened co-operation among stakeholder for public 
policies for generic top-level domain names (gTLDs).
54
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In its Tunis Agenda for the Information Society
55
, the Summit specifically defined the 
concept of internet governance as: 
 
“34. A working definition of Internet governance is the development and 
application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their 
respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” 
 
The Tunis Summit also agreed the creation of a new Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF) to be convened by the UN Secretary General that will have no oversight 
function on technical issues, domain name allocation or IP addressing, but is to 
provide a platform for discussion of public policy issues related to net governance. 
The IGF is expected to work closely with the ITU, often seen as being more 
sympathetic to developing country concerns. Another Tunis Summit development is 
the creation of a voluntary Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF), which to some extent was 
rebuffed at the Geneva Summit, but finally agreed as a voluntary arrangement at 
Tunis. Developed countries were keen that such a fund should be sourced from 
existing mechanisms. The DSF will rely on donations from civil society, private 
sector, local authorities and international institutions.  
We saw in Chapter 4 and sections 7.3 and 7.4 above, the issue of internet 
interconnectivity. So for example in section 7.3, the discussion centred on how DCs 
and LDCs can make use of the New Modes of Operation in reverse to aggregate 
traffic to terminate in developed country markets, and in section 7.4, how the ITU‘s 
Recommendation D.50 might realise a more equitable cost sharing arrangement for 
interconnecting TCP/IP networks between developed and developing nations 
(undersea fibre optic cable, satellite and microwave links for example). In the Tunis 
Agenda, the WSIS clearly recognised the problem of internet interconnectivity and 
the high costs paid by DC and LDC incumbent to interconnect with the international 
backbone operators. So at section 50 Tunis Agenda, the President of the PrepCom of 
the Tunis Phase states that: 
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50. We acknowledge that there are concerns, particularly amongst developing 
countries, that the charges for international Internet connectivity should be better 
balanced to enhance access. We therefore call for the development of strategies for 
increasing affordable global connectivity, thereby facilitating improved and equitable 
access for all, by: 
a) Promoting Internet transit and interconnection costs that are commercially-
negotiated in a competitive environment and that should be oriented towards 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory parameters, taking into account 
ongoing work on this subject; 
b) Setting up regional high-speed Internet backbone networks and the creation 
of national, sub-regional and regional Internet Exchange Points (IXPs); 
c) Recommending donor programmes and developmental financing mechanisms 
to consider the need to provide funding for initiatives that advance 
connectivity, IXPs and local content for developing countries; 
d) Encouraging ITU to continue the study of the question of the International 
Internet Connectivity (IIC) as a matter of urgency, and to periodically provide 
output for consideration and possible implementation. We also encourage 
other relevant institutions to address this issue; 
e) Promoting the development and growth of low-cost terminal equipment, such 
as individual and collective user devices, especially for use in developing 
countries;  
f) Encouraging Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other parties in the 
commercial negotiations to adopt practices towards attainment of fair and 
balanced interconnectivity costs.  
g) Encouraging relevant parties to commercially negotiate reduced 
interconnection costs for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), taking into 
account the special constraints of LDCs.
56
 
 
It is interesting to note the absence of any reference to the ITU‘s Recommendation 
D.50 within the rubric of the text. This is disappointing given that the ITU had a 
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major role in organising the WSIS, but perhaps indicates the differing negotiating 
positions between the United States for example and a number of developing 
countries (but also including Australia) on the thorny issue of sharing international 
connectivity costs (discussed in section 7.4 above). If the Digital Divide is to be 
effectively addressed, and particularly as regards the African subcontinent, then the 
costs for peering and transit between internet networks will need to be carefully 
monitored and assessed. There is a role for the ITU in this regard. Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis argues that international peering and transit agreements could come under 
the regulatory capture of the WTO‘s interconnection provisions of the Reference 
Paper if such services could be defined as services that are made available to the 
public. Section 2 RP requires cost-based interconnect. The RP currently applies to 
basic telecommunications services, but could apply to packet-switched data services, 
if such services are classed as basic services (public telecommunications services). 
This will depend to some extent on the scheduled commitments of the relevant WTO 
member.  
In terms of technology transfer, the Tunis Summit also agreed the following 
provisions: 
 
9. We call upon the international community to promote the transfer of 
technology on mutually-agreed terms, including ICTs, to adopt policies and 
programmes with a view to assisting developing countries to take advantage of 
technology in their pursuit of development through, inter alia, technical 
cooperation and the building of scientific and technological capacity in our efforts 
to bridge the digital and development divides.  
 
54. We recognise that an enabling environment, at national and international 
levels, supportive of foreign direct investment, transfer of technology, and 
international cooperation, particularly in the areas of finance, debt and trade, is 
essential for the development of the Information Society, including for the 
development and diffusion of the Internet and its optimal use. In particular, the 
roles of the private sector and civil society as the drivers of innovation and private 
investment in the development of the Internet are critical. Value is added at the 
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edges of the network in both developed and developing countries when the 
international and domestic policy environment encourages investment and 
innovation.
57
 
 
How will these targets be achieved without adequate access to technology? Clearly to 
achieve the targets, LDCs and DCs will require, not only access to the technology of 
ICTs, but also the ability to innovate around these technologies as well. To achieve 
these goals, LDCs and DCs will require access to information technology products, 
semiconductor technology, infrastructure for telecommunications networks and 
services, and the software to be embedded in such applications. There needs to be a 
commitment by developed countries to honour the commitments made under Article 
66.2 TRIPS if DCs and LDCs are to receive the know-how required through 
appropriate technology transfer and achieve the goals set out above in the Tunis 
Summit by 2015. Article 66.2 TRIPS and other technology transfer measures under 
IEL are discussed further in the next chapter (Chapter 8).  
 
In the build up to the November 2005 WSIS (2
nd
 Tunis meeting), there was heated 
discussion on how the governance of the Internet should be managed. The main issue 
for many DCs/LDCs (particularly China and India, and countries within the G90, but 
also some developed countries) was the continuing dominance of the US in the global 
management of the Internet. To address these issues, four models for future 
governance were proposed by the WSIS Working Group on Internet Governance to 
stakeholders in July 2005.  These four models included
58
: 
1. To create a Global Internet Council (GIC) of governments and involved 
stakeholders to take over from ICANN; 
2. To strengthen ICANN‘s existing Governmental Advisory Committee as the 
official forum for debate on internet governance and allow for greater 
governmental involvement; 
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3. Remove the U.S. oversight of ICANN and restrict it to the narrow technical 
role, forming the International Internet Council (IIC) to manage most aspects 
of the Internet administration. 
4. Create three new bodies: 
 The Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC) to manage "internet-
related public policy issues" 
 The World Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(WICANN) to take over from ICANN 
 The Global Internet Governance Forum (GIGF), a central debating 
forum for governments. 
The final agreement reached in Tunis at the WSIS (November 2005) saw the creation 
of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), but no clear agreement was reached on the 
replacement of ICANN by an organisation with political leadership from countries 
around the world (although ICANN itself has since delegated more of its technical 
function to country level root domain name root registries but still maintaining control 
of internet security as regards global root servers). The IGF is mainly a discussion 
forum to bring together various stakeholders in the Internet including governments, 
civil society, business and the academic community. It does not hold any decision-
making powers. At a recent plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly (December 
2010), it was decided by resolution that the IGF should continue for a further five 
years (2011-2015), following its first five year term.
59
  
In the aftermath of WSIS 2005, the WSIS has continued its work through a cluster of 
WSIS-related events that were held on an annual basis, and from 2009, the cluster of 
WSIS-related events (usually May in each year) was rebranded as the WSIS Forum. 
The current 2012 WSIS Forum for example, which at the time of writing will be 
hosted by the ITU in Geneva, will continue to look at issues of internet governance, 
security, the use of ICTs in the eradication of poverty, and open spectrum for 
development amongst other ICT issues.
60
 As regards WSIS follow-up, the ITU has 
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http://groups.itu.int/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uQbb5ZVur0Y%3d&tabid=1948, accessed April 2012. 
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maintained a position of leadership with regard to many of the tehnical aspects of 
internet connectivity and development.  
In the IT sector the WTO has worked hard to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on the importation of IT products: The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in 
Information Technology Products (ITA) was concluded by 29 participants at the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996. The ITA provided for 
participants to completely eliminate duties on IT products covered by the Agreement 
by 1 January 2000. Developing country participants were granted extended periods 
for some products. At the time of writing, there were 63 participants to the ITA, 
including a number of developing countries
61
. In research by Wunsch-Vincent for the 
UN ICT Task Force
62
, Wunsch-Vincent cites three reasons why developing countries 
are reluctant to lower tariffs on IT products: (1) low volumes of trade on IT are not 
perceived to lead to any quantifiable advantages; (2) by entering into WTO ITA 
negotiations that has as its aim the reduction of tariffs on IT imports, developing 
countries fear a loss of revenue on such imports; and (3) if developing countries 
themselves are producers of IT products, such countries may want to use import 
tariffs to protect their own emerging IT industries from exporters elsewhere
63
. In 
response to such fears, Wunsch-Vincent citing an OECD study argues that production 
fragmentation, the process by which MNCs outsource aspects of a production process 
across several geographically dispersed sites is built on the frequent and cheap 
exchange of intermediary and final products. Without the lowering of IT tariffs on 
imports, foreign investment for outsourcing in a DC or LDC might be discouraged
64
. 
Another issue is the scope of coverage of the ITA. At the time of writing, the ITA 
covers products scheduled at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System for tariff 
classification (discussed in Chapter 9), as opposed to the wider four-digit level that 
                                                 
61
 For a complete list of countries who are signatories to the ITA see the WTO‘s website at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itapart_e.htm (date accessed 15th October 2004). The EC 
has also stated in May 2004, that the ten new EC member states of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia are automatically signed to the EC‘s ITA 
commitments. According to the WTO, the ITA currently covers about 97% of world trade in IT 
products. See WTO News Items 4
th
 June 2004: ITA membership expands with enlarged EC. 
62
 The United Nations Information and Communication Technologies (UN ICT) Task Force was 
formally launched on 20 November 2001 by Secretary General Kofi Annan, with the mandate of 
promoting awareness, inclusive policies and innovative technological and business models, while also 
building public-private-civil society partnerships that would contribute to the realization of 
development goals through the application of ICT. 
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 Wunsch-Vincent S. and McIntosh J., WTO, E-Commerce, and Information Technologies: From the 
Uruguay Round through the Doha Development Agenda, Markle Foundation, 2004, pp. 42-43  
64
 Ibid., p. 43, citing OECD Study: Information Technology Outlook 2004, Paris, 2004. 
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would cover more recent innovations in product technology for the internet
65
. The 
ITA-II discussions were meant to address this issue by widening the scope of product 
coverage to include IT products important for e-commerce and TCP/IP networks and 
also to address issues of non-tariff barriers to trade such as certification and 
standardisation requirements (the subject of a separate study by the WTO‘s ITA 
Committee). India for example has complained about the lack of acceptance of Indian 
IT standards, the lack of accreditation of Indian centres that certify conformity of IT 
products, and restrictive visa regimes on the movement (export) of software 
professionals
66
. In the area of non-tariff barriers, the ITA Committee is however 
progressing with a study on electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic 
interference as examples of two standards issues that potentially restrict imports of 
IT
67
.  In December 2005, the Doha Work Programme at the Sixth Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong produced a ministerial declaration agreeing to the adoption 
of a ―Swiss Formula‖ setting out the coefficients to be used for the reduction of tariffs 
pursuant to negotiations on non-agricultural market access (NAMA)
68
. The 
convergence on a Swiss Formula for industrial products followed earlier submissions 
by both the US and Japan calling for different approaches on elimination or reduction 
of tariffs on IT products
69
.  The Swiss Formula is non-linear and although final 
agreement on its form has not yet been reached (and might never be reached with the 
collapse of the Doha talks), two variants include, either a limited number of 
negotiated coefficients, or the value of each country‘s coefficient being based on the 
tariff average of bound rates of that Member
70
. This latter approach would result in 
multiple coefficients. Given the contentious nature of NAMA negotiations and their 
potential application to a quickly growing IT industry, particularly for South-South 
trade as indicated in the recent UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005, the form of 
the fomula is likely to change further in a future round. Several DCs (India, Argentina 
and Brazil) were opposed to the Swiss formula on grounds that it could lead to more 
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drastic tariff cuts for DC tariff lines that were generally higher than developed country 
tariff lines.
71
  
 
Facilitating access to ICT technologies will lead directly to improved 
telecommunications infrastructure and therefore indirectly to developing countries 
developing the necessary skills and know-how to (eventually) increase international 
trade in telecommunication services and electronic intangibles. This in turn will lead 
to increased efficiencies at the domestic level. If the goals of the World Summit on the 
Information Society are to be met, LDCs and DCs will need to take a greater role in 
participating in the technical standard-setting activities of the developed countries, 
particularly in relation to information technology
72
. Countries, such as Singapore, 
Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly China and India, should be in a position to take such 
a role
73
. Standards can be used to foreclose competition as a proprietary standard can 
give a foreign operator market power that could then foreclose competition in 
downstream markets. The United States, Europe and Japan have all been markets 
where standards of particular operators, buttressed by strong IPR protection, for 
example Microsoft have proliferated leading to market leadership. There is nothing 
wrong with a company gaining a strong market position through innovation and use 
of IPRs, but the concern for competition authorities is whether that same company is 
also foreclosing competition in downstream markets as a result of a proprietary 
standard
74
. 
 
Also the WTO‘s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (―TBT Agreement‖), sets out 
provisions at Article 11 to help LDCs gain technical assistance with standards
75
, but 
                                                 
71
 See Third World Network (TWN) briefing note at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo224.htm, 
accessed October 2008. 
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 In the WSIS Tunis Agenda, the UN Secretary General is mandated to establish a UN Group on the 
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many developing countries complain that such assistance has not been forthcoming
76
. 
As such, some developing countries are calling on the WTO to implement an ―early 
warning system‖ with regard to standards, and a mechanism to facilitate adjustment 
by developing countries to meet new standards
77
.  Clearly the WTO Secretariat needs 
to meet this challenge if LDCs and DCs are to increase their contribution to world 
trade. The solution is essentially a political one.  
 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to take some of the international rules of the game, as set 
out in Chapters 2-6, and apply them to the advantage of DCs and LDCs. So for 
example in telecommunications we have provisions on reverse charging, network 
access points and points of interconnection that could all apply in reverse allowing for 
operators in the developing world to aggregate traffic and increase their negotiating 
positions in peering and transit agreements with developed country operators. We 
have also seen how the Layering Theory could work to the advantage of DC and 
LDCs operators by helping to increase transparency and effective competition on 
international backbone routes. This could only work if (a) regulators responsible for 
the regulation of the communications sector in DC and LDC countries were to first 
adopt the Layering Theory into national telecommunications law and put in place OSI 
5-7 layer packet filtering technology at local IXP exchanges where international 
backbones interconnect with the networks of local ISPs and local incumbent carriers; 
and (b) where developed countries with already sophisticated communications laws 
(for example in Europe with the New Regulatory Framework) amend the concept of 
SMP to include the Layering Theory and also put in place deep packet filtering 
technology so that operators terminating leased-line full or half circuits into IXP 
exchanges in Europe would be able to take advantage of enhanced competition on all 
internet routes. Such a move would ensure effective competition at both ends of a 
circuit where routes originate and terminate in DC, LDC, and European countries 
                                                                                                                                            
mutually agreed terms and conditions regarding the establishment of national standardizing bodies, and 
participation in the international standardizing bodies, and shall encourage their national standardizing 
bodies to do likewise.‖ 
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77
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respectively. To ensure effective competition on all international routes, including the 
OECD sector, then implementation of the Layering Theory will be required at the 
multilateral level (through the form of a revised Reference Paper as an additional 
commitment by Member States of the WTO at a future trade round), or failing this, 
then on a piecemeal basis through a new generation of PTA/RTA and bilateral trade 
agreements between the Quad countries and DCs/LDCs. Once there is effective 
competition on all international backbone routes (or as chapter 4 highlights, ‗strings‘), 
then the costs for access to international backbone networks by DC/LDC operators 
will come down followed by greater transparency of peering and transit. By 
enhancing effective competition in this way, we will begin to address the Digital 
Divide.  
 
This chapter has also called for technology to be transferred to DCs and LDCs (for 
example with OSI Layer 5-7 technology mentioned above to be implemented at IXP 
exchanges in Africa). Clearly without adequate access to infrastructure, services, and 
know-how, DCs and LDCs will not be in a position to address the Digital Divide. 
Technology Transfer is covered in the next Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8
1
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the Author highlighted the ways in which developing and 
least developed countries could use economic law to achieve better access to 
telecommunication markets in the developed world and help close the Digital Divide.  
However to gain access to such markets, many of these DCs and LDCs will need to 
improve access to technological resources at home to facilitate innovation and the 
development of technological products that would be suitable for markets for export. 
To do this, gaining access to the relevant technology through effective technology 
transfer agreements is a crucial first step. We saw in Chapters 6 and 7 the significance 
that the Layering Theory could have to enhance interconnection of DC and LDC ISP 
networks at IXP exchanges in both the developed and developing world. Not only 
would this provide for access to the lower infrastructure layers of TCP/IP networks, 
but also allow for more advanced forms of access at the higher service layers to allow 
for transmission of electronic goods and services (electronic intangibles), the subject 
of Chapter 9. Therefore enforcement of the Layering Theory through implementation 
of OSI 5-7 Layer Filtering technology and server technology for all IXP exchanges in 
the developing world would be significant step to addressing the Digital Divide. In 
this chapter, the author argues that such technology could be transferred by 
developing countries as part of their enforcement of Article 66 TRIPS on technology 
transfer. However, we will see in this chapter that several problems exist both in the 
international regulatory framework for transfer of technology and also with 
absorption and spillover over of technology in the local market once transferred.  
 
                                                 
1
 A version of this chapter was published by Kariyawasam in International Economic Law and the 
Digital Divide: A New Silk Road? Edward Elgar, 2007. 
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There is no doubt that since World War II, licenses and other forms of technology 
transfer agreements have fulfilled technological needs that could not be met by local 
technical and scientific capabilities. The aim of this chapter is to look at the 
competition implications faced by producers in developing and newly developed 
economies in licensing-in technology or through some form of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) from the developed world or other parts of the global economy with 
the aim of stimulating domestic production or with the aim of using as inputs into 
local manufacturing process and creating new outputs for export. FDI is moving into 
services, but its relationship with technology transfer, particularly in developing 
countries, has always been complex
2
. As a recent UNCTAD report stresses:  
 
As commercial enterprises, TNCs
3
 in principle do not have an interest in 
transferring knowledge to and supporting innovation in foreign affiliates 
beyond what is needed for the production process or product in questions. 
Developing countries therefore cannot expect that, by simply opening their 
doors to FDI, TNCs will transform their technological base.
4
  
 
This chapter will discuss FDI and technology transfer, but its main thrust will be to 
consider the available regulatory mechanisms that can increase the bargaining power 
of local producers when negotiating for technology transfer as well as discussing in 
outline some provisions on technology transfer that can be found in International 
Investment Agreements/Bilateral Trade Agreements and in WTO covered 
agreements, particularly TRIPS. The concept underlying the thematic discussion is 
that the market for technology is imperfect, and that the Small Medium Size 
Enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries are in a disadvantageous position vis-à-
vis suppliers often located in the developed world, although this position is fast 
changing as regards some countries, such as China (including Hong Kong), and India, 
                                                 
2
 For example, the OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which at its heart 
placed significance on protection of foreign investment and market access as incentives to stimulate the 
free flow of FDI into developing countries (by removing all impediments to FDI), was rejected by 
many developing countries. For a further discussion, see Chapter 13 Competition Policy and the WTO 
by V.N. Balasubramanyam and C. Elliott in The WTO and Developing Countries, edited by Homi 
Katrak and Roger Strange, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.  
3
 Transnational Companies, in this chapter referred to throughout as Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs). 
4
 UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/28, 2001, p.92. 
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as described in UNCTAD World Investment Report
5
. The position however for many 
DCs and LDCs remains the same.  
 
Much discussion on technology transfer has tended to focus on the transfer process 
itself, but not so much on the host policy environment to facilitate absorption and 
spillover of technology
6
, once the technology has been transferred. For such countries, 
how then can the technology transfer package be drafted to improve the recipients‘ 
position and therefore the conditions under which technology is to be transferred? 
What relevance do movements, such as Free and Open-Source Software movement 
have for developing countries as regards technology transfer? Also, what relevance do 
the recent talks at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) mentioned in 
the previous chapter have for technology transfer to developing countries? This 
Chapter discusses these issues and concludes with some recommendations going 
forward.  
 
8.2 The position of developing countries 
 
―Technology transfer has been, and will continue to be, one of the main mechanisms 
through which developing countries may advance in their industrialization 
processes‖7. Correa‘s point is well understood and documented in various forms in a 
large body of existing literature on technology transfer and developing countries
8
. In 
many ways, technology encapsulates both theoretical and empirical techniques. 
Although technology can be envisaged as a material good in the form of machines and 
products in tangible form, the concept also covers intangibles in the form of services 
and know-how. As Muchlinksi argues: 
 
The first assumption underlying the market for commercial technology is that 
such technology should be treated as the private property of its owner and not 
                                                 
5
 UNCTAD World Investment Report, Section  Chapter 1), 2005. 
6
 Discussed later in this Chapter at sub-section 8.4, entitled ―Spillover‖. 
7
 Carlos M. Correa, p. 31, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, Zed Books 
2000. 
8
 See for example the extensive literature survey compiled by Kamal Saggi, Trade, Foreign Direct 
Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey, World Bank, 2000.  
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as a public good capable of general use commoditized through the application 
of intellectual property rights, which give the owner a legally determined 
monopoly over the use and disposal of that right, or by way of protected and 
restrictive contractual transfer as in the case of non-patentable know-how that 
is secret.
9
  
 
More than anything in the conventional package associated with technology 
transfer
10
, it is the intangible component referred to as ―know-how‖ by Muchlinski 
that is crucial for the creation of a technological base. However, what does technology 
transfer actually mean in a legal sense?  
 
The now defunct UNCTAD draft International Code on the Transfer of Technology 
(the draft ToT Code) in its definition of ―technology transfer‖, described technology 
as ―systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a 
process or for the rendering of a service, which does not extend to the transactions 
involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods.‖11 The definition therefore excludes 
goods for hire or sale, but seems to refer specifically to the knowledge that goes into 
the creation and provision of a product or service (and not the finished product or 
service)
12
. The United Nations‘ own definition of the different components that 
constitute technology transfer can be summarised as four key aspects: technoware, or 
the physical objects or equipment; humanware, which includes skills and human 
aspects of technology management and learning; infoware, including designs, 
blueprints which constitute the document-embodied knowledge on information and 
technology; and orgaware, which covers production arrangement linkages within 
                                                 
9
 Muchlinski P., Multinational Enterprises and the law, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, p. 427. 
10
 For example, licenses for patents and trademarks, supply of industrial technology, technical-
industrial corporation, specialised technical services, and marketing rights etc.  
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 The draft ToT Code was abandoned due to disagreement between developing and developed nations 
as to the emphasis placed on various clauses within the code, for example on choice of applicable law 
and settlement of disputes. Many DCs and LDCs wanted a restrictive regime on choice of law in 
technology transfer agreements, for example in choosing the host country‘s local law as opposed to the 
investing country‘s law. By contrast, many developed countries wanted to preserve the parties freedom 
to choose. Developing countries were also against arbitration for settlement of disputes preferring 
instead settlement based on the rules of the technology importing state. In short, developing countries 
were looking for clauses that would deal effectively with economic regulation and development, 
whereas developed countries were more interested in clauses that would promote effective competition. 
See UNCTAD, chapter 1, para 1.2, 1985. See also Muchlinski P., Multinational Enterprises and the 
law, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, p. 445. 
12
 UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology Report, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/28, 2001, p.6. 
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which the technology is operated.
13
 The UN definition may appear imprecise for the 
purposes of defining technology transfer within legal documentation, but it 
nevertheless gives a good snapshot as to what technology transfer should 
encapsulate
14
. Developing countries are also concerned that too narrow a definition of 
technology transfer would exclude the relevant factors and processes that hinder their 
access to technology and that any definition should be ―inclusive and inter alia 
comprise the processes and factors relating to the access and use of technology‖.15 For 
example, access to information communications technology will be crucial in 
implementing the goals set out in the Declaration and Action Plan agreed at WSIS in 
Geneva 2003, discussed later in this chapter
16
. 
 
UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2004 has highlighted the shift in FDI towards 
the services sector17. The World Investment Report 2005 indicates the growing 
power of TNCs and the internationalization of R&D. Trade in services, particularly 
through FDI (commercial presence) can serve as a means of affecting technology 
transfer for example in creating a subsidiary or joint venture in the host country to 
provide a service either in relation to own production or to introduce a new service or 
compete with existing services in the local market, and/or linked to a licensing 
contract18. MNCs in the services sector can bring both hard technology (plant, 
equipment, industrial processes), and soft technology (knowledge information, 
expertise, skills in organisation, management, and marketing)19. The most recent 
UNCTAD World Investment Report in 2008 focuses on investment in infrastructure 
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 UN ESCAP, 1989. Cited by Ajay Mathur, Preety M. Bhandari and Sharmila B. Srikanth in ―Effective 
technology transfer: issues and options‖ in Positive measures for technology transfer under the climate 
change convention, Tim Forsyth (ed), The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997. 
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 The UNCTAD draft ToT Code provides a more detailed list of the elements of technology transfer: 
―(a) The assignment, sale and licensing of all forms of industrial property, except for trade marks, 
service marks and trade names when they are not part of transfer of technology transactions; (b) The 
provision of know-how and technical expertise in the form of feasibility studies, plans, diagrams, 
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 WT/WGTTT/5, para 19. 
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 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004, p. xx 
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 IP/IC/W/398, para 30. 
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stressing that, ―for the effective diffusion of technology from infrastructure TNCs, the 
existence of capable domestic enterprises is essential.‖20 Telecommunications in 
particular is cited as a more positive example of a sector benefiting from transfer of 
technology with increased efficiencies and lower costs to end-users.  
 
Besides importation, business partnerships are also a major source of technology 
transfer including, FDI, Build Operate Transfer (BOT) agreements, subcontracting, 
licensing and franchising. There has been much discussion of FDI in recent years. For 
example, UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report (2004) focuses on the shift to services 
in world trade and the role that FDI will play in that shift. According to the 2004 
report, although global inflows of FDI declined in 2003 for the third year in a row, the 
prospects for FDI look to improve, particularly in Asia, and to developing countries, 
which experienced a growth of 9% in 2003 rising to $172 billion overall
21
. In terms of 
law, there were 244 changes in laws and regulations affecting FDI in 2003, 220 of 
which further liberalisation
22
. The World Investment Report 2005 shows increased 
levels of FDI to developing countries, which rose by 40% in 2004
23
. As such, 
developing countries‘ share of FDI inflows reached 36%, according to UNCTAD, the 
highest since 1997. The Investment report for 2007 indicates that in 2006,developing 
countries attracted $380 billion in foreign direct investment — more than ever before. 
While two thirds of these flows went to rapidly growing markets in Asia, virtually all 
developing regions participated in the increase.
24 
The World Investment Report 2008 
continues to chart the growth of FDI into developing countries, but also forecasts a 
stalling of growth due to the world credit crisis. According to the 2008 report, in 
developing countries, FDI inflows peaked at  $500 billion, their highest ever – a 21% 
increase over 2006. The least developed countries (LDCs) attracted $13 billion worth 
of FDI in 2007 – according to UNCTAD also a record high.25 Among developing and 
transitional economies, the 2008 report lists China, Hong Kong (China), and Russia as 
the three largest recipients. FDI is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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8.3 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
FDI can be defined as the act of establishing or acquiring a foreign subsidiary (foreign 
affiliate) over which the investing firm (parent) has substantial management control
26
. 
FDI is generally financed through various measures including intra-company loans, 
equity capital or through reinvested earnings
27
. Firms that engage in FDI operate in 
more than one country and are MNCs. Although UNCTAD‘s 2004 and 2005 reports 
paint a favourable picture as regards FDI in-flow into developing countries, only a 
select group of DCs are actually receiving this investment: The majority loose out. In 
the last ten years, although global FDI figures have increased by almost a factor of 
five, only 0.5% of global FDI flows have been invested in 49 LDCs
28
. In terms of 
global R&D expenditure, the share of developing countries is estimated to have fallen 
from nearly 6% in 1980 to nearly 4% in the early 1990s
29
, notwithstanding substantial 
increases in R&D expenditure in Korea and Chinese Taipei
30. UNIDO‘s World 
Industrial Development Report (UNIDO 2002/2003), also highlights that upper-
middle-income DCs accounted for almost 90% of total enterprise financed R&D 
expenditures by developing countries in 1998: Korea accounted for 53%, Chinese 
Taipei 14%, Brazil 12%, and China 6%
31
. In the lowest ranked 30 developing 
countries, no such expenditure was registered
32
. Furthermore, R&D expenditure by 
foreign affiliates in developing countries is focused on countries such as Brazil, 
Mexico, and Chinese Taipei.
33
. It is anticipated that the decentralization of R&D 
activity by MNCs will likely continue to be focused on a small number of DCs. For 
example, in 2003, the top ten recipients for FDI in Asia were headed by China, Hong 
Kong (China), Singapore, India and the Republic of Korea, in that order
34
. In 2004, 
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the position is similar with both China and India accounting for nearly half of the total 
number of FDI projects in developing countries
35
. As mentioned earlier, this trend has 
continued, particularly with China: both the 2007 and 2008 UNCTAD World 
Investment Reports report China as being the largest of the developing countries for 
inward FDI.
36
 
 
8.3.1 FDI-Internalised/Externalised Transfers 
 
When examining MNC involvement in technology transfer in DCs/LDCs, there is 
also a need to distinguish between internalised and externalised transfers
37
. An 
internalised transfer takes place between a parent and its subsidiary, whereby the 
parent has a controlling share of the subsidiary in terms of share ownership. By 
contrast, an external transfer takes place between legal entities where the relationship 
is dictated by contract including joint venture, licensing, technical cooperation 
agreements etc. In choosing between internalised and externalised transfers, the MNC 
will often balance issues that apply to rent-extracting potential and the transaction 
costs of the transfer with host country characteristics and regulatory policies
38
. 
Internalised modes of transfer of technology tend to dominate with relatively novel 
technologies that are subject to quick change, such as information communications 
technologies (ICTs), whereas externalised modes of transfer are preferred in the case 
of more mature, standardised technologies
39
. The absorption factor of a host country 
to absorb the transfer of technology is also a determining issue in choosing between 
an external and internal transfer. So where there is a limitation on technological 
capability, an internalised transfer will often be preferred. Also host country 
regulatory policies, particularly, the IPR regime will have a direct bearing on mode of 
transfer. Thus, while Singapore has traditionally been mentioned as an example of an 
―internalisation-oriented‖ approach that tends to rely on the acquisition of foreign 
technology through FDI, Korea‘s approach has been through licensing and the import 
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of capital goods in order to facilitate the development of domestic technological 
capability and to minimize foreign ownership of domestic assets
40
. Likewise, Japan is 
often cited as an example of a country that has been able to restrict foreign investment 
but still obtain the technology required for industrialisation through a predetermined 
policy of licensing
41
. Japan was able to unbundle the technology transfer package, 
extracting the rights that were most suitable
42
.  
 
The neighbouring country of Singapore also has a fast developing regulatory regime 
and the soon to be introduced amendments to IPR, competition, and copyright 
legislation could continue to encourage more internal transfers into Singaporean 
foreign affiliates, as MNCs use Singapore as a hub for the re-export of technology 
into the Asia-Pacific region. For example, UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 
(2004) lists Singapore as top of the table in terms of FDI outflow as a percentage of 
gross-fixed capital formation
43
. This perhaps continues a general trend that 
internalised transfers of technology by MNCs have recently gained in significance 
relative to externalised transfers
44
. Since the mid-1980s royalties and technology fees 
received by MNCs in the US, Germany and the UK from their foreign affiliates 
represent an increasing share of the total technology payments received by MNCs
45
.  
 
The internalisation approach through FDI, may however, be limiting in terms of 
diffusion of know-how into the local domestic market. In a recent WTO paper, the 
WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI) argue: 
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While FDI may be efficient in respect of the transfer of operational 
technology, its contribution to a process of deepening of local innovative 
capabilities tends to be limited
46
.  
 
Maskus also makes the point that if the links to other economic sectors are weak, FDI 
may operate in enclaves with limited spillovers
47
 into technologies adopted and wages 
earned by local firms and workers
48
.  In an enclave situation where neither products 
nor technologies have much in common with local firms, there may be little scope for 
learning and spillovers may not materialise
49
. From this perspective, the disadvantage 
of internalised transfers of technology reside in the fact that the transfer of operational 
―know-how‖ often is not accompanied by a transfer of ―know-why‖ and that the 
transferred technology may be suited to a country‘s static endowments but not to its 
dynamic endowments.
50
 The WGTI goes on to argue that externalised transfer of 
technology may provide for greater scope in upgrading local technological capability 
on condition that the local market is able to absorb such know-how, for example in 
having the requisite domestic skills and a competitive environment that facilitates 
technological learning
51
. Furthermore, local markets that have the technological 
capability of using foreign technology but find that they are unable to ―unbundle‖ the 
package of assets transferred by way of internal transfer, will incur greater costs in 
acquiring technology than by way of externalised transfer
52
.  
 
By contrast, Moran argues that FDI involving internalised transfers is the best way 
forward, arguing that domestic content, joint venture, and technology-sharing 
requirements often slow growth and impact negatively on host country welfare 
(especially if they are backed by trade protection or other kinds of market 
exclusivity).
53
 MNCs often prefer FDI by way of direct investment and internal 
transfers to licensing. The preference for FDI is increased when the newest and most 
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profitable technologies (or closest to the MNC‘s actual line of business) are to be 
exploited.  
 
8.3.2 FDI-horizontal/vertical 
 
Two types of FDI generally apply, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal FDI involves 
the subsidiary producing products or services similar to those produced at home by 
the parent, whereas vertical FDI involves the subsidiary producing inputs or 
assembling from components
54
. For example, the construction of vertically integrated 
networks, sometimes known as ―production fragmentation‖, ―delocalisation‖, or 
―outsourcing‖ is the most significant recent trend in vertical FDI (Maskus 1998).   
 
If the technology is transferred by way of FDI (whether horizontal or vertical), it is 
unlikely to be licensed to domestic competitors in the host market, which will often 
mean that the only way that local competitors will be able to gain access to the 
technology (particularly IT) will be in reverse engineering (and this will depend on 
the skills available: with software, decompilation and disassembly, the technical 
procedures for reverse engineering, is a timely and expensive business
55
) or by hiring 
MNC employees with specialist skills or by some other form of spillover (see below). 
In high technology markets where database and object/source code acts as the 
technological platform, a provision for reverse engineering built into the regulatory 
framework is crucial for both competition and innovation. Although such a provision 
has been the subject of heated debate, several jurisdictions allow for it: in the US for 
example, in NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp, the court did not condemn the disassembling of 
an Intel microcode for the purpose of researching and developing a competitive 
microcode program
56
. The European Council Directive 91/250 on the Legal 
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Protection of Computer Programs allows for reverse engineering if it is intended to 
achieve ―interoperability‖ with the evaluated program57. The US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) allows for a similar provision
58
. In Singapore, the 
government there completed a public consultation on a Copyright (Amendment) Bill 
2004
59
 with the aim of adopting new measures on anti-circumvention that would 
attract both civil and criminal liability if breached. The Bill also provided for new 
exceptions relating to decompilation, restricted for purposes of research into 
interoperability, observing, studying and the testing of computer programs
60
.  The 
reason for ammending Singapore‘s Copyright Act arose mainly from copyright 
obligations arising from the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
('USSFTA'). Singapore‘s Copyright Act was revised first through the Intellectual 
Property (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2004 in July 2004, and again through the 
Copyright (Amendment) Act 2004 (following adoption of the Bill mentioned above) 
in January 2005.   
 
In the field of high technology, communications or similar network-based industries 
characterised by vertical integration, industry characteristics that will signal high 
barriers to entry, high concentration, and possible inefficiency that follows from low 
levels of local competition will include scale economies, high initial capital 
requirements, intensive advertising, and advanced technology, the kind of market 
characteristics that suit MNCs. By contrast, entry by domestic firms in potential host 
countries into markets characterised by such indicators is likely to be difficult. The 
entry of MNCs by way of FDI (internalised transfers through foreign affiliates) into 
local markets characterised in this way (eg monopolistic or oligopolistic markets) can 
result in two outcomes: (a) either increase the level of competition forcing local firms 
to become more efficient, or (b) force the least efficient firms out of business. The 
fear is that MNCs could outcompete all local firms and establish positions of market 
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influence or dominance greater than the historical position of the local firms, and go 
onto repatriate profits and avoid taxation through transfer pricing
61
. As Gurak argues: 
 
…foreign investors enjoy monopolistic/oligopolistic advantages in the host 
country over the quantity/quality of production, distribution, source of inputs 
and finance, prices, quantity/type of exports, and the method of production. 
These monopolistic/oligopolistic advantages may cause serious adverse effects 
on the economy of recipient countries, such as imbalance of payments, ―non-
transfer‖ of technology, deterioration of income distribution or the 
introduction of inappropriate (luxury) products.
62
 
 
Lall argues that MNCs could escalate the natural concentration process in DCs, or that 
the weakness of local competitors will allow MNCs to achieve a higher degree of 
market dominance than in developed countries
63
. MNCs may buy out local firms or 
force them out of business, thus increasing the barriers to entry to markets. Although 
Lall‘s research reflected a very different period in the late 1970s, the position on 
MNCs (or TNCs) continues to create cause for concern. For example in a more recent 
WTO paper, the WGTI refers to Lall‘s study of the effect of MNEs64 on 
concentrations in 46 Malaysian industries. In its paper, the WGTI cites Lall‘s 
conclusions that the presence of foreign firms on balance increases concentration, and 
that this was brought about by ―the MNEs impact on general industry characteristics-
such as higher initial capital requirements, capital intensity, and advertising intensity-
and by some apparently independent effect of foreign presence, perhaps related to 
―predatory‖ conduct, changes in technology and marketing practices, or gains of 
policy concessions from the government.‖ 65 In effect FDI has the tendency to 
increase concentration in most host countries with the added risk that MNCs could 
crowd out local firms in developing countries than developed because of their 
technological advantages
66. UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2004, also raises 
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the issue of local firms being crowded out by MNCs
67
, although the 2005 report 
indicates a more optimistic view. The most recent UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2011, however, continues to make reference to the problem of crowding out, 
but only marginally, for example when discussing the impact of Non-Equity Modes 
(NEMs) of financing on local manufacturers in DCs/LDCS. The main focus of the 
2011 report is on NEMs of TNC international production (NEMs), which UNCTAD 
defines as ―alternative forms of governance of TNC-controlled global value chains. 
NEMs include, for example, contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract 
farming, franchising and licensing, as well as other types of contractual relationship 
through which TNCs coordinate and control the activities of partner firms in host 
countries.‖68 UNCTAD states that there can be ―indirect impacts on capital formation 
with regard to NEMs‖.69 In a footnote to its Chapter IV (Non-Equity Modes of 
Production and Distribution), UNCTAD states, ―This can occur through ―crowding 
out‖ (where NEMs out-compete local firms which do not enjoy the advantages of 
transfers of knowledge and skills from TNCs), or its obverse, ―crowding in‖.70 
 
In Europe, the European Commission (EC) together with the European Court of 
Justice has developed a body of jurisprudence that deals with the effect of 
concentrations, whether concentrative joint ventures or by way of merger
71
. The EC 
has also recently introduced the revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
(TTBE) and the Guidelines to assist with its interpretation
72
.  In the United States, 
there is the Sherman and Clayton Acts. At the multilateral level, Articles 31 and 40 
TRIPS Agreement also deal with the issue of unfair competition
73
. 
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On the point of transfer pricing, Gurak goes on to argue that a transfer pricing 
mechanism can sometimes be used as a clandestine transfer of company revenues 
(invisible profits) from the subsidiary to the parent firm
74
. Often a transfer pricing 
mechanism accompanied by restrictive clauses in the technology transfer agreement, 
obliges the foreign affiliate (subsidiary) to ―(1) buy the necessary capital goods and 
other inputs of production from the sources, and at the prices, determined by the 
technology supplier (over-pricing); and /or (2) to sell the subsidiary‘s output to 
customers, and at prices, determined by the technology supplier (under-pricing).‖ 75 
The MNC will favour such an approach for a number reasons: avoiding any double 
taxation provisions or host country taxation provisions that may exist; maximising 
profits in pre-determined profit centres, for example where the MNC has set up a 
profit centre located within its regional headquarters; and overcoming host country 
controls and regulations on remittances (payment of royalties for example).  
 
8.4 Spillover 
 
As mentioned above, the actual diffusion of technology into the local market is as 
important as the technology transfer itself. Diffusion will take place by way of various 
types of knowledge spillover on other firms in the local market. There is also the 
related issue of absorption. Absorption can be defined as the ability of local firms to 
make use of knowledge spillovers from external actors.
76
 Spillover has been defined 
in various ways by economists and lawyers alike
77
, but in the context of the WTO, 
generally spillovers occur ―when the entry or presence of MNC affiliates leads to 
productivity or efficiency benefits for the host country‘s local firms, and the MNCs 
are not able to internalise the full value of these benefits‖.78It is one thing to create 
policy incentives to encourage MNCs in generating spillover, but quite another for 
developing country producers to use bare, documented technological information, 
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which is dependant on the absorption capacity of the producers. DCs and LDCs with 
limited absorption ability are much more likely to place greater reliance on unpatented 
know-how to assure effective transfer. Welch in citing studies by F. Contractor 
indicates that: ―less developed countries place greater emphasis on organisational and 
production management assistance in licensing arrangements than do advanced 
countries‖79. Some commentators argue that spillover effects are far more important 
for diffusion than the formal transfer of the technology itself
80
.  
 
Spillover in the host country is achieved in various ways including: (a) demonstration 
effects; (b) the establishment of vertical linkages between foreign investors and 
customers and suppliers which can transfer knowledge about quality standards, 
process improvements or techniques of management; (c) the movement of labour 
which enables employees to transfer the experience they have acquired in a foreign 
firm to a local firm; and (d) the impact of FDI on competition
81
. FDI is dealt with 
under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
although in its current form, the TRIMS offers little attention to the quality of the FDI 
or its relevance to technology transfer
82
.  
 
Mytelka is sceptical as to the benefits of FDI in generating spillover
83
. The United 
Nations University Institute for New Technologies have carried out a number of 
studies on spillover in the developing world
84
. Mytelka argues that studies of 
technology spillover in selected developing countries show very mixed results and 
that the actual measurement of spillover is problematical in itself. She argues: 
 
…many studies of technology spillover measure this as increases in 
productivity, that is in output per person/hour worked.  But increased 
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productivity may merely reflect a situation in which smaller local firms are 
driven out of the market by larger foreign firms in industries where scale 
economies are important.  Unless we know more about the ability of smaller 
local firms to acquire the financing needed for expansion, we cannot attribute 
the change in productivity to a technology spillover but merely to the 
replacement of existing capacity by more capital-intensive foreign firms.  
Productivity increases, moreover, are not necessarily accompanied by growing 
competitiveness as measured by market shares in the domestic or export 
markets.  Measuring technology spillover is thus a problem.
85
 
 
8.5 Technology Transfer at the Multilateral Level 
In Chapter 7, the Author discussed the first phase of the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) held in Geneva in 2003, and the WSIS Declaration of 
Principles 
86
 that support three main Articles on technology transfer. Also discussed 
was the second Phase of the World Summit, which took place in Tunisia in 2005. It is 
hoped that a number of goals set out Article 6 WSIS Action Plan
87
 will be achieved 
(see Chapter 7). In the context of the WSIS, the WTO‘s Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) and ITA-II are also discussed at Chapter 7.6. 
Many LDCs and DCs however still face the problem of innovating around the 
technology that they are importing, particularly in the area of semiconductor 
technology. Both the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits (1989), and the EU Directive 87/54/EEC on the Legal Protection 
of Topographies of Semiconductor Products (1986), create rights in the topological 
design of semiconductors
88
. The protection offered by US and EU law together with 
provisions set out in the TRIPS Agreement
89
, will make it increasingly difficult for 
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developing countries to get access to semiconductor technology despite the provisions 
of the ITA. Furthermore, TRIPS sets out at Article 38 that in respect of an integrated 
circuit incorporating an unlawfully reproduced layout-design or any article 
incorporating such an integrated circuit, the importer be required to pay a royalty as 
would be found in a typical freely negotiated license agreement had the technology 
been properly licensed. Such provisions put potentially onerous burdens on 
developing country producers to have the requisite knowledge that chip technology is 
non-infringing, and to compensate design title-holders in the event that it is. 
Furthermore, although the sui generis regime on integrated circuit designs allows for 
reverse engineering of protected layout designs, very few countries have the resources 
and skills necessary to undertake it
90
. Also, given that less than a handful of 
companies in the world control substantial patent pools (blocks of patents) in relation 
to semiconductor technology, LDC and DCs have even less chance of gaining access 
to the technology for the purposes of innovation.  This is particularly the case where 
leading developed country manufacturers are also involved in the setting of standards 
in relation to chip design
91
. If the WSIS goals are to be met, LDCs and DCs will need 
to take a greater role in participating in the technical standard-setting activities of the 
developed countries, particularly in relation to information technology. Countries, 
such as Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly China and India, should be in a 
position to take a greater role
92
.  
 
The WTO‘s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (mentioned earlier) sets out 
provisions at Article 11 to help LDCs gain technical assistance with standards
93
, but 
                                                                                                                                            
holder:  importing, selling, or otherwise distributing for commercial purposes a protected layout-design, 
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many developing countries complain that such assistance has not been forthcoming
94
. 
As such, some developing countries are calling on the WTO to implement an ―early 
warning system‖ with regard to standards, and a mechanism to facilitate adjustment 
by developing countries to meet new standards
95
.  Clearly the WTO Secretariat needs 
to meet this challenge if LDCs and DCs are to increase their contribution to world 
trade. The solution is essentially a political one which requires the WTO to enforce 
existing special and differential treatment provisions
96
, for example, Article 66.2 
TRIPS Agreement, which calls for Developed country Members to ―provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members 
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.‖ Paragraph 
11.2 of the Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (the 
―Implementing Decision‖) reaffirms that the provisions of Article 66.2 are mandatory, 
and that the TRIPS Council ―puts in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring 
and full implementation of the obligations in question‖.97 On 19th February 2003, the 
TRIPS Council made a decision on implementing Article 66.2 in compliance with 
paragraph 11.2 Implementing Decision, requiring developed country Members to 
submit annual reports on actions taken or planned in pursuance of their commitments 
under Article 66.2
98
. In December 2007, as a consequence of this decision, the United 
States produced a report to the TRIPS Council listing the specific provisions it had 
enacted to enforce Article 66.2.
99
 It is clear that some of these provisions were 
continuing philanthropic programs by charities based in the US that were transferring 
technology and know-how to countries, particularly in sub-saharan Africa. What is 
interesting is that in this report, the US for the first time made reference to its tax 
incentives to assist technology transfer. These incentives took various forms: 
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Under US tax law, institutions, such as charities, private foundations, religious 
institutions, and certain non-governmental organizations qualify for an exemption 
from federal income taxation by virtue of being organized and operated to carry 
out charitable work, including internationally. The US claims (according to OECD 
data) that non-governmental organizations based in the United States delivered 
US$6.3 billion in grants to low-income developing countries in 2003. 
The US also claims in its report to TRIPS that many foundations, NGOs and other 
institutions in the United States are engaged in activities directly relevant to 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed countries. It 
identified the foundation-led programmes relevant to the transfer of technology: 
Enhancing health care management systems, with a focus on HIV/AIDS care. 
Upgrading research laboratory and medical facilities. 
PhD level training of crop breeders 
Support for diffusion of new irrigation technologies. 
 
In its report of 2007, the US in referring to these tax incentives states that this is the 
first time it has referred to such incentives in reports on the implementation of Article 
66.2 to TRIPS and will continue to report on tax incentives provided in future 
reports.
100
   
 
The European Communities in their submission in 2007 list six specific objectives to 
implementing technology transfer: 
 
Objective.1: promote projects such as direct investment, licensing, franchising, 
sub-contracting:  
Objective.2: improve access to available techniques and industrial processes; 
Objective.3: support joint research projects;  
Objective.4: provide training in technology management and production 
methods; Objective.5: more indirectly, improve the absorption capacity to 
least-developed countries (capacity building);  
                                                 
100
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Objective.6: encourage trade in technological goods.
101
 
 
The EC states that, ‗the acquisition by least-developed countries of a sound and viable 
technological base does not depend solely on the provision of physical objects or 
equipment, but also on the acquisition of know-how, on management and production 
skills, on improved access to knowledge sources as well as on adaptation to local 
economic , social and cultural conditions‘102. This is good news for DCs and LDCs as 
these commitments, particularly objectives 1 (licensing of cost accounting software 
and OSI Layer 5-7 server hardware/software), 2 (access to engineers and IP routing 
specialists), 5 (the training of local NRA staff and local ISP legal teams), and 6 
(ancillary IT equipment) could form a reasonable basis for a request for technical 
assistance to the EU to implement the Layering Theory.  
 
With the failure of the discussions at Doha, there should perhaps be further movement 
here. For example, in a Decision (General Cancun Decision) adopted by the WTO‘s 
General Council in August 2004, the Council has instructed the Committee on Trade 
and Development to ―expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding 
Agreement-specific proposals [on special and differential treatment] and report to the 
General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision.‖103 We will, however, 
have to wait and see to determine whether the review will have any meaningful 
outcome for DCs and LDCs
104
.  
 
In an ideal world, an effective IPR regime should not block innovation or effective 
competition. As mentioned earlier, Article 7 TRIPS Agreement sets out the objective 
that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology.  Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement also contains a number of provisions 
that deal with anti-competitive conduct, including Articles 8 and 40. Article 8.2 
allows for Members to adopt ―appropriate measures‖ to prevent the abuse of 
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intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
―unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology‖. For example, in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction of Trade 
and Competition Policy, the view was expressed that ―one of the effects of 
international cartels could be to restrict the transfer of technology, particularly to 
developing countries.‖105Again under Article 40.2 TRIPS, members may adopt 
appropriate measures to prevent or control anti-competitive practices, which may 
include for example ―exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing.‖ Finally, in terms of gaining 
access to technology, LDCs and DCs could make use of the compulsory licensing 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 31 TRIPS sets out the conditions for 
compulsory licensing
106. Correa argues that ―the conditions that govern the granting 
of compulsory licenses will determine the extent of the system‘s effectiveness in 
promoting local innovation and the transfer of technology‖, and that ―the existence of 
a statutory provision itself may persuade rights-holders of the need to act reasonably 
in cases of requests for voluntary licenses, while strengthening the bargaining position 
of potential licensees.‖107 But without access to the technical know-how to execute 
the invention, access to the patent itself will not be very fruitful. Nevertheless there 
have been some US cases where a transfer of know-how was required as part of the 
compulsory license or settlement
108
. However, in order to implement such measures, 
LDCs and DCs are left with the task of putting in place effective legislation on 
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competition, which requires both trained personnel and resources
109
. Many LDCs 
have not used their compulsory licensing provisions because of the high costs and 
delays involved
110
.  
 
8.6 International Investment Agreements and Technology 
Transfer 
 
At the bilateral level, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) covering FDI 
in services reached 2, 265 by the end of 2003, and involving 175 countries
111
. At the 
end of 2004, this had grown by a further 73 new BITs (World Investment Report 
2005). Earlier in this chapter, the point was made that if the links to other economic 
sectors are weak, FDI may operate in enclaves with limited spillover into technologies 
adopted and wages earned by local firms and workers
112
. One way of addressing this 
weakness of FDI is perhaps something that can be addressed in an International 
Investment Agreement (IIA) or BIT, where FDI is included in the services chapter of 
the treaty
113
. This is already happening to some extent. For example, the 2004 report 
on investment from UNCTAD, lists the move of FDI into the services market
114
. The 
reasons why such agreements are negotiated, include for the LDCs and DCs, 
increased options for attracting foreign investment for development on the one hand, 
and on the other, increased certainty for foreign investors that their investments will 
be secure as well as increasing market access and obtaining better conditions for 
national treatment for MNCs (than perhaps provided by LDC‘s or DC‘s special 
commitments under the GATS).  
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However, a number of BITs contain prohibitions on certain performance 
requirements with regard to technology transfer
115
. Restrictions on performance 
requirements are not necessarily advantageous for LDCs and DCs. This is particularly 
the case with NAFTA, which in the performance requirements sections, prohibits the 
imposition or enforcement by a Party of requirements ―to transfer technology, a 
production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory‖ in 
connection with the admission or treatment of an investment of an investor of any 
Party or non-Party (unless required to do so by a competition authority)
116
. Similar 
technology transfer performance requirements can be found in other free-trade 
agreements
117
.  The bilateral investment treaties of the United States also often 
include a prohibition of mandatory requirements ―to carry out a particular type, level 
or percentage of research and development‖ in the territory of a party118. Although 
performance requirements that restrict only to control the competitive conditions of a 
market may be good for the general economic development of the host LDC or DC, 
more extensive requirements as to the generation, transfer and diffusion of 
technology, which go beyond competition-related issues, could also be prohibited 
under performance requirement restrictions
119
. Therefore LDCs and DCs interested in 
including development-oriented clauses in the IIA which touch on local personnel 
training requirements or the regulation of royalty payments by the developing country 
licensee would be restricted from doing so by the restrictions on performance in the 
IIA
120. However, as UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2004 points out: 
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IIAs covering services FDI are proliferating at the bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral levels. The resulting network of international rules on FDI in 
services is multifaceted, multilayered and constantly evolving, with 
obligations differing in geographical scope and substantive coverage. These 
rules are increasingly setting the parameters for national policies in the 
services sector.
121  
 
Despite these concerns, agreements signed outside the multilateral framework 
continue to rise. The most recent World Investment Report 2008 shows the number of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) rising to 5,600 at the end of 2007 with 
2,608 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 2,730 double taxation treaties (DTTs) and 
254 free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic cooperation arrangements containing 
investment provisions.
122
 The report records the shift in treaty-making activity from 
BITs towards FTAs. Clearly LDCs and DCs, entering into such agreements to attract 
FDI are going to increasingly face the difficult challenge of striking a balance 
between using FTAs/BITs to attract FDI on the one hand, and maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to pursue national development plans in the services sector on the other
123
.  
 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
The failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun in September 2003 
meant that no decision was taken on any of the issues under negotiation or 
consideration in the Doha Work Programme, including deliberations of the Working 
Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology, which was set up by ministers at Doha 
to examine ―the relationship between trade and transfer of technology, and of any 
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possible recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the 
WTO to increase flows of technology to developing countries. ‖124  
 
The Doha Round has now failed, which is a shame as the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration introduced for the first time in the WTO, a binding mandate for WTO 
Members to examine the relationship between trade and technology transfer
125.
 As 
this chapter has discussed, there are a number of provisions within the WTO covered 
Agreements that can be enforced to ensure that the international process of technology 
transfer can be better achieved, for example Articles 7, 31, 40, 65 and 66 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. However as Roffe and Tesfachew have argued, there has perhaps 
been too much concentration of analysis on the imperfections of the international 
technology transfer process and not enough on the domestic absorptive and adaptation 
capacity of the host country
126.
 If DCs and LDCs are to truly benefit from technology 
transfer, more attention has to be paid to improving host country legislation on 
technology transfer in terms of making it more effective in attracting foreign 
investment, creating spillover, and also in dealing with potential abuses of market 
power by MNCs. As mentioned earlier, this is no easy task given that many DCs and 
LDCs do not have adequate resources to put such competition legislation into effect, 
even if the know-how was available.  
 
What would be the objective of introducing better provisions on competition into host 
country legislation? Abbott argues that the ―promotion of technology transfer through 
competition policy involves assuring that technical information appropriately enters 
the public domain (i.e., private appropriation of technology should not impose 
unreasonable social welfare costs), preventing and correcting market-related abuses, 
and assuring that granting of patents and other IPRs are accomplished in a measured 
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way.‖127 Simply copying the patent systems of the US and EU may not be the best 
step forward. Abbott cites a recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study of 
competition and patents in United States that focuses on the anticompetitive risks of 
overprotection, including through the grant of patents of suspect quality
128.
 He argues 
that the thrust of the FTC Report is that ―the competition enforcement proceedings are 
a costly and inefficient mechanism for addressing the adverse impact of patent 
overprotection, as compared with reducing the grant of low quality patents and 
facilitating early challenges. Promoting greater vigilance over the granting of patents 
is characterized as ―competition‖ policy.‖129 Muchlinksy argues: 
 
…the true problem for LDCs is not so much that patents are taken out by 
foreign firms, but that the major producers of technology tend to possess 
considerable market power to which the protection of intellectual property is 
no more than a subsidiary form of protection. This suggests policy responses 
in other fields of law, especially competition law.
130
  
 
The challenge then for DCs and LDCs is to find a way to overcome the lack of 
resources to put in place the legislation and infrastructure required for effective 
competition authorities in the absence of funding, for example through the World 
Bank or WTO. Although external consultants can be funded to draft the necessary 
competition legislation, recruiting local skilled personnel to enforce the new 
legislation is another matter. Furthermore, often the external consultants funded by 
the external aid agencies will often draft laws that seek to promote competition, often 
to the advantage of foreign TNCs and developed economies, who are able to enter the 
market and with the necessary capital and technical experience to gain first mover 
advantages quickly in comparison to domestic companies (so called ‗crowding out‘ 
discussed earlier). Perhaps what is required is a mix of both sector-specific (ex-ante 
technology transfer) measures that sets out basic rules on technology transfer in 
advance, for example in the setting of price controls and compulsory licensing by 
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government, as well as general competition type (ex-post) provisions which deal with 
issues of discrimination, transparency, and unfair competition.  We need however to 
distinguish between the two sets of laws, antitrust (competition) and technology 
transfer. As Muchlinksy argues: 
 
…unlike antitrust laws, technology transfer laws seek to intervene in the 
operation of commercial markets in technology and regulate them in favour of 
the broader national economic interest in economic development. Although 
the use of antitrust laws as an instrument of national or regional industrial 
policy is often debated, its primary aim is to prevent anti-competitive practices 
in the market, not to control it.
131
  
 
Bearing these points in mind, precedent does exist for a combined approach. For 
example, and as mentioned earlier, the European Commission has recently adopted a 
revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
132
 as well as a series of 
new directives that adopt a mix of ex-ante and ex-post provisions for regulating 
electronic networks and services
133
. Article 12 of the Access & Interconnection 
Directive
134
 is a very good example of where the EC uses a combined ex-ante and ex-
post approach in dealing with anti-competitive practices with regard to the granting of 
access to an electronic network or software protocol or interface: 
 
―A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for 
access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, inter 
alia in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial 
of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would 
hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or 
would not be in the end-user's interest.‖ 
 
                                                 
131
 Ibid., p.443. 
132
 Commission Regulation 772/2004 (April 2004). 
133
 See for example the EC‘s Framework Directive 2002/21/EC and Access & Interconnection 
Directive 2002/19/EC as good examples of such combined ex-ante/ex-post instruments. 
134
 Directive 2002/19/EC. 
 271 
By doing this, the EC gives a great deal of discretion for National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) to act and impose access conditions in agreements between 
operators so as to create effective competition: NRAs can impose access conditions 
even in the absence of any one operator having dominance in a particular market
135
. 
In this instance, there may be no need for the NRA to conduct an extensive demand 
and supply-side substitutability test as regards the imposition of access obligations. In 
other words, access is seen as an area where immediate remedies may be required 
without the need for expensive and time-consuming market analysis.  
 
However there are dangers of the enforcement by LDCs and DCs of measures of this 
type. Enforcement of host country competition provisions on MNCs for example 
could result in threats of trade and/or financial retaliation by developed country 
governments. To avoid the risk of this kind of retaliation, LDCs and DCs could make 
better use of regional trade or economic area agreements, where a common set of 
rules (both ex-ante and ex-post) for technology transfer could be adopted and 
integrated into the framework of the regional agreement
136
. For example, to help 
maintain a level of consistency of regulatory treatment amongst European NRAs, the 
EC has included harmonisation-type clauses at Articles 6 and 7 Framework Directive, 
which require NRAs to consult with the EC in introducing measures which would 
have a significant effect on the European internal market
137
. In a similar way, by 
harmonising competition provisions within the framework of a regional trade 
agreement, LDCs/DCs could have a better chance of enforcing such provisions 
against MNCs at a national level. Furthermore the competition 
schedule/chapter/section of a regional trade agreement could provide for the creation 
of a regional competition advisory body that could supply resources and skills to 
member governments, which all parties to the regional agreement could help fund, 
minimising the expense for a country in creating its own extensive infrastructure. 
Given the proliferation of regional trade agreements in recent years, consensus 
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between regional trade partners with similar trade interests may be easier to achieve 
than creating a competition agreement or compact at the level of the WTO. As 
Balasubramanyam and Elliott argue:  
 
The WTO is often dismissed as an inappropriate forum, simply because its 
mandate is restricted to trade and not investment, and whilst the organisation 
can parley with the governments of member countries on trade issues, it 
cannot negotiate with MNEs which are privately owned.
138
 
 
The Mexico-Telmex case reviewed in Chapter 3 does however prove (to some extent) 
that the WTO can scrutinize private undertakings. In that case, the Mexican 
telecommunications incumbent operator Telmex was found to be in breach of some of 
the anticompetitive provisions of the WTO‘s regulatory Reference Paper. What type 
of provisions could be included in a competition chapter of a regional trade 
agreement? A starting point could be greater cooperation between competition 
authorities in developing and developed countries, licensing rules to reduce the 
transaction costs of enforcement, and punitive damages (eg., triple damages) as a 
warning to prospective violaters. 
139
 To this list can be added best practice 
recommendations from both the OECD‘s MNC Guidelines as well as sections on 
restrictive business practices from the (now defunct) UNCTAD‘s draft Code of 
ToT
140
, discussed earlier. Regional measures might go hand-in-hand with changes in 
WTO procedure. For example, Abbot argues that the ―WTO DSU might be expanded 
to include remedial measures directed at patent holders that initiate threats of trade 
sanctions by home government as ‗abuse of dominant position‘ including, in 
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egregious cases, recommendation of patent forfeiture,‖ as well as the desirability of 
increasing technology and information in the public domain.
141
 Although 
Balasubramanyam and Eliott generally conclude that the WTO might be an 
appropriate body to take responsibility for a future multilateral competition policy
142
, 
they also argue that the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body is primarily interested in 
resolving disputes between competition authorities as opposed to disputes between 
individual firms
143
.  
The point made by Abbott on increasing access to information in the public domain 
has also been gaining considerable ground in academic thinking in recent years. 
Perhaps one of the most influential advocates of the public domain has been 
Lawrence Lessig of Stanford University. Lessig together with colleagues from 
Harvard‘s Berkman Center for Internet & Society have pioneered the concept of the 
Creative Commons, which seeks to use copyleft licensing to encourage rights holders 
to place their work in the public domain
144
. Clearly as more innovators in the 
developed world seek to use copyleft licensing and vehicles such as the Creative 
Commons, more producers in the LDCs and DCs stand to gain, subject of course to 
their continued use of the copyleft mantra in terms of derivative works produced. A 
very good example of this is the Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) movement 
and GNU/Linux. FOSS is software that has made its source code public and allows 
users to change the source code and redistribute the derivative software. GNU/Linux 
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is an operating system developed, originally as a UNIX-like kernel by Linus Torvalds, 
on the open-source model and which has now become a serious competitor to 
proprietary Microsoft products. Allowing access to the source code allows for broad 
collaborative development in software production, better porting between different 
applications and programmes produced by independent developers, and the 
customisation of software to meet local needs
145
. As a recent UNCTAD report states: 
 
 Its technological opposite, closed-source or proprietary software…requires a 
significant upfront investment in license fees for installation and upgrades: it is 
not always adaptable to local concerns; and its exclusive or even dominant use 
may not adequately support the local development of the expert knowledge and 
skills needed to fully embrace the information economy.
146
  
 
The UNCTAD report argues that a business or Government using FOSS could avoid 
becoming locked into using software manufactured by a controlling monopolist
147
, 
and that ―freeing the source code make software non-excludable as well, and as a 
result software acquires the characteristics of a public good.‖148 For developing 
countries
149
, however, freeing-up the software would be of no use without the 
corresponding hardware and networks through which the software will flow: This is 
particularly important given that with the advent of digital networks, intelligence is 
moving closer to the end-user terminal, resulting in cheaper transmission costs and 
greater positive network externalities for those countries that have the resources to 
upgrade their legacy networks. There is no reason however why such digital networks 
that are proliferating in the developed world should expand geographically into the 
developing world, unless we have enlightened policy that will allow for it. This is one 
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reason, why the objectives set in Tunis in 2005, as part of the second phase of the 
World Summit on the Information Society, must succeed in the long run
150
. Maskus 
argues for the need to take the commons to the multilateral level. He argues for: 
 
…a Multilateral Agreement on Access to Basic Science and Technology 
(ABST). 
 
An agreement at the WTO would be negotiated in which all 
signatories would place into the public domain, or find other means of sharing 
at modest cost, the results of publicly funded research. The idea is to preserve 
and enhance the global commons in science and technology, while setting out 
a public mechanism for increasing the international flow of technical 
information, especially to developing countries, without unduly restricting 
private rights in commercial technologies. The agreement could cover "input 
liberalization," which would permit researchers from other countries to 
participate in, or compete with, local research teams for grants and subsidies. 
This could be combined with increased opportunities for temporary migration 
of scientific personnel and additional student visas.
151
 
The idea of getting consensus at the WTO between developed and developing 
Members post Doha on such a treaty would seem to be quite unlikely in the short 
term
152
. However given that Lessig has been successful in launching the Creative 
Commons in both the US and the UK, Maskus may not be so far out of the ballpark as 
one might imagine. Perhaps again, there is a need to focus first at the regional level: 
In Africa, a number of regions have already collaborated on FOSS, launching the Free 
and Open Source Software Foundation for Africa (FOSSFA), which seeks to promote 
the use of FOSS throughout the region
153. ―FOSSFA anticipates that FOSS will 
provide opportunities to develop local programmes built by Africans for use in 
                                                 
150
 Discussed earlier at section 7.6. 
151
 Maskus K., ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual 
Property, September 2003, p. 14. This proposal was first discussed by Barton J., in Preserving the 
Global Scientific and Technological Commons, Stanford University manuscript, 2003.  
152
 For example at the recent World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in December 2003, 
some of the poorest countries advocated the creation of a Digital Solidarity Fund, envisioned as a 
U.N.-administered fund to help technologically disadvantaged countries build telephone lines and other 
infrastructure in an effort to keep the digital and the wealth gap from widening further. No agreement 
on the fund could be reached in Geneva, and the idea was postponed to the second phase of talks in 
Tunis in 2005 where only voluntary agreement was reached. 
153
 E-Commerce and Development Report 2003, UNCTAD, p. 116. 
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Africa‖154. Perhaps it is only through such regional organisations, such as FOSSFA, 
that funds can be mobilised and channelled and links made with educational 
institutions, whereby educators can be trained to help young people across the region 
to ―learn, use, maintain, and modify software.‖155 As Theodore Roosevelt once said: 
―Great corporations exist only because they are created and safeguarded by our 
institutions; and it is our right and our duty to see that they work in harmony with 
these institutions. . . . The first requisite is knowledge, full and complete; knowledge 
which may be made public to the world.‖156 It would appear that his words have as 
much effect now as they did in 1901. 
This chapter has reviewed technology transfer from the perspective of DCs and 
LDCs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, and also in Chapter 2, when linking the 
significance of technology transfer to addressing the Digital Divide, unless and until 
DCs and LDCs are able to improve their access to technology both for the purposes of 
innovation in their own domestic markets, but also for the purpose of exporting new 
products overseas, DCs and LDCs will not be able to effectively address the Digital 
Divide. One key aspect only as we have seen will be in enforcing the provisions of 
Article 66.2 TRIPS in terms of enforcing special and differential rights in technology 
transfer in favour of DCs and LDCs by developed nations. As mentioned in this 
chapter, the recent commitment by the European Communities in 2007 on technology 
transfer could form the basis of a request for help with implementing the Layering 
Theory at IXP exchanges in Africa for example (there are only 17 as we saw in 
Chapter 4, hardly a massive commitment). 
DCs and LDCs however cannot depend on handouts. Furthermore, putting in place 
the hardware is one thing, but the law also needs to be put in place and the local NRA 
trained to enforce the law. If the EU law is taken as a precedent, particularly aspects 
of the EC‘s new regulatory framework for electronic networks and services and the 
modified test of SMP (Layering Theory) that will apply to NGN networks, local laws 
will also have to be changed. This will require further technical assistance from the 
                                                 
154
 Ibid. 
155
 Ibid. For a detailed case study on the use of ICT in development, see the case study on Jamaica 
written by the Author ―Readiness for the Networked World: Jamaica Assessment) at: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2002-01, date accessed October 2008.  
156
 See Roosevelt speech on trusts at: http://www.sagehistory.net/progressive/Trtrust.htm, date accessed 
October 2008. 
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EU, the ITU, World Bank and/or WTO. There needs to be the political will for 
funding to be forthcoming.  Also, there will need to be focus on improving 
infrastructure at home in DC and LDC markets, a point recently emphasised by the 
World Investment Report 2008. According to the 2008 report, which focuses on 
economic infrastructure, including electricity, telecommunications, water and sewage, 
airports, roads, railways and seaports, ―Telecommunications is the only infrastructure 
industry in which FDI has been the dominant form of TNC entry in developing and 
transition economies‖.157  This is good news for DCs and LDCs that need investment 
in outdated (analogue-circuit switched) infrastructure. But more investment is needed, 
particularly in Africa, as the 2008 report makes clear, and across a range of 
infrastructure sectors: 
Despite significant levels of TNC investment in developing-country 
infrastructure, more of it is required to bridge the vast financing gap: there is 
need for substantial amounts of additional investment, irrespective of source. 
For instance, in Africa, total TNC investment commitments in infrastructure 
during the decade spanning 1996–2006 were $45 billion – an amount (even if 
fully realized) that is barely equivalent to the region‘s current annual 
infrastructure investment needs of $40 billion.
158
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, investing in the infrastructure for communications will be 
crucial in addressing the Digital Divide. However as this chapter indicates there also 
needs to be a transfer of appropriate technology and policy measures to facilitate with 
the absorption of technology into the host market in order for producers in DCs and 
LDCs to be able to innovate and produce the kind of electronic intangibles suitable for 
export over newly developed infrastructure into developed country (mainly OECD) 
markets. But even if DCs and LDCs are in a position to grow local industries that 
manufacture electronic intangibles for use in both front-office and back-office 
functions, and available for export, their success in getting such products into 
developed country markets will depend on WTO rules regulating such electronic 
commerce, crucially whether electronic intangibles fall to be classified under the 
GATTs with its rules on tariffs, or the GATS with regulations on services, or even 
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TRIPS with laws on the protection and enforcement of IPRs. This issue of 
classification is the subject of the next Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 9
1
 
The classification of electronic intangibles in the WTO 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 4-6 of this thesis focused on how regulating effectively for SMP or 
dominance through use of the Layering Theory as regards advanced digital networks 
could lead to increased access possibilities for Other Licensed Operators (OLOs) that 
require access to the dominant operators delivery network so as to provide 
competitive electronic network and services in the dominant operator‘s home market.  
Such a provision could also lead to more transparent access for third country 
operators, for example, from DCs and LDCs needing to interconnect with the 
dominant operators network in the target country or though an IBP so as to deliver 
advanced electronic services from remote locations (cross-border services or Mode 1 
services and consumption abroad or Mode 2 services under the WTO GATS). The 
precedent set in the United States-Measures affecting the cross-border supply of 
gambling and betting services (US-Gambling) case, discussed in this chapter, has 
made the delivery of cross-border services under Mode 1 GATS more transparent and 
less likely to market access restrictions. The previous chapters have focused on the 
delivery mechanism or the infrastructure required in order to convey such services 
(including recommendations on transfer of technology). This chapter now looks at the 
classification issue of electronic intangibles as they cross the virtual border. The 
classification of infrastructure: Telecommunication network and service offerings 
have already been examined in Chapter 3 and is subject to the UN HS and CPC 
classification systems. The classification of electronic intangibles
2
, that is the content 
                                                 
1
 A version of this chapter has been published by Kariyawasam in International Economic Law and the 
Digital Divide: A New Silk Road? Edward Elgar, 2007. 
2
 A generic term, sometimes referred to as e-products or digital goods and services, ranging from MP3 
files, pay-per-view/video-on-demand movies to customized software in sectors as diverse as 
audiovisual to health and education. Such products, often a digital combination of binary code, are 
referred to in this chapter as ―electronic intangibles‖. 
 280 
that is to pass by way of the infrastructure still remains unresolved. For example, for 
physical goods passing through the customs point at a border crossing or at a shipping 
port, a tariff may be levied as an import tax together with any other customs duties 
applicable under the GATT. Similarly, for the delivery of a service, such as 
architectural or financial services cross-border, various local measures might apply to 
the regulation of these services in the target (importing) state. Even if the trade in 
electronic intangibles should be classed under GATS, which mode of the GATS 
should apply to such trade, Mode 1 or Mode 2 GATS? Classification under Mode 1 
would mean that the buyer‘s jurisdiction will apply because the supplier is conducting 
business in the buyer‘s jurisdiction whereas under Mode 2, the supplier‘s jurisdiction 
will apply. For electronic intangibles the relevant applicable trade rules will depend 
on how such intangibles are classed under WTO law. This is a contentious issue and 
at the time of writing, the WTO is deliberating on resolving this legal issue that has 
divided its members since inception; how to resolve the issue of classification of 
electronic intangibles? US-Gambling has gone some way in looking at the 
classification issue, particularly in the context of ―like services‖, but the overall issue 
of classification still remains to be agreed.  
 
In the recent past we have seen significant determinations by WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body, and requests for Panels on similarly diverse products from apples
3
, 
genetically modified crops
4
 to steel
5. But the issue of electronic intangibles, ―content 
rich‖ products that can be delivered directly to consumers by way of the internet is 
likely to become one of the most eagerly contested issues in the WTO as trade in 
electronic commerce continues to escalate. This chapter explores the issue of 
classification, whether as a good or as a service
6
, the different architectures of the 
GATT
7
 and GATS
8
 Agreements that will influence the process, and the almost 
diametrically opposing views of the European Communities and the United States on 
                                                 
3
 Japan-Measures affecting the importation of apples (Case WT/DS245/AB/R), WTO, November 2003 
4
 European Communities-Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products (Case 
WT/DS291/23), WTO, August 2003. 
5
United States-Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products (WT/DS251/AB/R-
WT/DS259/AB/R), WTO, November 2003. 
6
 Or even an Intellectual Property Right under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).  
7
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (incorporating GATT 1947). 
8
 General Agreement on Trade in Services (Annex 1(B) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation). 
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classification which has to some extent polarised opinion within the WTO. Finally, 
the chapter looks at the US-Gambling case and its significance to the trade in 
electronic intangibles.  
 
9.2 Why be concerned with Classification? 
 
Given the significance of the trade in electronic intangibles, the differing underlying 
political intentions of some of the more powerful members of the WTO has made the 
issue of classification very contentious.  This issue is one of the crosscutting issues 
(discussed in the various WTO councils) that the General Council itself has had to 
consider.  To begin to understand why discussions on classification have been so 
contentious, both within the subsidiary trade councils and at the WTO‘s General 
Council, we first need to understand the political motivations among the lead actors in 
this area, namely the United States which prefers a GATT-based (goods) 
classification for electronic intangibles, and the European Communities which prefers 
a GATS-based (services) classification.   
 
One important political consideration is that under current WTO rules, a classification 
for electronic intangibles under the GATS will allow countries to apply content 
restrictions based on rules of origin (a concept generally reserved for the GATT). The 
source of all content restrictions is directly related to the issue of protection of culture. 
This is an area of significant interest to the European Communities, particularly 
Member States, such as France and Germany. One example of such protection at 
work is the inclusion of audiovisual services under the GATS, which allows for a 
variety of protections under Articles XVI (market access), XVII (national treatment), 
and Article XIV (General Exceptions). US films have a dominant share of the market 
in Europe, and US ―industrial cinema‖ a dominant share of the world market. As 
Carty comments citing various sources:  
 
It has been argued that language has always been about power first, culture 
and learning second. Robert McCrum says in his Observer article that blue 
jeans and Holywood played their part in the dominance of the English 
language, but it was Cruise missiles and Stealth bombers that became crucial 
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to its success. Eighty percent of home pages on the web are in English 
compared to 4.5 per cent in German and 3.1.percent in Japanese.
9
  
 
 
Presently, a GATS listing allows restrictions on non-EU content being transmitted 
within the EU by way of national commitment restrictions in the European 
Communities Schedule of Specific Commitments (both 1994 and 1997)
10
. A GATS 
listing for electronic intangibles would therefore allow a similar range of protections 
in related ―content rich‖ sectors, such as education, health, advertising, medical, legal, 
insurance etc., depending on the level of specific commitments inscribed by the 
European Communities in these fields. Furthermore given the European Union‘s 
powers to negotiate future trade rounds under any potential new Constitution for 
Europe
11
, inconsistencies between internal policy approaches to classification of 
electronic intangibles with EC external policy will create unwanted difficulties for the 
Union in the years ahead.  A GATS classification could also lead to higher rates of tax 
in the form of VAT (value added tax) being imposed on imports of electronic 
intangibles
12
. Some have argued that imposing such a tax could lead to discrimination 
between third country imports and EU suppliers of electronic services through the 
form of discriminatory taxes
13
.  As the United States is seen as the leading exporter of 
electronic intangibles in the world, the imposition of such a tax could be seen as an 
attempt to curtail the US dominant position in e-commerce trade. The EU has been 
careful to stress, however, that such taxes are non-discriminatory, applying both to 
European Community service suppliers, as they do to third country service 
suppliers
14
. For DCs and LDCs, the other problem with services based taxes is how to 
                                                 
9
 Carty A., Meta-Concept of International Economic Law, in Perspectives in International Economic 
Law (ed Asif Qureshi), Kluwer Law International, 2002, p.68. 
10
 In this example the relevant measure would be Council Directive 89/552/EEC (as amended by 
Council Directive 97/36/EC). Article 4 of the Directive requires that EU broadcasters reserve a 
majority of their transmission time for European works.  
11
 The ratification of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe failed following Dutch and 
French rejections of the Treaty in referenda in 2005. The European Council called for a ‗period of 
reflection‘ and following this in June 2007 began negotiations on a Reform Treaty as a replacement. 
12
 For example, the European Commission, already levies VAT on electronic transmissions, originating 
both inside and outside the European Union under the Commission's sixth VAT directive (as amended). 
13
 Baker S., Lichtenbaum P., Shenk M., and Yeo M., E-products and the WTO, International Lawyer, 
35Int‘l Law.5, 2001. 
14
 The European Communities have also argued in submissions to the General Council that in some 
cases, EU suppliers have for a number of years faced discrimination in favour of suppliers from outside 
the EU and that the (VAT) sales tax would remedy the situation: ―sales taxes were the bulk of the [the 
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collect them? Revenues from a GATT based taxation through import tariffs paid by 
LDC/DC importers to domestic customs agencies are much more likely to be 
enforceable by LDC and DC administrations than the collection of services based 
taxes from individual end-users. Other problems surrounding the classification issue 
are: 
 
 Market access: There is a problem with classifying e-products under the GATT, as 
most market access commitments that have been made in the e-commerce sector 
(telecoms, audio visual, computer, express delivery services etc), have been made 
under the GATS; 
 Technological neutrality: Some electronic intangibles are more like services than 
goods, for example video on demand, customised MP3 collections etc., and vice-
versa (pay-per-view). If both goods and services can be delivered on-line, there 
will be constant and thorny questions regarding whether e-commerce activities 
(and which electronic intangibles) are subject to the GATT and which are subject 
to the GATS; 
 Customs duties are the significant national measures for trade in goods. 
Worldwide, national customs systems are designed for trade in goods. Given the 
nature of distribution over the internet, it may be nearly impossible to reliably 
enforce customs duties on electronic intangibles, although the technology is now 
available for putting-in place micro-payment systems for electronic deliverables, 
spearheaded by the music and film industries‘ use of digital rights management 
technologies
15
. However for many developing nations (and some developed), the 
cost of introducing such systems, or requiring their respective Small Medium 
Sized Enterprise (SME) sectors through domestic regulation to do so, could be 
prohibitive even though anti-circumvention measures are already been introduced 
in law through TRIPS-plus provisions as found in the WIPO Internet treaties, 
some of the provisions of which have already been incorporated into selected US 
bilateral and Free Trade Agreements
16
. There is also the fact that besides the 
tariffs applied by states on physical goods imported into a country at the country‘s 
border, many states also levy additional duties on imports, such as customs 
                                                                                                                                            
European Communities] fiscal revenues, and foregoing them on e-commerce could mean a substantial 
loss of revenue‖ [Page 4, WT/GC/W/492, WTO, April 2003]. 
15
 http://www.pico-pay.com/download/musicpaper.pdf . Accessed October 2008. 
16
 See chapter 8.  
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charges (imports only) and internal taxes (levied on imported as well as domestic 
goods). Although each state will have its own regulations on the nature of these 
taxes, generally importers are normally obliged to cover them all.
17
 For 
developing countries because most of their tariffs are higher on average for 
imports than developed countries, the revenue generated by customs duties and 
additional import duties and taxes can be substantial, one of the reasons why DCs 
and LDCs may be reluctant to continue the current moratorium on a duty free 
system for imports on electronic intangibles.
18
 Teltscher in her paper on the tariff 
revenue implication of electronic goods trading wrote in 2001: 
 
First, compared to the tariff rates, the rates for additional duties are 
significantly higher [for DCs]: they amount on average to 23 per cent, compared to 
only 6.9 per cent for the tariff. The final calculation of the duties levied on imports 
therefore increases from 6.9 per cent (tariff only) to 29.2 per cent (tariff, customs 
surcharges, taxes).
19
 
 
 Classification: As mentioned in Chapter 3, the GATS has no compulsory or 
universally agreed classification system for services. Members usually follow the 
nomenclature developed for GATS purposes (GNS/W/120), which in many 
sectors is based on the provisional Central Products Classification (CPC) of the 
UN
20
. If electronic intangibles are determined not to fall under either the GATT or 
the GATS, then new rules will be required and the problem will be to determine 
the extent of these rules, or whether existing ones can be reformed, extended or 
interpreted in ways that would mean the law keeping step with the technology.  
 
This chapter explores these issues in detail examining (a) the implications of the 
choices to be made in legal terms focusing on the structural differences between the 
GATT and GATS; (b) the policy considerations between a GATT/GATS 
                                                 
17
 Teltscher S., From physical to digital delivery: Definition, scope and tariff revenue implications of 
electronic goods trading, UNCTAD briefing paper, Proceedings of the 34th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, 2001, p.8. 
18
 Ibid, p. 8. 
19
Ibid. My emphasis.   
20
 CPC was not used in a number of sectors including financial, telecommunications, air transport, and 
maritime transport. CPC descriptions are usually technologically neutral, focusing on the end-use of the 
service concerned rather than the means or medium of delivery. 
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classification for electronic intangibles; and (c) the differing positions of the European 
Communities and the United States.  
 
 
9.3 Structural differences between the GATT and the GATS 
 
At the second session of the ministerial conference, a declaration on global electronic 
commerce was adopted in Geneva on 20th of May 1998
21
.  At that conference, 
ministers recognised the increased opportunities from global electronic commerce 
trade, and directed the WTO General Council to establish a comprehensive work 
programme to address trade related issues relating to electronic commerce, 
specifically looking also to take account of the developmental needs of developing 
countries, including economic financial and legal needs.  It was also agreed that 
member states of the WTO would continue their practice of not imposing customs 
duties on electronic transmissions.  In September 1998, the General Council 
established a work programme on electronic commerce
22
, directing each of its 
councils including the Council on Trade in Services, the Council Trade in Goods, 
Council for TRIPS, and the Committee for Trade and Development to look at specific 
issues under their respective jurisdictions on trade in e-commerce
23
, with the General 
Council playing a central role in the work programme by keeping the work of the 
separate councils on e-commerce under continuous review through a standing item on 
its agenda. Furthermore, the General Council, given its overarching remit, would also 
examine any issues of a crosscutting nature.
24
 
 
WTO members have held five dedicated discussions on crosscutting issues relevant to 
electronic commerce, under the auspices of the General Council
25
.  One of the 
crosscutting issues of concern is the classification of electronic intangibles.  The issue 
before the WTO is whether the supply of digitised products, which can be delivered 
                                                 
21
 WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, WTO, 1998.  
22
 WT/L/274, WTO, 1998. 
23
 Defined as ―the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by 
electronic means.‖ (Paragraph 1.3, WT/L/274, WTO, 1998). 
24
 Id at paragraph 1.2. 
25
 Summaries of the discussions can be found in the following WTO documents: the first discussion in 
June 2001 in WT/GC/W/436; the second discussion in May 2002 in WT/GC/W./475; the third 
discussion in October 2002 in WT/GC/W/386; the fourth discussion in February 2003 in 
WT/GC/W/492, and the fifth in July 2003 in WT/GC/W/509. 
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either on a physical medium or by way of the internet should be classified under the 
GATS or GATT, or even TRIPS.  The type of products, generally described as 
electronic intangibles consist of sound recordings, video games, audiovisual works, 
computer software, and literary works, generally any form of content, protected by 
copyright or other forms of intellectual property rights that can be delivered in a 
physical form (CDs, CD-ROMs, DVD is, videos, book's newspapers and magazines), 
or as a form of an electronic transmission over the Internet.   
 
The trade in electronic intangibles already plays a significant part in international 
trade.  Schuknecht and Perez-Esteve argue: 
 
as access to Internet becomes more available worldwide and bandwidth and 
phone lines expand, the cheaper prices of these products offered through the 
internet will cause a substitution effect between the physical and electronic 
trade of digitizable media products.  The extent of this will depend on their 
degree of substitutability.  In the long-term, one might expect, a stagnation, 
and even a decline, in the physical trade of these products.
26
  
 
Similarly, Mattoo and Schuknecht say that as products are transferred over the 
internet, prices will start to drop resulting in a significant pick-up in this form of trade. 
They argue that above average growth rates in these areas are likely to continue in the 
future
27
. 
 
In looking at the classification issue, a certain category of electronic intangibles could 
fall to be classified under either the GATS or the GATT.  This includes a narrow 
range of media products that can be imported under both HS classifications (the 
classification system for trade in goods under the GATT), and/or downloaded over the 
Internet (and hence classified as a service under the GATS system of classification 
W/120).  The WTO has estimated such trade in intangibles to amount to 
approximately 1% of total merchandise trade and 1% of total duties collected 
                                                 
26
 Schuknecht L. and Perez-Esteve R, A quantitative assessment of electronic commerce, WTO, 1999, 
p.11. 
27
 Mattoo A. and Shuknecht L, Trade Policies for Electronic Commerce, WTO, 2000, p.5 
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worldwide.
28
 This would not include the vast majority of services, all 
media/information products that never did cross borders in physical formats, being 
clearly under the GATS (most media/entertainment forms that have traditionally been 
regarded as services: broadcast TV programming, radio programming), such trade 
amounting to approximately 99% of trading merchandise, and more than 99% of 
duties collected worldwide
29
. 
 
Whereas the GATT contains rules on safeguards, and domestic regulation, and 
subsidies and countervailing measures, the GATS also has working parties discussing 
disciplines on domestic regulation, emergency safeguard mechanisms, and 
government procurement (including subsidies).  Most of these negotiations are still at 
an early stage, and it is not yet apparent how the classification argument of electronic 
intangibles might impact these different negotiations.  What is sure however, is that 
any uncertainty on classification is likely to impact the confidence of exporters of 
electronic content.  
 
Finally, if WTO Members were to decide to classify electronic intangibles as trade in 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) under the TRIPS Agreement, the transmission of 
such IPRs by way of e-commerce will ignore the concept of border crossing and 
border enforcement of such rights.  As such, there will be a need to consider as an 
alternative to either customs duties (GATT) or tax revenues (GATS), royalties 
(TRIPS) instead, whether the transmission is a cross-border one or purely domestic.  
As to enforcement of IPRs, Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement will apply, and 
enforcement will inevitably depend on the level of scope of digital rights management 
technologies in place, more the subject of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation‘s (WIPO‘s) ―Internet‖ Agreements than TRIPS30. 
 
                                                 
28
 See presentation by Lee Tuthill, trade in services division, WTO ―WTO implications of classification 
issues‖ at : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem05_e/presentation_tuthill.ppt. Accessed 
26/11/03. 
29
 Id. 
30
 The two WIPO Internet Treaties were adopted under the auspices of WIPO in 1996: the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The text of 
these treaties can be accessed at WIPO‘s Digital Agenda at: 
http://ecommerce.wipo.int/agenda/index.html, accessed November 2005. The WCT and WPPT are 
self-standing treaties which build on the Berne and Rome Conventions, and the TIPS Agreement, but in 
certain areas go further for example in the area of enforcement of copyright, digital rights management, 
and anti-circumvention measures.  
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9.4 Establishing a legal framework 
So how then do we begin to conceive of a legal framework that can help trade 
negotiators in classifying electronic intangibles?  There are three possible frameworks 
that can apply; section 9.4.1 below discusses the legal rules for distinguishing 
between goods and services, section 9.4.2 the principle of trade neutrality, and section 
9.4.3 the principle of technological neutrality. Another important principle to consider 
would be the principle of progressive trade liberalisation, which is covered in section 
9.4.4. It would perhaps be helpful at this stage to discuss some of these principles, and 
whether they can assist in formulating an effective legal framework for classifying 
electronic intangibles as goods, services, or as some form of hybrid or other category 
(such as intellectual property rights).  Each principle is discussed in turn. 
 
9.4.1 Legal/economic rules for distinguishing between goods and services 
 
The economics literature is full of statements to the effect that goods are material, or 
tangible, whereas services are immaterial and intangible.  Hill (1999) argues that: 
 
Because (a service) is not an entity, it is not possible to establish ownership 
rights over a service, and hence to transfer ownership from one economic unit 
to another.  In contrast to goods, therefore, services cannot be traded 
independently of their production and consumption.
31
 
 
Hill distinguishes between a good and a service in a number of ways.  In particular, he 
argues that: 
 
Goods are entities of economic value over which ownership rights can be 
established.  If ownership rights can be establish the can also be exchanged, so 
that goods must be tradable.  Goods can be consumed or used long after they 
had been produced at locations which are removed from their place of 
production stopped.  The separation of distribution and use from production is 
not feasible for services.
32
 
 
                                                 
31
 Hill P., Tangibles, intangibles and services: a new taxonomy for the classification of output, 
Canadian Journal of Economics Vol 32, No. 2, 1999, p. 442. 
32
 Page 447, Id. 
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We see therefore that under Hill's analysis goods are material objects, but goods do 
not necessarily have to be material or tangible.  He argues that intangible entities do 
exist and that they have all the economic characteristics of goods.  These can be 
described as "originals" created by authors, composers etc., which have no physical 
dimensions or spatial coordinates of their own and have to be recorded and stored on 
physical media, such as paper, films, and disks.  They can be transmitted 
electronically.  Hill argues that the intangible is the archetypal immaterial good:  " It 
is a good because it is an entity over which ownership rights can be established, and 
which is of economic value to its owner." 
33
 He further argues that when goods are 
produced, their production has two important characteristics not shared by services: 
 
 The entire output from the process of goods production is owned by the producer 
and therefore is at the disposal of the producer; 
 the use or disposal of the good by the producer is a separate activity from its 
production and takes place afterwards. 
 
On the other hand, for services, two essential characteristics need to be noted: 
 the production of services requires the agreement, corporation and 
participation of the consuming unit (s); and 
 services cannot exist independently of their consumers.  In effect, there cannot 
be a producer without a consumer.  A service needs to be provided to another 
economic unit. 
 
Hill argues that because the service is not an entity, it is not possible to establish 
ownership rights over a service, and therefore not possible to transfer ownership from 
one economic unit to another.  In contrast to goods therefore services cannot be traded 
independently of their production and consumption. 
 
In conclusion, Hill argues that in describing services as intangible goods, an 
assumption is made that the product must be an entity of some kind, whereas a service 
typically consists of some kind of improvement to an existing entity. Ogoti and Shah 
(1999) go further than Hill in distinguishing intangibles as goods and/or services. 
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They argue that in certain industries (for example in the software industry), further 
factors would need to be taken into account such as mass production, as opposed to 
the customisation of digital products and services in determining the classification 
issue: a higher quotient of customisation indicates services, whereas a lower quotient, 
goods. In their view, the issue is to develop a set of characterisation factors for 
electronic transmissions that will help to distinguish between goods and services.  
 
Similarly Civilka argues that the distinction between goods and services is not definite 
and rather a sliding transition exists where the considerations, purposes, and character 
of each good and service has to be examined on a case-by-case basis for 
distinguishing between them
34
.  The problem is not to distinguish between a physical 
delivery of an object, and a physical process of a service, the difficulty is to 
―distinguish between the digital products as a group of products, digitally delivered 
and which may fall within the traditional classification of both services and goods‖35.  
He argues that the physical delivery has an aspect of a product that is a "tangible" 
object, while the physical process of a service can be described as being an activity 
that takes place.  For all electronic services there is a transmission of digits being sent 
to a computer, and that these digits are physically delivered to a computer, 
constituting goods, whereas the aggregate of the digits constitutes a service. 
 
Civilka goes on to argue (a point not considered by Hill), as to whether digital 
products and services, so-called intangibles, need not be classed either as goods or 
services, but as intellectual property rights.  He argues that when users buy the right 
to use an electronic good or service, what they are actually buying are the rights to use 
the program, limited by license: ―Digital deliveries are neither services or goods but 
rather another type-sui generis type-of merchandise, represented by their connection 
to intellectual property rights and lack of connection to a physical element or 
service.‖36  Civilka argues that the transfer of intellectual property rights from the 
supplier to the user is framed in the license agreement between supplier and user so 
that when the intellectual work is being sold along with the material medium, the 
ownership passes in respect of the material medium, rather than the author's own 
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http://www.itc.tf.vu.lt/doc/mokslas/skaitmenines_pranesimas_angl.pdf , accessed October 2008. 
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work.  What is involved therefore is the purchase of the tangible medium on the one 
hand, and delivery of the right to use the intellectual work as set out in the license 
agreement on the other.  In effect, the trade in electronic intangibles is simply a trade 
in intellectual property rights, and nothing else. The governments of Singapore and 
Indonesia have also considered the trade in electronic intangibles as being equivalent 
to trading in intellectual property rights
37
. Similarly, the Government of Australia in a 
submission to the Council for Trade in Services states that:  
 
Most products or services delivered electronically consist of information. They 
remain information at the point of delivery to the consumer.  Therefore, the 
value of such information in all cases consists solely of its intellectual property 
value, plus cost of distribution to the consumer.
38
   
 
In summary, we can look usefully at Hill's arguments that the essential characteristics 
of goods are that they can be owned, and where they exist independently of their 
owners, can be traded.  Services, by contrast, involve some desired change caused by 
the service provider to something owned by the consumer or to the state of the 
consumer herself: 
 
 The delivery of a service requires a relationship between consumer and 
producer; under this analysis, digital goods and services that can be 
owned, such as music, video, books, constitute goods; 
 however some digital goods and services, such as the ability to watch a 
video on demand (where the consumer chooses a video from an array, 
which is then delivered by the suppliers server to the consumer) are 
services. 
 
Hill‘s approach is primarily economic as opposed to legal in further considering a 
suitable legal framework for distinguishing between goods and services. From a legal 
perspective at a multilateral level we can also ask whether existing WTO 
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jurisprudence can inform the debate.  Perhaps the leading case on this point is the 
WTO Appellate Body Decision, Canada_Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals
39
 
(Canada Periodicals). In this case, the Appellate Body found that while advertising 
and editorial content had "service attributes‖, they formed a physical product in the 
periodical itself.  In Canada Periodicals, the Canadian government‘s use of a measure 
to restrict imports of split-run periodicals under the GATS was rebuked by the 
Appellate Body on the basis that GATT applied to the imports, and not the GATS. 
The Canadian measure effectively restricted Canadian advertisers buying cheap 
(dumped) advertising space in magazines with little Canadian editorial content, 
restricting Canadian advertisers to buying space in the Canadian magazines market. 
Canada argued that advertising was a service that fell under the GATS (at the time, 
Canada had not scheduled any liberalisation commitments in this sector and was 
therefore free to discriminate between Canadian and non-Canadian magazine 
imports). However, the Appellate Body had to distinguish between the concept of a 
good and service which was made more complicated by the fact that neither the 
GATS nor the GATT explicitly define the terms ―services‖ or ―goods‖. The Appellate 
Body argued that Canada‘s measure had the effect of restricting the import of goods 
into Canada thereby limiting benefits under the GATT: what was at stake was the 
import of a magazine (a good) rather than the advertising (services) contained in the 
magazine.  
 
Canada Periodicals was a landmark case in helping to distinguish between goods and 
services under the WTO covered agreements. As mentioned, services are not 
expressly defined in the GATS. Under the GATS all services are covered except those 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, and all measures affecting the 
supply of services.  The GATS defines trade in services, as the supply of a service 
through any of the four modes, specified in Article 1
40
. The agreement does not 
distinguish between the different technological means by which a service may be 
delivered, whether between people, through the postal system, by telephone or across 
the Internet.  As such the electronic delivery of a service is covered by the GATS 
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 Case WT/DS31/AB/R, 1997. 
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 The four modes of supply are: (1), cross-the border, where the services supplied from the territory of 
one member into another; (2), consumption abroad, where the consumer purchases a service, which is 
delivered in the territory of another member; (3).  Commercial presents, with a service supplier of one 
member establishes a subsidiary or a branch in another member to supply a service; (4), presence of 
natural persons, with services supplied by a person working in the territory of another member. 
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demonstrating a general principle within the WTO, that the legal regime governing a 
transaction is determined by the nature of the product that is traded and not by means 
of its delivery or production
41
.  The General Council has determined that the GATS 
apply to all measures affecting the supply of services.  In the Panel report of the 
Bananas dispute case
42, the term ―affecting‖ has been interpreted to cover not only 
measures that directly govern the supply of a service, but also measures that indirectly 
affect it.
43
   
 
One focus of Canada Periodicals was determining the issue of classification of 
advertising space within a magazine, a good. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the WTO 
Agreements make use of two classification systems: the harmonised commodity 
description and coding system (HS), which applies to goods under the GATT, 
originally created under the auspices of the World Customs Organisation (WCO), and 
the classification list (W/120), which is based to a great extent on the provisional 
United Nations‘ central product classification (UNCPC), and applying mainly to 
services under the GATS.   Although both the HS and the UNCPC were originally 
developed for statistical purposes, most scheduled commitments of WTO members 
are based on these classification systems.   The HS provides a system for the 
identification of products (product lines) that help Members identify the customs 
duties payable, and the collection and comparison of trade statistics.  The HS is made 
up of a number of chapters that separate products, by their physical characteristics 
rather than their end-use criteria.  The chapters are further divided by headings, 
subheadings, and finally, the six-digit HS code number. The HS nomenclature is used 
to classify anything that qualifies as a good and in accordance with its physical 
characteristics.   
 
For this reason alone, the HS may not be able to classify electronically tradable 
digitised information if such information was to be characterised as goods.  Take the 
example of software: while the HS distinguishes between empty carrier media and 
carrier media with content, it does not have a classification for the content itself. The 
HS does not have a classification because software is not a physical entity.  Goods on 
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 Page 6, WT/GC/W/90, WTO, 1998. 
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which software is stored, such as magnetic diskettes, magnetic tapes and disks for 
laser reading systems (e.g., CDs and DVDs) are provided for, as "recorded media." 
under the HS. As such, software is treated as sound and video recordings only.  
Furthermore as far as a services' classification is concerned the W/120 only defines 
software in the context of its description of computer and related services, it does not  
define software as a service in its own right.  Software, is defined as part of the 
W./120 description of 1Bb Software Implementation Services (Computer and Related 
services), based loosely on UNCPC Code 842 as services related to "consultancy, 
development and implementation" (but not the software itself). Neither packaged nor 
customised software appear to be covered by the existing GATS framework. This is 
just one specific example of where the goods HS classification framework and the 
services W/120 classification framework fails to adequately classify the electronic 
intangible software, either as a good or as a service. The European Communities, 
however, have looked at the UNCPC 842 definition very carefully on software 
implementation services.  In looking at this definition, the European Communities in 
its submission to the General Council argue that the electronic transmission of 
software simply forms the delivery part of the development of software and is 
therefore subject to the GATS and commitments on the services of UNCPC 842.
44
  
This is a very clever twist on the definition contained in category 842 and underlies 
the EC's keenness to ensure that an intangible product such as software falls under the 
GATS rather than the GATT. In a paper to the WTO‘s General Council on e-
commerce in 2005, the United States was keen to stress the continuation of the 
moratorium on duty free imports of electronic intangibles and particularly software, 
and to ensure that the relatively liberal treatment on import of software on physical 
media (goods) continued when software was delivered also by way of the internet.
45
 
We shall return to the differing positions of the European Communities and the 
United States later in this Chapter at Section 9.5.  
 
9.4.2 The principle of trade neutrality 
 
Under this principle set out in Article III GATT, like products are generally subject to 
like trade rules.  Matsushita et al (2003) argues that "the like product determination‖ 
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is one of the thorniest in GATT/WTO jurisprudence.  Panel and appellate body 
reports, routinely state that the determination of whether products are "like" should be 
made on any case-by-case basis.
46
 In WTO jurisprudence, three different approaches 
have been used for determining whether imported and domestic products are "like" 
for the purposes of the national treatment obligations under Article III:2 and Article 
III:4 GATT.  The leading case is Japan_Taxes on Alcohol Beverages
47
 (Japan 
Beverages). In this case the decision of whether products are similar, or are directly 
competitive and substitutable focuses on the following factors: 
 
 The products end-uses in a given market; 
 consumers tastes and habits; 
 the products properties, nature and quality.48 
 
In Japan Beverages, the Appellate Body specifically endorsed looking at "competition 
in the relevant market", including by assessing the elasticity of substitution between 
two products.
49
 Because electronic intangibles can be argued to be directly 
substitutable with their physical counterparts (viz., CDs and MP3 files), the principle 
of trade neutrality will normally require that electronic intangibles should therefore be 
treated no differently from physical products, and that GATT rules applicable to 
physical products (or their equivalent), should apply to electronic intangibles. In the 
report of the Fifth Dedicated Discussion of the General Council on e-commerce
50
, the 
General Council picked up on the inconsistent treatment of similar products under the 
GATT and the GATS. They highlighted the case of software (discussed above) and 
architectural services. For architectural services they described a situation where a 
Member had full commitments for architectural services (and therefore no restrictions 
on market access and national treatment), but at the same time imposed customs 
duties on the physical architectural design (the physical outcome of the service)
51
. 
Because the same architectural design could be downloaded from the internet the 
problem of inconsistent treatment was very apparent. To deal with this problem of 
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inconsistency, Drake and Nicolaidis suggest that one solution (under GATS for 
example) might be to specify that the service being assessed for likeness is actually 
the service input to a transaction rather than the subsequently customized end-product 
(output)
52
. However, the solution they suggest could still gives rise to similar inputs 
(for example conventional film and its electronic equivalent, a webcast) giving rise to 
inconsistent treatment. The European Communities argue that where market access 
for an electronic transmission covered under the GATS is not granted the same level 
as its physical counterpart, where such counterpart exists (and where transactions are 
economically comparative), it would then be necessary for WTO members to address 
consistency problems on a case-by-case basis.
53
 The EC does not state in what forum 
such cases would be heard, but the assumption would be the WTO's Dispute 
Settlement Body. However to have an institution such as the WTO pass judgement on 
individual Member's regulatory regimes in this way would not be satisfactory.  
 
In order to ensure the neutral treatment of physical and digital deliveries we would 
also need to consider the practicality of imposing and collecting duties on delivery of 
electronic intangibles and also whether it would be even desirable to do so.  The 
impracticability of imposing duties on electronic deliveries perhaps led to the 
moratorium agreed by WTO members in 1998 of not imposing customs duties on 
electronic transmissions. In one of its last submissions on e-commerce to the General 
Council in October 2005, the United States wanted the moratorium to last until (at 
least) the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China in 2005 (and during the 
completion of the Doha Round).
 54
  The United States also wanted a clarification on 
the meaning of the term ‗electronic transmissions‘ to which the moratorium applied, 
and which the United States felt was vague, preferring instead, ‗products transmitted 
electronically‘ which it felt was clearer.55 At the time of writing, no final agreement 
seems to have been reached. In Hong Kong, in 2005, Ministers agreed the following 
text that formed part of the Doha Ministerial Declaration: 
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46. We take note of the reports from the General Council and subsidiary 
bodies on the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, and that the 
examination of issues under the Work Programme is not yet complete. We 
agree to reinvigorate that work, including the development-related issues 
under the Work Programme and discussions on the trade treatment, inter alia, 
of electronically delivered software. We agree to maintain the current 
institutional arrangements for the Work Programme. We declare that Members 
will maintain their current practice of not imposing customs duties on 
electronic transmissions until our next Session.
56
 
 
9.4.3 The principle of technological neutrality 
 
The principle of trade neutrality under the GATT would compare with the principle of 
technological neutrality under the GATS. The European commission in its submission 
to the General Council in May 2003 referred to technological neutrality "as the need 
for a similar treatment of economically comparative transactions, independent from 
the technology used."
57
 In the same submission, the European Communities also refer 
(in a footnote) to a different notion of technological neutrality as meaning "where a 
rule or a specific commitment was written in a manner that did not distinguish 
between technologies, then that rule or specific commitment would apply to any sort 
of technology used."
58
 The GATS agreement defines trade in services as the supply of 
a service through any of four modes: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence and movement of natural persons. The four modes differentiate 
services transactions on the basis of the territorial presence of a supplier and the 
consumer of the service.  The GATS makes no distinction between the different 
technological means by which a service may be delivered.  Measures affecting the 
electronic delivery of services are "measures affecting trade in services." in the sense 
of Article 1 of the GATS just as they would be if imposed by any other means. It is 
also important to note that the "supply" of service is defined to include production, 
distribution marketing, a sale and delivery of a service
59
.  
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Furthermore, in scheduling basic telecommunications services commitments GATS 
commitments apply to services "provided through any means of technology (cable, 
wireless, satellite etc)"
60
. Under this principle, a change in delivery technology should 
not therefore change the applicable trade protections, and that one technology should 
not be favoured over another.  The principle of technological neutrality would also 
ask that directly substitutable products be treated under the same trade rules.  So, for 
example, CDs and print books would be classed under the same trade rules as MP3 
files and digital books respectively. The US-Gambling case has now confirmed the 
principle of technological neutrality arguing that on-line gambling services provided 
remotely should be classed as ―like‖ domestic gambling services. The issues of 
likeness is an important one for e-commerce assessing whether electronic services are 
like their ―brick and mortar‖ or conventional trade services. The test of likeness 
confirmed in US-Gambling is discussed further below in section 9.6. 
 
9.4.4 The principle of progressive trade liberalisation 
 
Under this principle, commitments on tariff reductions may not be withdrawn (GATT 
Article 2:1 (b)), and any withdrawal of GATS commitments requires payment of 
compensation to affected countries (GATS Article XX.).  The principle of "no step 
backwards" has been very successful in achieving tariff reductions under the GATT. 
The question however for WTO negotiators is, whether in classifying electronic 
intangibles under the GATS, lesser protection is achieved than a classification under 
the GATT. Ogoti and Shah (2001) argue that the GATT aims at free trade at a faster 
pace compared to the GATS, which aims at progressive liberalisation of service 
sectors. There may be merit in this argument, but the counter argument would be that 
in the long term, the greater flexibility offered by the GATS (for dealing with 
"content" issues for example) might generate better rewards than simply lower tariffs 
for electronic deliveries under the GATT.  
 
9.5 The position of the United States and the European Communities on the 
classification of electronic intangibles 
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In discussing this issue, most WTO Members have gathered around the differing 
positions adopted by the United States and the European Communities on whether or 
not the GATT or the GATS respectively should apply to electronic intangibles
61
. 
These positions have arisen primarily from the differing architectures offered by the 
GATT and the GATS described above. For example, the United States has been the 
principle advocate that electronic intangibles should be classified as goods and benefit 
from GATT protections. In its submission to the WTO‘s General Council, the United 
States argues: 
 
…While the transmission of these [electronic intangibles] products can 
certainly be characterised as a service, the products themselves are not 
consumed in their transmission, but rather retain a permanence analogous to 
the goods world….62 
 
In the same submission, the United States also attempts to draw a connection between 
electronic intangibles and other ―intangible‖ products that already have a goods 
classification. For example, the United States poses the interesting question: ―what are 
the implications of the long-standing practice of some WTO Members to classify 
―electricity‖ (clearly an intangible) as a good in their tariff schedules?‖ 
 
However, in a later submission to the General Council in 2003, the United 
States appears to have softened its position, taking a more indirect approach to the 
issue of classification, arguing that: 
 
Today, these products can flow seamlessly across global networks and can be 
permanently retained on an end-user‘s computer, and still retain the underlying 
functions as if they were sent in physical form. Thus, the means of delivery of such 
products may change but the downloadable products‘ functional characteristics do not 
change merely by a difference in delivery.
63
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The United States appears to stop short of suggesting that electronic 
intangibles should be classed as goods under the GATT, but focuses instead on the 
functional characteristics of the product. In doing so, the US shifts the emphasis from 
the means of delivery by way of a telecommunications or internet transmission 
service to looking at the product itself, a good. Later the United States suggests that, 
―the focus should not be on how to classify these products, but rather on how to treat 
them for trade purposes with the goal being the most liberal treatment irrespective of 
how such products are classified.‖64 
 
There is also a greater focus on the issue of trade promotion than classification 
and that ―currently digital products in their physical form and on-line equivalents have 
for a number of years been traded under circumstances in which they may be subject 
to either the GATT or the GATS,‖ and ―which counsels against prematurely 
establishing new trade rules for e-commerce‖.65  
 
It would appear therefore that the United States has most certainly softened its 
position on insisting on a goods classification for electronic intangibles under the 
GATT. On the point of the current moratorium on customs duties the United States 
addresses the desire by some Members to impose tariffs on electronic intangibles (on 
grounds that the physical equivalents of such products suffer a higher tariff under the 
GATTs) by suggesting that equivalence of treatment should be achieved not by 
imposing tariffs on electronic intangibles but by lowering current tariffs on the 
equivalent physical product. The United States justifies this argument by suggesting 
that the ―direct effects of government revenue through tariff losses seem to be very 
small whereas the effects on the efficiency of an economy can be large‖66.  It remains 
to be seen how DCs and LDCs, for now mainly net importers of electronic intangibles 
(with the notable exceptions of India and China) will react to such a position. For 
many DCs and LDCs the loss in both import tariffs on electronic intangibles (should 
they be classed as goods) and tax revenues could be substantial. Certainly as 
Teltscher, in her paper referred to earlier, makes clear: 
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…how significant are fiscal losses from the non-collection of tariffs and taxes, 
if e-commerce replaces traditional trade in goods? The analysis of trade and tariff data 
showed that while revenues from imports of digitizable products are small in absolute 
numbers and relative to total revenues, the developing countries‘ share in world tariff 
revenues from digitizable products is disproportionately higher than that of developed 
countries: while developing countries account for only 16 per cent of world imports of 
digitized goods, their share in tariff revenues resulting from these imports is 63 per 
cent. Developing countries are therefore primarily concerned should physical delivery 
of goods be replaced by electronic delivery and tariffs not be collected.
67
 
 
It is also important to point out that the US position on classifying electronic 
intangibles under the GATT is inconsistent. This is perhaps surprising given the 
significance of this type of trade to the US. Nevertheless an inconsistency does arise 
and comes about from the not very much discussed United States position on customs 
valuation. This position, buried in various obscure meetings of the WTO‘s Technical 
Committee on Customs Valuation and the World Customs Organisation (WCO), 
basically covers the scenario where software or other data instructions are imported 
into a country by way of satellite signals.  
 
In the Decision on the Valuation of Carrier Media Bearing Software for Data 
Processing Equipment originally adopted by the Tokyo Round Committee on the 24
th
 
September 1984
68
, the Decision reads (at paragraph 2): 
 
In determining the customs value of imported carrier media bearing data or  
instructions, only the cost or value of the carrier medium itself shall be taken  
into account.  The customs value shall not, therefore, include the cost or value of 
the data or instructions, provided that this is distinguished from the cost or the 
value of the carrier medium.
69
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This Decision was in line with United States policy that data should not be taxed, and 
only the value of the carrier medium (whether by satellite or physical support) should 
be taxed. However in a separate report produced by the WCO, the WCO Secretariat 
makes the following statement: 
 
The [WCO] Secretariat believes, subject to the application of GATT decision 
4.1
70
, that there may be circumstances under the WTO Agreement where the 
cost of such software may form part of the customs value of imported goods. 
 
And in a further report by the WCO that: 
 
The WCO believes that there may be situations, perhaps limited in number, 
where the payment for software imported by satellite could fall within the total 
payment made or to be made by the buyer in respect of an imported good.
71
 
 
In short the WCO is stating that in certain circumstances (for example where the 
carrier media was a satellite signal), the data or software carried by the satellite signal 
could be classed as a good and therefore subject to customs valuation. The United 
States disagreed with this opinion and sought reassurance that in fact data/software 
was not a good and was not subject to customs valuation. In the end, the US achieved 
this result
72
. 
 
What is clear is that the United States would now like data and software in the form of 
electronic intangibles to be classed as goods, and subject to the GATT, albeit with the 
current moratorium on customs duties remaining in place. It would appear therefore 
for want of a better expression that the United States would both like to have its cake 
and to eat it.  In contrast, the European Communities contend in its submission to the 
General Council that electronic intangibles should be treated as services and that e-
commerce involves two types of delivery: 
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 Goods delivered physically, while ordered electronically, which fall within 
the scope of the GATT; 
 Electronic deliveries, which consist of services and therefore falls within 
the scope of the GATS.
73
 
 
The European Communities position finds support from other members of the WTO 
for several reasons: A services classification for electronic intangibles allows 
countries to apply content restrictions based on national origin. Existing restrictions of 
this type include the EU Television without Frontiers Directive (TWFD), which 
requires EU broadcasters to reserve a majority of their transmission time for European 
Works). With convergence and the coming together of information technology, 
broadcasting and telecommunication networks, the TWFD has now been amended by 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2007/65/EC (AVMSD) in 2007.
74
  
 
The AVMSD regulates new delivery mechanisms for audio-visual media content, 
such as on-demand services. The restrictions imposed by the AVMSD on inclusion of 
‗European Works‘ in on-line audiovisual programming have softened, reflecting 
perhaps the reality that material on the internet can be much more easily sourced from 
jurisdictions outside the EU, and more likely the US.
75
  Nevertheless, the ability to 
restrict trade in electronic intangibles under GATS offers Members more scope than 
under the GATT for imposing restraints on the current global strength of US e-
commerce companies abroad.  
 
Historically, the WTO Secretariat has tended to lean in favour of the European 
Commission‘s position of a GATS classification for electronic intangibles, and notes 
that members endorse the view that the vast majority of all products delivered 
electronically are services, although ―there is still disagreement over a limited number 
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access to European works…‖ 
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of these deliveries‖. 76 In an earlier report, the WTO Secretariat took an even stronger 
position arguing that: ―Any suggestion that `electronic transmissions‘ as such should 
be regarded as outside the scope of the GATS would of course fundamentally damage 
the entire [GATS] Agreement and undermine a wide range of existing commitments, 
since the vast majority of cross-border trade in many sectors is done electronically.‖77 
 
In a more recent submission to the General Council, the European Communities also 
took a strong position addressing directly the United States position of focusing on the 
functional characteristics of a product:  
 
…the HS and WTO Members‘ schedules generally only list physical goods 
according to their physical characteristics.  The fact that some intangibles 
such as electricity are classified as goods is the exception that proves the 
rule: where intangible products were intended to be subject to the GATT 
1994, this was expressly provided for in the schedules.  And the GATT 
schedules have never covered any information digitised into bits and sent 
across a border through a telecommunications network, directly from the 
supplier to the customer….What members need to discuss here is thus only 
the transmission of digitised information and how to classify the 
transmission of digitised information.
78
 
 
Clearly, the European Communities are adopting a diametrically opposite view to the 
position taken by the United States. The Commission discusses a number of electronic 
intangibles that in the past had to be stored on physical supports (CDs etc) to be 
transmitted to the customer, but now no longer need such supports given direct 
delivery options by way of the Internet. The EC can see no reason to artificially turn 
the electronic delivery of such products into a good in order for the GATT 1994 to 
apply. The EC argues that: 
 
                                                 
76
 Page 2, S/C/W/183, WTO, 2000. 
77
 Paragraph 37, S/C/W/68, WTO, 1998. 
78
 Paragraphs 7 and 9, WT/GC/W/497, WTO, 2003. See also the report of the fifth dedicated discussion 
on electronic commerce under the auspices of the General Council (July 2003), where the European 
Communities argue that ―there was no tariff line in the classification of goods under the GATT that 
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―As clarified by the Appellate Body already way back in the European 
Communities – Bananas case, only where a service is supplied in conjunction with a 
particular good, the respective scopes of the GATS and the GATT 1994 may overlap.  
The underlying reason is that a trade measure can sometimes hinder both the 
importation of the good and the provision of the related service.  But now that the 
service can be delivered without the handling of a good, the application of the GATT 
is not necessary any more.‖ And in the next paragraph: ―If WTO Members started to 
classify under the GATT electronic deliveries with a physical equivalent, it would 
bring under the GATT many services (architectural services, engineering services, 
consulting services, health services… etc) that have physical outcomes.79 
 
The European Communities argue that to bring such products under the scope of the 
GATT would create uncertainty and destabilize the operation of the GATS. Also as 
we have seen above with audio-visual content, there are strong political reasons for 
the European Communities wanting to classify electronic intangibles as services. For 
example, the European Commission‘s own legal framework for electronic commerce 
adopts a ―services approach‖. The primary Directive dealing with e-commerce is the 
EC‘s Directive 200/31/EC80 that states: 
 
This Directive seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal 
market by ensuring the free movement of information society services 
between the Member States.
81
  
 
Clearly the focus of the Directive is on services and not goods. In the field of tax, with 
the amendment to the EC‘s Sixth VAT Directive 77/388/EEC82, data processing and 
the supplying of information, intellectual property rights, advertising services, 
banking, financial and insurance transactions, radio and television broadcasting 
services, telecommunication services (including access to networks), and 
electronically supplied services all fall under Article 9 of the Directive, relating to the 
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 Id, WT/GC/W/497, WTO, 2003. 
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supply of services
83
. Therefore to classify electronic intangibles as goods would mean 
creating inconsistency with the EC‘s own internal legal framework with that of its 
external policy.  
 
As mentioned, there is also the issue of protection of European culture. One example 
of such protection at work is the inclusion of audiovisual services under the GATS, 
which allows for a variety of protections under Articles XVI (market access), XVII 
(national treatment), and Article XIV (General Exceptions). Presently, a GATS listing 
allows restrictions on non-EU content being transmitted within the EU by way of 
national commitment restrictions in the European Communities Schedule of Specific 
Commitments (both 1994 and 1997)
84
. A GATS listing for electronic intangibles 
would therefore allow a similar range of protections in related ―content rich‖ sectors, 
such as education, health, advertising, medical, legal, insurance etc., depending on the 
level of specific commitments inscribed by the European Communities in these fields. 
Furthermore, and as stated above, given the European Union‘s powers to negotiate 
future trade rounds under any new potential EC Constitution for Europe, 
inconsistencies between internal policy approaches to classification of electronic 
intangibles with EC external policy will create unwanted difficulties for the Union in 
the years ahead.  
 
The European position seems to find favour from other WTO Members. The 
Government of Australia for example appears to support the European Communities‘ 
position on classification: 
 
It is probably mistaken to seek a definitive determination of this 
[classification] question which may, in the end, be resolved according to the 
nature of the specific transaction. At this stage, we would not see significant 
benefit from members seeking to identify particular products that could be 
treated as goods, even if electronically transmitted….The classification 
process should aim for the maximum separation between the nature of services 
                                                 
83
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supplied and the means of supply. The analogy for classification should be 
with other classes of product where the substantial value is distinct, and can be 
separated from the form and medium in which the product is finally 
consumed. This is more commonly an attribute of services, rather than 
goods.
85
 
 
The Government of Japan however, favours the United States position for goods 
under the GATT arguing that ―the GATT principles of the most-favoured nation 
treatment, national treatment and the general elimination of quantitative restrictions 
will apply to such digital contents.‖86 Canada is more cautious arguing for a goods 
classification on software only (but in classifying software under the GATT would 
presumably agree de facto to all other electronic intangibles being classified in the 
same way):  
 
In the case of software, the GATT currently provides a well-developed set of 
rules and disciplines that offer certainty and predictability in the determination 
of the rights and obligations of producers and particularly exporters in both 
domestic and foreign markets. Classifying electronically traded software as a 
good would presumably allow software producers to continue to take 
advantage of the level of liberalization achieved under the GATT and, in 
particular, the ITA (The WTO‘s Information Technology Agreement).87 
 
 
9.6 US Gambling 
 
US-Gambling marks a turning point for the GATS in that it is the first case decided 
that directly involves trade over the internet. Mexico-Measures affecting 
telecommunications services discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 7 concerned cross-border 
telecommunications services, but in US-Gambling, the DSB panel
88
, and after, the 
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Appellate Body
89
) discussed US measures that would restrict foreign members from 
providing gambling services remotely to US consumers, whether by fax, e-mail, 
telephone or the internet. In 2003, Antigua and Barbuda requested the WTO 
Secretariat to establish a panel to review US measures on the cross-border supply of 
gambling and betting services. Central to the complaint was Antigua‘s assertion that 
US Federal and state measures on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting 
services was a violation of GATS Article XVI: 1 on market access. Antigua claimed 
that the US had made a full commitment to the cross-border supply of gambling and 
betting services and that prohibiting all cross-border supply of such services was a 
violation of Article XVI:1
90: In effect that a full prohibition amounted to a ―zero 
quota‖. The US argued that it had made no commitment to gambling and betting 
services and claimed that market access restrictions are allowed and only the specific 
market access restrictions set out in Article XVI:2 which describe numerical quotas 
are the categories that would fall foul of Article XVI. The US argued that: 
 
…the gambling-related US measures listed in the Panel request are framed 
entirely in terms of non-numerical criteria that restrict certain forms of 
activity, rather than numbers of providers, operations, or output. Thus, no 
relevant US measures would appear to fall within the ambit of Article 
XVI:2.
91
 
 
Another important issue raised by Antigua was the concept of ―like services‖. Antigua 
argued that under GATS Article XVII on national treatment, the type of games 
offered by Antigua are the same as those offered by the US, the only difference being 
the origin of the services and the suppliers and the mode of supply (cross-border as 
opposed to commercial presence)
92. Antigua cited the Appellate Body‘s report in the 
EC-Asbestos case
93
 arguing that the AB in that case referred to four categories of 
characteristics that have been used to assess ―likeness‖ in the context of the GATT: (i) 
physical properties; (ii) capability of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) 
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consumer perception; and (iv) international tariff classification
94
. The US refuted the 
issue of likeness arguing that the ownership and structure of US gambling services 
together with how such services were regulated in the US rendered them ―unlike‖. 
The US argued that: 
 
…The GATS explicitly recognizes in its preamble the ―right of Members to 
regulate‖ services. The ―like services and suppliers‖ language of Article XVII 
must therefore be interpreted in light of that object and purpose of the GATS. 
Thus one must consider not only the different competitive characteristics of a 
service or supplier as such, but also the existence of regulatory distinctions 
between services in interpreting and applying the likeness analysis under 
Article XVII.
95
 
 
Japan in its submission as a third party observer to the proceedings made a similar 
argument to the US that cross-border supply could be considered ―unlike‖ domestic 
supply because regulatory circumstances were different
96
. US-Gambling resulted in an 
extremely lengthy panel report (almost 300 pages), and a shorter AB report of over 
100 pages. A full discussion of the case is beyond the scope of this thesis. In summary 
however, the other main issue at stake was whether the US was permitted to restrict 
cross-border gambling and betting services on grounds that its measures were 
―necessary‖ to protect public morals or to maintain public order. The US maintained 
that its measures were consistent with the chapeau of Article XIV, which allows for 
example derogation of existing GATS commitments on public policy considerations, 
such as security, public morals, and fraudulent practices.  
 
The Appellate Body report was published in April 2005. In the report, the AB 
reversed the panel‘s decision arguing that three out of the four US measures at stake 
were necessary to protect public morals and that the US could maintain these 
measures. The AB also ruled that the US had not shown that one of its measures (the 
Inter-State Horseracing Act) applied to both domestic and foreign service suppliers 
and was therefore not in conformity with the chapeau of Article XIV. Both the panel 
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and AB reports maintain the rule of technological neutrality discussed earlier in this 
chapter and that GATS obligations taken in 1994 would apply to any current or future 
delivery technology under cross-border supply (GATS mode 1)
 97
. The AB argued 
that the US GATS schedule included commitments in respect of gambling and betting 
services and that any restriction on electronic service delivery under mode 1 was in 
effect the imposition in the form of quotas and therefore a breach of Article XVI:2(c) 
GATS
98
. The significance of this ruling is great. New internet services delivered 
under mode 1 and where such services can be captured by an existing GATS 
commitment (and relevant CPC and WS/120 classification code) will therefore 
automatically be covered by the GATS. In other words, a mode 1 commitment 
automatically secures market access for like services regardless of the technology of 
delivery. WTO members therefore need to be particularly careful when drafting new 
commitments under mode 1, to specifically exclude any service that could also be 
subject to electronic trade (and where such a commitment is not wanted).  The US had 
tried to argue that gambling and betting fell outside their scheduled commitments as 
they had deviated from the CPC classification code when making commitments in the 
entertainment sector. The AB argued that in making commitments, members would 
need to adhere to the CPC and WS/120 and that any deviation from these guidelines 
should be detailed carefully
99
. Another important issue arising from the case is the 
distinction between the regulation of suppliers of electronic services and consumers 
of such services. So for example as mentioned above, restrictions on cross-border 
supply of electronic services could be classed as a violation of Article XVI, but that 
restrictive regulation by a member of the consumption of those services by the 
relevant member‘s consumers would be permissible under Article XIV GATS. 
Presumably regulations that restrict consumers‘ consumption would fall to be 
considered under Article VI on domestic regulation, creating therefore a hazy 
boundary between GATS Articles XIV and VI. The upshot of this is a fear of 
diminished sovereignty over domestic public policy and local services regulation. The 
key issue is to determine what is ―necessary‖ to protect public morals and to maintain 
public order. Both the Panel and the AB established a weighing and balancing test to 
determine the issue of ―necessity‖, citing the case of Korea-Various measures on 
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beef
100
. In short, this test questions whether the measures (i) protect very important 
societal interests; (ii) impose strict controls to protect such measures; and (iii) 
contribute to the realisation of the ends that they pursue
101
. In US-Gambling, the AB 
found that the Panel had erred in not looking for suitable alternative remedies that the 
US could have pursued other than the measures that they had adopted, and that in 
failing to do so, and with Antigua failing to establish a suitable alternative measure, 
that the US measures were in fact necessary. The Panel had focused on the failure of 
the US to enter into consultations with Antigua on alternative measures for protecting 
public morals as a failure of establishing ―necessity‖. The AB argued that this was a 
mistake and that: ―such consultations in our view, cannot qualify as a reasonably 
available alternative measure with which a challenged measure should be 
compared.‖102 Perhaps in this sense, the AB ruling, reversing the Panel‘s 
determination on the applicability of Article XIV to US measures was not as robustly 
argued as other aspects of their report, considering that the end result was to create a 
distinction between the regulation of foreign suppliers of electronic services to gain 
access to the US market (easier) than the consumption of their services by US 
consumers (more difficult). In providing access to the US market by the former but 
restricting access to the latter, Antigua argued that such a result was ―absurd‖103.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
 
It would perhaps be helpful at this stage before considering possible solutions to the 
problem of classifying electronic intangibles to first summarise the outstanding 
problems: First there is a problem with classifying electronic intangibles under the 
GATT, as most market access commitments that have been made in the e-commerce 
sector (telecoms, audio visual, computer, express delivery services etc), have been 
made under the GATS. Second, some electronic intangibles are more like services 
than goods, for example video on demand, customised MP3 collections etc., and vice-
versa (pay-per-view). If both goods and services can be delivered on-line, there will 
be constant and thorny questions regarding whether e-commerce activities (and which 
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electronic intangibles) are subject to the GATT and which are subject to the GATS. 
Third, customs duties are the significant national measures for trade in goods. 
Worldwide, national customs systems are designed for trade in goods. Given the 
nature of distribution over the internet, it may be nearly impossible to reliably enforce 
customs duties on electronic intangibles, although the technology is now available for 
putting-in place micro-payment systems for electronic deliverables, spearheaded by 
the music and film industries‘ use of digital rights management technologies104. 
However for many developing nations (and some developed), the cost of introducing 
such systems, or requiring their respective Small Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) 
sectors through domestic regulation to do so, would be prohibitive. Fourth, the GATS 
has no compulsory or universally agreed classification system for services. Members 
usually follow the nomenclature developed for GATS purposes (GNS/W/120), which 
in many sectors is based on the provisional Central Products Classification (CPC) of 
the UN
105
. If electronic intangibles are determined not to fall under either the GATT 
or the GATS, then new rules will be required and the problem will be determine the 
extent of these rules, or whether existing ones can be reformed, extended or 
interpreted in ways that would mean the law keeping step with the technology.  
 
Given these difficulties a possible way forward would be to adopt the solution offered 
by Baker et al (2001) and allow the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to resolve 
the problem. Drake and Nicolaidis however think that such an approach would not be 
effective in determining which electronic intangibles are goods and which services.  
They argue that the DSB should be used to interpret WTO members‘ collective intent 
as expressed in WTO instruments rather than force governments to legislate on such 
fundamental issues because they could not agree on a common approach. To some 
extent however, with the US-Gambling case discussed above, the DSB has 
determined some issues on regarding trade in electronic-based services. For example, 
with regard to technological neutrality, all mode 1 based GATS commitments now 
cover electronic delivery of ‗like‘ services. US-Gambling has not determined however 
the more thorny questions of which of the trade treaties should apply to electronic 
intangibles. Drake and Nicolaidis suggest, ―establishing a new category of ‗hybrid‘ 
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products that have the properties of both goods and services.‖ 106 Another solution 
(discussed above) would be to treat electronic intangibles as tradable intellectual 
property rights, suggested by the Governments of Singapore and Indonesia
107
, and the 
academic author Civilka
108
. Civilka further suggests the use of license agreements in 
assignment of IPR to suggest that electronic intangibles are services and not goods.  
 
Drake and Nicolaidis suggest a fourth solution
109
: that trade negotiators should define 
and agree on clear criteria differentiating goods from services. Coming to such 
definitions would presumably encompass many of the arguments outlined earlier in 
this chapter when discussing legal rules for distinguishing between goods and services 
(Section 9.3). For an electronic intangible to be classed as a good, Drake and 
Nicolaidis suggest their own definition for a digital good that would require 
conformity with two fundamental criteria. Digital products can be categorised as 
goods if: 
 
1. they can be locally stored110; and 
2. are transferable between buyers111. 
 
They rightly observe however that if such a definition was adopted, WTO Members 
such as the European Communities would have far less flexibility to apply cultural 
exceptions (as under the GATS) to restrict non-EU imports of electronic content rich 
products. In the United States, the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, a think tank 
consisting of the separate states of the United States, are developing measures to 
design, test and implement a sales tax and use tax system that simplifies the current 
system in the United States. They suggest a similar definition for a digital good where 
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they define the ‗digital equivalent of tangible personal property‘ as a product (except 
prewritten computer software) meeting all of the following conditions: 
 
1. Is expressed in binary digits; 
2. Is delivered, accessed, or subscribed to electronically; and 
3. The sale of which would be treated as a sale of tangible personal 
property if transferred on tangible storage media
112
.  
 
Hill argues that the traditional dichotomy between goods and services can be 
preserved provided intangibles are grouped with tangible goods. Also intangibles are 
sufficiently different from tangible goods that there may be a case for identifying 
them separately by having a trichotomy of tangible goods, intangible goods, and 
services. He cites the North American Industry Classification System, which identifies 
a new Information and Cultural Industries Sector whose products it acknowledges to 
be unlike both traditional tangible goods and traditional services. The note to the 
classification states that, ―the value of these products does not lie in their tangible 
qualities but in their information, educational, cultural or entertainment content.‖ He 
argues that Europe should follow a similar approach.
 113
 
 
Baker et al suggests that rather than arguing between the GATS and the GATT, a 
better outcome might be for WTO Members to reach a negotiated solution to balance 
their interests. A solution would be treat electronic intangibles as services in exchange 
for GATS commitments to give e-products (electronic intangibles) trade benefits 
equivalent to comparable physical goods
114. However, for Baker‘s solution to work 
(particularly for the United States, Canada, and Japan), a sufficient number of other 
WTO Member States will have to make adequate commitments to justify for example 
the United States agreeing to classify electronic intangibles as trade in services as 
opposed to goods. This kind of critical mass approach was also used in the 
negotiations on basics telecommunications, where the United States refused to make a 
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binding offer under the GATS, until at least 60% of other nations had committed to 
the Basic Agreement and the Reference Paper. If a GATS classification was settled 
upon however, another important question to ask would be whether the GATS could 
provide for a similar level of liberalisation as under the GATT, particularly if 
Members supported a GATS version of the Information Technology Agreement?
115
 
 
Whatever solution is found to the problem of classification of electronic intangibles, 
Member's trade negotiators need to be careful not to get too bogged down in 
entrenched positions that lead to protracted negotiations within the various councils of 
the WTO, and on cross-cutting issues in the General Council. A major challenge for 
the WTO Secretariat would be to develop a test for ―likeness‖ as regards intangible 
and tangible products and as mentioned in Chapter 9.4.2 (the principle of trade 
neutrality) above. US-Gambling has to some extent put such a test in place. The 
failure of the WTO to act quickly in determining the issue of classification will lead to 
the danger that more powerful trading partners will bypass WTO negotiations and 
incorporate rules on trade in electronic intangibles into Free Trade Agreements and 
Bilateral Investment Agreements with less powerful partners that are much more 
favourable to their own commercial interests. This could lead to a web of agreements 
with conflicting standards on classification.  
 
The Author argues that the European Commission is right to want to protect the 
integrity of its cultural content flowing over its networks. For example, the new 
Audio-Visual Media Services Directive adopted in 2007 provides for the fact that on-
demand services may well be sourced from outside the EU, but still requires the 
integration of ‗European Works‘ into content for on-demand services broadcast in the 
EU.
116
 A balance is therefore achieved with the aim of preventing on-demand 
broadcast services (non-linear audio-visual media services)--which the European 
Commission envisages in time perhaps replacing television broadcasts (linear 
audiovisual media services)--from being dominated by foreign content. For this 
reason, one could imagine why the EU should want electronic non-linear audio-visual 
services to remain under the GATS. If rules of origin was to be the driving force 
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behind the classification debate then one could argue that all content rich products 
that can be distributed by way of the internet should also be under the jurisdiction of 
the GATS, allowing (for example) member states to use measures (as opposed to 
tariffs) to control the entry of such products across their borders as in US- Gambling. 
The GATS also allows for market access restrictions, which theoretically could allow 
a member state to restrict the number of electronic intangibles imported into a 
member state. As Teltscher, an economist who worked for UNCTAD, argues: 
 
A second important difference between the GATS and the GATT is the 
possibility to impose quantitative restrictions or quotas. While the GATT (in 
general) prohibits the use of quotas, they are allowed under the GATS 
(depending on the market access commitment specified in a country‘s 
schedule). So theoretically, this could mean that a country could put (in 
principle) a limit on say the number of books transmitted electronically via the 
Internet.
117
 
 
The potential for such a restriction could stifle the market for electronic intangibles, 
burdening it with excessively high levels of regulation that would stop electronic 
content from being downloaded (subject to the necessary Digital Rights Management 
technology being in place). One could imagine that in countries that were opposed to 
foreign content flooding their markets, such quotas could be used subject off course to 
the principles of market access and non-discrimination under Articles XVI and XVII 
of the GATS discussed earlier in this chapter, otherwise a country could find itself 
before the WTO‘s DSB. However, if the Digital Divide is to be truly addressed, 
content must be available freely and at low cost. This can only happen if successive 
trade rounds continue to reduce import tariffs on electronic intangibles to zero. One of 
the remarkable successes of the ITA agreement (discussed in Chapter 8) on 
information technology products has been to reduce imports tariffs on such products 
allowing end-users in DCs and LDCs access to cheaper computers and infrastructure. 
The same is required for the content flowing over such infrastructure. If we remind 
ourselves of the definition of the international digital divide arrived at in Chapter 2: 
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A failure—between those users in countries who have access to 
communications infrastructure, services and tools to aid literacy and 
information literacy, and those who do not—to access the minimum available 
capacity of communication technologies and information within a structural 
context of successive innovation, competition and trade. 
 
The capacity to appropriate information is crucial for addressing the digital divide. 
Access to content is important. Making content cheaper therefore is a necessary step. 
The GATT can achieve this by driving down import tariffs through the lockstep of 
successive trade rounds. The question then is how to control the cultural content of 
the intangibles imported? As we have seen in this chapter, the GATS achieves this 
through regulatory measures, for example on the use by the US of Article XIV GATS 
on grounds of public morality, the US was able to successfully restrict the 
consumption by US end-users of cross-border gambling services from Antigua. As 
mentioned above this is a strong argument for the use of the GATS in regulating e-
commerce. However we could also argue that the same result could be achieved not 
through international economic law, but through national domestic laws on obscenity, 
broadcasting (whether linear or non-linear) and standards in media. The problem for 
most DCs and LDCs would be putting in place such laws and having suitable powers 
for enforcement. 
 
Nevertheless, if the primary goal is addressing the Digital Divide, the author suggests 
that the US Streamlined Sales Tax Project‘s definition for a digital good should be 
adopted by the WTO. All electronic intangibles would therefore come under the 
GATT, so long as the following conditions are met. That the intangible: 
 
 
1. Is expressed in binary digits; 
2. Is delivered, accessed, or subscribed to electronically; and 
3. The sale of which would be treated as a sale of tangible personal 
property if transferred on tangible storage media
118
. 
 
                                                 
118
 The US Streamlined Sales Tax Project makes it clear that this definition would not apply to pre-
written computer software.  
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This would capture most electronic intangible products, such as music, books and 
films that can be sold in physical format on tangible storage media, but exclude on-
line legal, architectural, educational, and health services that would still be classed as 
‗services‘ under the GATS. Furthermore, such a move would allow DCs and LDCs to 
collect additional taxes on the import of electronic intangibles. If the current 
moratorium on not charging import tariffs on electronic intangibles continues, DCs 
and LDCs stand to lose. As Teltscher argues: 
 
The majority of countries that are mostly affected by tariff revenue losses 
come from the developing world…Given their higher levels of MFN rates, this 
should not come as a surprise. What is remarkable, however, is the magnitude: 
despite the developing countries‘ import share in digitizable products of only 
16 per cent, their absolute tariff revenue (loss) is almost double that of the 
developed countries, amounting to 63 per cent of world tariff revenue losses 
for these products. This clearly shows that, as far as potential fiscal losses are 
concerned, developing countries would be much more impacted by the 
proposed ban. The top ten countries affected by fiscal loss are the EU, India, 
Canada, Mexico, Brazil, China, Russia, Poland, Argentina and Thailand.
119
 
 
Clearly, a GATT classification would favour net exporters of electronic intangibles, 
such as the US and Japan, and not net importers, such as the DCs and LDCs. Should a 
GATT classification be adopted therefore, the current moratorium on not charging 
import tariffs should be replaced by perhaps a staged response where DCs and LDCs 
can set import tariffs, subject to rules of origin. The important point to ensure is that 
DCs and LDCs do not also charge excessive additional taxes, such as customs 
surcharges (levied on imports) and internal taxes (levied on both imports and 
domestic goods) both of which the importer will have to bear, and that if excessive, 
could potentially stifle the market for electronic intangibles in their countries and 
therefore access to content (particularly of an educational nature as opposed to 
products that are for entertainment only—music, games and films—which could 
attract a higher tax).  
 
                                                 
119
 Ibid note 117, p. 5. Note that Teltscher‘s article was written in 2001 and therefore the trade statistics 
she used for econometric analysis will have changed somewhat, particularly for India and China. 
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Any import revenues collected could be used to help further develop a DCs and LDCs 
national policy for technology transfer, funding the recommendations suggested in 
Chapter 8 for example, or in acquiring the know-how and technology to increase the 
number of IXP exchanges and implement the Layering Theory suggested in Chapter 
6.  
 
Paragraph 34 of the Doha Mandate that requires WTO Members to ―recognize the 
importance of creating and maintaining an environment which is favourable to the 
future development of electronic commerce.‖120 Unless a solution is found to the 
problem of classification, the WTO risks falling behind as business continues to do 
what it has been doing throughout history; using technology in advance of the law to 
further its own commercial interests. 
 
                                                 
120
 WTO |  Doha 4th Ministerial - Ministerial declaration: WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 2001.  
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Chapter 10

 
Enforcing the Right To Development 
through Technological Processes 
 
 
We are writing a bill of rights for the world…one of the most important rights is the 
opportunity for development 
                                  Eleanor Roosevelt 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis have centred on answering the first two questions 
set out in the introduction to this thesis. This Chapter is concerned with the third 
question: whether it is possible to define a relationship in IEL between civil and 
political, and economic social and cultural rights as a collective for example in the 
form of the much debated and somewhat controversial Right to Development (the 
―RTD‖ as defined in this thesis) on the one hand, with economic indicators, such 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the other? 
And if so, whether enforcing principles of IEL to grow FDI and GDP through 
technological processes (and thereby enforce the RTD) at the national  [target state] 
level will help address the Digital Divide in that target state? 
 
Chapter 10 is divided into three sections. The first 10.1 will discuss an outline of the 
evolution of development theory, the second section 10.2 ICTs and development, and 
the third section 10.3 an economic law approach to development (economic 
development). The first two sections are merely introductory and do not aim to discuss 
in detail these subject areas. For example, in 10.1 in discussing development theory 
                                                 

 A version of this chapter was published in Capitalism & Human Rights (ed Janet Dine), Edward Elgar, 
2006. 
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the Author is not attempting to discuss the many specific theories on development 
proposed by different financial institutions such as the Bretton Woods institutions 
(eg., World Bank and IMF), for example development theories on sustainable 
development, micro-development, women-centred development, endogenous 
development, appropriate development, and ―Basic Needs‖ development etc. The 
sheer breadth of this discussion would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the 
Author‘s focus is on the historical evolution of the UN Right To Development (RTD), 
one of the main themes of this thesis. The reason for this is that the Digital Divide 
cannot be addressed just by importing technology, but requires a well-trained base of 
human capital to achieve effective utilisation and absorption of that technology (see 
the section on ICT and Development below). Also, technology diffusion and 
absorption was discussed in detail in Chapter 8 on technology transfer. The RTD 
encompasses the whole gamut of rights (civil and political, and economic, cultural 
and social) including a right to education and a right to share in scientific and cultural 
knowledge (discussed below in Section 10.3 Enforcing the RTD through Economic 
Law). The Author asserts that by enforcing the RTD, DCs and LDCs will be in a 
better position to improve their basic living standards at home, and so improve their 
human capital base. The historical background to the RTD is given in Section 10.1 
Outline Background to The Right To Development.  
 
One hypothesis of this thesis is that by effectively enforcing the RTD, then FDI and 
GDP can grow (and vice-versa), which in turn will stimulate technology transfer, 
innovation, and the narrowing of the Digital Divide, effectively generating a ―positive 
feedback‖ loop. In Section 10.3(Enforcing the RTD through Economic Law), the 
Author sets out a new theory (―Right To Development Theory‖) to prove the link 
between the RTD, FDI, and GDP. He does this through developing the legal theory 
and also with the use of symbolic equations. He argues that the equation he develops, 
Equation 5 will need to be verified through econometric research, but that the aim of 
this thesis is to flag-up areas in which research can focus, and which would be the 
subject of post-doctoral work for example. Such work will be interdisciplinary and at 
the interface between law and economics, but for the present is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. With Equation 5 in place, the Author then suggests how the RTD could be 
operationalised through a form of national-level tax relief, and to do so, he develops 
the concept of a national measure, the RTD Tax Relief. Another reason for choosing 
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the RTD (as opposed to any of the other theories on development suggested above) is 
that the RTD represents the culmination of efforts by DCs and LDCs over half a 
century to use international law to encourage developed countries to assist with 
international development
1
. As such, the RTD is very closely associated with the 
interests of DCs and LDCs. As the aim of this thesis is to address the Digital Divide 
through economic law from the perspective of DCs and LDCs, the RTD forms a main 
theme of this thesis. In agreeing with Marks
2
, the Author also argues that the most 
powerful nation in the world, the United States, although stiffly opposed to the RTD 
from commencement, is already promoting something similar to the RTD, the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (albeit with important differences), and argues 
that the RTD Tax Relief that the Author proposes will create a working compromise 
between the MCA and the RTD, and which could be more politically acceptable to 
the developed world than the RTD alone. As discussed in section 10.1 of this chapter, 
the RTD has its origins in the attempt by DCs and LDCs to use international law in 
the pursuit of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, followed by demands for 
a broader New International Economic Order, and failing this, in the successful pitch 
for the RTD, which seeks to integrate development into the human rights discourse
3
.  
 
In Section 10.2 in discussing ICTs and Development, the Author is not attempting to 
address the myriad ways in which ICTs can be used, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but instead the Author focuses on assessing the appropriate use of ICTs in 
development at a conceptual level: Should DCs and LDCs focus on the use of ICTs as 
a specialist sector or include ICTs in a more integrated way across different sectors 
(health, education etc.)? To what extent should international donor organisations, such 
as DFID, UNCTAD, and the UNDP be involved with local communities (so called 
Alternative Development) or national government (following standard Modernization 
Theory) in promoting ICTs and development? In answering this question, the Author 
also draws on his own field research experience for Harvard Law School‘s Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society
4
.  
                                                 
1
 Gordon R., and Sylvester J., Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. Int‘l L.J. 1, 2004, p. 3. 
2
 Marks S., The Human Right To Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 
137, 2004. 
3
 Supra note 2, p. 3. 
4
 Berkman Center (Harvard Law School) research report: Readiness for the Networked World: Jamaica 
Assessment, Kariyawasam R., published on-line at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2002-01, Vol 
2002-01, pages 1-65, Harvard Law School. 
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The first two sections of this chapter therefore serve as an introduction to the third 
section, on which the bulk of this chapter is focused, and which (as mentioned) aims 
to address the third question posed by the thesis, can the RTD be linked to economic 
growth factors such as FDI and GDP. The third section also discusses the Bush 
Administration‘s Millennium Challenge Account, and the United Kingdom‘s 
Commission on Africa, and concludes with a discussion of the role of the WTO in 
helping to enforce the RTD Tax Relief. The first section starts with a brief outline of 
the evolution of development theory. 
 
10.2 Brief Outline of the Evolution of Development Theory 
 
Modernization 
 
As Gordon and Sylvester suggest, Development as it is currently construed is 
essentially a post-World War II phenomenon
5
. In 1949, in proposing a fair deal that 
sought to improve the lives of people living in underdeveloped areas, Truman put 
forward his Point IV Program: 
 
―More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching 
misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic 
life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas.‖6 
 
Truman‘s vision of poverty has continued to form the basis of the development 
project since
7
, and if Truman characterised the people of developing countries by 
nature of their poverty, then as Gordon suggests (citing Escobar), the World Bank 
quantified it in defining countries with an annual per capita income below $100 as 
poor
8
. Poverty then became the defining characteristic of the developing world and 
                                                 
5
 Gordon R., and Sylvester J., Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. Int‘l L.J. 1, 2004, p. 4. 
6
 Gordon citing Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World 12-14 (1995).  
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid, p 23-24. 
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the solution was economic growth and development
9
. Development had its roots in 
modernity and the modernization project has been a foundation on which 
development theory has been built. As mentioned earlier, modernization can be 
described as ―the process by which a society comes to be characterized by a belief in 
the rational and scientific control of man‘s physical and social environment and the 
application of technology to that end.‖10 Modernization continues to be supported by 
all the major international aid agencies, which is essentially a Western construct, the 
imposition of Western best practice and Western legal systems on the developing 
world. A present-day example of this would be the imposition of Western-style 
competition law systems as a condition to World Bank funding. In the early 1970s, 
the reaction to Western-based modernization programs was a call by developing 
world leaders for a New International Economic Order (discussed below). Gordon 
and Sylvester suggest that the current ―reincarnation‖ of the Western approach to 
modernisation is ―good governance‖ which has the aim of both limiting the power of 
the State in the economy while simultaneously expanding the role of the market, and 
establishing a system of liberal democracy as a counterpart to structural adjustment or 
neoliberal economic reform. Current examples of Western good governance would be 
the export of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has its origins in the collapse of Enron 
and later WorldCom, and which covers procedures for company directors and 
MultiDisciplinary Partnerships (MDPs) from the United States.  The extraterritorial 
nature of this Act (and the costs for implementation) has been felt in the UK, Asia 
(particularly the financial capitals of Tokyo and Hong Kong), and Europe.  
 
10.2.1 Constructing Development in practice 
 
In pushing Truman‘s agenda, the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have exercised and 
continue to exercise considerable influence over the national economies and 
development plans of DCs and LDCs. The World Bank plays the role of a private 
commercial bank except that its depositors and borrowers are member states. Over the 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, p. 5. 
10
 Ziauddin Sardar, Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism, in Critical Development Theory, 
Contributions to a New Paradigm 117 (eds Ronaldo Munck & Denis O‘Hearn), 1999. 
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period between 1950-1970 sometimes known as the Golden Age of Development, the 
WB extended project-based loans to build dams, highways, and other infrastructure 
projects
11. However, as Gordon and Sylvester suggest, ―the trickle-down theory, 
which postulated that economic growth would necessarily shrink the gap between the 
rich and the poor, proved to be untrue.‖12 Optimism began to wane and developing 
world leaders called for a permanent sovereignty over natural resources (discussed 
below). In the second era of development, the WB concentrated on meeting the 
―Basic Needs‖ of developing nations, which focused on reducing poverty through 
programs for food, clothing, shelter, education and employment
13
. The period of the 
1980s by contrast is described as the ―lost decade for development‖. In this period, the 
third world debt crisis arose and the IMF and WB introduced the concept of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the aim of which was to halt the escalating 
deficits of debtor countries, mainly developing countries. As Gordon and Sylvester 
suggest, under the rubric of economic development, ―The World Bank‘s scope 
increased to encompass legal and judicial reform, family planning, education, 
developing the private sector and health care.‖14It is now widely accepted that SAPs 
had a detrimental effect on the economies of DCs and LDCs, as by the end of the 
1980s, some of these countries were even more debt ridden and unable to provide 
basic services, such as education and healthcare to their people
15
.  
 
The 1990s saw the remergence of modernization in the form of globalisation, and that 
now DCs and LDCs needed to integrate into the global economy: development took 
the form of privatisation, economic liberalisation and the proliferation of free markets. 
For example, the WB in devising their Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF), suggest that growth must now include structural, human, physical, and sector-
specific aspects of development, and that development must integrate market-friendly 
policies and incentives with the agents for change being governments, local 
organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Good governance also 
emphasised marketization and privatisation as opposed to detailed sector-specific 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., p. 9. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid, p.10. 
14
 Ibid, p.11. 
15
 Ibid. 
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regulation (government regulation)
16
. The CDF encouraged the move away from 
import-substitution models, moving instead to export-led growth and a domestic 
environment conducive to private markets
17
. The move to privatisation of national 
incumbent telcos is discussed in Chapters 4 and 7. 
 
10.2.2 Outline Background to the UN Right To Development 
 
Throughout the periods described above, developing world leaders followed a 
pendulum type relationship with development experts in the West, embracing and 
subsequently rejecting reforms as they failed. From the early 1970s, a growing body 
of thought from developing countries in the area of international law tried to establish 
a legal right for development. This had its origins in a movement for a Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) that led to a call for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), and which eventually culminated in the UN Declaration on 
the Right To Development
18
. The PSNR was a reaction to the agreements that many 
DCs and LDCs had imposed on them through the period of colonial rule by Western 
colonial powers and which effectively exploited the natural resources of certain DCs 
and LDCs
19
. These newly independent states now sought to establish authority over 
their natural resources by passing measures that allowed them to renationalise such 
resources, in other words, the right to expropriate foreign enterprises if they deemed it 
necessary to do so. The UN resolution allowing the right to nationalise was eventually 
passed by the UN Assembly in 1962
20
, however Western interests focused on the 
claim for compensation should nationalisation take place. This claim for 
compensation effectively made it uneconomical for many non-oil exporting 
developing countries to nationalise natural resources
21
. As such, the movement for the 
PSNR and subsequent resolution proved to be without teeth, but nevertheless laid the 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, p. 12. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Bunn I., The Right To Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Int‘l 
L. Rev. 1425, 2000.; Marks S., The Human Right To Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 137, 2004; Gordon R., and Sylvester J., Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. Int‘l 
L.J.1, 2004; Segger MC and Khalfan A., Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and 
Prospects, OUP, 2005; ‗The dielectics of Law and Development‘ by Scott Newton in The New Law 
and Economic Development (eds Trubek D. and Santos A.), CUP, 2006, Chapter 5. 
19
 See Gordon, supra note 6, p. 14. 
20
 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803, December 1962. 
21
 See Gordon, supra note 6, p. 14. 
 327 
foundation for a NIEO
22
. The NIEO was encapsulated in a body of UN measures 
passed by a majority of members, but never accepted by the West
23
. The main 
foundation for the NIEO was a Charter of Economic Rights which included subjecting 
private foreign capital to the domestic laws of Third World host countries, full and 
effective participation in world governance, special trade preferences, stabilizing 
export prices for commodities exported by Southern countries, debt forgiveness or 
rescheduling, and technology transfer…The charter also recognised the sovereign 
right to nationalize foreign property and to determine what compensation should be 
paid, and confirmed the right of host nation governments to supervise transnational 
corporations operating within their jurisdictions.‖24 Yet again, leaders of the 
developing world failed to obtain the redistribution of international economic power 
that they sought (even though the Charter for example was passed by a majority of 
members), but nevertheless as with the PSNR, some elements of the NIEO did appear 
in the UN RTD, considerably watered down.  
 
The Senegalese jurist Keba M‘Baye is widely credited with the initial idea of the 
―Right To Development‖. In 1972, at a lecture at the International Institute of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, he argued: ―every man has a right to live and a right to live 
better‖25. Over fourteen years later, the UN Declaration on the Right To Development 
(RTD) which states that the right to development is a human right
26
, was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, resolution 4/128 on the 4
th
 December 1986. Despite being 
in force for just under twenty years, the Declaration, not being a legally binding 
instrument, has suffered from a lack of implementation and the political will required 
for international cooperation. The Declaration‘s evolution can be traced back to the 
transposition of civil and political rights (Articles 1 to 21 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights
27
) and economic, social, and cultural rights (Articles 22 to 28 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) into two separate legally binding treaties (i) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
28
; and (ii) International 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, p. 15. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 M‘Baye K., Le Droit au Developpement comme un Droit de L‘Homme, 5 Revue Des Droits de 
L‘Homme (Hum. Rts. J) pp 503-515, 1972. 
26
 Article 1 Declaration on the Right To Development (referred to throughout this chapter as the 
―Declaration‖). 
27
 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (A) II on 10/12/1948. 
28
 General Assembly Resolution 2200A, adopted 16/12/1966, entering into force 23/03/1976. 
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Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
29
. As the (then) 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, argued, ―it took 
many years of international deliberations and negotiations for the world community to 
get back to the original conception of integrated and indivisible human rights. The 
Declaration on the Right to Development was the result.‖30 The Right to Development 
(―RTD‖) as a human right has been reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration adopted at 
the Second UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1993
31
. Sengupta has 
described the RTD as: 
―…a composite right to a process of development; it is not just an ―umbrella‖ 
right, or the sum of a set of rights. The integrity of these rights implies that if 
any one of them is violated, the whole composite right to development is also 
violated. The independent expert describes this in terms of a ―vector‖ of 
human rights composed of various elements that represent the various 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as the civil and political rights. 
The realization of the right to development requires an improvement of this 
vector, such that there is improvement of some, or at least one, of those rights 
without violating any other.‖32  
 
 
10.2.3 Opposition to the RTD 
 
The United States has been opposed to the RTD from its commencement: 
 
―In our estimation the right to development (RTD) is not a ―fundamental‖, 
―basic‖, or ―essential‖ human right. The realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights is progressive and not aspirational. We do not view them as 
entitlements that require correlated legal duties and obligations. States 
                                                 
29
 General Assembly Resolution 2200A, adopted 16/12/1966, entering into force 03/01/1976. 
30
 Sengupta A., ‗The Right to Development as a Human Right’, 2000, p.1. 
31
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the UN World Conference on Human 
Rights, June 25, 1993. 
32
 Fifth report of the Independent Expert on the Right To Development, Mr Arjun Sengupta, Submitted 
in accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/69, at 5, p6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6 (2002). 
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therefore have no obligation to provide guarantees for implementation of any 
purported ―right to development‖.‖33 
 
This is despite the fact that the US supported the RTD at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, when the Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action 
(discussed in Section 11.3 below) was adopted by consensus
34
. However the US has 
consistently resisted any reference to any form of legal obligation that could give rise 
to a transfer of funds for development to developing countries. As Marks argues, the 
US has stressed that development occurs thanks to economic liberties and private 
enterprise rather than a claimed right to development
35. He also argues: ―About the 
only difference in nuance between the Republican and Democratic administrations is 
that the former stress economic liberties as the motor for development while the latter 
attach importance to individual rights more generally as making development 
possible.‖36 Marks also concisely captures ideological differences between the 
developed world and the developing over the RTD, particularly with regard to the 
[then] Cold War between East and West. In doing so he cites Philip Alston‘s 
comment on the Reagan Administration‘s view of the RTD: ―as the antithesis of a 
large part of its foreign policy. In this view, the right to development is little more 
than a rhetorical exercise designed to enable the Eastern European countries to score 
points on disarmament and collective rights and to permit the third world to ―distort‖ 
the issue of human rights by affirming the equal importance of economic, social and 
cultural rights with civil and political rights and by linking human rights in general to 
its ―utopian‖ aspirations for a new international economic order.‖37 Clearly the 
situation has now changed: The Berlin Wall has come down, and the Cold War has 
said to have thawed somewhat. And yet the US still appears to be caught by its past. 
In 2003, when the Human Rights Commission decided to request its Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to prepare a concept document 
                                                 
33
 United States Government, Statement at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 59
th
 Sess., 
Comment on the Working Group on the Right To Development (Feb. 10, 2003), cited by Marks S. in 
―The Human Right To Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality‖, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 137, 2004, 
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34
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: Note by the Secretariat, World Conference on Human 
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35
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137, 2004, p.6 
36
 Ibid., p.7. 
37
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establishing the feasibility of establishing the RTD as an international legal standard 
of a binding nature, guidelines on the implementation of the RTD and principles for a 
development partnership based on the Declaration to the RTD (discussed below in 
Section 11.3), the United States (together with Australia and Japan) cast the only 
negative votes: forty-seven other countries voted in favour
38
. As to other countries, 
the EU position for example on the RTD remains unclear. Marks argues that the EU 
position is often one of ―damage limitation‖ (between those countries supporting the 
RTD, such as India, China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, and Nepal sometimes referred to as the Like-Minded Group, and often in 
opposition to the United States) in that the EU ―will go along with a resolution if 
nothing particularly objectionable is inserted or will abstain.‖39 He cites a quote from 
the Greek Ambassador, speaking on behalf of the EU to the Commission on Human 
Rights in 2003: ―The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the European Union 
and the African, Carribean, and Pacific Countries constitutes a concrete contribution 
to the fight against poverty and a further step towards the realization of the Right To 
Development.‖40 As to the other UN agencies on the RTD, Bunn writes: 
―Highlighting the crucial links between the three key goals of the United Nations 
Charter in the areas of peace, development, and human rights, the UNDP has set forth 
a policy to integrate human rights with sustainable development. The UNDP outlines 
three levels of commitment to human rights, First, it ―works for the full realization of 
the right to development,‖ particularly in the eradication of poverty. Second, it 
advocates human rights as part of sustainable development and third, it promotes 
good governance. The overall approach reflects how development and human rights 
complement, as well as depend upon, each other.‖41 However, Marks argues that the 
UN agencies other than the Human Rights Commission have not been as supportive 
on the RTD, commenting in particular on the lack of any detailed comment on the 
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 Ambassador Tassos Kriekoukis, Head of the Delegation of Greece on behalf of the European Union, 
Statement at the Commission on Human Rights, 59
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 Bunn I., The Right To Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Int‘l 
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RTD at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000
42
. He also says however that: 
―The General Assembly recently reaffirmed over U.S. opposition its ―commitments to 
implement the goals and targets set in all the major United Nations conferences, 
summits, and special sessions and those undertaken at the Millennium Assembly, in 
particular, those relating to the realization of the RTD.‖43 
 
Given its high profile, several commentators also identify weaknesses within the 
RTD. Bunn quotes for example Ghai: ―The value of the concept of a right is that it 
creates entitlements, and the entitlements are easier to enforce if the contents and 
beneficiaries of the right are clearly specified. In the case of the right to development, 
it is not clear who are the right and duty bearers. Equally vague is the content of the 
right.‖44 This lack of justiciability and legal standing of the RTD is discussed further 
below in Section 10.3. Bunn also cites Brownlie in discussing the content of the RTD 
which ―is to perhaps blur the conceptual profile and make the task of promulgation of 
the right the more difficult.‖45 And finally in citing Carty: ―The debate about the right 
to development marks a crisis in legal theory, because it encompasses a determined 
attempt to place material content before form and yet retain whatever advantages are 
supposed to attach to the use of legal language.‖46 There is no doubt that there is a 
valid argument that the RTD lacks legal standing, but there are also arguments to 
suggest that the RTD could be enforced in law, but through the process of IEL, which 
is discussed in Section 10.3 below.  
 
 
10.3  ICTs and Development 
 
In discussing ICTs and Development, Soeftestad and Sein describe the trustee 
relationship between developed and developing countries: ―…to become developed, 
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poor countries need to emulate the developed countries. In turn, the developed 
countries have the moral duty to help poorer countries achieve this growth. This 
creates a trusteeship relationship between the two worlds. Many developed countries, 
including the OECD collectively, take this seriously and in good conscience.‖47 They 
divide the literature of ICT and Development into two main camps; the optimists and 
the pessimists
48
. The optimists see ICTs as a catalyst for national development by 
being the means for transformation. ICTs are viewed as tools for empowerment which 
enable common citizens. ICTs can be viewed as a commodity, and by ―successfully 
leveraging their low-cost producer advantage over the developed countries, 
developing nations can earn foreign exchange by manufacturing computer and related 
products, through performing high-skilled jobs (eg., offshore software development) 
and even low skilled jobs (eg., offshore data entry and data processing functions.‖49 
However, they describe the danger to this utopian concept in that the poorer countries 
often end-up manufacturing products; even organising their economies solely to 
benefit the richer (developed) countries. ―Offshore computing and manufacturing ICT 
commodities are done mainly to feed the consumerism of the richer nations, and not 
for the developing countries. The rise in such ―global‖ ICT industries hardly indicates 
transfer of technology and more importantly, transfer of knowledge. In this context, 
ICTs result in helping richer countries advance further, while the poorer countries 
remain poor.‖50 The pessimists argue that there are few links between ICTs and 
development, and that ICTs can lead to more repression by authoritarian governments 
who now have more powerful tools to control their citizens. In citing Sein and 
Ahmad, they argue that ―ICTs can push developing countries deeper into poverty by 
streamlining and improving design and manufacture of goods and thereby reducing 
the demand of raw materials, energy, and even low-skilled labour-longstanding 
comparative advantages of developing countries.‖51 
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Soeftestad and Sein propose a different view of ICTs and Development to that of 
either the optimists and pessimists, who are seen as being at polar ends of the 
spectrum. They suggest a ―middle path‖, and that development should be 
conceptualised through the perspectives of both human development and alternative 
development paradigms. The human development paradigm is influenced by Amartya 
Sen‘s work on capacities and entitlements and is centred on the understanding that 
national development is the enlargement of people‘s choices52. These choices are the 
choice of healthy life, the choice to be educated, and the choice to a decent standard 
of living. They key indices in measuring these choices include: Human Development 
Index, Gender Development Index, Gender Equity Measure, and the Human Poverty 
Index. The Human Development paradigm therefore stresses non-economic factors 
over economic or growth factors. A key failing of the paradigm is that it fails to take 
into account who should be responsible for achieving the indices
53
. The second 
paradigm, the alternative development paradigm is again people-centred and 
development is achieved through civil society, including local participation, initiation, 
and leadership of development efforts. In summary, human development provides the 
means to measure socio-economic development, but alternative development utilises 
political freedom and citizen participation. In this sense, ―ICT then becomes a means 
of communication‖.54 Soeftestad and Sein source their ideas from the Appropriate 
Technology (AT) movement, which supports the development and use of sustainable 
approaches to meeting human and ecological needs through the appropriate use of 
technology. In turn, AT has its sources in Schumacher‘s concept of ―small is 
beautiful‖55. ―To be appropriate, technology must be connected to the place, 
resources, economics, culture, and impact of its use.‖56 In short that effective ICT in 
development requires a human and cultural-centred approach. To measure the 
intended impact of its use, three fundamental questions first need to be asked: (i) what 
is to be the level of the impact? often the main beneficiaries of development projects 
are at the local (community) level. Soeftestad and Sein argue that the main 
―modernization‖ perspective places prior emphasis on the national level, but the 
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alternative development view however is to focus on the local; (ii) on whom does it 
impact? depending on the level, different stakeholders will be impacted. The offshoot 
question from this is whether ICTs directly impact the poor or only indirectly?; (iii) 
on what do ICTs impact? As mentioned in Chapter 2 on the Digital Divide, Soeftestad 
and Sein argue that first order (simple substitution of old technology with new) and 
second order impacts (increase in the phenomenon enabled by the technology i.e. 
increased communication) do not really give a measure of the true impact of ICTs on 
national development, and that impact can only truly be measured through third order 
effects, such as the generation of new related businesses and societal change (virtual 
organisations, empowerment of women etc.)
57
 
 
Soeftestad and Sein also discuss the use of Appropriate Technology (AT) which is 
discussed above. Repeating again their argument that: ―To be appropriate, technology 
must be connected to the place, resources, economics, culture, and impact of its 
use.‖58 In short that effective ICT in development requires a human and cultural-
centred approach. Following the finding of the Author‘s research on the use of ICTs 
in Jamaica for the Berkman Centre for Internet & Society (Harvard Law School), the 
Author very much concurs with Soeftestad and Sein‘s views on the use of AT. In 
conducting case study research in Jamaica, the Author used a template (a Readiness 
Assessment) for the use of ICTs in Jamaica. ―Readiness is the degree to which a 
community is prepared to participate in the Networked World. It is gauged by 
assessing a community‘s relative advancement in the areas that are most critical for 
ICT adoption and the most important applications of ICTs. When considered together 
in the context of a strategic planning dialogue, an assessment based on these elements 
provides a robust portrayal of a community‘s Readiness. The value to a community of 
assessing its Readiness lies in evaluating its unique opportunities and challenges.‖59 
The readiness assessment is based on a methodology developed by the Information 
Technologies Group
 
at the Center for International Development at Harvard 
University
60
.  As a guide for understanding ICTs and development, the methodology 
looks at the ICT environment through five lenses: 
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Networked Policy: By looking at Trade Policy and the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Environment  this category helps to determine whether the national 
policy facilitates and fosters ICT development in the country or region. 
 
Networked Access: This category looks at indicators such as Information 
Infrastructure, Internet Availability, Internet Affordability, Network Speed and 
Quality, Software and Hardware, and Service and Support in order to build an 
understanding of the relative ease and quality of access to IT and the Internet.   
 
Networked Learning: How has ICT been used and applied in the learning 
environment by students and teachers throughout primary, secondary and 
tertiary education?  What is the quality and supply of the labor force trained in 
ICT?   
 
Networked Economy: How advanced is the use of the Internet for business-to-
business and business-to-consumer electronic commerce? Moreover, how has 
the government adopted the use of IT for government citizen services and 
procurement? 
 
Networked Society: How intensively is ICT integrated in everyday life? Are 
there significant opportunities available for those with ICT skills? What is the 
quantity and quality of local content? How are people and organizations 
utilizing ICT? 
 
 
The Jamaica case study results reveal findings that reflect Soeftestad and Sein‘s view 
of Appropriate Technology. For example, the Author found that ICTs could not be 
introduced into a community with the expectation that the community will 
immediately adopt them. Many schools in Jamaica have benefited from the 
introduction of computers, but without adequate teacher training in the use of the 
computers and also good access given to the children, the computer lab either 
becomes a place that is kept under lock and key or quickly deteriorates due to a lack 
of appreciation for the importance of maintenance. The research revealed that it was 
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imperative that funding be targeted at tertiary institutions of learning that are equipped 
to train teachers in the use of ICT in the curriculum. Also, the use of small-scale pilot 
projects to help inform later and larger projects was very useful in Jamaica. 
Introducing a pilot project in a particular area encouraged other infrastructure 
requirements and systems needed by the pilot and which would make it successful. In 
this way, the pilot becomes a catalyst for change. Well thought through ICT projects 
that take into account the needs of the community and the user interface forced both 
investors and the local community to think about the development of other systems 
that first need to be put in place before the pilot could succeed. This need to 
understand the requirements of end-users on the ground was the important lesson 
arising from putting in place a system of e-government in Portmore (a district in 
Jamaica) and funded by the Netherlands based development NGO, the IICD.  
However, all the successful ICT projects in Jamaica including music, educational 
learning, e-government, agriculture, improving business efficiency have had at their 
core one important principle; the need first to identify the local demand and satisfy 
that local demand before building out complicated IT systems. ICTs needed to be 
understood in the context of everyday life, and the success of the take-up of ICTs 
depended on how readily the technical people could satisfy the local demand for 
service. 
 
Furthermore, development assistance need not be restricted to NGOs or purely 
government-funded projects. Sometimes funding through government organs could 
lead to a lack of efficiency at best or outright corruption at worst. And yet a small 
amount of technical assistance provided directly to well thought through commercial 
pilot programs could lead to dramatic improvements in working practices for small 
businesses nationwide. For example, the USAID-funded New Economy Project was 
involved in providing technical assistance and management consultancy to a number 
of commercial entities in Jamaica that were specifically involved in helping improve 
the business processes of smaller Jamaican SMEs. In one case, the NEP had been 
working with a private company called Management Control Systems (MCS.com) to 
provide on-line payroll and tax services to small companies that do not have the 
resources to produce their own payroll records, wage slips and tax returns. At the 
time, the project served a projected market of around 2000 to 2500 firms in Jamaica. 
 337 
In other words for an initial investment of US$90,000, the NEP could potentially 
deliver benefits to over 2000 Jamaican firms. 
 
Clearly the finding in Jamaica support the argument for AT. Furthermore, many of the 
ideas suggested by the Author in this thesis; the Layering Theory for increasing 
transparency of access to incumbent networks in developed countries by third country 
operators (Chapters 6 and 7); using the New modes of Operation in reverse (Chapter 
7); the use of competition law in ensuring beneficial technology transfer and to check 
the potential abuse of monopoly IPR rights by MNCs (Chapter 8); and suggestions by 
the CIPR for an extension granted to LDCs for patent protection to pharmaceuticals to 
2016 to be broadened to cover the implementation of TRIPS as a whole, and that the 
TRIPS Council consider introducing criteria based on Article 66.1 TRIPS (indicators 
of economic development and scientific and technological capability) to decide the 
basis on which LDCs should enforce their TRIPS obligations after 2016 (Chapter 8). 
Although the Author agrees with Soeftestad and Sein‘s view of Alternative 
Development (for example in light of the Jamaica case study), the Author suggests 
that such a view is more appropriate to the actual use of ICTs in development projects 
at the local community level, but that in order to address the Digital Divide, national 
and international measures are also required, and which by necessity of the globalised 
nature of the communications industry, require those measure to conform with IEL, 
predominantly driven by the West. Gordon and Sylvester are particularly scathing of 
international law. They argue: ―International law is based in part on shared interests, 
but it is also based on power and that power resides with the industrialized world, and 
more particularly these days, with the United States. Law has been used in the service 
of development and as a mechanism to control the Third World, through such 
principles as prompt, adequate and effective compensation…International law proved 
incapable of assisting the non-West, for its purpose is to serve the West. In the era of 
globalization, international law will be an even stronger part of the edifice that locks 
the Third World into a chasing a future that is made in the West through the discourse 
of Development.‖61 There is no doubt some truth to this. However, the RTD Theory, 
which the Author sets out below, as well as the RTD Tax Relief are also measures 
which are intended to operate at both the international and national levels, and again 
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follow the ―Modernization‖ school of thought.  The Author suggests that what is 
needed in order to truly address the Digital Divide is a combined approach utilising 
both AT at the local community level, but also aspects of IEL as set out in this thesis, 
for example legislative measures in telecommunications law, competition, intellectual 
property, trade, and investment. In effect, the Author is suggesting that those very 
measures that Gordon and Sylvester rightly attack, should also be the instruments that 
DCs and LDCs should use in order, in this instance, to address the Digital Divide. In 
the next section 10.4, the Author discusses how the RTD can be enforced through 
IEL. 
 
10.4  Economic Development 
 
In Section 10.1 (Outline Background to the UN Right To Development), the Author 
set out the series of events that eventually led to the RTD. The Author also explored 
criticisms of the RTD and described the position taken by different member states, 
particularly the United States in relation to the RTD, and also some of the UN 
agencies. The justiciability of the RTD was also mentioned, but discussed more 
below. In this section, the Author discusses the US Administration‘s MCA and sets 
out ideas for a new RTD Theory and RTD Tax Relief, which he argues could be a 
realistic compromise between the MCA (pushed by the United States) and the RTD 
(pushed by the coalition of G90 and specifically the Like Minded Group
62
, mentioned 
above in Section 10.1). 
 
10.4.1 The US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
 
In his speech at the Monterrey Conference in Mexico, March 2002, President Bush 
launched the MCA, which would utilise a proposed $5 billion annual increase in 
Overseas Development Assistance. Funds from the MCA were to be made available 
to projects in countries, where political administrations governed justly, invested in 
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their people, and encouraged economic freedom
63
. In order to receive MCA funds, 
DCs and LDCs need to prove that they will follow or are following three crucial 
goals: (i) good governance, (ii) The health and education of their people; and (iii) 
Sound economic policies that foster enterprise and entrepreneurship. In many 
respects, the MCA follows the concept of ―good governance‖ discussed above in 
Section 10.1, and which has the aim of both limiting the power of the State in the 
economy while simultaneously expanding the role of the market. In 2004, Bush 
signed the law creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which is to 
administer the MCA. Marks in his article The Human Right to Development: Between 
Rhetoric and Reality
64
, makes a detailed comparison between the RTD and the MCA. 
He argues that in many respects the MCA contains many of the principles to be found 
within the RTD, including the Independent Expert‘s RTD-Development Compact 
(discussed below). For example, he argues that both the RTD and the MCA contain 
provisions on the mutuality of obligations, and that the focus on governance, 
including human rights, and on health and education overlap with the RTD-DC
65
. 
There are also significant differences. For example, the RTD foresees multilateral 
funding, whilst the MCA is to be administered by the MCC, a US entity.
66
 
Furthermore, the sixteen specific indicators that the MCC is to use to determine MCA 
funding include little on human rights when compared to the RTD-DC, which sets as 
a condition that all human rights (both economic, cultural and social, and civil and 
political) that fit within the composite RTD should be realised or at least not 
diminished. Under the MCA, in order to qualify for funds, a country must score above 
the median on half of the indicators in each of the three groups (six for ruling justly, 
four for investing in people, and six for economic freedom), and score above the 
median on corruption regardless of the ranking for the other indicators
67
. Marks has 
concerns over some of the indicators, particularly the indicators used for ―ruling 
justly‖ as he argues that two of the sources for these indicators (Freedom House and 
the Heritage Foundation) are politically biased. For example, he argues that ―Freedom 
House and the Heritage Foundation are clearly identified with the political right and 
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tend to represent the neoliberal approach to economic issues. These sources are 
consistent with the known preferences of the Bush Administration. However, a 
program that is expected to be applied to a wide range of countries over a long period 
of time would be more credible it drew on a more diverse set of sources.‖68 The 
sources for other indicators used by the MCA include the IMF and the World Bank, 
the two Brettons Woods institutions that Gordon & Sylvester argue so vehemently 
against. Clearly there is a danger that access to MCA funds will be governed by mere 
statistics. For example Marks argues: ―The reliance on Freedom House may be 
presumed to be based on the fact that it produces a numerical ranking of countries. 
The use of this source as the sole performance indicator of human rights could mean 
that crucial decisions affecting billions of dollars and millions of lives will be based 
on the reduction of complex social and political systems to a single number or 
ranking.‖69 He also argues that the MCA could have adopted the UNDP‘s Human 
Development Index (HDI) for its source for the indicator for ―investing in people‖. 
The HDI is designed to highlight the extent to which governments invest in people, 
with a focus on education and health. The HDI is also used in the Human 
Development paradigm referred to by Soeftestad and Sein, mentioned above in the 
section on ICTs and Development. The next section discusses other finance schemes, 
specifically for Africa, proposed by the British Government and its Commission for 
Africa. 
 
10.4.2 The UK Commission for Africa 
 
In 2005, the UK Government launched its impressive ―Our Common Interest: Report 
of the Commission for Africa‖ (―Africa Report‖), as part of its drive to see the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) fulfilled. The Africa report also stresses the 
significance of economic growth for Africa, suggesting a range of economic growth 
policies and stressing that ―robust competition laws and policies, with strong 
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institutions to enforce them, are vital to improving productivity and to promoting 
innovation and better prices.‖70 The report stresses the need for good governance, but 
also argues that policies implemented must promote long-term growth and reflect the 
country-context. In discussing the investment climate in Africa for example, the 
Africa Report stresses the need for improving the environment for domestic 
investment, but also to support foreign investment, for example in enforcing 
commitments made in the G8 Africa Action Plan at the Summit in Kananaskis 2002, 
and reinforced at the G8 Summit in Sea Island 2004
71
. Investment is also the focus of 
the 2005 World Development Report ―A Better Investment Climate For All‖, which 
supports the idea that enhancing the investment climate, particularly for agriculture 
and for rural areas, will significantly accelerate economic growth
72
. The Africa Report 
also discusses setting up an Investment Climate Facility (ICF) which will require 
US$550 million over seven years, and which will be used to invest in over 300 
projects in Africa. Through the New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) 
programme, the ICF will focus on putting in place legislation, regulation, and policies 
to enhance competition policy, strengthen the private sector, and investment councils. 
In this respect, there are similarities with the US MCA, except for one important 
difference, the ICF is to have African ownership and is to be backed through the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank that will 
provide insurance to private (foreign) investors. Domestic (African) investors cannot 
(currently) be covered due to the MIGA‘s current convention73. Whether this will 
change in the future remains to be seen. The report envisages a range of private 
investment, particularly in infrastructure. The sector for ICTs will benefit as this is 
seen by the report‘s Authors as a crucial area for Africa both in terms of improving 
efficiency but also in assisting with the move from the current dependency by many 
African countries on commodities to services. The report argues that the ―benefits of 
ICT are far-reaching-connecting schools to the internet, enabling remote rural 
communities to get urgent medical advice by phone, giving farmers access to market 
price information, and potentially halving the costs of sending remittances.‖74 In 
helping to tackle the Digital Divide and investing the resources into ICT needed to 
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enable Africa to participate in the global knowledge economy, the report argues that 
the international community will need to move to funding at least $20 billion a year in 
infrastructure
75
. In terms of getting greater private sector participation, the Africa 
Report also calls for the creation of a US$100 million Africa Enterprise Challenge 
Fund to support private sector initiative that will contribute to small enterprise (SME) 
development by increasing access to markets. This is an important provision as micro 
SME funding will have a direct impact on local communities as borne out by the 
Author‘s research (Jamaica Case Study) and also in helping to achieve the Human 
Development and Alternative Development paradigms mentioned above in Section 
10.2. In effect, the Africa Report envisages doubling aid levels over the next three to 
five years (resulting in US$51.5 billion of aid reaching Africa by 2008/10), 100 per 
cent debt cancellation, and meeting existing obligations to achieve the 0.7 per cent 
ODA/GNI target by raising finance from an International Finance Facility (IFF)
76
, and 
by developing international levies for example in the form of a tax on airline tickets 
with revenues dedicated towards development
77
. The airline ticket levy is an 
interesting option. According to the report, the levy would be voluntary to reflect 
some of the costs of carbon emissions. The report argues that being voluntary, the 
levy would avoid many of the difficult issues involved in getting an international 
agreement on taxation. The RTD Tax Relief, which the Author discusses in Section 
10.10 below would also not require an international agreement on taxation, but the 
corporation of individual states to introduce the measure in national legislation, and 
also the WGTT to formulate effective criteria for the tax to work. However, in 
suggesting an airline levy, the British Government is demonstrating at least in part, 
that it is open to the idea of a further tax, albeit a voluntary one. As mentioned below, 
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the RTD Tax would not be a tax on consumers, but financed through a State‘s 
commitment to ODA.  The next section discusses enforcing the RTD through IEL. 
 
10.4.3 Enforcing the RTD through International Economic Law 
 
In this section, the Author is concerned as to how the RTD could be effectively 
enforced through domestic and international economic law. In doing so, he puts 
forward an Economic Right to Development Theory (the ―RTD Theory‖) which aims 
to show the ultimate relationship between the RTD as a composite of human rights on 
the one hand
78
 and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and GDP on the other. In making 
reference to indicators such as FDI and GDP, the RTD Theory is clearly based on a 
concept of economic growth and New Growth Theory (discussed below), an 
ideological position favoured by the United States. For example, in his testimony to 
the House Financial Services SubCommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy, 
Technology and Economic Growth, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios said: ―put 
simply, economic development assistance in poor countries works best when you are 
pursuing good policies that are conducive to growth.‖79 Marks also quotes the 
Heritage Foundation as saying: ―Adherence to policies that promote economic 
freedom should be the most heavily weighted of the three broad criteria that countries 
must meet in order to qualify for MCA funding. Only economic freedom, which 
depends on the rule of law, leads to higher per capita income and the alleviation of 
poverty.‖80 Marks‘ criticism of the US approach, particularly as regards the MCA, is 
that it makes very little reference to human rights. However the RTD, which is very 
much concerned with the vector of human rights that the Independent Expert refers 
also seeks to integrate growth theory, the importance difference with that of the US 
position being that growth should not be sacrificed for equity. For example, the then 
Independent Expert refers to growth as being part of the RTD: ―We must include the 
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growth of resources, such as GDP and technology, as an integral element in the vector 
of rights that constitute the right to development.‖81 As mentioned however, growth 
must not be at the expense of equity. Sengupta argues: ―As considerations of equity 
and justice are primary determinants of the right to development, the whole structure 
of growth will have to be determined and reoriented by them.‖82 The RTD Theory 
suggested by the Author seeks to integrate new growth theory (in line with the school 
of ―Modernization‖), but with equity and justice. As such, the Author argues that the 
RTD Theory might be a workable compromise between that of the US‘s MCA and 
that of the RTD favoured by the Like Minded Group. The Author argues that putting 
in place an effective regulatory domestic framework for FDI that will help realise the 
RTD by way of technology transfer processes which in turn will facilitate the delivery 
of fundamental human rights, such as the right to education, health, access to food, 
and freedom of information that form part of the composite RTD in the target state, 
more likely than not, a DC and/or LDC. 
 
The Author argues that generating the real technology spillover
83
, which will help to 
realise the RTD in the target state, will require balancing foreign investor intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection with the use of competition law and potential WTO 
surveillance to check on misuse of MNC market power on the one hand, with 
incentivising the international business community to invest in technology transfer to 
the target state on the other
84
. In achieving the latter, the Author puts forward a 
recommendation for introducing a Right to Development Tax Relief (―RTD Tax 
Relief‖) that will operate in investor states and be administered jointly through the 
investor state‘s department for international development and tax revenue 
departments, and that will apply to any nationally registered MNC under relevant 
Company Act legislation in the investor state
85
.  
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 Ibid, citing the Independent Expert, ―Third Report of the Independent Expert on the Right To 
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In proposing the Theory, the Author hopes to link the human-centred RTD with target 
and investor state obligations under domestic economic law and investor state 
obligations under IEL, giving for the first time a potential legal mechanism for the 
implementation of the RTD that will be founded both in equity and justice, and which 
will have justiciability. Besides demonstrating the link between the RTD and 
economic law by way of discussing the law, the Author also demonstrates the link 
through simple economic theory, using a series of (symbolic) equations culminating 
in Equation 5 discussed below. The value in Equation 5 is to indicate the economic 
variables that the RTD could depend on, and therefore, provide the basis for further 
research, both legal and econometric, that could test the link between the RTD, FDI, 
and GDP. In addition, more work is needed to understand the process of FDI and any 
technology spillover that may result in the target state (if any), in particular, to 
examine the processes of spillover that may have a direct bearing on the RTD where, 
for example, there is a large technology gap between local domestic and FDI firms.
86
.  
 
 
 
10.5  The Economic Right To Development Theory 
 
In a recent report by the open-ended working group on the RTD of the Human Rights 
Commission (Economic and Social Council), the working group states that: ―The 
right to development has been defined as the particular process of development in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.  It is a 
process of step-by-step progressive realization of all the rights, the implementation of 
a development policy to realize these rights, and the relaxation of resource constraints 
                                                                                                                                            
Intellectual Property and Development, 2002 at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/text/final_report/chapter1htmf, accessed February 2010, p.16. 
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 In developing the RTD Theory and Equation 5, the Author was reminded of the popular fictional 
story of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde by Robert Louis Stevenson. ―It was on the moral side, and in my own 
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Chapter 10 of the book by Stevenson.  In looking at Equation 5, we could liken the parameters dealing 
with human rights in a similar way to Stevenson‘s fictional character Henry Jekyll demonstrating 
man‘s tendency for goodness, his desire to alleviate the suffering of his fellow man and the respect of 
basic human rights, and Edward Hyde, with commercial interests, a potential desire for greed and a 
potential disregard for the rights of others; and yet they are one and the same man. We can see a similar 
balance/conflict in Equation 5 with both commercial and human rights variables appearing in the same 
equation. 
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on these rights through economic growth. The right to this process has to be viewed as 
a composite right wherein all the rights are realized together in an interdependent and 
integrated manner.  The integrity of these rights implies that if any one of them is 
violated, the composite right to development is also violated.‖87 In a separate report 
by the working group in reviewing the progress and the obstacles in the 
implementation of the RTD, the working group states that: ―The Independent Expert 
has defined the RTD, following Article 1 and the preamble to the Declaration, as a 
right to a particular process of development in which `all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized‘. Development is regarded as a process of 
economic growth, with expanding output and employment, institutional 
transformation and technological progress of a country that steadily improves the 
well-being of the people.‖88 
 
It is this concept of linking the RTD with a process of development and as a process 
of economic growth, which depends to some extent on technological progress that this 
chapter is concerned with. In this chapter, the Author argues that technological 
processes for the delivery of food (for example technology transfer for cooling 
systems in refrigeration trucks), access to health (electronic medical records, 
machinery for blood sampling and treatment), education (on-line educational 
resources, technology for educational materials in CD ROM or machine readable 
format), freedom of expression (access to the internet and communications 
infrastructure), all can be delivered by way of effective technology transfer, and that 
technology transfer depends to some extent on international and national frameworks 
for the regulation of IPRs and competition. The working group on the RTD has made 
explicit reference to technology transfer and the RTD. For example in its report 
reviewing the progress of the RTD, the working group states that: 
 
―19. Availability of resources - material and human - and access to 
technology have always been recognized as the forces that drive and sustain 
                                                 
87
 Preliminary study of the independent expert on the right to development, Mr. Arjun Sengupta, on the 
impact of international economic and financial issues on the enjoyment of human rights, submitted in 
accordance with commission resolutions 2001/9 and 2002/69, E/CN.4/2003/WG.18/2, Geneva 2003, 
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 Consideration of the sixth report of the independent expert on the right to development, 
E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2, February 2004, p.4. 
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the development process.  Indeed, access to appropriate technology has often 
been the more critical input in undertaking development.  It has not only been 
a substitute for other inputs, but has also provided the quantum jumps in 
attaining outcomes perceived, at some point in time, as being unattainable.  It 
has been the means by which the developing countries have tried to catch up 
with those that had a head start, and it has been the tool that the developed 
world has used in attaining and sustaining their well-being and living 
standards.  The issue of access to and transfer of technology is, however, an 
issue between the developed and the developing world.‖89   
 
10.6 The RTD and Collective Rights 
 
We will come back to the issue of access to and transfer of technology slightly later in 
this chapter. In developing the Theory however, an important question to ask is 
whether the RTD can apply to a collective of people or is specifically tied to an 
individual living person? The question is important to answer as if the RTD can only 
be recognised as an individual right, then it would be much more difficult to link 
(directly) enforcement of the RTD with the regulation of intellectual property or 
competition at the domestic level, than if the RTD can be linked directly to a 
collective of people. The reason for this is that the regulation of intellectual property 
and/or competition is economic law, and from the perspective of English law for 
example, economic law comprises the regulation of State interference with the affairs 
of commerce, industry and finance
90
. The eminent legal scholar and jurist, Clive 
Schmitthoff once argued that ―English economic law shows two characteristics. First, 
it has evolved the central concept of public interest and, secondly, its fabric is very 
different from that of other branches of law…The new concept of public interest is 
used to indicate the wide-and growing-area in which Parliament has regulated certain 
activities of private persons in the social and economic sphere because it considers 
such regulation to be desirable for the common weal. The concept of public interest is 
thus a socio-political concept.‖91 In a similar vein, the noted international trade lawyer 
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90
 Sealy LS and Hooley RJA, Commercial Law, Text Cases and Materials, Third Edition, Lexis/Nexis 
Butterworths, p.31. 
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 Schmitthoff CM, ―The Concept of Economic Law in England‖ [1966] JBL 309, pp315, 318-319 cited 
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and legal jurist John H. Jackson once defined international economic law as 
embracing ―trade, investment, services when they are involved in transactions that 
cross national borders, and those subjects that involve the establishment on national 
territory of economic activity of persons or firms originating from outside that 
territory.‖92 We can see therefore that from such guidance, a link between economic 
law and ―people‖, as a collective, can be easily established, but not as easily linked 
perhaps to an individual, although more recent legislative frameworks for competition 
law are increasingly recognising the interests of individuals, such as the ―consumer‖ 
in policymaking, for example in the regulation of electronic communications 
services
93
. The question therefore is to determine whether the RTD applies only to 
individuals or also gives rise to collective rights: If the latter, then it becomes easier to 
link the RTD with a system of economic law, and therefore the transfer of technology 
(and hence IP and competition frameworks). The importance of making this link is to 
then realise the RTD through effective enforcement of domestic economic law in the 
target state, and also to look for economic solutions that can be equally enforced in 
investor states.  
 
In reading the Declaration, Article 2(1) sets out the RTD as a human-centred right: 
 
―The human person is central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.‖ 
 
However at the same time, the then Independent Expert (Arjun Sengupta) also refers 
to the collective rights that arise as a consequence of the Declaration
94
. He argues that 
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the right to development was promoted both by the Third World protagonists and 
First World critics as a ―collective right of states and of peoples for development.‖95 
This is an indirect reference to the concepts of PSNR and NIEO discussed earlier in 
Section 10.1. Article 1 Declaration recognises the collective rights of peoples by 
stating: ―all peoples are entitled to the human right to development.‖  
 
In discussing collective rights, the Independent Expert cites Georges Abi-Saab, who 
suggests a possible definition of collective rights as a sum-total of double aggregation 
of the rights and of the individuals. (If there are n different rights, ri, i = 1, ….n, and if 
there are m different individuals j = 1, . . .m, having these rights, the collective rights 
will be R = i  j rij )96. In effect, this equation links individual rights and the 
rights of the collective. The Independent Expert goes onto argue that ―In the case of a 
collective right, such as that to self determination, the right-holder may be a collective 
such as nation, but the beneficiary of the exercise of the right has to be an 
individual…Indeed, in many cases individual rights can be satisfied only in a 
collective context, and the right of a state or nation to develop is a necessary condition 
for the fulfilment of the rights and the realization of the development of 
individuals.‖97 In one of its reports, the open-ended working group on the RTD (under 
the ESC Commission on Human Rights) has argued that ―the realization of the right 
to development is seen as the fulfilment of a set of claims by people, principally on 
their State but also on the society at large, including the international community, to a 
process that enables them to realize the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
International Bill of Human Rights.‖98 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.minorityrights.org/Legal/development/rtd_pt1_considering.pdf, date accessed February 
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The Independent Expert also argues that in understanding the concept of collective 
rights and its link to the process of development, three fundamental criteria need to be 
met in realising the RTD: 
 
(a) effective participation of all individuals in the decision-making and the 
execution of the process of development, which would necessarily require 
transparency and accountability of all activities; and  
(b) equality of access to resources; and 
(c) equity in the sharing of benefits.99 
 
We see here a strong reflection of the ideas expressed by the school of Alternative 
Technology and the Human Development and Alternative Development Paradigms 
discussed above in Section 10.2 ICTs and Development. In applying Sengupta‘s 
criteria to the development of the RTD Theory and the establishment of a RTD Tax 
Relief, it can be argued that: (a) will be satisfied in the target state if a fully 
transparent legislative procedure involving the executive, judiciary, the legislature and 
civil society of the target state is able to pass economic law (competition and IP laws) 
that will realise effective technology transfer in the target state; and (b) will be 
satisfied if technology transfer can lead to technology being accessed and used in a 
fair and equitable way for the benefit of all members of the community of the target 
state (and particularly at the local community level following the Human 
Development and Alternative Development Paradigms); and (c) will be satisfied if the 
benefits of the technological processes delivered through technology transfer actually 
lead to improved access to food, education, health, and freedom of expression for all 
members of the community of the target state. As the Independent Expert argues, the 
three criteria (a)-(c) are ―the essential elements of the process of development which 
make the right to that process a human right and which are the foundation of a right to 
development-development with equity and justice.‖100 
 
 
10.7 The RTD and Economic Law 
 
                                                 
99
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100
 Ibid, p.13. 
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Having linked the RTD to collective rights, it now becomes necessary to examine 
more closely how the RTD can be linked with economic law. To begin this process, it 
would be first helpful to look at the Vienna Declaration 1993
101
, which established 
the consensus of the RTD as a human right (and which the United States accepted). 
Paragraph 10 of the Vienna Declaration states that: ―Lasting progress towards the 
implementation of the right to development requires effective development policies at 
the national level, as well as equitable economic relations and a favourable economic 
environment at the international level.‖102 The Vienna Declaration clearly states that 
the RTD requires a favourable economic environment at the international level, which 
using economic terminology can be re-stated as, the RTD is a function of an equitable 
economic environment at the international level. An equitable economic environment 
at the international level can in turn be described as a function of the effective 
regulation of IEL. The regulation of IEL will depend on international treaties dealing 
with economic issues such as trade, competition intellectual property rights, and 
technology transfer, and primarily the WTO‘s TRIPS Agreement.  
 
As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, TRIPS creates a number of obligations on the 
international community for technology transfer, particularly as regards DCs and 
LDCs. For example, Article 66.2 TRIPS Agreement, which calls for Developed 
country Members to ―provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base.‖ Furthermore, Paragraph 11.2 of the Doha Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (the ―Implementing Decision‖) 
reaffirms that the provisions of Article 66.2 are mandatory, and that the TRIPS 
Council ―puts in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full 
implementation of the obligations in question‖.103 On 19th February 2003, the TRIPS 
Council made a decision on implementing Article 66.2 in compliance with paragraph 
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11.2 Implementing Decision, requiring developed country Members to submit annual 
reports on actions taken or planned in pursuance of their commitments under Article 
66.2
104
.  
 
With the failure of the discussions at Doha, there should perhaps be further movement 
here. For example, in a Decision (General Cancun Decision) adopted by the WTO‘s 
General Council in August 2004, the Council has instructed the Committee on Trade 
and Development to ―expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding 
Agreement-specific proposals on special and differential treatment and report to the 
General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 2005.‖105 
Provisions on special and differential treatment affect DCs and LDCs in that they 
grant such countries certain preferences at the WTO. We will, however, have to wait 
and see to determine whether the review will have any meaningful outcome for DCs 
and LDCs
106
. A committee has been created look into the Special and Differential 
Rights (S&D) of DCs and LDCs. The committee is to look at alternative ways of 
achieving S&D, for example to make legal recourse to dispute settlement conditional 
on applying a test of whether trade policy meets development objectives. The test 
would focus on the likely net effects of not implementing WTO rules in favour of a 
more development orientated trade policy
107
.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 8, in an ideal world, an effective IPR regime should not 
block innovation or effective competition in the target state. Article 7 TRIPS 
Agreement sets out the objective that the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology.  Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement 
also contains a number of provisions that deal with anti-competitive conduct, 
including Articles 8 and 40 (see Chapter 8). Article 8.2 also allows for Members to 
adopt ―appropriate measures‖ to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
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right holders or the resort to practices which ―unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology‖. Again under Article 40.2 TRIPS, 
members may adopt appropriate measures to prevent or control anti-competitive 
practices. Article 31 TRIPS sets out the conditions for compulsory licensing
108
 (see 
Chapter 8). However, in order to implement such measures, LDCs and DCs are left 
with the task of putting in place effective IPR legislation, which requires both trained 
personnel and resources
109
. In the area of human rights, we can also find obligations 
on the international community in finding solutions to international economic 
problems, so for example under Articles 1, 55
110
 and 56 of the United Nations Charter 
which specifically make reference to international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic nature. Both TRIPS and the UN Charter are legally binding 
treaties, TRIPS in particular, given the availability of sanctions under the WTO‘s 
Annex on Dispute Settlement
111
. Furthermore, the Declaration itself contains specific 
provisions on cooperation at the international level to promote an equitable economic 
environment. Article 3(3) Declaration states that: 
 
“3. States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development 
and eliminating obstacles to development. States should realize their rights 
and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new international 
economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest 
and co-operation among all States, as well as to encourage the observance and 
realization of human rights.‖ 
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As mentioned earlier however, the Declaration is not a legally binding instrument, 
although Sengupta has argued that the RTD could in time become customary law, and 
that in addition, the RTD deals with rights recognised in international conventions, 
that are legally binding
112
. Finally, there are two other international instruments that 
although may not be legally binding, nevertheless have relevance particularly in 
influencing the role of MNCs in helping to enforce (indirectly) the RTD. The first 
instrument is the UN Global Compact
113
, which seeks to regulate the business 
practices of transnational corporations as well as to promote principles that could be 
incorporated into company policy in human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-
corruption. The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument, but instead relies on 
public accountability, transparency, labour and civil society. The second instrument is 
the UN Norms on Corporate Responsibility developed by the working group of the 
UN Sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights, and adopted 
by the sub-commission in August 2003
114
. The Norms recognise that although States 
are primarily responsible for protecting human rights, MNCs are also responsible for 
promoting the principles as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and 
several other treaties dealing with civil and political, economic cultural and social 
rights
115
. The Norms are not legally binding, but many of the substantive provisions 
on human rights contained in the Norms do make use of existing provisions in 
international law, the Norms now applying these provisions to private enterprises
116
.  
 
 
10.8 Obligations at the domestic (target state) level 
 
As obligations on economic law can be imposed on States at the international level to 
comply with certain treaties, such as TRIPS, so too can similar obligations be 
imposed at the domestic level, and specifically the target state. For example, TRIPS 
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sets-out specific requirements for domestic legislation in the protection of IPRs and 
such obligations when coupled with IPR provisions in certain bilateral or Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) can create TRIPS-plus provisions that will also apply at the 
domestic level
117
. As a consequence of signing such agreements, the target state, 
usually a DC or LDC, will then find its hands tied in terms of having effective control 
over its own domestic regulatory agenda on say foreign investment, competition, 
IPRS, and labour standards. As such, the target state will need to balance any local 
measures introduced to generate increased spillover through technology transfer (for 
example through the imposition of performance requirements
118
), IPR legislation, and 
competition law to check possible MNC IPR exploitation with its obligations under 
bilateral/investment/FTA agreements. Generating effective spillover in the local target 
market is crucial for DC and LDC innovation and growth.  The actual diffusion of 
technology into the local market (spillover) is as important as the technology transfer 
itself (see Chapter 8).   
 
There is also the related issue of absorption. It is one thing to create policy incentives 
to encourage MNCs in generating spillover, but quite another for developing country 
producers to use bare, documented technological information, which is dependant on 
the absorption capacity of the producers. As mentioned earlier, development is 
regarded as ―a process of economic growth, with expanding output and employment, 
institutional transformation and technological progress of a country that steadily 
improves the well-being of the people.‖119 It is this concept of linking the RTD with a 
process of development and as a process of economic growth, which depends to an 
increasing extent on technological processes that will help deliver access to adequate 
food, health, education, cultural life and scientific progress. The ICESR, a legally 
binding international treaty, sets out specific rights in this regard with a right to an 
adequate standard of living including adequate food
120
, the right to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
121
, the right to 
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education
122
, and the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress
123
, all of which can be delivered through technological processes. 
The Author does not argue that access to effective technology is the only way to 
achieve such rights, but it is becoming an increasingly significant way given the costs 
involved. For example, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter and cited again here, 
the Human Rights Commission working group on the RTD has specifically stated 
that: ―Availability of resources - material and human - and access to technology have 
always been recognized as the forces that drive and sustain the development process.  
Indeed, access to appropriate technology has often been the more critical input in 
undertaking development.  It has not only been a substitute for other inputs, but has 
also provided the quantum jumps in attaining outcomes perceived, at some point in 
time, as being unattainable.‖124 To what extent then is the target state under an 
obligation to implement the economic and social rights mentioned above, and can any 
legal relationship be found between the RTD and economic and technological 
indicators? This question is addressed in the next section. 
 
10.9 The Legal Obligation 
 
Article 2(1) ICESCR sets out the legal obligation: 
   
―Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.‖ 
 
Commentators have questioned whether Article 2(1) gives rise to obligations that are 
immediately justiciable, and although there has been controversy on the subject, it 
does appear that the Article does give rise to obligations on States with immediate 
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legal effect
125
. And so under Principle 21 of the Limburg Principles (which provide 
guidelines on the implementation of the ICESCR Covenant): 
 
―The obligation `to achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights‘ 
requires State parties to move as expeditiously as possible towards the 
realisation of the rights. Under no circumstances shall this be interpreted as 
implying for States the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full 
realisation. On the contrary all State parties have the obligation to begin 
immediately to take steps to fulfil their obligations under the [ICESCR]
126
 
Covenant.‖127 
 
Similarly Principle 17 of the Limburg Principles state that: 
 
―At the national level States parties shall use all appropriate means, including 
legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, social and educational 
measures, consistent with the nature of the rights in order to fulfill their 
obligations under the Covenant.‖ 
 
Note however that although the obligations under Article 2(1) have immediate effect, 
both the Article and the Limburg Principles also specify that the State can ―take steps‖ 
in realising the rights set out in the ICESCR. Notwithstanding this however, clear 
obligations arise. Furthermore Article 8(1) Declaration also sets out obligations on the 
State: 
 
―States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the 
realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health 
services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income. 
Effective measures should be undertaken to ensure that women have an active 
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role in the development process. Appropriate economic and social reforms 
should be carried out with a view to eradicating all social injustices.‖ 
    
We can see here as well the reference to an economic solution for implementation of 
measures at the national level to realise the RTD. The Author suggests that one 
possible interpretation of an  ―economic solution‖ would be to put in place an 
effective domestic legislative framework in DCs and LDCs for intellectual property 
and competition law that would facilitate beneficial technology transfer and 
specifically the technological processes required to help deliver adequate access to 
food, health, education, the right to enjoy a cultural life, share in scientific progress, 
and provide the means of freedom of expression, all of which form part of the 
composite RTD.  
 
However there are considerable hurdles to jump. As the Commission on Intellectual 
Property states: ―Since many technologies of interest to developing countries are 
produced by organisations from developed countries, the acquisition of technology 
requires the ability to negotiate effectively based on an understanding of the particular 
area of technology. This process requires a determined approach on the part of the 
recipient of technology to acquire the necessary human capital and the appropriate 
institutions.‖128 We see here the relevance of the use of appropriate technology and 
the Human Development and Alternative Development paradigms mentioned earlier 
in Section 11.2 above. Clearly there are considerable costs in doing this and we 
should bear in mind that low-income countries, with over 40% of the world‘s 
population, account for less than 3% of world trade, with developed countries 
exporting around $6000 per capita and developing countries around $330 per capita, 
with the lowest income countries exporting less than $100
129
. In helping to tackle this 
problem, the Independent Expert has proposed an idea for a RTD-Development 
Compact (RTD-DC), which would form the basis of financial aid from the 
international community, but would also recognise the reciprocal obligations of both 
developed and developing countries. The Author has already discussed the RTD-DC 
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with respect to the US MCA above, but discusses the RTD-DC in more detail in 
section 10.13 below.  
 
Obligations at the domestic level however should not just apply to DCs and LDCs in 
attempting to attract technology transfer. The Author also argues that generating real 
technology spillover will require incentivising the international business community 
to invest in technology transfer to the target state. How this can be achieved is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
10.10 Right To Development Tax Relief 
 
To incentivise the international business (MNC) community, the Author puts forward 
a suggestion for introducing a Right to Development Tax Relief (―RTD Tax Relief‖) 
that will operate in investor states and be administered jointly through the investor 
state‘s international development department and/or tax revenue department, and that 
will apply to any nationally registered MNC under relevant Company Act legislation 
in the investor state. The Author argues that to qualify for the RTD Tax Relief, the 
MNC will need to satisfy a minimum set of Technology Transfer Terms (the 
―Terms‖), which the Author suggests could be established by the WTO‘s Working 
Group on Technology Transfer (WGTT), such Terms to be annexed to the investor 
state‘s implementing legislation for the RTD Tax Relief. Under this proposed scheme, 
MNCs will notify their technology transfer agreements to the relevant investor state‘s 
development department and/or tax revenue department.  
 
Both the development and tax revenue departments of the investor state could have 
concurrent jurisdiction (for example as compared to similar provisions on 
concurrency to be found in national competition law frameworks, such as the United 
Kingdom‘s Competition Act 1998, allowing for both a sector-specific national 
regulatory authority and a separate competition authority to hear competition 
complaints) to call for and examine such agreements, and if found to be in breach, 
have the power to impose both civil and criminal penalties both on the MNC as a 
corporate entity or individually on the MNC‘s board of directors. The power to do so 
will be set out in the implementing legislation bringing the RTD Tax Relief into force 
in the relevant investor state‘s jurisdiction. 
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There may be issues of State Aid linked to the implementation of the RTD Tax Relief 
which will need to be examined, for example in Europe, under Community 
competition rules on State Aid found in Articles 87 and 88 EC Treaty (now Articles 
107-109 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and relevant case law 
specifically defining the meaning of aid in terms of its effect, for example preferential 
tax treatment,
130
 and the application of the ‗market investor principle‘.131 Furthermore, 
there may be issues of State subsidies at the multilateral level given that the WTO 
also has certain rules (Subsidy Rules under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures) on States offering support to private industry. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the analysis of State Aid/WTO subsidy rules is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
The Author also suggests a sliding scale of tax relief: greater relief provided for 
MNCs licensing into LDCs with less relief available for licensing into DCs. The 
appropriate scale for tax relief, the Author suggests, could be set by the WGTT 
following a separate set of Measures. Alternatively, the Commission on Intellectual 
Property (CIPR) suggests that the TRIPS Council should consider introducing criteria 
to decide the basis on which LDCs should enforce the TRIPS obligations after 
2016.
132
 Such criteria could include indicators of economic development and 
scientific and technological capability as reflected in Article 66.1 TRIPS Agreement 
of the need for flexibility to create a viable technological base.
133
 In making this 
recommendation, the CIPR refers to a study completed by Lall and Albaladejo,
134
 
which set out various measures of scientific and technical capability in developing 
countries. The author can see no reason why a similar set of measures of scientific and 
technical capability (hereafter called the ―Measures‖) could not be used to set a 
sliding scale of tax relief providing the greatest relief to those MNCs investing in 
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developing countries with very low Measures, and gradually reducing the tax relief 
depending on rising Measures. The Measures suggested here are not the same as the 
Terms suggested in the text above. The Terms includes a minimum set of legal terms 
on technology transfer, approved by the WTO‘s Working Group on Technology 
Transfer, that would form the basis as to whether a MNC that included such terms in 
its technology transfer agreements with developing country producers/states would 
qualify for tax relief or not. It is a legal test, which if satisfied would qualify the MNC 
for tax relief. The Measures suggested above would then determine the scale of that 
tax relief: a higher Measure leading to lower tax relief and vice-versa. The Measures 
therefore would form more of an economic means-based test. 
 
In this section 10.10, we have looked at the mechanism of the RTD Tax Relief, how it 
could be constituted of separate Terms and Measures that operate in the form of a 
sliding scale for tax relief to the MNC (or TNC) interesting in transferring beneficial 
technology transfer to a receiving state. In Chapter 11, the author sets out how this 
RTD Tax Relief could be operationalised by way of the UN‘s Universal Periodic 
Review mechanism, and with specific reference to the United Kingdom 
(operationalising the RTD Tax Relief at a country-specific level).  
 
10.11  Linking the RTD with economic growth (GDP) and FDI 
 
By reviewing the obligations on States at both an international and domestic level, 
and looking at possible technological processes of development an explicit link 
between technology transfer and the RTD has now been made. In this section, the 
relationship between technology transfer and FDI is made, which would then provide 
the foundation for linking FDI with the RTD. Linking FDI with the RTD is significant 
as both, to some extent, are also linked with economic growth as defined by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The presumption is that by increasing FDI into a country, 
then that would have a corresponding effect on GDP, which in turn would impact the 
RTD. We can start then by asking the question: What is the relationship between FDI 
and technology transfer? 
 
Business partnerships are a major source of technology transfer including, FDI, Build 
Operate Transfer (BOT) agreements, subcontracting, licensing and franchising. There 
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has been much discussion of FDI in recent years. For example, UNCTAD‘s World 
Investment Report (2004) focuses on the shift to services in world trade and the role 
that FDI will play in that shift. According to the 2004 report, although global inflows 
of FDI declined in 2003 for the third year in a row, the prospects for FDI look to 
improve, particularly in Asia, and to developing countries, which experienced a 
growth of 9% in 2003 rising to $172 billion overall
135
. In terms of law, there were 244 
changes in laws and regulations affecting FDI in 2003, 220 of which further 
liberalisation
136
. FDI is discussed in the context of technology transfer in Chapter 8. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 8, FDI can be defined as the act of establishing or acquiring a 
foreign subsidiary (foreign affiliate) over which the investing firm (parent) has 
substantial management control
137
. This is quite a narrow definition for FDI. In a 
report for the Asian Development Bank surveying the technology spillovers from 
FDI
138, Fan, an ADB economist suggests a broader approach: ―FDI can potentially 
benefit domestic firms. The benefits arise from foreign firms demonstrating new 
technologies, providing technological assistance to their local suppliers and 
customers, and training workers who may subsequently move to local firms. Local 
firms can also learn by watching. Moreover, the very presence of foreign-owned firms 
in an economy increases competition in the domestic market. The competitive 
pressure may spur local firms to operate more efficiently and introduce new 
technologies earlier than would otherwise have been the case. Because foreign firms 
are not able to extract the full value of these gains, this effect is commonly referred to 
as the spillover effect.‖139  There are of course many negative effects of FDI including 
for example the crowding out of local businesses as a result of foreign entry. Dine 
discusses a number of negative consequences including citing a study by 
Borenszstein, De Gregorio and Lee showing that FDI only benefits countries that 
have average male schooling above one year of secondary education. Below that and 
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FDI has a negative effect
140
. Furthermore, that in many low-income countries, FDI is 
not sought for technology transfer but for the employment of low-skilled workers 
(mostly in low-technology manufacturing activities) and for foreign exchange
141
. In 
some cases, the need to attract FDI may result in the lowering of regulations relating 
to health and employment in the target state, particularly in dedicated ―Export Zones‖, 
where in the manufacturing sector materials may be imported by FDI firms, 
assembled and then exported with little or no use being made of local inputs other 
than labour. As Dine argues, ―If this is coupled with the tax concessions given to the 
companies to locate their plants in the country it can be seen that the development 
benefits from this strategy are negligible.‖142 
 
As we saw in Chapter 8, firms that engage in FDI and operate in more than one 
country can be classed as MNCs. MNCs can transfer technology in a number of ways 
as described above, but two main ways are either through FDI through a foreign 
subsidiary or through external licensing with a third party in the target state. MNC can 
achieve tighter control over the technology transfer process by using FDI, particularly 
when the target state‘s legislative framework for the protection of IPRs is weak. 
Although UNCTAD‘s 2004 report paints a favourable picture as regards FDI in-flow 
into developing countries, only a select group of DCs are actually receiving this 
investment: The majority loose out. In the last ten years, although global FDI figures 
have increased by almost a factor of five, only 0.5% of global FDI flows have been 
invested in 49 LDCs
143
. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the decentralization of 
R&D activity by MNCs will likely continue to be focused on a small number of DCs. 
For example in 2003, the top ten recipients for FDI in Asia were headed by China, 
Hong Kong (China), Singapore, India and the Republic of Korea, in that order
144
.  
However as mentioned above, it is not entirely clear to what extent FDI also 
contributes to actual technology spillover and absorption into local target markets. 
Fan suggests a more cautionary approach: ―Until now, policy frameworks in most 
developing countries have tended to focus predominantly on attracting FDI, 
particularly in high-technology areas. Policy initiatives have largely bypassed 
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measures to specifically enhance the spillover benefits from FDI. There are now a 
large number of empirical studies that suggest it is difficult for domestic firms to 
extract the potential benefits of spillovers when a large technology gap exists between 
domestic and FDI firms. FDI policy should thus be placed in a broader economic 
policy context in order for the host economies to maximize the benefit they derive 
from FDI inflow. Government policy can play a role by investing in growth theory. 
More rigorous theoretical work is needed to explore the relationship between FDI and 
spillovers, FDI and domestic firms, and the role of FDI in promoting growth.‖145 
 
Fan makes a reference to growth theory. The relationship between FDI and GDP 
described above illustrates a certain kind of thinking in economics known as ―New 
Growth Theory‖ (NGT), which takes as its central focus the growth of technological 
knowledge and its diffusion and absorption. NGT views innovation and imitation 
efforts that respond to economic incentives as major engines of growth (Fan 2002). 
Generally, growth theory falls into three broad categories: (1) post-Keynesian growth 
models which emphasise the role of savings and investment in promoting growth; (2) 
neo-classical models which emphasise technical progress; and (3) new growth models 
which emphasise the role of R&D, human capital accumulation and externalities
146
. 
Under the NGT model, the social rate of return to investment must exceed the private 
rate of return (Balasubramanyam 1996). In addition, under NGT, knowledge spillover 
contributes to growth in the aggregate. In his paper linking FDI with growth, 
Balasubramanyam argues that FDI has long been recognised as a major source of 
technology and know-how to developing countries, but that technical progress 
accounts for a low proportion of the growth experienced by most developing countries 
because of the lack of human capital
147
. He also argues that although NGT provides 
―powerful support for the thesis that FDI could be a potent factor in promoting 
growth‖, the absence of a favourable economic climate could result in FDI becoming 
counter-productive, in that FDI can actually ―thwart rather than promote growth‖ and 
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may ―enhance the private rate of return to investment by foreign firms while exerting 
little impact on social rates of return in the recipient economy.‖148 
 
Clearly the jury is still out on FDI and its significance to local spillover. 
Notwithstanding Fan‘s and Balasubramanyam‘s cautionary comments on FDI, it is 
perhaps at this stage that we should ask: what exactly is the economic relationship 
between the RTD and GDP, and between GDP and FDI? And therefore is it possible 
to establish a relationship between FDI and the RTD? If the latter is possible, then 
could we find a way of achieving/enforcing the RTD through FDI, and as a 
component of FDI, technology transfer?  
 
10.12 The Link between FDI, GDP and the RTD 
 
Sengupta has suggested a symbolic (economic) approach that links the RTD with 
GDP
149
. As background he explains that the realisation of many of the interdependent 
human rights depends on the sufficient availability of goods and services, and that 
such availability is constrained by a country‘s resources, represented to some extent 
by GDP. Furthermore he argues that ―access to the relevant goods and services would 
depend on public policies, including public expenditure which cannot expand 
indefinitely without an increase in public revenue; this in turn, would be related to the 
country‘s GDP. A process of development in which all rights are realised together 
would, therefore, include growth of GDP as an element that would relax the country‘s 
resource constraints.‖150 How then can we link the well-understood and documented 
ways of growing GDP by way of investment (both domestic and foreign) with the 
RTD? 
 
Marks in reviewing Sengupta‘s symbolic theory linking the RTD with GDP151, where 
Sengupta describes the RTD as a vector, shows it symbolically as: 
RD  = (g, R1 ,  R2, ……Rn  )   (1) 
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Where RD is the right to development, which consists in an undefined relationship 
between growth in domestic product (g) and the realisation of ―n‖ number of human 
rights.  
 
In their paper analysing the relationship between trade strategy, FDI and growth in 
developing countries in the context of New Growth Theory
152
, economists 
Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford
153
 test a hypothesis put forward by the 
economist Jagdish Bhagwati that the volume and efficacy of incoming FDI will vary 
according to whether a country is following the export promoting (EP) or the import 
substituting strategy (IS)
 154
. Balasubramanyam et al test Bhagwati‘s hypothesis, 
using the formula: 
 
Y = g(L, K, F, X, t),   (2) 
 
where: Y = gross domestic product (GDP), 
 L = Labour input, 
 K = domestic capital stock, 
 F = stock of foreign capital, 
 X = exports, 
  t  = a time trend, capturing the technical progress. The term ―g‖ expresses that  
 Y (GDP) is a function (more precisely, a production function) of the variables  
 on the right hand side of the equation. 
 
They then difference equation 2 above (measure the rate of change of the variables 
with respect to time ―t‖) giving155: 
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y =  l + k + f + ,x   (3)156 
 
Where the lower case letters denote the rate of growth (in terms of time t) of the 
individual variables set out in equation 1 (so for example ―l‖ shows the growth rate of 
labour input and ―x‖ is the growth rate of exports). The parameters  ,,,  are 
output elasticities of labour, domestic capital, foreign capital and exports respectively, 
and y is the rate of growth of GDP with time t. They argue that because of the well 
known difficulties of accurately measuring capital stock (domestic and foreign 
capital), they approximate instead the rate of growth of the capital stock by the share 
of the respective domestic and foreign capital stock in GDP. Balasubramanyam et al 
do this by replacing the rates of change in domestic and foreign capital inputs by the 
share of domestic investment and foreign direct investment in GDP (so k = I/Y and f 
= FDI/Y), where I is domestic investment, FDI is foreign direct investment and Y is 
GDP. This then yields the following equation: 
 
y =   l +  (I/Y) +  (FDI/Y) + x ,  (4) 
 
Balasubramanyam et al therefore arrive at equation (4) linking the rate of change of 
growth (GDP) and FDI. The Author now makes use of equation 4 by substituting the 
term for ―y‖ in equation 4 for g157 in equation 1 (which links the RTD with the rate of 
growth of GDP), giving: 
 
RD  = ([  l +  (I/Y) +  (FDI/Y) + x ], R1 ,  R2, ……Rn  ) (5) 
 
Equation 5 now shows in a purely symbolic way the potential relationship between 
the RTD expressed by the symbol RD   with foreign direct investment (FDI)
158
. It also 
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shows the potential relationship between the RTD on the one hand, and domestic 
investment, domestic labour productivity, and the growth rate of exports on the 
other.
159
  
 
The significance of the symbolic Equation 5 is in linking the RTD with economic 
factors promoting growth (GDP), such as FDI, labour and the growth in exports. All 
of these factors can be measured and enforced through domestic economic law in the 
target state. However, as mentioned above, examining FDI, specifically technology 
transfer processes and their relationship to spillover in the target market require 
further analysis.  
 
In the discussion above, it would appear that the author is attempting to combine 
Bhagwati‘s essentially market based economic growth model approach with 
Sengupta‘s social justice model (based on Sen‘s capabilities approach). This would at 
first appear to be a contradiction of terms. Furthermore (and as a subset of the 
sentence before), that Equation 5 as a consequence also appears to be presented as a 
new form of economic theory. In both cases, this is not the author‘s intention. As 
regards the first concern on linking a market-based approach with a social justice 
model, the idea of linking the concept of a RTD (social justice) with FDI (market-
based), for example is to show that economic, social and cultural rights cannot be 
improved without simultaneous improvement to civil and political rights. This is 
indicated by the discussion in Chapter 2 when examining the specific components of 
the International Digital Divide. The thinking behind Equation 5 is to demonstrate 
that although economic rights might be addressed through a beneficial technology 
transfer, unless citizens of the receiving state also have access to the necessary 
freedoms under civil and political rights (viz freedom of expression and/or a right to 
privacy) to enjoy the technology transferred (for example access to technological 
services, such as narrowband and broadband internet access brought about by FDI 
into the receiving state‘s telecommunications sector), then the advantages of access to 
the Internet are diminished, perpetuating the Divide. We saw in Chapter 2 (section 
2.3.4 Human Capital Base) in research by Norris of the significance of access to 
                                                                                                                                            
to test the equation and to find an appropriate statistically defined relationship. See the Conclusion 
section below. 
159
 Measurements, for which the Author argues can be made, and variables, which can be enforced in 
domestic frameworks of economic law. 
 369 
media to help address the Digital Divide. Similarly, if a receiving state was to 
introduce a data termination charge (as part of its telecommunication laws regulating 
market-based economic growth) on all content providers (providers of audio or video 
including NGOs, such as Amnesty International) in socially restrictive states, then 
innovation would be impacted, and likewise freedom of expression. A data 
termination charge would be a charge imposed by infrastructure operators on content 
providers to ‗deliver‘ the latter‘s content to end-users connected to the infrastructure 
operator‘s network. Innovation would be impacted because it would be more 
expensive for providers of content to directly reach end-users and therefore a 
disincentive to create new content rich applications. In this respect, linking the RTD 
(a rights based on model of social justice) on the left hand side of Equation 5 with 
FDI (market-based economic growth model) on the right hand side is illustrative only 
of this subtle linkage. Equation 5 is not a new economic model for growth. It is 
symbolic only, demonstrating the subtle links between Sengupta‘s concept of social 
justice (RTD) with Bhagwati‘s concept of economic growth (FDI).  
 
With this said, assuming that such research on economic growth, for example in large 
magnets for FDI like China and India will be forthcoming, the question then remains 
as to how DCs and LDCs can be assisted in achieving Equation 5, in growing GDP, 
and how the developed countries can help. This in part, can be through the RTD-
Development Compact, proposed by the Independent Expert (Sengupta), and 
discussed in the next section. 
 
10.13 The RTD Development Compact 
 
The RTD-Development Compact (RTD-DC) is a mechanism for implementing the 
RTD. It is the mechanism, as put forward by the Independent Expert, by which DCs 
and LDCs enter into a ―development compact‖ with the international community to 
seek assistance and cooperation in meeting its development goals
160
. As the 
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Commission on Human Rights working group on the RTD made clear in 2004
161, ―the 
logic of a development compact rests on the acceptance by and a legal commitment of 
the international community to pursue, individually and collectively, the universal 
realization of all human rights and, on their part, for the developing countries to 
follow explicitly a development strategy geared towards the universal realization of 
human rights.‖162 The RTD-DC is based on a framework of mutual commitment or 
reciprocal obligations between the target state and the [investing] international 
community to ―recognise, promote and protect the universal realisation of all human 
rights.‖163 
 
As the HR Working Group on the RTD makes clear, three essential elements are 
required to bring a RTD-DC to life: (1) a programme of development to which target 
state civil society, donor institutions, and other countries are consulted on, and which 
specifies policies and sequential measures to be adopted in order to realise the RTD; 
(2) which specifies the responsibilities of donors and multilateral agencies, detailing 
their Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget; and (3) an effective monitoring 
system. Sengupta (the then Independent Expert) argues that to finance the RTD-DC, 
the international community will need to honour existing ODA commitments of 0.7% 
of their GNP to go into a ―callable fund‖164, which would be serviced by a support 
group, and which would review DC and LDC proposals for funding
165
.  This callable 
fund is similar in concept to the MCA proposed by the US Bush Administration, but 
depends on multilateral funding as opposed to the MCA. 
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What are the reciprocal obligations that could form the basis for any RTD-DC? The 
Author argues that as regards the developed countries, the obligations could be in 
putting-in-place a RTD Tax Relief as discussed above, honouring current 
commitments on ODA, and in the long term, honouring existing commitments under 
WTO law, such as Article 66.2 TRIPS on technology transfer and technical 
assistance, and already agreed provisions on Special & Differential Treatment for 
DCs and LDCs
166
.  
 
As to the other side of the development compact, obligations on DCs and LDCs 
would be in developing national development policies that have the RTD as their very 
foundation; putting-in-place effective IPR regimes to facilitate technology transfer 
and FDI, and competition frameworks to check any imbalance of IPRs
167
; and 
conducting more research at a national level, with the help of the international 
community, to examine the relationship between FDI, technology transfer, local 
spillover, and its implications for development and the Digital Divide. In Chapter 12, 
the concluding Chapter, the Author discusses how and why the WTO (rather than the 
Commission for Human Rights for example) could be involved in the implementation 
of the RTD-DC and the RTD Tax Relief to help address the Digital Divide, and also 
the role that developed national governments and the governments of DCs and LDCs 
could play in that process. And finally, and importantly, the Author summarises the 
research completed for this thesis and whether the questions (i)-(iii) posed in Section 
1.1 (Introduction) have been addressed.  
 
The next chapter (11) discusses one way as to how the RTD can be operationalised, 
for example by looking at the position of the UK and how MNCs based in the UK can 
be incentivised to provide beneficial technology transfer to producers in DCs/LD 
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Chapter 11 
 
Operationalizing the Right to Development: The RTD Tax and 
the Universal Periodic Review 
 
 
In a world of interconnected threats and opportunities, it is in each country‘s self 
interests that all of these challenges are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of 
larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep, and sustained global corporation 
among states. The world needs strong and capable states, effective partnership with 
civil society and the private sector, and agile and effective regional and global 
intergovernmental institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. 
Report of Kofi Annan, UN  Secretary-General In larger freedom, September 
2005 
 
The right to development can only be compelling for those who find the principle on 
which it is based to be compelling. 
 High Level Task Force on the implementation of the right to development, 
March 2010 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks to take the conclusions on the Right To Development set out in the 
previous chapter and to explain how the RTD can be operationalised.  As we saw 
from the previous chapter, it is possible to think of the RTD as a legally enforceable 
right and that this right extends to both individuals and communities, and to States 
acting on behalf of both. The RTD can be seen as a vector of the individual human 
rights and which is dependant on the effective implementation of a general set of civil 
and political, and social and economic rights within the country concerned.  And as 
we saw also in the previous chapter, it is not possible to envisage greater social and 
economic rights without also considering enforcement of civil and political rights. 
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Educating the human capital base is just as important as setting in place the right to a 
free press, the right to privacy, and freedom of expression.   
The aim of this chapter is to establish a mechanism for operationalising the 
RTD. This chapter suggests that the RTD Tax Relief described in the previous chapter 
can be implemented and enforced through the UN‘s Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism (‗UPR‘) established by the Human Rights Council (‗HRC‘) in Resolution 
5/1 of 18
th
 June 2007.  
The chapter provides a template for operationalising the RTD by providing for 
a Technology Transfer Tax Credit in WTO member state domestic law, and that 
would be available to MNCs registered for corporation tax purposes in that member 
state to receive a tax credit for technology transferred by the MNC to producers in 
DCs and/or LDCs. The chapter provides a case study of the  United Kingdom, and the 
UK‘s Department for International Development. The chapter argues that the UK, 
with a long tradition of providing aid to developing countries and with a relatively 
advanced tax collection regime, could provide leadership in operationalising the RTD, 
and developing a UPR reporting template to the HRC that could be used by other 
developed nations, particularly the Quad States, and industrializing developing 
nations, such as India, China and Brazil. The chapter argues that the latter three states 
in particular are in a position to offer leadership through multilateral fora to the Group 
of G90 and like-minded states in bringing the indivisibility and interdependence of the 
RTD to all States. This could be by implementing a tax credit scheme as outlined by 
the UK case study in this chapter, and then reporting on the performance of this 
scheme as part of the cycle of reviews under the UPR process.  
 
 
11.2 Right To Development 
 
The UN commission on human rights established the Independent expert on the right 
to development (Arjun  Sengupta--subsequently replaced in 2006 by  a task force that 
was perceived to have a broader base of expert advice on the implementation of the 
declaration on the rights to development).
168
  The task force was required to 
investigate criteria on the compliance of Millenium Development Goal 8 (MDG 8)  
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 A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/CRP.4, January 2010, para 2. 
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with the RTD.
169
  According to the report on expert consultation by the high-level 
task force on the implementation of the RTD (sixth session), the task force has now 
reviewed 12 global development, aid and trade-based partnerships with a view to 
establishing criteria and sub-criteria  in compliance with the RTD. The aim of this 
exercise was to   ―Move the right to development from political commitment to 
development practice, using as a tool a set of criteria and operational sub criteria for 
the periodic evaluation of compliance with the RTD.‖170   Participants to the working 
group on the right to development (sixth session), were clear that the primary 
addressees of these criteria were states and intergovernmental mechanisms and 
processes, such as the working group on the RTD, the Human Rights Council, the 
General assembly and the treaty monitoring bodies of the United Nations.
171
 The 
participants identified national institutions, academic institutions and civil society 
organizations as secondary audiences. Also, the participants recognized that under 
international human rights law, governments would be regarded as the duty bearers 
rather than the claimants of rights under the RTD. However, states also represented 
the collective interests of those people under their jurisdiction, which then gave them 
the right (potentially) to make claims under the RTD for their citizens.
172
  The 
participants also made clear that the criterion that the task force were recommending 
would ―seek to provide greater content to the right to development and therefore must 
use terms which will last over time, while indicators may reflect current conditions 
and require revision to future use.‖173 The selection of the criteria and indicators 
required close methodological scrutiny.  
 
 
11.2.1 RTD Criteria: Core Norm, attributes and indicators 
 
The RTD draft criteria have now been published by the working group on theRTD in 
its March report 2010. 
174
  In the annex to the report, the task force sets out a table  
listing the criteria. The task force makes clear the basic expectation of the RTD is the 
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 A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2, March 2010 at the Annex to the report.  
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Core Norm. This ―Core Norm‖ has three attributes175:  ―(a) States acting collectively 
in global and regional partnerships; (b) States acting individually as they adopt and 
implement policies that affect persons not strictly within their jurisdiction; and (c) 
States acting individually as they formulate national development policies and 
programmes affecting persons within their jurisdiction.‖ 176  Each of the three 
attributes are assessed by reference to several criteria, and these in turn are referenced 
through a selection of sub-criteria.  The sub-criteria are supported from a range of 
reliable measurement tools listed in the footnotes to the Annex.
177
  According to the 
high-level task force, the criteria and sub-criteria are meant to stay relatively stable, 
but the indicators are expected to change from time to time and as circumstances 
develop.
178
  
 
11.2.2 Problems with indicators and recommendations 
 
 In the June 2010 report by the chairperson rapporteur
179
, the report makes clear that 
there are several problems or concerns with regard to the RTD criteria. For example 
some delegations felt that there was a lack of clarity on the three sub levels of the 
criteria. Also there were concerns on who would monitor the limitation of the RTD 
and that there was a clear need to clarify the rights of peoples. 
180
 Others felt that the 
emphasis was slipping more to national efforts as opposed to international corporation 
and that there was a need to emphasise shared responsibility and access to resources. 
181
 There was concern also of the criteria adopting a human rights-based approach to 
development. Some felt that the emphasis should be on strengthening the economic 
development and capacity of states to promote and protect all human rights.
182
 There 
was also a perception that the criteria lacked an overall balance between national and 
international spheres of responsibility. Also that the criteria and corresponding sub 
criteria went beyond the contents of the RTD Declaration (discussed in Chapter 10) in 
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looking at other issues such as good governance and participation.
183
 It was agreed 
that the criteria would be circulated to governments and other entities so that they 
could be further refined and developed. Also, once agreement was reached on the 
criteria,, the working group would begin the process of developing a reporting 
template.
184
    
 
11.2.3 Reconciling the RTD Tax Relief with the RTD Criteria 
 
As mentioned above, the criteria for the RTD are set out in the annex to the March 
2010 report of the working group on the RTD high-level task force on the 
implementation of the right to development. 
 
The Annex lists several attributes. For example the first attribute is a comprehensive 
and human centred development policy. The second attribute is participatory human 
rights processes. The third attribute is on social justice in development. It would now 
be useful to consider how the RTD tax relief as described in the previous chapter can 
be reconciled against the attributes, criteria, sub criteria and indicators to the RTD. 
There are several criteria under which the RTD tax relief could fall. For example in 
attribute one, under 1(f) ―to promote and ensure access to adequate financial 
resources". The sub criteria at (1)(f)(i) is listed as ―domestic resource mobilisation" 
and the relevant indicator of this criteria is ―effective taxation policies that ensure 
mobilisation of maximum available resources to fill the performance of human 
rights." In the footnotes to the criteria, this indicator is defined as ―government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP". It is unclear exactly what this means from the point 
of view of taxation, and perhaps a more helpful criteria would be the next one down at 
1(g) ―to promote and ensure access to the benefits of science and technology". Here 
the relevant sub criteria is listed as 1(g)(i) ―poor technology development strategy", 
explained as ―the existence of a policy framework for technology development 
targeted at poor people's needs." Again the footnotes to the Annex define this criteria 
as ―the existence of a national policy statement on science and technology." Another 
relevant sub criteria to 1(g) is 1(g)(iii) defined as ―manufacturing technology" with 
the relevant indicator of ―technology component of exports and performance 
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requirement provisions in trade agreements." However it is not clear from this 
definition whether this is in relation to goods or services. Also of relevance under 
criteria 1(g), is sub criteria 1(g)(iv)  ―technology transfer, access and national 
capacity", where the relevant indicator is ―electricity consumption; Internet coverage; 
intellectual property and licensing, intellectual property and technology transfer 
provisions in trade agreements." The footnotes to the Annex define this indicator as 
―bilateral trade agreements and regional trade agreements that include conditions 
tightening intellectual property rights protection beyond the agreed level of the TRIPS 
agreement." This would imply that the technology transfer provisions are only to be 
found in bilateral and regional trade agreements as opposed to private technology 
transfer agreements between licensor or licensee, or for example between a parent and 
a subsidiary through some form of foreign direct investment. Further the sub criteria 
on information technology at 1(g)(vii) seems (to this author) to be to use an indicator 
that is too narrowly defined as access to telecommunications infrastructure. Again the 
footnotes to the annexe define this indicator by reference to mobile telephone usage 
statistics only. This can be misleading, in that the telephone line density (the number 
of fixed lines per 100 population) could be much lower in some developing countries 
where mobile phone penetration is higher.  
 
It is argued therefore that the RTD tax relief could either fall under criteria 1(f) on 
adequate access to financial resources, or 1(g)(iv), the sub criteria for technology 
transfer, access and national capacity. 
 
 
11.3 Operationalising the RTD Tax Relief: The UK example 
 
We have seen above how the RTD tax relief can be reconciled against each of the 
attributes, criteria, some criteria and indicators has developed by the high-level task 
force. This section looks at how the RTD tax relief can be implemented in national 
law. Given that the UK has a fairly developed tax collection system, and also is one of 
the leading aid donors in the world, it would be useful to look at implementation of 
the RTD relief in UK law, and that could form a precedent for the rest of the world, 
particularly the Quad nations, and also the leading industrialising countries of India, 
China and Brazil. These latter three played a significant role in the recent Doha round 
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of talks and therefore their implementation of the RTD tax relief would be significant 
in terms of bringing on board other developing countries. 
 
11.3.1 The company‘s wider duties and technology transfer tax credit 
 
The United Kingdom has recently amended its company law statute. Under the 
Company Law Act 2006, at section 172 of the Act, directors of companies now have 
statutory duties to have due regard to stakeholders and the wider community when 
considering their actions. This is an important provision in that, directors now need to 
consider perhaps the greater good of the company's impact in the community. Under 
section 172, directors have a duty to the company to act in good faith, to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. Directors must have 
regard to: the consequences of any decisions in the long-term, company employees, 
suppliers and customers, and the company's impact on the community and 
environment. They must have high standards of business conduct and they need to act 
fairly between members of the company. Section 170 of the Act makes clear that this 
is a general statutory duty and replaces the common law rules at section 170(4). The 
Act also requires the court to have regard to the existing interpretation and 
development of common law principles (for example the laws of agency). The 
argument is that if companies now have an obligation to regard the wider community, 
then in developing countries where UK companies operate, they may also be a need 
for directors to consider (under UK company law) the impact the company is having 
on the local community. Good corporate social responsibility would indicate that a 
duty to provide beneficial technology transfer to producer partners in the developing 
world where UK companies operate would be within the scope of directors‘ duties. 
 
The reason that this duty is mentioned is with regard to incentivising UK companies 
to provide beneficial technology transfer. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
technology transfer is a key to the implementation of the RTD. One way to incentivise 
multinationals is to provide beneficial technology transfer and to grant them tax relief 
for doing so. If there is a general duty under section 172 Companies Act 2006 for 
directors to have regard to the wider community, the need to do so would be further 
strengthened if there was a commercial incentive operating alongside corporate social 
responsibility obligations. 
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The commercial incentive would be a technology transfer investment tax credit. 
Presently under the UK Finance Act 2002, the Finance Act provides for a community 
investment tax relief. At section 57 of the Act the community investment tax relief is 
defined as a tax relief to those companies providing finance to community 
development finance institutions for lending to enterprises in disadvantaged 
communities that are excluded from mainstream sources of finance. There is no 
reason why a RTD tax relief could not be based on a similar form of financial 
instrument. Schedule 16 of the Finance Act defines a community investment tax relief 
and sets out the eligibility for that tax relief. Under the Finance Act, where a 
corporation makes an investment into a community development finance institution, 
the company is eligible to receive a tax credit of up to 5% per annum of the amount 
invested in the community development finance institution and which may be claimed 
in the tax year in which the investment is made and in each of the four subsequent 
years. The value of the tax credits is therefore directly in proportion to the amount of 
investment made. 
 
In a similar way, a company that has a qualifying technology transfer agreement can 
register the agreement with the Department for International development. So long as 
the agreement complies with a relevant set of Terms (the legal Terms to be contained 
within a technology transfer agreement as determined by the WGTT) as set out in 
Chapter 10.10, DFID in exercising the duties delegated by the Secretary of State, 
would-be able to grant the transferor a technology transfer investment tax credit. In 
order to bring this into effect, the Finance Act 2002 would need to be amended by 
statutory instrument to allow for a new form of corporate tax relief (the scale of the 
relief to be determined by the Measures discussed in Chapter 10.10 i.e. higher tax 
relief for a lower level of Measures and correspondingly lower relief for a higher level 
of Measures, the Measures being an indication of the receiving state‘s technological 
and manufacturing capability as described in Chapter 10.10). The regulatory change 
to bring this into effect could then be notified under the United Nations Universal 
Periodic Review Process as part of the U.K.'s commitment to operationalise the RTD. 
The subject of the periodic review is discussed in the next section.  
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11.4  The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
 
The universal periodic review is the UN process that involves reviewing the human 
rights records of all 192 UN member states once in every four years. The UPR allows 
each state the opportunity to declare the steps they have taken to improving human 
rights within their territory and the steps that they intend to take to improve the 
position. Also, the UPR process allows states to share human rights practices that are 
considered best practice developed globally. The UPR is a unique process, which was 
established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in March 2006 and following the 
resolution of the General Assembly (resolution 60/251). This resolution mandated the 
HRC to ―undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable 
information, the fulfillment by each state of its human rights obligations and 
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment 
with respect to all states."
185
 On the 18
th
 January 2007, the HRC agreed an institution-
building package, one of the elements of which is the UPR. 
 
The reviews are conducted by the UPR working group, which consist of 47 members 
of the HRC (although any UN member state can take part in dialogue with the state 
under review). Each state review is assisted by a troika (a group of three states drawn 
from lots prior to each working group session). The review is based upon documents 
submitted to the UPR working group. These documents consist of: (1) information 
provided by the state under review, which can take the form of a ―national report"; (2) 
information from independent human rights experts and groups, known as the ―special 
procedures", human rights treaty bodies, and other UN entities; (3) information from 
other stakeholders including non-governmental organizations and national human 
rights institutions. 
 
At the relevant review session of the working group, the state under review will 
present its national report as well as the answers to any written questions it has 
received in advance. Any questions that other member states wish to pose to the state-
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under review will have been submitted in advance to the troika. At the review session, 
states can then take to the floor and ask questions and make recommendations about 
the documentation provided by the state under review. This is therefore a very 
effective technique in ensuring that the state under review is challenged on any 
promises that it has made or where there are gaps in the state under review‘s response 
to questions.  
 
A report is then prepared by the troika (in consultation with the state under review). 
This report, known as the ―outcome report" and gives a summary of the review. The 
outcome report is adopted at a later meeting of the working group, and not sooner 
than 48 hours after the country review. Following the adoption of the outcome report, 
the state is then required to implement any recommendations contained in the final 
outcome reports. When the time comes for the second review of the state under the 
UPR, the state under review will need to provide information on what they have done 
(or not done) to implement recommendations made during the first review (four years 
earlier).
186
 
 
In this way, the UPR can provide an effective means to check for implementation of 
the tax relief on beneficial technology transfer as a component of the RTD.  
 
11.5 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has set out a means of operationalising the RTD. The chapter 
recommends operationalising one component of the RTD by means of an amendment 
to the UK Finance Act 2002, and creating a new tax relief for those companies in the 
UK who provide transfer of appropriate technology to producers in DCs/LDCs. As 
described above, in order to qualify for the tax credit, the UK company will need to 
submit its technology transfer agreement to DFID for verification. DFID could then 
confirm that the agreement is a qualifying agreement under the Finance Act (as 
amended) and issue the company with a tax credit certificate, which it can use to 
offset against corporation tax. It is suggested that as part of the amendment to the UK 
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Finance Act, that the amendment includes a provision that the Secretary of State is 
able to delegate his powers for the purposes of verifying compliance with the 
requirement for approval of a technology transfer tax credit to DFID. This example 
follows a similar mechanism already established for a community development tax 
credit under the Finance Act 2002. 
 
As to whether the UK company's technology transfer agreement is a qualifying 
agreement, will depend entirely on whether the agreement‘s clauses comply with any 
(yet to be established) Terms by the WTO's working group on the transfer of 
technology, and as suggested above. It is also important to remember that this tax 
credit (higher for a lower level of Measures and vice-versa) would only apply for the 
supply of services as opposed to goods because of restrictions imposed by the WTO's 
subsidies and countervailing agreement on the export of goods. 
 
The implementing legislation to establish the RTD tax relief (or technology transfer 
tax credit in the UK) could be seen as a provision that the UK government could then 
report as part of its UPR obligation for the next cycle of reviews planned for 2012, 
when the review for the UK arises again, or four years later in 2016.  
 
It is suggested that the UK regime for such a tax credit for beneficial technology 
transfer agreements could form an important precedent for other countries 
implementing similar schemes, such as the United States and Canada, both of which 
have advanced tax collection regimes and where similar schemes to that of the UK 
could be adopted. 
 
Other DCs/LDCs looking for enforcement of Article 66.2 TRIPS could then use the 
UPR process, specifically the UPR working panel review sessions, to table questions 
and recommendations on the implementation of the scheme. If the UPR process is 
used in this way, this aspect of the RTD (technology transfer, under attribute 1 of the 
RTD criteria) could be quickly achieved. This could be done whether or not the 
working group on the RTD has completed a reporting template for the RTD. 
 
To make all of the above a feasible reality, civil society needs to assert its influence. 
On-line campaign groups, such as Avaaz, have been remarkably successful in pushing 
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for changes in law that help the public good.
187
 In a similar way, civil society needs to 
encourage political leaders to act from the bottom-up in helping to develop the case 
for development. By using a mechanism such as the UPR and in requiring developed 
country governments to implement tax relief schemes that incentivise the business 
community in investing in technology transfer to states impacted by poverty, the 
DC/LDC‘s human capital base can be enhanced through transfer of know-how.  
 
In a report by the high-level task force on the implementation of the RTD, specifically 
the criteria and operational sub criteria for the implementation of the RTD the report 
states: ―the consultation concluded that the right to development, in spite of the 
political context in which it is subjected to contending priorities, enriches both 
substantive and procedural elements of international human rights law by addressing 
redistribution and equity questions at the national and international levels from the 
perspective of accountability and other principles, shared by the development and 
human rights agendas. The greatest challenge, in this regard, lies in defining whether 
and how human rights, in particular the right to development, can contribute to 
creating an enabling environment necessary for the constant improvement of the well-
being of the people."
188
 
 
The implementation of the RTD tax relief is one way of overcoming this challenge 
and to operationalising the RTD.  
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Chapter 2 to this thesis reviewed research on the digital divide and a series of 
definitions before arriving at a new definition for the international Digital Divide: 
 
A failure—between those users in countries who have access to 
communications infrastructure, services and tools to aid literacy and 
information literacy, and those who do not—to access the minimum available 
capacity of communication technologies and information within a structural 
context of successive innovation, competition and trade. 
 
From this definition, the thesis then identified four specific sectors in which to 
investigate the operation of IEL: 
 
 Competitive access to communications and information technology networks;  
 The transfer of technology; and  
 The trade in electronic intangibles. 
 The human capital base 
  
In reviewing these sectors, the author has also been mindful of the following 
questions introduced in Chapter 1: 
 
(iv) Can IEL be used to help address the Digital Divide between developed 
and developing nation states? 
(v) Can IEL be used to accelerate the process of development in 
developing and least developed countries through technological 
processes (viz., telecommunications and technology transfer)? and; 
(vi) Is it possible to define a relationship in IEL between civil and political, 
and economic social and cultural rights as a collective for example in 
the form of the much debated and somewhat controversial Right to 
Development (the ―RTD‖ as defined in this thesis) on the one hand, 
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with economic indicators, such Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the other? If so, how can the RTD 
be ‘operationalised’? 
 
The bulk of this thesis (chapters 3-7) has been concerned with the first sector on 
competitive access to communications and information technology networks 
(converging now to become NGNs). This thesis shows that NGNs are not currently 
regulated at the international (WTO) level and that the need for mandatory regulation 
in even the more advanced territories, such as the European Union has not been 
sanctioned. Certainly the current regulatory framework favours the IBPs and large 
telecommunication incumbents in the developing world and that for many smaller DC 
and LDC ISP operators the current framework is not delivering effective competition. 
Solutions to regulatory problems in this sector are given in Chapter 5-7 (see below). 
Chapter 2 discussed NGNs and how effective competition does not depend on just 
interconnection of the underlying physical networks, but also access to the higher 
service layers of the protocol stack. With new services based on differing protocols 
coming on-line every year, this issue of access is crucial for delivering effective 
competition at all layers. Chapter 3 reviewed the rules of the game as regards 
international telecommunications, Chapter 4 went deeper reviewing the issues 
surrounding peering and transit agreements, the means by which smaller ISPs in both 
the developed and developing worlds access the backbone networks of larger IBPs to 
access the wider internet. In this chapter, a number of potential anti-competitive 
practices were reviewed from the nature of the agreements themselves to the 
migration by IBPs of smaller ISPs from peering agreements to paying transit 
agreements.  Problems associated with a lack of infrastructure, particularly a lack of a 
sufficient number of IXPs in Africa, were mentioned and how lack of infrastructure 
maintains the monopolies of the large telecommunications incumbents in the 
developing world. The definition above of the international digital divide refers to the 
need to have access to communications infrastructure, and with such access, the 
content and information tools that flow over the infrastructure. We have also seen 
from references to UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2008 that continued 
investment in infrastructure, particularly for Africa remains a high priority for both 
the developed and developing world. In 2007 in Nepal for example, just having access 
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to cheaper international bandwidth meant an anticipated drop in the cost of internet 
access for end-users by 67%.
1029
 
 Chapter 5 set out the important elements of the European Commission‘s new 
regulatory framework for electronic networks and services that forms the basis to the 
Layering Theory discussed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 6, the author argues that the EC‘s 
new framework could form a model template for the regulation of NGNs in the 
developing world. But for this to happen, the European framework needs to be 
improved, particularly its current test of SMP as established by Article 14(2) 
Framework Directive, and based on the case of United Brands. The author argues in 
Chapter 6, that under the current new regulatory framework, the European 
Commission is left with the daunting task of having to review constantly its definition 
of relevant product and service markets that underpins its test of dominance. NGNs 
offer the potential of delivering a new raft of advanced internet services within a 
myriad of new relevant product and service markets that fall outside current 
definitions. The author argues that the Layering Theory is a regulatory tool that will 
allow NRAs greater power to accurately determine market power in the 
communications sector by establishing a new test for interpreting SMP. The Author 
contends that as more traffic is switched over TCP/IP networks it will become 
increasingly important for regulators (worldwide) to accurately determine where the 
access bottlenecks are so as to regulate for effective competition. The European 
framework could, the author argues, be an excellent template for the rest of the world. 
 Why the need for redefining market power and exporting the Layering Theory 
to other regulatory frameworks elsewhere? The overriding reason is off course to 
enhance effective competition by addressing the potential for abuse of market power, 
and thereby bring down the cost of access to the internet, addressing the Digital 
Divide. Chapter 4 makes clear that IBPs do not necessarily prevent access and 
interconnection. In fact, IBPs will want to interconnect through peering agreements 
with other large ISPs in order to expand their network coverage. However Chapter 4 
also makes clear that IBPs migrate smaller ISPs from peering agreements to paying 
transit agreements. Further although bundling and price discrimination can in fact be 
pro competitive, Chapter 4 reviews several different examples of potential 
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anticompetitive practices by IBPs on international backbone routes (particularly to 
DCs and LDCs where competition between IBPs on available routes is much less 
extensive given the lower returns on investment in infrastructure). An IBP could 
leverage its market power in specific ways by: 
 
- Extracting from smaller ISPs agreements not to compete in certain service or 
geographical markets; 
- Setting a price floor on the service offered by the smaller ISP; 
- Linking the smaller ISP's access to a desired service; e.g., long-haul backbone 
trunks; or 
- Forcing a commitment to buy or lease less desirable and/or less competitively 
provisioned services. 
 
The problem is two fold: first, internet interconnection is currently not regulated by 
WTO instruments, such as the Reference Paper, and second that both international 
and domestic laws do not require IBPs to lodge their peering and transit agreements 
to NRAs as part of a process of disclosure.  
 In 2007, the ITU in a symposium on international internet interconnection 
discussed the lack of transparency in internet interconnection with NGNs and the rise 
in ‗differentiated charging‘ (the process by which operators charge in accordance with 
the type of network protocol being used—see Chapter 6). We saw how this concept of 
differentiated charging, pushed by the large backbone operators has led to a 
counterargument for the need for ‗net neutrality‘—all network application needs 
being met equitably i.e. any particular internet host, protocol or application should not 
receive preferential treatment. In the United States, where differentiated charging is 
most common, there has been strong opposition to this model of charging by service 
and content providers such as Microsoft, Google and Skype, who do not own 
backbone infrastructure of their own network and who fear the higher costs for access 
that might result. The point was made in Chapter 4 that if large content providers, 
such as Google fear differentiated access, what are the implications for much smaller 
DC and LDC ISPs crucially dependant on access to the NGNs of IBP backbones on 
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far fewer and less competitive routes to IXPs in the developing world? In the report 
produced for the ITU symposium on internet interconnection in 2007, Lie states that: 
 
In the absence of countervailing influences, the international internet market 
risks a return to the questionable competitive environment of the late 1990s 
where market concentration in the hands of a Tier-1 ISPs led to high prices for 
international internet connectivity.
1030
 
 
As mentioned above, the problem is not just with interconnection of networks, but 
with access to the higher service layers of the NGNs. To offset the potential for 
‗unconsidered de facto determination of international NGN interconnection norms‘ by 
the larger backbones, Lie argues that stakeholders need to engage as a matter of 
priority in policy development on internet interconnection. 
 The Layering Theory is in response to Lie‘s plea for engagement. In Chapter 
6, the author argues that the Layering Theory, if implemented at the national, regional 
and multilateral levels by both developed and developing nations could prevent the 
potential for abuse of dominance arising from a market concentration of Tier 1 ISPs 
(IBPs) that Lie warns off.   
 If incorporated into a revised Reference Paper by WTO member states as an 
additional commitment at future trade rounds, the Layering Theory will also work in 
tandem with existing rules on cost-oriented interconnection to increase effective 
competition between providers of international digital networks and services at the 
multilateral level. As mentioned, the Theory is to give NRAs/NCCs a tool for 
accurately determining a relevant market in the communications sector and thereby 
determine dominance. Such a power is particularly important in markets where 
electronic applications are driven by software just as much as hardware (e.g. 
electronic program guides, application interfaces, the production/manufacture for 
which could be outsourced to a third country). By applying the theory at the 
multilateral level by amending WTO measures such as the regulatory Reference 
Paper (as suggested at Annexe 1 to this thesis), the Author is advocating for increased 
effective competition at the multilateral level for cross border electronic services 
under mode 1 or consumption abroad of electronic services under mode 2 GATS. The 
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Layering Theory will allow for increased market access and national treatment for any 
operator (whether from a developed or developing country) to deliver electronic 
intangibles into a target WTO member state (subject to WTO scheduled 
commitments). This would be particularly advantageous for ISPs in developing 
countries.  If the Reference Paper was to be amended in line with the Layering Theory 
by the WTO Secretariat (specifically the Council for Trade in Services) and 
recommended as an additional commitment at future trade rounds, then for each WTO 
member that schedules this commitment, better rules on interconnection and access 
that specifically apply to NGN networks can be achieved for each IXP exchange in 
that member‘s territory. This is not the case at present as the current Reference Paper 
excludes internet networks and services (discussed in Chapter 4). For smaller DC and 
LDC ISPS interconnecting and gaining access to a large IBP, whether the local 
telecommunication incumbent in its own territory or with other IBPs at IXP 
exchanges at home or overseas, the new amended template for a Reference Paper 
promises enhanced effective competition. Cheaper access to communications and 
information technology networks is in line with our definition of the Digital Divide 
set out in Chapter 2. The knock-on effect will be to bring down the costs for internet 
access in the developing world, addressing the Digital Divide. 
 However, in order to enhance effective competition at all layers of a NGN 
network at IXPs, the NRA/NCC in a DC or LDC must be able to enforce the Layering 
Theory. In light of anticompetitive practices, and to ensure that LDC/DC ISPs have 
the means to lodge complaints to NRAs, they will require access to the OSI Layer 5-7 
filtering and cost accounting technology, upon which the Layering Theory depends 
(discussed in Chapter 6). Operators and regulatory authorities in the developed world 
already have access to such technology.  
 The Author argues that in light of failure of the Doha Round, if developed 
countries are to truly honour their publicly stated commitments to Article 66.2 TRIPS 
on technology transfer discussed in Chapter 8, then the Quad countries could as part 
of a technical assistance program under UNCTAD, the World Bank, ITU or the WTO 
transfer the technical expertise required to the developing world to train regulators on 
implementation of the Layering Theory and to put in place the OSI Layer 5-7 filtering 
and cost accounting technology at IXPs in DCs and LDCs, or at least the international 
gateway exchanges, where local DC incumbents interconnect with the networks of the 
international backbone operators. For example, there are currently only 17 IXP 
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exchanges throughout the whole African continent.
1031
 In 2007, as part of its 
commitment to enforcing Article 66.2 TRIPS, the European Communities set out 
several objectives in their submission to the TRIPS Council. These objectives are 
discussed in Chapter 8, but several of these objectives, particularly objective 1 
(licensing of cost accounting software and OSI Layer 5-7 server hardware/software), 
2 (access to engineers and IP routing specialists), 5 (the training of local NRA staff 
and local ISP legal teams), and 6 (ancillary IT equipment) could form a good basis for 
a request for technical assistance to the European Communities to implement the 
Layering Theory.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 7, adoption of a revised reference paper (RP) in light 
of the Layering Theory works both ways; DC and LDC markets will be just as open to 
competition by aggressive and efficient foreign operators as developed country 
markets by DC and LDC operators who are able to undercut on costs for innovation 
and service delivery due to access to a cheaper workforce. As Chapter 7 outlines, DC 
and LDC commitments to a revised RP can still be made so long as adequate 
measures to protect domestic incumbent telcos have been implemented into national 
law prior to such a commitment being made. For example, DC and LDC governments 
can choose to introduce legislation that will protect any incumbent telco from new 
competition measures (bought in by adoption of the revised RP) that is responsible for 
services of a general economic interest (SGEI), for example universal 
service/universal access and public broadcasting functions. The European 
Commission was successful in protecting its Member States‘ national telco 
incumbents in just this way through the operation of the former Articles 86(2) and 
86(3) of the EC Treaty for example (now Articles 106(1) and 106(2) TFEU), which 
sets out the framework for SGEI in Europe. 
  In the next trade round, either as part of the Doha negotiations or more likely 
in subsequent rounds, if G-90 countries were to seek from the Quad countries GATS 
specific commitments in network-based transactions and complementary services 
(services ancillary to telecommunication services, such as financial, distribution, 
computer, audiovisual etc), DCs and LDCs who are able to attract sufficient FDI into 
their home markets and who can utilise beneficial technology transfer to innovate 
based on a well trained resource of human capital, will be able to make use of such 
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commitments to generate an export portfolio of advanced network electronic services 
and goods into markets in the developed world. Much will depend on the relative 
negotiating positions of the parties concerned. In a similar way, the Quad Countries 
might be very resistant to DCs and LDCs protecting their domestic incumbents by 
DC/LDC regulators ruling out competition in SGEI services. However if DCs and 
LDCs were to also make a ―critical mass‖ offer of opening up TCP/IP internet 
services to competition (subject to other scheduled commitments in complementary 
services), then such a restriction might be more palatable. 
 Again as discussed in Chapter 7, G-90 countries could also seek a phased 
implementation for any revised RP in light of the Layering Theory applying to 
packet-switched networks. There is also nothing to stop DCs and LDCs liberalising 
their own telecommunications regimes independently of the WTO and the RP, and at 
a pace that suits their own developmental needs. The crucial question will be the need 
to attract FDI. As UNCTAD‘s World Investment Report 2008 has shown, a number of 
DCs, such as Singapore, China, India, and Korea are not just magnets for inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI), but also are suppliers of foreign direct investment 
themselves, and usually through technology orientated companies, such as Singapore 
Telecom and the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Telecom. Chapter 7 discusses how 
DCs can use the New Modes of Operation (introduced in Chapter 3) in reverse, 
aggregating traffic for termination in developed countries.  
 The other argument that needs to be made in favour of developing countries is 
that as a number of these countries develop their ICT industries, invest in IP-based 
infrastructure, develop the necessary human resource skills in areas of protocol 
design, coding, hardware and software development, and begin to identify technology 
service products that are suitable for export over network-based technologies 
(―complementary services‖), such countries will then need to enforce the provisions 
of Article IV GATS, which deals with increasing the participation of developing 
countries in international trade in services
1032
. In future trade rounds, it is in such 
areas where the thrust of negotiating resources should apply, at least in the technology 
sectors. These issues have been discussed in Chapter 7.  
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 Chapter 8 discusses the Doha Ministerial Declaration introduced for the first 
time in the WTO, a binding mandate for WTO Members to examine the relationship 
between trade and technology transfer. For this sector, as with the first sector on 
competitive access to communications and information technology networks, current 
IEL favours the developed nations.  For technology transfer at the international level, 
the main regulatory framework is the WTO‘s TRIPS Agreement. Chapter 8 makes 
clear that there are a number of provisions within TRIPS that can be enforced to 
ensure that the international process of technology transfer is better achieved, for 
example Articles 7, 31, 40, 65 and 66 of TRIPS, but that to date very little progress on 
implementation and enforcement has been made.  In the context of the divide, DCs 
and LDCs have been clamouring for better enforcement of Article 66.2 in particular 
on transfer of technology. At the international level, if there is to be any improvement 
in this sector, it will have to do with the enforcement of Article 66.2. However the 
problem with the technology transfer sector is not just at the international level.  As 
Roffe and Tesfachew argue, there has perhaps been too much concentration of 
analysis on the imperfections of the international technology transfer process and not 
enough on the domestic absorptive and adaptation capacity of the host country
1033.
 If 
DCs and LDCs are to truly benefit from technology transfer, more attention has to be 
paid to improving host country legislation on technology transfer in terms of making 
it effective in attracting foreign investment, creating spillover, and also in dealing 
with potential abuses of market power by MNCs. What is required is a mix of both 
sector-specific (ex-ante) measures that sets out basic rules on technology transfer in 
advance, for example in the setting of price controls and compulsory licensing by 
government, as well as general competition type (ex-post) provisions which deal with 
issues of discrimination, transparency, and unfair competition.   
 As we saw in Chapter 8, there are dangers of the enforcement by LDCs and DCs 
of measures of this type. Enforcement of host country competition provisions on 
MNCs for example could result in threats of trade and/or financial retaliation by 
developed country governments. To avoid the risk of this kind of retaliation, LDCs 
and DCs could make better use of regional trade or economic area agreements, where 
a common set of rules (both ex-ante and ex-post) for technology transfer could be 
adopted and integrated into the framework of a regional agreement. For example, to 
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help maintain a level of consistency of regulatory treatment amongst European NRAs, 
the EC has included clauses at Articles 6 and 7 Framework Directive
1034
, which 
require NRAs to consult with the EC in introducing measures which would have a 
significant effect on the European internal market. In a similar way, by harmonising 
competition provisions within the framework of a regional trade agreement, 
LDCs/DCs could have a better chance of enforcing such provisions against MNCs at 
a national level. As discussed in Chapter 8 (section 8.7), DCs and LDCs could also 
benefit from increased access to information on technology transfer made available in 
the public domain. By implementing these measure and enhancing technology 
transfer at an international and domestic level both developed and developing 
countries will be enhancing the appropriation of information and information literacy 
tools necessary for the training of the human capital base in DCs and LDCs, 
enhancing absorption and spillover of technology and thereby the process of 
innovation, all of which according to the definition set out in Chapter 2, will help 
address the Digital Divide.  
 In Chapter 9, we saw that the ability of DCs and LDCs to export electronic 
intangibles into developed country markets will also depend on potential WTO rules 
on classification. In this last sector of three identified as relevant to the Digital Divide 
and investigated in this thesis, current regulation for electronic intangibles at the 
international level is absent. The WTO has failed to classify electronic intangibles 
either as goods under the GATT, services under the GATS, or as some form of hybrid 
intellectual property right under TRIPS. Furthermore the status of the current 
moratorium of not imposing customs duties on imports of electronic intangibles is 
uncertain following the collapse of the Doha Round this year. As such, current 
regulation favours the interests of net exporters of electronic intangibles, such as the 
Quad countries, and particularly the United States. The greatest impact of the lack of 
current regulation on DCs and LDCs is the loss of potential revenues that such 
countries could be earning from import tariffs, and additional import duties and taxes, 
such as customs surcharges that are only levied on imports, and internal taxes—sales 
taxes or consumption taxes—that are levied on both imported and domestic goods. 
Nevertheless, cross-border trade in electronic services under GATS mode 1 has been 
substantially strengthened as a result of the WTO‘s Appellate Body report in US-
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Gambling. In a more recent case, China-Measures affecting trading rights and 
distribution services of certain publications and audiovisual entertainment products 
(‗China-Audiovisual‘, Appellate Body report, 21st December 2009)1035, the Appellate 
Body (AB) looked at the classification of ‗sound recording distribution services‘ in 
China‘s schedule of specific commitments. China argued that ‗electronic‘ sound 
recording distribution services were not covered by China‘s schedule of 
commitments. However both the Panel and AB found that sound recording 
distribution services" in sector 2.D of China's GATS Schedule extended to the 
distribution of sound recordings in non-physical form through electronic means and 
upheld the Panel's conclusion (in paragraph 8.2.3(b)(i)) of the Panel Report that the 
provisions of China's measures prohibiting foreign-invested entities from engaging in 
the distribution of sound recordings in electronic form were inconsistent with Article 
XVII of the GATS. This is an important finding and further strengthens the precedent 
established in the earlier WTO case of US-Gambling that on-line products are 
equivalent to their physical counterparts, and that the WTO is able to extend the 
commitments made by a member to include intangible products delivered over the 
Internet. 
 However, as mentioned, the thorny issue of how electronic intangibles might 
come to be classified by the WTO (GATT, GATS, TRIPS) is yet to be determined. 
The consequence of a classification decision either through the DSB or by agreement 
within the WTO membership will have significant implications for DCs and LDCs. 
Tariff peaks already create strong disincentives for LDCs/DCs in moving towards 
processing raw materials and agricultural commodities and higher value added 
manufacturing products. They reduce the gains from trade, hinder efforts to 
technologically upgrade, and restrict a country‘s financial capacity to import 
technology
1036
. If applied to electronic intangibles, say as an indirect consequence of 
the WTO membership at some future stage agreeing to classify electronic intangibles 
as goods rather than services
1037
, then the gains already made by certain DCs in the IT 
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sector could in time be severely curtailed. Despite this concern, the Author makes 
clear in Chapter 9 that all electronic intangibles should be classed as goods to give 
greater certainty to the trade in electronic intangibles. The author recommends 
adopting the test for goods as set out by the US Streamlined Sales Tax Project. 
Furthermore, that the moratorium (the current status of which is uncertain following 
the collapse of the Doha Round) of not charging import tariffs on electronic 
intangibles be dropped
1038
. The author argues that a goods based classification and the 
scrapping of the moratorium will allow DCs/LDCs to generate additional revenues on 
imports (using revenues to invest in capacity building programs domestically), as 
currently most DCs and LDCs are net importers of such products but that also through 
progressive liberalisation and the lock-step nature of the GATT agreement, these 
tariffs can be expected to come down through future trade rounds. This in turn will 
lead to more information and information-literacy tools becoming available to end-
users in DCs and LDCs, one of the elements identified in Chapter 2 as helping to 
address the Digital Divide.  
 Finally, in Chapter 10, the author argued that to enhance the human capital base, 
DC and LDC states need to strengthen both civil and political, and economic, social 
and cultural rights, and collectively all rights as represented by the UN Right To 
Development. The author suggested a Right to Development Tax Relief (―RTD Tax 
Relief‖). The idea for a tax relief for companies that license technology to developing 
countries has already been suggested by the Commission on Intellectual Property 
(CIPR) in its report on intellectual property and development
1039
. As mentioned in 
10.10, the Author develops this idea further in formulating the RTD Tax Relief which 
he suggests could operate in investor states and be administered jointly through the 
investor state‘s international development department and/or tax revenue department, 
and that will apply to any nationally registered MNC under relevant Company Act 
legislation in the investor state. The Author argues that to qualify for the RTD Tax 
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Relief, the MNC will need to satisfy a minimum set of Technology Transfer Terms 
(the ―Terms‖), which the Author suggests could be established by the WTO‘s 
Working Group on Technology Transfer (WGTT), such Terms to be annexed to the 
investor state‘s implementing legislation for the RTD Tax Relief. Under this proposed 
scheme, MNCs will notify their technology transfer agreements to the relevant 
investor state‘s development department and/or tax revenue department. The Author 
also suggests a sliding scale of tax relief: greater relief provided for MNCs licensing 
into LDCs with less relief available for licensing into DCs. The appropriate scale for 
tax relief, the Author suggests, could be set by the WGTT following a separate set of 
Measures. As discussed in Chapter 10.10, a lower set of Measures would lead to a 
higher tax relief, and vice-versa. 
In Chapter 11, the author then looks at how the RTD could be operationalised at a 
country specific level (using the UK as a case study) by introducing a tax credit 
system for MNCs through amendment of the UK Finance Act 2002, and use of the 
UN Universal Periodic Review mechanism to report implementation of the RTD Tax 
Relief. The author argues that implementation of such a scheme in the UK can 
provide a useful template to the Quad countries, the United States, Canada, Japan and 
the European Communities with advanced tax regimes in implementing similar 
schemes to help operationalise the RTD.  
 
12.1 Concluding Thoughts 
 
There is little doubt that competition for the world‘s resources is constantly increasing 
with the growth in the world‘s population. Furthermore the implications for the world 
of global warming and dimming are also becoming well understood with available 
land mass and access to clean water for the poorest people potentially shrinking and 
the consequent implications for mass migration and rapidly rising populations. 
Effective development policy as applied to DC/LDCs will need to become a priority 
for the developed world, but simple aid is not going to work, business processes are 
required. As argued in this thesis, the use of technology and IEL is just one solution to 
address the Digital Divide. The Author asserts that the recommendations outlined 
above are extremely relevant for DCs and LDCs, given that the policy options for 
them to control their microeconomic policies are becoming increasingly limited, 
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partly as a result of signing FTAs and bilateral agreements with developed countries, 
but also as a consequence of the WTO covered agreements.  
 Clearly DCs and LDCs may argue that progress has not been made. For 
example, in the past, many developed countries have used during their various phases 
of development, various aspects of IEL: a combination of tariffs, quotas and sector-
specific subsidies to develop their domestic industries. Some developing countries 
that are now newly industrialised nations ―protected the home markets to raise profits, 
implemented generous subsidies, encouraged their firms to reverse engineer foreign 
patented products, and improved performance requirements such as export-import 
balance requirements and domestic content requirements on foreign investors (when 
foreign companies were allowed in).‖ 1040All of these strategies are now severely 
restricted under current WTO agreements. 
 And yet there are still available options. The Layering Theory set out in 
Chapter 6 and applied to DCs and LDCs in Chapter 7 also seeks to use principles of 
IEL, specifically trade and competition law to help achieve greater transparency and 
access in world (and national) communications markets. The Author also argues that 
by implementing effective IPR and competition regimes and making effective use of 
FDI and technology transfer, we can begin to address the Digital Divide. However, 
the Author notes caution in that DCs and LDCs will need to measure the costs of 
implementing more rigorous IPR regimes as it is by no means certain that increased 
IPR protection yields greater benefits in terms of FDI. For example as argued in 
Chapter 8, developing countries who have acceded to the WTO, and who have 
therefore accepted TRIPS in full, will have to adopt a certain level of minimum 
standards in patent (and other IPR rights) protection and enforcement as set out in 
Section 5 TRIPS (patents).  
 Also discussed in Chapter 8, the value of increasing IPR protection in the 
target (developing country) state to attract FDI will need to be carefully assessed. 
State commitments under bilateral trade/investment agreements and FTAs will need 
to be considered. DCs and LDCs often grant increased IPR protection by way of such 
agreements to gain increased market access opportunities through preferential tariffs 
in specific markets, such as agricultural and manufactured goods for example in the 
United States or in the EU. However, such preferential tariffs are time-bound in that 
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they will be eroded once the US reduces remaining tariffs and quotas on a non-
discriminatory basis in future trade rounds
1041
. In contrast, DC/LDC IPR 
commitments made in FTAs or bilateral agreements will remain in place, unless 
renegotiated by the parties concerned, which to some extent will depend on the 
bargaining positions of the parties concerned, which given the current position of 
LDCs/DCs as evidenced by the recently failed Doha round negotiations, does not 
prove to be very promising.   
  The Digital Divide remains a huge issue in developing countries, particularly 
the LDCs. This thesis suggests that the Digital Divide can be addressed by using 
existing laws within IEL in imaginative ways, such as reforms in telecommunications, 
technology transfer and trade, but that these reforms are specific and that to 
implement them the political will must exist on both sides: from the developed 
nations as part of reform through the WTO and domestically at home; amending the 
Reference Paper; accepting a goods based classification on electronic intangibles and 
dropping the moratorium on customs duties for imports; enforcing Article 66.2 TRIPS 
on technology transfer; reforming domestic law on market power in the 
communications sector and providing for increased market access on electronic 
intangible exports from DC/LDC countries through more effective GSP regimes. For 
the developing nations: as part of reform through the WTO and domestically at home; 
scheduling more commitments to all services impacting on network-based 
transactions; accepting an amended reference paper as an additional commitment in 
the GATS; liberalising telecommunications and internet services domestically 
(subject to SGEI commitments); improving domestic frameworks on technology 
transfer (and IPRs), and strengthening both civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights in the form of the RTD. To effectively address the 
Digital Divide as defined in this thesis, the political will to implement these reforms 
must exist. Does it? 
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US Free Trade Agreements‖, Trade Note 20, World Bank, February 2005. 
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ANNEXE 1 
A NEW REFERENCE PAPER FOR BITS AND BYTES 
 
Definitions 
Users mean “electronic communications network and service consumers and electronic 
communications network and service suppliers.” 
Major Supplier means “a supplier who either individually or jointly with others, enjoys a 
position equivalent to dominance for the relevant Component Part in a particular Layer (as 
set out in Schedule 1) in the supplier’s relevant geographic market, that is to say a position 
of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.” 
Electronic Communications Networks means “transmission systems, and where applicable, 
switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals 
over any of the Layers as defined in Schedule I irrespective of the type of information 
conveyed.” 
Electronic Communications Service means “a service normally provided for remuneration 
which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, and who’s Component Part(s) fall into any of the Layers as defined in Schedule I, 
but excluding services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted 
using electronic communications networks and services. An Electronic Communications 
Service may consist of one or several Component Parts.” 
Component Part means “a physical or logical part of an Electronic Communications Service 
and which falls into one of the Layers as defined in Schedule I.” 
Access means “the making available of facilities and/or services, to another undertaking, 
under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis for the purpose of 
providing electronic communications services.” 
Interconnection means “the physical and logical linking of public electronic 
communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the 
users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or another undertaking, or 
to access electronic communications services provided by another undertaking. Electronic 
communications services may be provided by the parties involved or other parties who have 
access to the network. Interconnection is a specific type of access implemented between 
public network operators.” 
 
1. Competitive safeguards 
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications   
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices.   
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1.2 Safeguards   
The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular:   
(a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;   
(b) using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results;  and   
(c) not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information 
on electronic communications networks and services and commercially relevant information 
which are necessary for them to provide electronic communications services. 
   
2. Interconnection  
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public electronic communications 
networks and services in order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users 
of another supplier and to access services provided by another supplier, where specific 
commitments are undertaken.   
2.2 Interconnection and access to be ensured   
2.2.1 Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible 
point in the network.  Such interconnection is provided.   
(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical 
standards and specifications) and rates and of a quality no less 
favourable than that provided for its own like services or for like 
services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or 
other affiliates;   
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards 
and specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, 
reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently 
unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for network components or 
facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided;  and  
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points 
offered to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the 
cost of construction of necessary additional facilities.   
2.2.2 Access with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible point in the 
network. A major supplier must meet all reasonable requests for access. 
2.3 Public availability of the procedures for interconnection and/or access negotiations   
The procedures applicable for interconnection and/or access to a major supplier will be 
made publicly available.   
2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements   
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its interconnection 
agreements or a reference interconnection offer.   
2.5 Interconnection and access:  dispute settlement   
A service supplier requesting interconnection and/or access with a major supplier will have 
recourse, either:   
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(a) at any time or   
 
(b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known   
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in 
paragraph 5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates 
for interconnection and/or access within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that 
these have not been established previously.   
   
3. Universal service  
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to 
maintain.  Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they 
are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner 
and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by 
the Member.   
   
4. Public availability of licensing criteria   
Where a licence is required, the following will be made publicly available:   
(a) all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required to reach a decision 
concerning an application for a licence  and   
(b) the terms and conditions of  individual licences.   
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon request.   
   
5. Independent regulators 
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of electronic 
communications networks and services. The decisions of and the procedures used by 
regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market participants.   
6. Allocation and use of scarce resources  
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, 
numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency bands will be made 
publicly available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific 
government uses is not required. 
Schedule 1 
LAYER 4 CONTENT 
LAYER 3 APPLICATIONS 
LAYER 2 TRANSPORT 
LAYER 1 ACCESS 
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